Marciano RODRIGUEZ, by his next best friend and guardian Lazaro Rodriguez; Emelina Rodriguez; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America; Donna Shalala, in her capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 97-5812.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
March 15, 1999.
169 F.3d 1342
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
JoNel Newman, Florida Justice Institute, Inc., Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Royn Juanita Hermann, Adalberto Jordan, Asst. U.S. Attys., Miami, FL, Mark B. Stern, Maria Simon, App. Staff, Civ. Div., Michael S. Raab, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., App. Staff, Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellees.
This appeal involves a class action challenge to one provision of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, which is more formally known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). The challenged provision, codified as
After determining that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976), dictated application of the rational basis test in assessing the constitutionality of
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE WELFARE REFORM ACT‘S PROVISIONS AFFECTING THE ELIGIBILITY OF ALIENS FOR SSI AND FOOD STAMP WELFARE BENEFITS
The federal government provides SSI benefits to impoverished individuals who are elderly, blind, or disabled, see
First, with certain exceptions not relevant to this case, the Act provides that “an alien who is not a qualified alien (as defined in [
The second way in which
- A permanent resident legal alien who has either worked or can be credited with “40 qualifying quarters”5 of work in the United States is eligible for SSI and food stamps, see
8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(B) ; - An alien who is “lawfully residing in any State” and is either a veteran with an honorable discharge, an active duty service member, or the spouse or unmarried dependent child of such veteran or active duty service member is eligible for SSI and food stamps, see
8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(C) ; - An alien who “is lawfully residing in the United States” and “was a member of a Hmong or Highland Laotian tribe” who provided assistance to the United States military in the Vietnam era is eligible for food stamps, see
8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(K) ; - An alien who is a refugee admitted to the United States pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1157 is eligible for SSI and food stamps for seven years after the alien‘s admission, see8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A)(i) ; - An alien who is granted asylum in the United States pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1158 is eligible for SSI and food stamps for seven years after asylum is granted, see8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A)(ii) ; - an alien who is granted conditional entry pursuant to section 203(a)(7) of such Act as in effect prior to April 1, 1980 [
8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) ]; or - an alien who is a Cuban and Haitian entrant (as defined in section 501(e) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980).
8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) .
An alien whose deportation is withheld, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) because of fear of persecution is eligible for SSI and food stamps for seven years from the date the deportation is withheld, see8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A)(iii) ;- An alien who is a Cuban or Haitian entrant pursuant to the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980 is eligible for SSI and food stamps for seven years after such status is granted, see
8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A)(iv) ; - An alien who is admitted to the United States as an “Amerasian immigrant,“—an alien fathered by a United States citizen and born in Vietnam between January 1, 1962 and January 1, 19766—is eligible for SSI and food stamps for seven years after admission to the United States, see
8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(A)(v) ; - “[A]n alien who was lawfully residing in the United States on August 22, 1996” and is “blind or disabled”7 is eligible for SSI and is also eligible for food stamps if he “is receiving benefits or assistance for blindness or disability,”8 see
8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(F) ; - An alien who was “lawfully residing in the United States on August 22, 1996” and, on that date, was 65 years of age or older is eligible for food stamps, see
8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(I) ; - An alien who was “lawfully residing in the United States” on August 22, 1996 and is currently under 18 years of age is eligible for food stamps, see
8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(J) ; - “[A]n alien who is lawfully residing in the United States and who was receiving [SSI] benefits on August 22, 1996” is eligible for SSI, see
8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(E) ; - An alien who is receiving SSI benefits “for months after July 1996” pursuant to an application filed before January 1, 1979 remains eligible for SSI if “the Commissioner of Social Security lacks clear and convincing evidence that such individual is ... ineligible” for SSI benefits because of the Welfare Reform Act‘s new eligibility requirements, see
8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(H) ; - An alien who is either an American Indian born in Canada or a member of an “Indian tribe”9 is eligible for SSI and food stamps, see
8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(G) .
