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Robinson v. State
578 P.2d 141
Alaska
1978
Check Treatment

*1 ROBINSON, Appellant, Bobbie Alaska, Appellee.

STATE of

No. 2880. Alaska.

Supreme Court of

April Miracle, J. Asst. Public Defend-

Barbara Shortell, Defender, er, An- and Brian Public chorage, appellant. for Jenicek, Ivan Lawner and Monica Asst. Balfe, Joseph Atty., D. Dist. Attys., Dist. Gross, Atty. Anchorage, and Avrum M. Gen., Juneau, appellee.

OPINION Justice, BOOCHEVER, Before Chief CONNOR, Justices. WITZ and RABINO *2 RABINOWITZ, Justice. Davis was in the bathroom. When Jones wait, indicated that he would Chatman be- posses- Bobbie Robinson was convicted of gan to close the door. Jones asked that it cocaine, 17.10.010, of a sion violation of AS open Chatman, be left who had a small jury a primary after trial. Robinson’s child holding her leg, told the officers that appeal tention in this centers on the denial they could come so open in door sup- his motion to would not create a draft on the press child. evidence obtained as the result of an From position their in allegedly foyer unconstitutional search and sei- of the hotel room,3 zure.1 the officers could see a strainer and glass jar a containing matches and some night On October short straws. The officers suspected that Anchorage Department Police a received these drug paraphernalia. items were manager call from the of the Gold Rush concerning registered guest, Hotel a Bobbie About 30 seconds after the en- officers they hotel, Davis. When arrived at room, tered the Robinson emerged from the manager motioned Investigator Jones and bathroom. Jones testified: Investigator adjoin- Needham into a room Mr. stepped Robinson out and said hello registered the room to Bobbie Davis. to me. I said to hello him. He said what manager gave The them information which you said, do well, want? And I I’m here suspicions might aroused their that there be response in to the hotel. Mr. Davis is illegal activity occurring some sort in registered here. obviously You aren’t suppres- Davis’ room. Jones testified at the Mr. Davis and we both know that. He spoke he sion that after laughed and turned around and walked manager, suspected he regis- man over and sat in down the chair. fact, was, as tered “Bobbie Davis” in Bobbie shirt; Robinson was not wearing a Jones Robinson, a person with whom Jones was testified that he could see top of what previously acquainted. police The prophylactic looked like a protruding from decided a investigation to conduct routine top of Robinson’s belt. After Robinson within the activities room.2 down, sat Needham picked up the strainer. As Jones stood outside the room regis- jumped up Robinson and took the strainer preparing knock, tered to Davis to the door Needham, from saying, “You can’t do that.” opened and a woman started to emerge. Jones saw the prophylactic which contained When Jones showed her badge, his she grams 1.4 of cocaine on the chair where door, it, slammed the bolted and chained Robinson sitting. had been Needham began yell “police.” Jones testified picked up and Jones placed Robinson great activity that he could hear a deal of under arrest. in the room. Jones on the knocked door United States woman, a second has opening without recognized door, that hotel rooms was as well as respond- asked who there. Jones dwellings fall they protections within the ed that officers and re- open fourth quested that she amendment. In door. The wom- Stoner v. Califor- nia, an, Chatman, opened approxi- Ms. the door

