Robinson v. Cas 4000 Kansas LLCRobinson v. Cas 4000 Kansas LLC
their limited discussion of this case, the plaintiffs concede that they must produce “sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer‘s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason.” Id. The plaintiffs have utterly failed to produce any record evidence disputing the defendant‘s ample evidence of Lockhart‘s poor and unremediated work performance, including repeated inattention to duty, sleeping on duty, and abandoning her post, all of which led to her termination. Under these uncontroverted circumstances, the employment action taken by the defendant appears reasonable and, indeed, wholly warranted. Therefore, the court grants the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment.4
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant‘s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 25, on Count II of the complaint, which alleges wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, is GRANTED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Anessa Abrams, B. Patrice Clair, Ford & Harrison LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Re Document Nos.: 17, 20
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING PLAINTIFF‘S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT; AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
This action arises out of Plaintiff‘s four-count complaint against Defendants, CAS 4000 Kansas LLC (“CAS 4000“) and Change All Souls Development Inc. (“CASDI“). In Counts I and II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the
II. MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
Plaintiff has moved to amend his complaint in order to add a defendant and plead additional facts supporting his theory under the FLSA that the various entities he sues operated as a “single enterprise employer.” Pl.‘s Mot. Am. Compl., ECF No. 20. Defendants have opposed such amendment. See Defs.’ Opp‘n Mot. Am. Compl., ECF No. 22. For the reasons set forth below, leave to amend is granted and the amended complaint Plaintiff has lodged on the docket, see Notice, ECF No. 24, is deemed the operative complaint in this action.
Under
Defendants oppose amendment on the bases that the motion is untimely, amendment is not in the interests of justice, amendment will result in delay, and amendment would be futile. None of these arguments carry the day.
Jurisdiction in this Court is based on federal question jurisdiction due to the FLSA claims. See
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff‘s motion to amend his complaint. As set forth below, amendment of the complaint will moot some of Defendants’ arguments concerning the FLSA claims (and the parallel D.C. Minimum Wage Act claims). However, because the amended complaint does not appear to change many of Plaintiff‘s
III. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings on all four counts of Plain tiff‘s complaint. See generally Defs.’ Mot. J. Pleadings, ECF No. 17. Because some of these Counts are affected by the amendment of Plaintiff‘s complaint, each count is addressed separately.
A. FLSA (Count I)
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings of Plaintiff‘s FLSA claims based on four arguments: (1) CAS 4000 and CASDI are not joint employers; (2) these entities, either jointly or individually, are not an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce; (3) these entities, either jointly or individually, do not have an annual gross volume of sales greater than $500,000; and (4) plaintiff was not an employee engaged in commerce. Each argument is addressed in turn.
1. Whether CAS 4000 Kansas and CASDI are joint employers
Defendants argue that defendants CAS 4000 and CASDI are not joint employers under the FLSA. Plaintiff‘s amended complaint adds a third defendant and additional factual allegations on this point. Accordingly, the Court finds that this argument is moot in light of the amended allegations. Moreover, Defendants’ argument relies on denials contained in their answer, which cannot be relied upon in a motion for judgment on the pleadings (which requires application of the same standard as applied under
2. Whether Defendants, either jointly or individually, are an enterprise “engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce”
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff‘s FLSA claim fails because they do not engage in commerce as required by the statute. However, Defendants’ argument fails because they rely upon law concerning individual coverage, not enterprise coverage, and Defendants focus on the wrong prong of the applicable enterprise clause (i.e., handling goods rather than materials).
Pursuant to the FLSA‘s wage provisions, an employee may assert coverage through an “enterprise theory of coverage” or through an “individual theory of coverage.” See
Under enterprise coverage, the FLSA applies to an employer “engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” See
To establish enterprise liability, the FLSA provides a two-part test. An “enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” falls under FLSA provisions if it:
(i) has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or that has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person; and
(ii) is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000....
Defendants argue that Plaintiff‘s allegations do not meet this standard because Plaintiff, who provided on-site maintenance at a local residential building, does not work for an enterprise engaged in commerce as that concept has been defined by the relevant case law. But Defendants primarily rely on Thorne v. All Restoration Services, Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir.2006), which is a case involving individual coverage, not enterprise coverage. See id. at 1255 n. 1. Moreover, Defendants’ analysis of the Department of Labor‘s FLSA regulations, and the arguments they press as a result, focuses on the definition of goods, but entirely ignores the more relevant materials clause.
