140 Iowa 182 | Iowa | 1908
— Plaintff, who is a physician and surgeon, with thirteen others of like profession, were indicted by the grand jury of Bremer County for the crime of entering into an agreement, combination, or understanding to fix and maintain fees and charges to be exacted for medical and surgical services in said county. Plaintiff was arrested under the indictment, and thereafter brought habeas corpus proceedings before the Honorable C. H. Kelley, Judge, to secure his release from custody, claiming
The said L. C. Kern, Dr. C. T. Brown, Dr. O. L. Chaffee, Dr.' W. A. Rohlf, Dr. II. O. Jungblut, Dr. B. O. Dunkelberg,- Dr. C. II. Graening, Dr. Stafford, Dr. A. G. Rennison, Dr. Patterson, Dr. J, P. Auner, Dr. Murphy, Dr. Bradford, Dr. Cross, on the 30th day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and seven in the county aforesaid, being physicians and surgeons located and practicing their professions in the county of Bremer, State of Iowa, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and maliciously conspire, combine, confederate, and agree with each other to create, organize, and enter into, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and maliciously enter into and become, a member of and a party to a trust, pool, agreement, contract, combination, confederation, and understanding to fix, establish, and regulate and maintain the price of a commodity in the county of Bremer, State of Iowa, and did then and there willfully and unlawfully fix, regulate, and establish' the price of medical service and. medical skill, and the profit, benefit, fee, and compensation to be received therefor, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of -the State of. Iowa.
The demurrer challenges these contentions of plaintiff, and it is stoutly insisted upon this appeal that the indictment does charge an offense, and that the statute under which it was found is a valid exercise of legislative power. As the case must turn upon the construction of a statute,
Pools and Trusts. Any corporation organized under the laws of .this or any other State or county for transacting or conducting any kind of business in this State, or any partnership, association or individual, creating, entering into or becoming a member of, or party to any pool, trust, agreement, contract, combination, confederation or understanding with any other corporation, partnership, association, or individual, fto regulate o^ fix the price of any article of merchandise or commodity,! or to fix or limit the amount or quantity of any article, commodity or merchandise to • be manufactured, mined, produced or sold in this State, shall’ be guilty of a conspiracy.
The first point to be decided is: Do the -acts charged constitute a crime under this section of the Code % It will be noticed that it forbids a combination, agreement, or understanding to regulate or fix the price of any article of merchandise, or commodity, or of merchandise to be manufactured, mined, produced, or sold in this State. The primary inquiry is: Are the charges of a physician or surgeon for his medical skill or ability an article of merchandise or commodity to be produced or sold in this State. Por appellant it is contended that the word “commodity” is broad enough to cover the charge made for professional services or skill, and that the trial court was in error in holding to the contrary.
As already indicated, the word must be taken in connection with the others used in the statute, and it is manifest that the commodity referred to must have been 'such as could be manufactured, mined, produced, or sold in the State, and the price was to be of an article of merchandise or commodity. If the contention of appellant be correct, the statute covers all kinds of personal labor, both skilled and unskilled, under the term “commodity.” Indeed, this is the broad claim made by counsel. Now, whilst there is a class of political economists who treat labor as so much merchandise, the wage being regulated simply by supply
Used in connection with the term “merchandise,” and qualified as it is in the latter part of the section by the words “manufactured, mined, produced, or sold,” it is
Appellants rely largely upon the celebrated cases of Loewe v. Lawler et al., 208 U. S. 274 (52 L. Ed. 488, 28 Sup. Ct. 301) and In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (15 Sup. Ct. 900, 39 L. Ed. 1092), and other like cases in support' of their construction of the statute; but in our opinion none of these cases are applicable. The Debs case is not in point. Others involved a pool between manufacturers and still other boycotts. In the Loeiue case defendants were engaged in a boycott of plaintiff and its customers, and were in the performance of acts calculated to destroy plaintiff’s business by driving away customers, by threats and coercion were driving away plaintiff’s employees, and circulating false reports regarding plaintiff and its business, the effect of which was to destroy its interstate trade. These acts were held to be an unlawful interference with interstate commerce, and a violation of the anti-trust law known as the “Sherman Act” (Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3200]). The statute before us has nothing to do with commerce; nor does it have to do with restraint of trade or commerce as does the
The trial court was right in discharging the plaintiff, and its judgment must be, and it is, affirmed.