ROBIN EUSTACHE v. STATE OF FLORIDA
No. SC16-1712
Supreme Court of Florida
[July 12, 2018]
LAWSON, J.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Eustache v. State, 199 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), which certified the following question to be of great public importance:
WHERE A DEFENDANT IS INITIALLY SENTENCED TO PROBATION OR COMMUNITY CONTROL AS A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, AND THE TRIAL COURT LATER REVOKES SUPERVISION FOR A SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATION AND IMPOSES A SENTENCE ABOVE THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER CAP UNDER SECTIONS 958.14 AND 948.06(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS THE COURT REQUIRED TO IMPOSE A MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE THAT WOULD HAVE ORIGINALLY APPLIED TO THE OFFENSE?
Eustache, 199 So. 3d at 490. We answer the certified question in the affirmative. The Fourth District also certified conflict with Christian v. State, 84 So. 3d 437 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), on the same issue. We disapprove Christian to the extent it holds that a minimum mandatory sentence cannot be imposed on a defendant who substantively violates youthful offender supervision.
For the reasons that follow, we hold that upon revocation of a youthful offender‘s probation for a substantive violation, the trial court is authorized to either impose another youthful offender sentence, with no minimum mandatory, or to impose an adult Criminal Punishment Code (CPC)1 sentence, which would require imposition of any minimum mandatory term of incarceration associated with the offense of conviction. Because the trial judge in this case was convinced by the parties that he
We have jurisdiction. See
BACKGROUND
Eighteen-year-old Robin Eustache entered a guilty plea to robbery with a firearm, which carries a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence. Eustache, 199 So. 3d at 486. The trial court, however, sentenced him as a youthful offender under the Florida Youthful Offender Act (Act) to four years in prison and two years of prоbation. Id. The Act, codified at
After serving the prison portion of his sentence, Eustache violated his probation by committing two new drug offenses, and entered a plea admitting the violation. Eustache, 199 So. 3d at 486. The trial сourt found Eustache guilty of the probation violation, revoked his probation, and sentenced him on the underlying offense of robbery with a firearm to fifteen years in prison with a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence. Id. Eustache did not file a direct appeal.
Eustache filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to
Eustache then filed a second rule 3.850 motion, arguing that his sentence is illegal either because the trial court wrongly believed it was required to impose the minimum mandatory sentence or because the trial court should not have imposed the minimum mandatory sentence at all. Id. The State‘s response contended that once the trial court exercised its discretion to revoke probation and impose a sentence above the youthful offender cap, it was required to impose the minimum mandatory sentence enhancement. Id. After the
On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed Eustache‘s fifteen-year sentence and application of the adult minimum mandatory sentence enhancement, holding that under the Act, a trial court, after revoking youthful offender supervision and choosing not to impose a sentence within the youthful offender cap for a substantive violator‘s underlying offense, must impose any minimum mandatory sentence required for adult offenders charged with the same offense. Id. at 489-90. In so holding, the district court relied on the Second District‘s decision in Yegge v. State, 186 So. 3d 553, 556-57 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (upholding application of minimum mandatory sentence enhancements to a youthful offender‘s sentence following a substantive probation violation), as well as its own decision in Goldwire v. State, 73 So. 3d 844, 846 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (holding that it is within the court‘s discretion to revoke youthful offender status and apply minimum mandatory sentence enhancements). Id. The district court receded from its statement in Blacker v. State, 49 So. 3d 785, 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), that minimum mandatory penalties cannot be imposed even after a youthful offender substantively violates supervision, certified direct conflict with Christian to the extent it agreed with Blacker, and certified the question as one of great public importance. Id. at 490.
ANALYSIS
This case concerns interpretation of the Youthful Offender Act. Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. See Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 2006). “When the language of the stаtute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, . . . the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931)).
The sentencing of a youthful offender upon revocation of probation or community control is governed by
A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06. However, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for a substantive violation for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, with credit for time served while incarcerated, or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated.
If probation or community control is revoked, the court shall adjudge the probationer or offender guilty of the offense charged and proven or admitted, unless he or she has previously been adjudged guilty, and impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation or the offender into community control.
