Héctor Luis ROMÁN-OLIVERAS; Sonia María Yama-Ruiz; Felicita Oliveras-López, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY (PREPA); James Vélez; Julio Renta, Defendants, Appellees.
No. 13-1991.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Aug. 5, 2015.
797 F.3d 83
Moreover, the court‘s comment that there was “nothing before me that would tell me that I should do anything different” was most likely a reference to, and rejection of, the
Finally, Christopher argues that the district court erred in failing to calculate the applicable GSR for Count Nine, instead choosing to “group[]” the two counts together since there was “no point” in calculating the sentence for each count separately. We agree this was error. “[T]he proper procedure” during sentencing “is to render a separate sentence on each count.” Zavala-Marti, 715 F.3d at 51 n. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is especially true here where Count Nine did not authorize a life sentence; rather, it carries a twenty-year maximum penalty.34 See Almonte-Nunez, 771 F.3d at 92 (“[C]ollateral consequences may arise as a result of an above-the-maximum sentence imposed on a particular count. . . . It strikes us as both unwise and unfair to place the risk of such harm on the defendant where, as here, the excessive sentence is easy to correct.“).
Accordingly, we vacate Christopher‘s sentence and remand so that the district court may impose an individual sentence on each of the two counts of conviction.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions of all three Defendants. We also affirm Cummings‘s sentence, but we vacate and remand Christopher‘s sentence so that the district court can impose an individual sentence on each count.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
Nicolás Nogueras-Cartagena and Nogueras Law & Associates on brief for appellants.
Margarita Mercado-Echegaray, Solicitor General, and Rosa Elena Pérez Acosta, Assistant Solicitor General, on brief for appellees.
Before THOMPSON, LIPEZ, and BARRON, Circuit Judges.
BARRON, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from a suit that Héctor Luis Román-Oliveras, along with his
I.
Román worked for PREPA for over twenty years. In March of 2006, however, he was suspended from his job, and in February of 2007, he was then dismissed. Román along with his wife and mother responded by filing this suit against PREPA, his supervisor, and the plant superintendent under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
The District Court initially dismissed the complaint in its entirety. But on appeal, this Court partially reversed and reinstated the plaintiffs’ ADA claim against PREPA and their claims under Puerto Rico law against all defendants. See Román-Oliveras v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir.2011). On remand, the parties then held settlement negotiations. Those negotiations took place in Judge Aida M. Delgado-Colón‘s chambers in July of 2012. Judge Delgado-Colón later memorialized an account of the discussions in a minute entry in December of 2012. In that entry, Judge Delgado-Colón recounted that the parties had reached a binding oral settlement agreement during the negotiations, and that all that remained was the submission of a final written settlement agreement. The parties, however, did not ultimately submit a final written agreement.2
Judge Gelpí rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments and dismissed the case with prejudice. He then ordered that PREPA deposit the settlement amount with the District Court. This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, the plaintiffs repeat the same arguments that they made below. The plaintiffs argue first that even if there was a binding settlement agreement, the District Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce it. The plaintiffs rely on Kokkonen.
There, the district court dismissed a lawsuit after the parties had executed a settlement agreement. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673. The district court did not mention the underlying settlement agreement in the dismissal order. Id. Nor did the district court state that it was retaining jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Id. Nevertheless, when one party later sought to have the court enforce the settlement agreement, the district court concluded that it had the inherent authority to provide a remedy to safeguard its earlier order of dismissal. Id.
The Supreme Court rejected that ruling. The Court held that a post-dismissal suit to enforce a settlement agreement is simply a separate breach-of-contract claim. Id. at 379, 114 S.Ct. 1673. The Court thus held that federal courts need an independent basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce that contract claim. Id. at 381, 114 S.Ct. 1673.
The plaintiffs argue from Kokkonen that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction here. But they are wrong to do so. The District Court indisputably had subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ suit and that suit had not yet been dismissed when the defendants sought to enforce the settlement agreement that they claimed had been reached. Thus, if the District Court correctly concluded that the parties had reached a final, oral settlement agreement, the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce it when it purported to do so.
The court then ordered the parties to finalize their settlement agreement by April 12, 2013. The plaintiffs, however, declined to sign the instrument circulated by the defendants. The District Court nevertheless found this unsigned instrument “captured the terms and conditions” of the oral settlement agreement.
That brings us to the second of the plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal—that the District Court erred in finding that there was a settlement agreement to enforce. Federal law governs our answer to that question because the underlying cause of action arises under federal law.3 See Malave, 170 F.3d at 220. And our review of the facts that the District Court found about whether the parties did in fact enter into such an agreement is only for clear error. See Kinan v. Cohen, 268 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir.2001).
The record is clear that Judge Delgado-Colón found that the parties had entered into a final and binding oral settlement agreement as of July 2012. She clearly recorded that finding in a minute entry before she recused herself from the case. And because that finding was based on Judge Delgado-Colón‘s “personal knowledge through . . . a settlement conference,” Malave, 170 F.3d at 221, we lend her finding particular weight. See F.A.C., Inc. v. Cooperativa de Seguros de Vida de Puerto Rico, 449 F.3d 185, 192 (1st Cir. 2006). Moreover, at the time Judge Delgado-Colón entered the finding, the parties did not object. Nor did the parties object when Judge Delgado-Colón dismissed a pending summary judgment motion as “[m]oot in light of Settlement.” Thus, the parties’ conduct—after Judge Delgado-Colón found that a binding, oral settlement had been reached—also reasonably suggested that “the existence of the settlement had . . . been conceded previously by both parties.” Malave, 170 F.3d at 221.
Judge Delgado-Colón did recuse herself after determining that a binding, oral settlement had been reached. But we find no basis for concluding that Judge Gelpí, after assuming the case from Judge Delgado-Colón, erred in relying on the well-documented conclusion that Judge Delgado-Colón had already reached. Judge Gelpí, after all, issued a show cause order as to why the purported settlement agreement could not be enforced. But the plaintiffs proffered no evidence in response that might cast doubt on the existing factual record before Judge Gelpí. Nor did the plaintiffs ask Judge Gelpí for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there actually had been an oral settlement agreement. Instead, the plaintiffs left the determination of whether there was a settlement agreement to Judge Gelpí to make on the basis of the record as it then existed. Though the plaintiffs did contend that there was no settlement agreement for Judge Gelpí to enforce, that bare assertion
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
BARRON
CIRCUIT JUDGE