In summary, the Welfare Reform Act, as amended, makes the fourteen categories of qualified aliens specified in
B. THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM THAT THE WELFARE REFORM ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND THE DISTRICT COURT‘S DISPOSITION OF THAT CLAIM
The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against the United States and several other defendants (collectively “the defendants“) seeking to enjoin § 402 of the Welfare Reform Act, which is codified as
In Count 1 of their complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that
Applying the rational basis standard of review, the district court concluded that
II. DISCUSSION
The plaintiffs raise two contentions on appeal. First, they contend that the district court should have applied a heightened level of scrutiny, such as the strict scrutiny test, instead of the rational basis test, in assessing the constitutionality of
A. WHETHER RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY APPLIES IN ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 8 U.S.C. § 1612
In Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976), the Supreme Court considered a Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge to a federal statute which, like
After noting that Congress is not required to treat citizens and aliens alike in the provision of welfare benefits, id. at 78-80, 96 S.Ct. at 1890-92, the Court narrowly framed the question raised by the plaintiffs’ challenge to the statute: “The real question presented by this case is not whether discrimination between citizens and aliens is permissible; rather, it is whether the statutory discrimination within the class of aliens—allowing benefits to some aliens but not to others—is permissible.” Id. at 80, 96 S.Ct. at 1892 (emphasis in original). The Court answered that question by holding that the statutory discrimination between the classes of aliens in the provision of Medicare benefits was permissible.
Integral to the Mathews decision was the Court‘s holding concerning the level of scrutiny applicable to a federal statute that discriminates among aliens in the provision of welfare benefits. About that, the Court wrote:
For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of
changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary.... Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility of the political branches of government to respond to changing world conditions should be adopted only with the greatest caution. The reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization.
Id. at 81-82, 96 S.Ct. at 1892 (emphasis added). The Court defined the scope of that “narrow standard of review” as follows:
Since it is obvious that Congress has no constitutional duty to provide all aliens with the welfare benefits provided to citizens, the party challenging the constitutionality of the particular line Congress has drawn has the burden of advancing principled reasoning that will at once invalidate that line and yet tolerate a different line separating some aliens from others.
Id. at 82, 96 S.Ct. at 1892-93 (emphasis in original). Applying that standard to the lines Congress had drawn in making only certain aliens eligible for Medicare benefits, the Court concluded that the classifications were constitutionally permissible because they were not “wholly irrational.” Id. at 83, 96 S.Ct. at 1893 (emphasis added). Although the Court did not actually use the phrase “rational basis scrutiny” to describe its “narrow standard of review,” it did apply as the decisional criterion a “wholly irrational” standard, id., and that is merely another way of stating the rational basis test. Neither party in this case contends there is any difference between a statute lacking a rational basis and being wholly irrational, and we perceive none.
Although the strict scrutiny standard does apply to Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenges to a state‘s classification of aliens, see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971), the Mathews Court firmly rejected the argument it also applies to a Fifth Amendment challenge to Congress’ classification of aliens. The Court explained that “the Fourteenth Amendment‘s limits on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and naturalization.” Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86-87, 96 S.Ct. at 1895. That is so, because “it is the business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of ... the States ... to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens. The equal protection analysis also involves significantly different considerations because it concerns the relationship between aliens and the States rather than between aliens and the Federal Government.” Id. at 84-85, 96 S.Ct. at 1893-94. Thus, the Court concluded, there is no “political hypocrisy” in applying strict scrutiny to a state‘s classification of aliens, but the considerably narrower “wholly irrational” or rational basis test to Congress’ classification of aliens. Id. at 86-87, 96 S.Ct. at 1895.