Focusing on the plain language of
In addition, we note that the Fourth District‘s holding (that a trial judge must impose any associated adult minimum mandatory sentence(s) on a youthful offender when exceeding the initial six-year statutory cap for substantive probationary violations) is arguably inconsistent with dicta from State v. Arnette, 604 So. 2d 482, 484 (Fla. 1992), stating that “youthful offenders maintain youthful offender status even when they violate a condition of [probation or] community control.” Florida‘s district courts of appeal have generally read this language from Arnette to mean that even where a trial court imposes a prison sentence in excess of the six-year statutory cap after a substantive probation violation, the defendant retains his or her youthful offender “status” along with the other attendant benefits of youthful offender sentencing. See, e.g., Christian, 84 So. 3d at 442; Blacker, 49 So. 3d at 788; Gadson v. State, 160 So. 3d 496, 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); Jacques v. State, 95 So. 3d 419, 420-21 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); Hudson v. State, 989 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). It was the Arnette majority‘s statement that a defendant always retains his or her “youthful offender status” after violating probation that led the panel in Christian to conclude that minimum mandatory terms did not apply to any post-violation sentence. Christian, 84 So. 3d at 443. Even the Fourth District, in this case, held that Eustache would retain his youthful offender “status” for most purposes. Eustache, 199 So. 3d at 487. However, we reject this portion of the Fourth District‘s analysis.
The sole issue in Arnette was whether a trial court could impose а sentence in excess of the six-year cap after a defendant violated his or her youthful offender probation. 604 So. 2d at 483. Arnette held that that the trial court was limited to the youthful offender six-year cap, even after a probation violation. Id. That holding was superseded by the enactment of chapter 90-208, section 19, at 1161, Laws of Florida,
As explained above, the trial judge imposed Eustache‘s current sentence after being incorrectly told by both the state and defense counsel that he had no discretion to impose a sentence below the ten-year minimum mandatory term, when the judge did have the discretion to reimpose a youthful offender sentence with no minimum mandatory. Bеcause defendants generally must be sentenced by a court that is able to exercise its discretion and consider all of its options before imposing a sentence, see Soanes v. State, 31 So. 3d 914, 914-15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); see also Munnerlyn v. State, 795 So. 2d 171, 171 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), this error warrants remand and resentencing.
CONCLUSION
We answer the certified question in the affirmative, quash the decision below, and disapprove Christian and the decisions cited in footnote 3 to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion. We remand this case to the Fourth District with instructions to remand to the trial court for resentencing.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, and POLSTON, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., сoncurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. LABARGA, J., dissents.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority‘s determination that “Eustache is entitled to a new sentencing
Eustache was originally sentenced under the Youthful Offender Act to four years’ imprisonment followed by two years’ probation. Majority op. at 2-3; see
Under the majority‘s interpretation, when Eustache is again resentenced the trial court will have only two options: it can sentence Eustache (1) as a youthful offender to a sentence of less than six years’ imprisonment; or (2) to an adult sentence that necessarily includes a ten-year mandatory minimum term. Majority op. at 2, 4. Because an adult sentence imposed under thе majority‘s interpretation of the statutes has to include a mandatory minimum term, the majority‘s result would also strip Eustache of his youthful offender status, causing him to lose all of the benefits of that designation, including entitlement to early release. Of course, this point becomes moot if the trial court elects to reimpose a youthful offender sentence. Majority op. at 2, 9.
However, a reading of the applicable statutes does not require the majority‘s result. In fact, concluding that the statute is ambiguous and construing it in favor of Eustache leads to a significantly different result. See
I. Rule of Lenity
First, I disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that
Although the majority‘s interpretation of
As Judge Conner explained in Eustache, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with Judge Davis‘s specially concurring opinion in Yegge that “the maximum sentence for the offense” under section 958.14 is not necessarily synonymous with “a defendant‘s maximum exposure in a criminal case.” Yegge v. State, 186 So. 3d 553, 560-61 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (Davis, J., specially concurring). As Judge Davis observed, “[t]he maximum sentence for an offense is determined by the legislature via statute. But a defendant‘s maximum exposure is determined by the statutory maximum sentence combined with other specific factors as related to the particular defendant or the specific circumstances of the commission of the offense.” Id. at 561 (emphases added). Thus, the meaning of “maximum sentence” in the context of sections 958.14 and 948.06 appears to be ambiguous.
