Rodriguez v. DelamaterRodriguez v. Delamater
AURELIO N. RODRIQUEZ PRO SE
So Ordered.
Signed this 5 day of August, 2026.
Patrick G. Radel
United States Bankruptcy Judge
BRESEE & FIRST, PC
Attorney for Debtor-Defendant Robin Delamater
20 Corporate Woods Blvd.
Albany, NY 12211
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Presently pending are the Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint and the Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss this adversary proceeding.
Jurisdiction
The Court has core jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this contested matter in accordance with
Background
On July 31, 2025, Robin Delamater, by and through counsel, filed a Voluntary Petition under Chapter 7 of the
On November 5, 2025, Aurelio N. Rodriguez (the “Plaintiff”) filed this adversary proceeding against Robin Delаmater (the “Debtor-Defendant”). (Docket No. 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts two causes of action: (1) denial of discharge for false oath or account pursuant to
On January 23, 2026, Defendant-Debtor filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 23). This Court held a hearing on March 3, 2026, at which Plaintiff indicated he
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint and an Objection to Defendant-Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss on March 16, 2026. (Docket Nos. 36 & 38). Debtor filed a reply objecting to Plaintiff’s Motion tо Amend. (Docket No. 42).
This Court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and Defendant-Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss on April 16, 2026. Plaintiff appeared pro se and Michael O’Connor, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Debtor. The motions were deemed submitted and this Court reserved decision.
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Docket No. 36) is DENIED, in part, and Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 23) is GRANTED, in part.
Motion to Amend
As the Plaintiff sought to amend his Complaint more than twenty-one days after Defendant-Debtor filed her Motion to Dismiss and did not receive written consent to amend, Plaintiff must seek leave from the court.
A court should give leave to amend freely and should only deny a request “for such reasons as unduly delay, bad faith, futility of the amendment, and perhaps most important, resulting prejudice to the opposing party.” State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Ellis v. Chao, 336 F.3d 114, 127 (2d Cir. 2003) (“It is well established that leave to amend a complaint need not be granted when amendment would be futile.”).
“Futility is directly intertwined with the standard for a motion to dismiss. A court may properly deny leave to amend where the amended complaint would not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Pergament v. Yerushalmi (In re Yerushalmi), No. 07-72816-478, 2009 WL 2982964, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2009).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint purports to add additional facts to the same causes of action made in the original Complaint. As the arguments supporting dismissal and the arguments made in the Amended Complaint are the same, this
Motion to Dismiss
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all factual allegations as true and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Glob. Network Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2006).
§ 727(a)(2)(A)
Section 727(a)(2) denies a Debtor their discharge when “the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody of property under this title, has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed—(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of the petition.”
To sufficiently plead a concealment claim under
In order to survive a motion to dismiss his concealment claim, Plaintiff must allege that the property at issue (a 2022 Honda Accord) belonged to the Debtor. There is no dispute that Debtor does not own the vehicle. Debtor’s relative purchased the vehicle over three years ago and holds title to the vehicle. Plaintiff argues that Debtor concealed her equitable interest in the property. (Docket No. 36). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Debtor exercises exclusive control over the vehicle – she drives it to work, uses it for pеrsonal errands, and refers to it as “my vehicle” to law enforcement. Id. Thus, according to the Plaintiff, Debtor holds an interest in the vehicle, and Debtor concealed that interest by not disclosing the information on her bankruptcy petition.
While a debtor’s failure to disclose assets on a bankruptcy petition may constitute concealment, for purposes of a
The Bankruptcy Code does not define “property of the debtor” for purposes of
In New York, “an asset is any form of personal property with value, including [chattel] that creates, acknowledges, or evidences a financial obligаtion, not exempt from liability by statute or common law.” Ng v. Adler (In re Adler), 494 B.R. 43, 62 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013) (cleaned up).
Section 541(a)(1) defines “property of the estate” as “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” “Congress [therefore] intended to limit the reach of
Under New York law, the definition of a vehicle оwner can be broken into the following three parts:
- A person, other than a lien holder, having the property in or title to a vehicle or vessel;
- the term includes a person entitled to the use and possession of a vehicle or vessel subject to a security interest in another person; and also includes
any lessee or bailee of a motor vehicle or vessel having the exclusive use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period greater than thirty days.
As previously established, Debtor does not hold legal title to the vehicle. Debtor is therefore not an owner under part one.
For part two, Plaintiff alleges that Debtor exercises exclusive control over the vehicle – she drives it to work, uses it for personal errands, and refers to it as “my vehicle” to law enforcement. Plaintiff, however, fails to allege Debtor’s relative holds a security interest in the vehicle. See McClaney v. Util. Equip. Leasing Corp., 560 F. Supp. 1270, 1274 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (“[T]he meaning of the phrase, regarded in its entirety [ – ‘a person entitled to the use and possession of a vehicle subject to a security interest in another person’ – ] could not be more clear: in situations where a vehicle is sold under contract which reserved a security interest in the vendor, it is the vendee who is nevertheless the owner. . .Plaintiff’s reading of the phrase. . .would extend ownership status to anyone using the vehicle with permission.”); see also Rhett v. Griggs, 1991 WL 8491, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1991) (“[B]oth Associates and N.C.N.B., as lessors and title holders of the tractor and trailer respectively, are liable as ‘owners’ of the vehicles unless it is determined that they hold only liens or security interests in them.”); see generally Matthews v. CTI Container Transport Intern. Inc., 871 F.2d 270, 275-76 (2d. Cir. 1989) (distinguishing certain elements that make a lease agreement intended for security – whether the lessee is required to maintain insurance coverage upon the leased
As for part three, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to indicate Debtor is either a lessee or a bailee of the vehicle “having exclusive use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period greater than thirty days.” Specifically, there are no facts indicating a lease agreement or other contract/transaction, nor that Debtor had “exclusive control” of the car for а period greater than thirty days. See Mays v. New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 197 Misc 1062, 1063-64 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950) (Bailment is defined as “a delivery of personal property for some particular purpose, or a mere deposit, upon a contract express or implied, and that after such purpose has been fulfilled it shall be redelivered to the person who delivered it, or otherwise dealt with according to the directions or kept until he reclaims it as the case mаy be. It is essential that there be actual or constructive delivery by the bailor as well as actual or constructive acceptance of the property of the bailee.”); see also Sullivan v. Spandau, 589 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (App. Div. 1992) (“The agreement between [the parties] is clearly a lease. It is denominated as a ‘lease’ and the parties are described as ‘lessor’ and ‘lessee.’ It calls for the payment of ‘rent’. . . .).