Faced with the tight fit between the holding in Mathews and the issue before us, the plaintiffs offer six arguments in support of their position that Mathews nonetheless does not control and we should apply heightened or strict scrutiny in assessing the constitutionality of
We find this argument unpersuasive because its central premise—that
The plaintiffs next argue that, even assuming
This second argument fails to address the relevant issue. Instead of discussing whether rational basis scrutiny applies to federal statutes that draw distinctions among aliens in the provision of welfare benefits, it jumps ahead to the issue of whether the distinctions in
Third, the plaintiffs argue that heightened scrutiny is called for in reviewing
Fourth, the plaintiffs argue that the deferential rational basis test only applies to statutes affecting aliens that were enacted
That argument is foreclosed, at least in this case, by Mathews. The Court rejected in Mathews the narrow view of Congress’ sovereign immigration power advanced by the plaintiffs in this case. Broadly defining the scope of Congress’ sovereign power over immigration, the Court stated that “the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government” Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81, 96 S.Ct. at 1892 (emphasis added), and that “it is the business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of ... the Federal Judiciary, to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens.” Id. at 84, 96 S.Ct. at 1893-94 (emphasis added). Not only that, of course, but Mathews specifically held a statute discriminating among aliens in the provision of Medicare, a form of welfare benefits, does lie within Congress’ power “in the area of immigration and naturalization,” and for that reason is subject to rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 82, 96 S.Ct. at 1892. As to that holding, it is impossible to distinguish
Contrary to another position of the plaintiffs, holding that rational basis scrutiny applies is not inconsistent with the dicta in Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 973 (11th Cir. 1984), that some federal actions affecting aliens may fall “outside the plenary power to control immigration that justifies the extraordinary executive and congressional latitude in that area.” While that dicta may, or may not, have some viability in other situations, it has none here; the holding of Mathews—not dicta but holding—is that the decision to discriminate among aliens in the provision of welfare benefits is a decision that lies within Congress’ plenary power over immigration.
Fifth, the plaintiffs suggest that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 96 S.Ct. 1895, 48 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976), requires that we apply heightened scrutiny in this case. It does not. In Hampton, the Court invalidated a rule promulgated by the federal Civil Service Commission which barred aliens from federal employment. The Court reasoned that “the Commission performs [the] limited and specific function [of] ... promot[ing] an efficient federal service” and therefore lacks authority over immigration matters. Id. at 114, 96 S.Ct. at 1910. However, the Court expressly stated that “[w]e may assume ... that if Congress or the President had expressly imposed the citizenship requirement, it would be justified by the national interest in providing an incentive for aliens to become naturalized....” Id. at 105, 96 S.Ct. at 1906. Because Hampton did not deal with a Congressional enactment, it provides no support for the plaintiffs’ position that rational basis scrutiny does not apply in this case.
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that
This argument, too, is meritless. Plyler is inapposite because it deals with a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a state‘s classification of aliens. Nothing in Plyler even arguably suggests that a heightened level of scrutiny would have applied if the challenged statute had been enacted by Congress, i.e., that Mathews would not have controlled had the same classification been prescribed by a federal statute. Indeed, the Plyler Court specifically cited Mathews for the purpose of noting that the deference which extends to Congress’ power to govern aliens’ “admission to our Nation and status within our borders,” id. at 225, 102 S.Ct. at 2399 (emphasis added), does not extend to a state‘s classification of aliens. Plyler is entirely consistent with Mathews, which noted that while strict scrutiny is applicable to a state‘s classification of aliens, it does not apply to congressional classifications. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86-87, 96 S.Ct. at 1895 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment‘s limits on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and naturalization.“).