When one properly focuses on the enterprise provisions, in particular the materials clause, it is clear that even an employee in Plaintiff‘s position can work for a covered enterprise, assuming it meets the dollar volume threshold. See, e.g., Dole v. Odd Fellows Home Endowment Bd., 912 F.2d 689, 695 (4th Cir.1990) (elderly residents’ home that employed individuals who handled materials that moved in interstate commerce while serving food to residents, washing their laundry, or cleaning, can be covered enterprise); Locke v. St. Augustine‘s Episcopal Church, 690 F.Supp.2d 77, 88-89 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (church who employed custodians that, in the course of operation, consumed cleaning products purchased locally but which had previously moved in interstate commerce can be covered enterprise); Jones v. Cadillac Condo. Ass‘n, No. 88-A-1855, 1989 WL 49156 (D.Colo. May 10, 1989) (defendant who employed maintenance men who lived on the grounds and used light bulbs, cleaning chemicals, paints, nails, screws, and other materials which moved in interstate commerce and were consumed in the course of defendant‘s operations can satisfy enterprise test). In fact, the Eleventh Circuit itself has persuasively distinguished Thorne based on the materials analysis that eluded Defendants here. See Polycarpe v. E & S Landscaping Serv., Inc., 616 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (11th Cir.2010). And, given the lack of manufacturing in the District of Columbia and the nature of
3. Whether Defendants have an annual gross volume of sales greater than $500,000
Defendants further argue that Plaintiff‘s FLSA claim fails because he cannot establish that Defendants meet the dollar threshold required for enterprise coverage under the statute. Defendants’ argument is not frivolous and they point to documentation that supports their argument. However, the Court cannot rely upon this information external to the complaint in assessing a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants meet the threshold3 and the Court, for purposes of this motion, assumes the truth of that allegation. Of course, he will have to prove it at the motion for summary judgment stage. But for now, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied on this point.
4. Whether Plaintiff was an employee engaged in commerce
As set forth above, a plaintiff alleging a FLSA violation can establish coverage either under an enterprise theory or an individual theory. In an abundance of caution, defendants argue that, if Plaintiff seeks to establish coverage under an individual theory, his claim would fail because he was not engaged in commerce. As set forth above, the Court deems that the most reasonable reading of Plaintiff‘s amended complaint is that he only pursues coverage under an enterprise theory. If Plaintiff pursued coverage under an individual theory based on the current record, he would have a much more difficult argument to make. See, e.g., Thorne, 448 F.3d at 1266; Lehman v. Teamsters Retiree Hous. of Janesville, Wis., Inc., No. 09-cv-288-slc, 2010 WL 1729880 (W.D.Wis. Apr. 27, 2010) (finding that the “duties of on-site manager for residential apartment complex were primarily local in nature and consisted mostly—indeed almost exclusively—of intrastate activity“); Locke, 690 F.Supp.2d at 90-91 (custodian in church did not meet individual coverage). However, because the Court does not read the amended complaint to raise an individual coverage claim, it need not decide the issue.
B. D.C. Minimum Wage Act (Count II)
Based on the proposition that the District of Columbia has construed the DCMWA consistent with the FLSA, Defendants repeat their FLSA argument that they are not joint employers under the DCMWA. But, as set forth above in the context of the FLSA, the Court determines that the new allegations in the amended complaint moot this issue and further holds that this issue is more appro priately
C. Wrongful Eviction (Count III)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for wrongful eviction under District of Columbia law. Defendants argue that, because Plaintiff received his apartment as partial compensation for his duties as on-site property manager, he does not meet the definition of tenant under D.C. law and, thus, he was not entitled to advance notice to quit depriving him of a viable wrongful eviction claim. Anderson v. William J. Davis, Inc., 553 A.2d 648 (D.C.1989). Plaintiff counters this argument by relying upon an unsigned Relocation Agreement that refers to Plaintiff as a tenant. But Plaintiff acknowledges that the agreement was never executed. See Am. Compl. ¶ 45.4 Accordingly, Plaintiff‘s argument does not effectively rebut Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff was not a tenant, and the Court accordingly grants judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff‘s wrongful eviction claim.
D. Breach of Contract (Count IV)
Defendants further argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for breach of contract because he fails to plead the existence of a valid contract. Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not identify any consideration or mutuality of obligation in support of the alleged contract to relocate plaintiff.5 Plaintiff did not respond to this argument. As such, it is deemed conceded and judgment on the pleadings is granted on the breach of contract claim. See Nat‘l Sec. Counselors v. C.Ι.Α., 898 F.Supp.2d 233, 268 (D.D.C.2012) (“[T]he Court may treat the plaintiff‘s failure to oppose the defendant‘s ... arguments as a decision to concede those arguments.” (internal citations omitted)); see also D.D.C. Civ. R. 7(b) (party‘s failure to oppose a motion may be treated as conceded by the Court).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiff‘s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. However, because the amended complaint fails to correct certain defects, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Counts III and IV. The Court will deny Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Counts I and II. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge