Rogers v. Credit Acceptance Corp.Rogers v. Credit Acceptance Corp.
Dated: March 25, 2013
BELFANCE, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Credit Acceptance Corporation appeals the trial court‘s denial of its motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration and to compel arbitration. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
I.
{¶2} On December 10, 2007, Tonja Rogers filed a complaint against Credit Acceptance, alleging violations of the
{¶3} The case had no activity for two years before the trial court granted Ms. Rogers’ motion. On September 7, 2011, it issued a journal entry ordering Credit Acceptance to “promptly provide to [Ms. Rogers‘] counsel an understandable and comprehensive translation of [the log.]” Fifty days after the trial court issued its order, Credit Acceptance had not provided the translation. Accordingly, Ms. Rogers moved for the trial court to sanction Credit Acceptance for failing to promptly provide the translation. In her motion, Ms. Rogers asked the trial court to deny Credit Acceptance‘s Motion to Arbitrate as a sanction. After Ms. Rogers moved for sanctions, Credit Acceptance submitted a translation of the log. The trial court ruled on Ms. Rogers’ motion and found that Credit Acceptance had failed to comply with its order to promptly provide the translation. It determined that a proportionate sanction would be to grant Ms. Rogers’ motion and deny the Motion to Arbitrate.
{¶4} Credit Acceptance has appealed, raising a single assignment of error for review.
II.
JURISDICTION
{¶5} We initially address Ms. Rogers’ challenge to this Court‘s jurisdiction. She argues, that, while the trial court denied Credit Acceptance‘s Motion to Arbitrate, which would typically render the order final and appealable pursuant to
{¶6}
(B) If any action is brought upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, the court in which the action is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in the action is referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until the arbitration of the issue has been had in accordance with the agreement, provided the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with arbitration.
(C) * * * an order under division (B) of this section that grants or denies a stay of a trial of any action pending arbitration, including, but not limited to, an order that is based upon a determination of the court that a party has waived arbitration under the arbitration agreement, is a final order and may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed on appeal pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure and, to the extent not in conflict with those rules, Chapter 2505. of the Revised Code.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING DEFENDANTS’ ARBITRATION MOTION AS A SANCTION FOR CREDIT ACCEPTANCE‘S ALLEGED DELAY IN PRODUCING THE TRANSLATED ACCOUNT LOG “PROMPTLY” AS REQUIRED BY PRIOR DISCOVERY ORDER.
{¶7} Credit Acceptance argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to compel arbitration as a discovery sanction because it had complied with the court‘s order. It also argues that, even if its behavior violated the court‘s order, the sanction was disproportionate to the violation.
{¶8} This Court reviews a trial court‘s decision to impose sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Fuline v. Green, 9th Dist. Nos. 25704 & 25936, 2012-Ohio-2749, ¶ 6. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court‘s decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). We will not “disturb the judgment of the trial court unless the degree of the sanction is disproportionate to the seriousness of the infraction under the facts of the case.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Morgan Adhesives Co. Inc. v. Datchuk, 9th Dist. No. 19920, 2001 WL 7383, *3 (Jan. 3, 2001). Factors to consider when determining whether a sanction is proportionate to the seriousness of the infraction include the following:
{¶9} We initially note that it is not clear that the trial court can refuse to enforce an arbitration clause as a sanction for a discovery violation although there is statutory language that arguably allows for such action. See
{¶10} Before a court may sanction a party for a discovery violation, the court must have issued an order to compel discovery, and, thus, we begin by looking at the trial court‘s order. See Powell v. Wisener, 9th Dist. No. 22023, 2004-Ohio-4459, ¶ 7 (“[A]s no motion to compel discovery was filed in the trial court and no order compelling discovery was ever entered, the
{¶11} We acknowledge that a trial court has broad discretion in managing discovery issues and determining appropriate sanctions. Nevertheless, a court must look at many factors when determining whether a certain sanction is appropriate. See Datchuk, 2001 WL 7383, at *3. In light of the unique trajectory of this case, we cannot say that the trial court‘s imposition of sanctions absent a hearing or some further inquiry into all of the facts and circumstances was reasonable. First, the matter had been pending in the court for several years, when the trial court issued its order on September 7, 2011. Up to that point, Ms. Rogers had merely sought an order extending the deadline for submission of a brief in opposition. Credit Acceptance opposed Ms. Rogers’ motion, arguing that the log was irrelevant. Upon issuing the September 7, 2011 order,
{¶12} In addition, prior to the trial court‘s issuance of its September 7, 2011 order, a motion to compel had not been filed. Instead, as noted above, Ms. Rogers merely requested the court reset the briefing schedule and the hearing on Credit Acceptance‘s motion to compel arbitration. By its very nature, a motion to compel acts as notice to the nonmoving party that sanctions could result, and a trial court‘s order granting a motion to compel would contain some indication that consequences will follow if the discovery is not provided. However, in this case, Credit Acceptance did not have that preliminary warning. Instead, the September 7, 2011 order forming the basis of the sanction was the trial court‘s ruling upon a motion to extend time for briefing. This order was more akin to a pretrial order than an order to compel. Noticeably absent was any warning of the potential consequences of failing to “promptly” provide the translation log. Thus, when Ms. Rogers complained after 50 days that the log had not been provided, given the circumstances and the inherent ambiguity in the order, the trial court should have conducted further inquiry prior to imposing sanctions. In so doing, the trial court could have been fully apprised of all of the facts and circumstances leading up to Credit Acceptance‘s eventual provision of the log. We emphasize that we express no opinion as to the propriety or extent of sanctions that may be imposed upon further inquiry by the trial court; rather, we hold
{¶13} Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Credit Acceptance‘s assignment of error is sustained.
III.
{¶14} Credit Acceptance‘s assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
EVE V. BELFANCE
FOR THE COURT
CARR, J. DISSENTING.
{¶15} I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority that the matter must be remanded to the trial court for further inquiry into the issue of sanctions. I would merely reverse the trial court‘s judgment which effectively denied Credit Acceptance Corporation‘s motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. Moreover, I do not agree with the majority opinion that the statutory language may arguably authorize such a sanction.
APPEARANCES:
JAMES OH, RUSSELL KORNBLUT, and GREGGORY ELZEY, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.
THOMAS THEADO, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
JACK MALICKI, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
DUSTIN L. LEWIS, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.