In summary, Mathews is inescapably on point as to the level of scrutiny applicable in this case. It holds that a federal statute which discriminates among aliens in the provision of welfare benefits is subject only to rational basis scrutiny. In this case, the plaintiffs are challenging
B. WHETHER 8 U.S.C. § 1612 SATISFIES RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY
Under rational basis scrutiny, “a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity,” and should be upheld “if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “rational-basis review in equal protection analysis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.... [A] classification must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Moreover, the government need not come forward with evidence to justify the classification; instead the burden is on those challenging the legislation “to negative every conceivable basis which might support it, whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record.” Id. at 320-21, 113 S.Ct. at 2643 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Finally, “courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature‘s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends. A classification does not fail rational-basis review because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations—illogical, it may be, and unscientific.” Id. at 321, 113 S.Ct. at 2643 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In this case, we agree with the defendants that Congress’ decision to reduce the number of aliens eligible for SSI and food stamps by providing that only the aliens in the fourteen categories specified in
However, the fact that denying all aliens, except those identified in
The plaintiffs have failed to meet that burden in this case. A category by category examination reveals that none of the fourteen categories Congress established is wholly irrational. To begin with, three of the categories extend benefits to aliens who have made special contributions to this country. Those categories consist of aliens who have substantially assisted our nation‘s economy by working for at least 40 quarters (10 years), aliens who are veterans or active military personnel, and Hmong or Highland Laotian aliens who provided aid to the United States military during the Vietnam era. See
Congress could have concluded that aliens in five of the other categories—refugees, asylees, aliens whose deportation has been withheld because of fear of persecution, certain Cuban or Haitian entrants, and Amerasian immigrants, see
Three of the remaining categories consist of aliens who both were lawfully residing in
As for Congress’ decision to extend benefits to especially vulnerable aliens only if they were lawfully residing in the United States as of August 22, 1996, the day the Welfare Reform Act was enacted, that is not “wholly irrational” either. Congress could have rationally imposed that cutoff date to deter future immigration by those seeking access to welfare benefits. In addition, the rationality of a cutoff date, indeed the necessity of having one, flows from the fact that the funds available for welfare programs are not unlimited. The fact that cutoff dates inevitably lead to persons “who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be[ing] placed on different sides of the [eligibility] line” is not enough to make such a classification irrational any more than the necessity of “drawing lines for federal tax purposes” is irrational. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 83, 96 S.Ct. at 1893. In the matter of drawing lines, judicial deference to congressional judgment is particularly appropriate, because the “differences between the eligible and the ineligible are differences in degree rather than differences in the character of their respective claims.” Id. at 83-84, 96 S.Ct. at 1893.
We have covered eleven of the fourteen categories of aliens excepted from ineligibility. One of the remaining categories consists of lawfully residing aliens who were receiving SSI benefits on August 22, 1996, the day the Welfare Reform Act was enacted; they remain eligible for that type of benefit. See
Congress also decided to continue to extend SSI benefits to aliens who are receiving benefits “for months after July 1996 on the basis of an application filed before January 1, 1979” and “with respect to whom the Commissioner of Social Security lacks clear and convincing evidence that such [aliens are] ineligible for such benefits as a result” of the eligibility changes instituted by the Welfare Reform Act.
We turn to the last category for discussion. Congress decided to provide benefits to aliens who are members of an Indian tribe or are American Indians born in Canada. See
Plaintiffs have failed to show that Congress acted in a wholly irrational manner in regard to any of the fourteen categories it established in
Finally, we reject the plaintiffs’ contention that the Supreme Court‘s decisions in United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996), somehow compel us to conclude that
As for Romer, the plaintiffs point to that case‘s statement that a statute fails rational basis scrutiny if it cannot be explained by “anything but animus toward the class that it affects.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 116 S.Ct. at 1627. They argue that Congress’ decision to deny SSI and food stamps to aliens other than those specified in
III. CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that rational basis scrutiny applies to
Notes
[T]he term “qualified alien” means an alien who ... is—
(1) an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence under the Immigration and Nationality Act [
(2) an alien who is granted asylum under section 208 of such Act [
(3) a refugee who is admitted to the United States under section 207 of such Act [
(4) an alien who is paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of such Act [
(5) an alien whose deportation is being withheld under section 243(h) of such Act [
(6) an alien who is granted conditional entry pursuant to section 203(a)(7) of such Act as in effect prior to April 1, 1980 [
(7) an alien who is a Cuban and Haitian entrant (as defined in section 501(e) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980).
The plaintiffs contend that some of them are “qualified aliens” and others are not. Nonetheless, we have relegated the definition of “qualified alien” to a footnote and discuss it no further, because none of the plaintiffs fit within the fourteen categories of aliens eligible for benefits set forth in