mately eight speak inches. Jones asked rehearing Davis; with Mr. Chatman told him that L.Ed.2d 303 the police had years impris- 1. Robinson was sentenced to 10 determine who is in what room so—and if in years suspended; appeal- onment with 5 somebody has doing something illegal, fact it is ed excessiveness of this sentence. Because they they’re so that know that we know that primary issue, disposition our there, we do normally in prompts which them to appeal not reach the sentence issues at this why move. This is the hotels call us. We do time. regularly make arrests simi- lar situations. 2. Jones testified: room approxi- 3.This in the Gold Rush Hotel is routinely things We check these out mately 12 feet 14 feet. number different reasons. Number either Robinson be- or Chatman validates this investigation on Stoner their focused scene found The superior near search. court found that the checkbook cause indi- The checkbook stubs robbery. adequately state did not establish Ms. of a Chat- been checks had Robinson, cated' several man’s or to discovering that Ston- Upon out to hotel. prove hotel order to valid third out and was registered at hotel *3 er However, the party superior consent. court requested the officers his to object held that Robinson’sfailure to the to enter Ston- night permission clerk’s the presence of the officers consent constituted and gave his consent room. The clerk er’s to the search. particularly, supe More the entered the The officers opened door. rior stated: its room and thorough a search the [UJsually the courts do inquire quite incriminating contents, evidence finding searchingly power person into the the Ston- Supreme Court reversed The Stoner. consenting to had Mr. Rob- conviction, had been ruling that it er’s inson not I present certainly been would falling search not on warrantless based in this instance had—had the observa- recognized exceptions one within premises tions . . . made inside the Supreme requirement. The warrant upon . wholly rested the admis- was night clerk emphasized by sion into room the woman whose waive Stoner’s constitutional able to not relationship clearly has not been estab- unam- clerk’s clear and despite the rights here, lished I feel that the court would Su- to the search. biguous consent .The sup- under those circumstances have to Court concluded: preme But press evidence. Mr. Robinson house, or a tenant of a No less than there, having the opportunity to [was] house, a boarding in a occupant of a room intercept entry into premises further consti- is entitled to in hotel room guest against unreasonable protection tutional protection That and seizures.

searches depend left to if were disappear . police] foyer in the [The of an em- discretion upon the unfettered . . And their further that this It follows of the hotel. ployee incursion, were, as it continued into unlawful, a warrant was without search accomplished rest of the room was with omitted)4 (citations knowledge at least Mr. Robinson’s that ease is contention in this There no in that he did implied consent and reason have an actual did not Robinson leave, did ask them not ask them to not hotel in his expectation privacy able secure a warrant. matter Thus, analysis of this our room.5 First, will address the issue of we war- begin premise that must given the offi purportedly consent unless se unreasonable per rantless search The court held by Robinson. cers defined narrowly within one it falls request failure to that Robinson’s requirement warrant to the exceptions emerged he from the leave when has ar The state the fourth amendment.6 consent to their by constituted allegedly given bathroom gued State, 793, 490, 1977); (Alas- California, 483, 510 P.2d Smith v. 797 84 376 U.S. Stoner v. 4. 861, 889, 856, rehearing 893, 1973). L.Ed.2d 11 ka S.Ct. 1330, 940, 12 L.Ed.2d 84 S.Ct. 377 U.S. Jeffers, 342 v. See United States 303 6.See, g., Hampshire, Coolidge 403 e. v. New 59, 93, 48, 51-52, 95, 64 72 S.Ct. 96 L.Ed. U.S. 2022, 564, 443, 454-55, 29 L.Ed.2d U.S. 91 States, Fung (1951); Eng v. 281 Jem United States, (1971); Katz v. United 576 803, (9th 1960). Cir. F.2d 576, 357, 507, 514, 347, 19 L.Ed.2d 88 S.Ct. State, 834, (1967); 544 P.2d Schraff v. See, g., v. United e. Katz (Alaska 1975); Erickson 587-88 19 L.Ed.2d 1973). (Alaska J., (Harlan, (1967) concurring); & Woods Rohde, Inc. room. In order show into hotel erred in denying the suppress motion to on obtained, search voluntary ground consent to of Robinson’s consent. the state must show that the consent was We next address effect of the unequivocal, specific, intelligently given enter, consent to allegedly given the offi or and uncontaminated duress coercion.7 cers Ms. Chatman. In United States v. have We concluded that burden was not U.S. inmet this case.8 The evidence shows that the United Robinson asked what officers were do- States permission Court held that emerged when he from the bathroom. may to search be obtained from third objected picked up He when Needham possesses who “common only thing strainer. did do was over or other sufficient