Thus, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to indicate Debtor is an owner of the vehicle under New York law.
An equitable interest in property is typically described as “rights in personam against the holder of the legal title.” Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Nevius, 76 F.2d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1935); see also Darwin (Huck) Spaulding Living Trust v. Carl (In re Carl), 517 B.R. 53, 65-66 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that while debtor was not legal owner of property in question, debtor has been found to have equitable interest in property where the property was transferred but debtor retains benefit of beneficial ownership).
Here, Plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to establish that Debtor holds an equitable interest in the property. As mentioned previously, Plaintiff only alleges that Debtor “drives [the vehicle] to work, uses it for personal errands, and refers to it as ‘my vehicle’ to law enforcement.” (Docket No. 36). There is no allegation that Debtor pays for auto insurance, monthly car payments, or regular repairs. See McCarthey Invs., LLC v. Shah (In re Shah), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1621, at *22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2010) (finding the Debtor concealed his interest in property when he transferred his interest in real property to his wife for no consideration while he retained possession and use of the property and also made all the payments required to maintain it, including the mortgage, common charges, utilitiеs, real estate taxes, and property insurance). Nor are there any facts pled that indicate there was a constructive or resulting trust with respect to the vehicle that would show the debtor’s relative only holds title in whom no equitable interest
Plaintiff, therefore, fails to adequately plead that the Debtor concealed her property.
Accordingly, the vehicle concealment cause of action is dismissed.
§ 727(a)(4)(A)
Section 727(a)(4)(A) denies a Debtor their discharge when “the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case. . .made a false oath or account.”
Fraudulent intent is shown through actual fraud, not constructive fraud – the debtor must be aware of their interest in an asset or a past event or condition in their financial history that should be disclosed; and the debtor must have intended to induce creditors to a particular course of action or inaction based on their reliance of the debtor’s omission or misrepresentation. Mazer-Marino v. Levi (In re Levi), 581 B.R. 733, 746 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017). However, “[a] reckless disregard of both the serious nature of the information sought and the necessary attention to detail and accuracy in answering may rise to the level of fraudulent intent necessary to bar a discharge. Field v. Irving (In re Irving), 27 B.R. 943, 946 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
“A statement materially relates to the bankruptcy case when it contains relevant information that creditors and the trustee reasonably would have regarded as significant in identifying the assets of the estate that could be liquidated and used to satisfy claims.” Sanango v. Mi Young Kal (In re Mi Young Kal), 665 B.R. 688, 699 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Levi, 581 B.R. at 754) (internal quotation mark omitted). In other words, the false statement or omission must relate “to the debtor’s business transactions, or if it concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the existence or disposition of the debtor’ property.” Id. “An undisclosed asset having little value, being unreachable by creditors, or causing no detriment to
Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Debtor violated
With respect to the vehicle, Plaintiff alleges that the Debtor violated
With respect to litigation history, Plaintiff alleges that the Debtor failed to disclose in her Statement of Financial Affairs an Albany Family Court case and an Albany City Court case from the past year. Plaintiff states that the Debtor concealed these cases to hide judicial rulings that found Debtor to “unbelievable” and “lacking credibility.” The Court finds the Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled how omitting the two previous cases is material to the bankruptcy case. A judgе’s finding
With respect to the misstated judgment date, Plaintiff states that the Debtor listed January 12, 2024, on her petition as the date in which the state court entered judgment in favоr of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that the actual date the state court entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff was on July 14, 2025, and Debtor wrote the wrong date to obscure that fact that the bankruptcy petition was “an immediate reaction to a trial loss 17 days prior.” The Court finds the Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege how misstating the judgment date is material to the bankruptcy case. See generally id. Therefore, this portiоn of the claim cannot survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
With respect to the prior addresses, Plaintiff states that Debtor failed to list any prior physical address in her bankruptcy petition. She only disclosed a P.O.
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that Debtor failed to disclose an account with Broadview Federal Credit Union in her Schedules. Plaintiff alleges that Dеbtor’s
This Court finds Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as to this aspect of his claim. Plaintiff is therefore permitted to amend his complaint to assert an objection to discharge under
Conclusion
The Court grants Debtor’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 23) in part and grants Plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint (Docket No. 36) in part. Plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint is granted as to his claim under
Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff’s claims seeking to (a) deny Debtor a discharge for allegedly concealing property under
On or before August 20, 2026, Plaintiff shall file and serve an Amended Complaint, asserting only an objection tо discharge under
The Clerk’s Office is requested to mail a copy of this Decision and Order to Plaintiff.