request that officers leave. While there premises or effects sought inspected.” to be are in which circumstances an authorized *4 The Court explain went on to the type of person’s police presence valid consent to authority which is necessary to validate a supersede could an initial invalid consent party third consent: given by party,9 an unauthorized third we presented are not with such circumstances is, course, Common authority not to be here. Robinson was confronted with the implied from the mere property interest a accompli presence; fait of the officers’ third party has in the property. The not his consent pres- did indicate to their authority justifies which the third-party way except by in any ence silence. We consent . . rests ... on lightly have held that consent is not to be mutual use of the property by persons we to If hold that inferred.10 Robin- generally having joint access or control son’s failure to demand that the officers most purposes, so that it is reasonable consent, leave to amounted it would mean recognize to that any of the co-inhabit- that consent could be slight, inferred from ants right permit has the to the inspec- rather preponderating, than circumstances. tion in his right own and that the others Accordingly, we hold that the state did not have assumed the risk that one of their showing meet its burden of consent to this might permit number the common area search, superior warrantless and the to be searched.11 State, 508, (Alaska example, 7. Erickson v. 507 P.2d 515 9. For if expressly Robinson had 1973); State, 252, v. Sieziak 454 presence P.2d 257-58 sented to the officers’ toor a subse- 1969), denied, (Alaska 921, quent cert. 396 U.S. 90 Ms. Chatman’s assumed lack of 252, (1969). authority present problem. S.Ct. 24 L.Ed.2d 202 no State, 508, (Alaska 10. Erickson v. 507 P.2d 515 8. Because we have concluded that the state did 1973); State, 252, v. Sleziak 454 P.2d 257-58 prove not that Robinson consented to this en (Alaska 1969), denied, 921, cert. 396 U.S. 90 try, we need not decide whether the Alaska 252, (1969). 24 L.Ed.2d 202 requires Constitution any that in order to validate allegedly given, consent must be reject 11. We argument the state’s that a less right first advised to refuse consent ato stringent applied standard should be to an en- State, warrantless search. See Sieziak v. 454 try than to other searches. The 252, (Alaska 1969), P.2d 259-60 cert. officers was a search within the fourth amend- 921, 90 S.Ct. 24 L.Ed.2d 202 protections. See, g., ment e. Johnson v. United United 10, 13, 367, 368, 92 Bustamonte, States held in Schneckloth v. (1948); State, Ferguson L.Ed. v. U.S. (Alaska 1971). P.2d As we said in warnings that such were not Spietz, (Alaska State 531 P.2d required by However, the federal constitution. 1975): interpretation we are not bound that represents A door of the home a firm consti- interpreting See, g., our own constitution. e. tutional open. barrier whether or not it is 1977); Blue v. 558 P.2d doorway The front . . awas constitu- (Alas Lemon v. 1154 n. 5 any tional barrier to search or seizure not 1973); Fairbanks, City ka Baker based either on a valid warrant onor one of (Alaska 1970). 401-02 narrowly exceptions. defined the prosecution the trial court held had at n. 7. In sustained its burden Id. admissibility of prerequisite proving as a by preponderance of the evidence prosecution had questioned evidence the that Mrs. Graff’s consent was legally suffi- reasonably ap- prove initially that to cient.15 searching officers that

peared to the Our review of the evidence con the de- would bind party’s third consent tained the record before us reveals that fendant, government that the secondly, prove by preponderance the state failed to immediately exist show that facts did must evidence that Ms. Chatman had the which rendered the third to the search prior authority to consent to the entry of the binding.12 Concerning the party’s short, officers. In the state did not demon the district court found requirement, second to, joint strate that Ms. Chatman had access prove had failed to government of, or control any pur the hotel room for actual that Mrs. Graff had pose. Anticipating the foregoing conclu held The district court consent to a search. n sions, the state makes the further conten Mrs. statements although Graff’s tion that relevant evidence of Ms. Chat- respondent occu- that she and the officers man’s with Robinson im were admissible the east bedroom pied properly hearsay excluded as under the rea officers, belief of the good faith prove soning of Matlock. Although the issue is extra-judicial state- they were nevertheless doubt, altogether agree free from we prove the truth ments inadmissible sustaining court erred in Ap- averred. The Court facts therein *5 objections, hearsay thereby preclud the and Supreme Court of affirmed and peals proving ed the state from Ms. Chatman’s Supreme reversed. States the United authority regarding premises ques in of evidence that the rules observed Court We thus conclude that aspect tion. this trials do not applicable in criminal normally the matter be supe should remanded to the judge hearings before generally govern suppression rior court to conduct a further In this evidentiary questions.13 determine purpose determining for the part: in stated Supreme Court regard, whether Ms. Chatman had the authority to be, certainly there may However give permission entry or consent to the against rule be no automatic should the officers into the hotel as well as pro- in such hearsay evidence reception of to make the further determination whether clear to us equally it seems ceedings, and at the in question reasonably or not time ex- not have judge the trial should appeared the officers that Ms. Chatman’s in the cir- statements Mrs. Graff’s cluded Robinson. consent would bind here.14 presented cumstances light foregoing, In the case is no reason for the further found The court to the court with di- remanded the evi- to have distrusted district court suppression to conduct a further rections Mrs. Graff’s declara- and excluded dence opinion. hearing in accordance with this At admissibility of her state- tions. Given hearing, superi- the conclusion of such a ments, concluded that Supreme Court Id., 14. 415 U.S. at 94 S.Ct. at whose consent the third 12. In Matlock Graff, conclusion, reaching with Mrs. a woman L.Ed.2d at In this was in issue was 252. The district proposed shared a bedroom. whom Matlock Court relied on the then requirement satisfied be- 1101(d)(1), found the first 104(b) and Federal Rules of Rules in the house woman’s residence cause of the Id., U.S. at 174 n. 10 and Evidence. pres- significant period of time and her for a at 39 L.Ed.2d at 251 n. 10 and 11. prior in house to the ence to the officers that of her statement because Id., at 94 S.Ct. at 15. occupied respondent the east bed- she and the holding, Despite the Su- L.Ed.2d at 253. room. preme preferred that the district court suppressing of the evidence first reconsider 164, 172- 13. United States light opinion holdings in of its therein. 993-94, findings is to make and enter or court law.16

fact and conclusions of In B., Matter J. H. minor, Appellant. Remanded with instructions. No. 2947. Justice,

BOOCHEVER, concurring. Chief Supreme Court of Alaska. agree majority opinion I with May exception of the statement contained in same applying Footnote standard to premises request to enter as to a request premises. The

to search authorities cited 11 do not with a specifically

Footnote deal authorizing between entry

distinction an authorizing a search. I believe that may occupant well arise where an

situations implied authority has premises an entry premises by those but not have im-

plied authority to A consent to search. opening

search in sense of drawers and portions premises into hidden

delving a much greater privacy

involves invasion of

than mere to the premises admission question

themselves.1 The that I believe is

relevant in this case whether Chat- Ms.

man had to consent to the offi- entry

cer’s into the hotel room. No search subsequently as the items seized view, plain assuming *6 permissible.2

into the room was The case

distinguishable Spietz, from State (Alaska 1975),

P.2d 521 in that no one entering

sented to officer’s the home in case, Spietz and therefore there was no

right go into the home seize items that seen

could be from outside the home. appeal pend- 1965) (consent 16. Jurisdiction of the is retained Cir. to enter room motel receipt findings court’s third did not extend to search of defend- fact and conclusions of law based on the addi- person); Holzhey ant’s v. United suppression tional ordered virtue of (5th 1955) (consent F.2d daugh- Cir. opinion. ter and son-in-law to enter and search their premises where accused lived did not authorize Bussey, 1. See United States v. 507 F.2d personal effects). search of accused’s locked (9th 1974) (confederate’s Cir. occupied by and search of motel room 2. Anderson v. defendant confederate did not extend to 1976); Daygee personal People luggage); defendant’s Davis v. (Alaska 1973). California, (9th State F.2d

Case Details

Case Name: Robinson v. State
Court Name: Alaska Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 28, 1978
Citation: 578 P.2d 141
Docket Number: 2880
Court Abbreviation: Alaska
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