199 So. 3d at 491 (Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, this interpretation furthers the policy reasons expressed by the Legislature in punishing youthful offenders differently than adults. See
By contrast, the majority‘s preferred interpretation of the statute leads to a draconian result not specifically required anywhere in the statute. Where a statute is “susceptible of differing constructions” so that there are two different, reasonable interpretations of the statute, the rule of lenity, as expressed in section
The rule of lenity provides that ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of the defendant. See State v. Weeks, 202 So. 3d 1, 8 (Fla. 2016). Regarding the rule of lenity, Judge Conner explained:
The rule of lenity requires that “any ambiguity or situations in which statutory language is susceptible to differing constructions must be resolved in favor of the person charged with an offense.” State v. Byars, 823 So. 2d 740, 742 (Fla. 2002); see also Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 814 (Fla. 2008). The Legislature has not clearly required the imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence for a youthful offender who substantively violates probation or community control. If the Legislature had intended the outcome espoused by the majority, it could have easily added language to section 958.14 stating that if a sentence above the cap provisions of section 958.04(2) is imposed, all sentencing enhancements and minimum mandatory provisions apply.
Eustache, 199 So. 3d at 491 (Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The rule of lenity compels the opposite result than that reached by the majority—that trial courts have the discretion to impose a sentence above the youthful offender sentencing cap that does not also have a mandatory minimum requirement.
II. Arnette
Further, because I would construe the statute in favor of youthful offenders, I would not find conflict with this Court‘s interpretation of the Youthful Offender Act in Arnette. In Arnette, this Court
The benefits conferred to youthful offenders by the statute are substantial. Among them are the opportunity to receive, upon successful participation in the youthful offender program, “a recommendation to the court, by the department, for a modification or early termination of probation, community control, or the sentence at any time prior to the scheduled expiration of such term.”
The district courts of appeal also agree that Arnette was not superseded by statute, as evidenced by the majority‘s disapproval of the language in twenty-one district court cases. See majority op. at 9-10, note 3. Indeed, as then-Judgе Lawson reasoned in Christian:
In Goldwire v. State, 73 So. 3d 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), another Fourth District panel appears to have mislabeled a youthful offender sentence above the six-year cap (as now authorized by the Youthful Offender Act itself following a substantive violation of probation) as a “non-youthful offender sentence.” Id. at 846. This mislabeling caused the panel to conclude (erroneously, in our view) that the trial court had the discretion to avoid other sentencing features applicable to a youthful offender sentence, and impose a firearm minimum mandatory following a substantive violation of probation. Id. We do not believe that Arnette permits this result. See Arnette, 604 So. 2d at 484 (“youthful offenders maintain youthful offender status even when they violate a condition of community control“). Although the legislature amended the version of Youthful Offender Act at issue in Arnette to authorize a youthful offender sentence above the six-year cap following a substantive violation of probation, the statute has not been amended to authorize imposition of a non-youthful offender sentence following a substantive violation. Nor has the statute been amended to authorize variation from any other feature of a youthful offender sentence following a substantive violation of probation.
Christian, 84 So. 3d at 444 n.7.
However, the majority‘s limiting interpretation of the statute necessarily requires it to abandon the core principle of Arnette and disapprove of the district court cases that have relied on Arnette. The majority acknowledges the inconsistency of its decisiоn with our jurisprudence, stating, “we note that [this opinion] is arguably inconsistent with dicta from State v. Arnette, 604 So. 2d 482, 484 (Fla. 1992),” and the “district courts of appeal have generally read this language from Arnette to mean that even where a trial court imposes a prison sentence in excess of the six-year statutory cap after a substantive probation violation, the defendant retains his or her youthful offender ‘status’
Rather than receding from long-standing precedent for the sole purpose of denying youthful offenders additional legal protections deemed appropriate by the Legislature, this Court should read the statute to preserve the benefits granted to youthful offenders by the Legislature. As the Legislature stated:
The purpose of this chapter is to improve the chances of correction and successful return to the community of youthful offenders sentenced to imprisonment by providing them with enhanced vocational, educational, counseling, or public service opportunities and by preventing their association with older and more experienced criminals during the terms of their confinement. It is the further purpose of this chapter to encourage citizen volunteers from the community to contribute time, skills, and maturity toward helping youthful offenders successfully reintegrate into the community and to require youthful offenders to participate in substance abuse and othеr types of counseling and programs at each youthful offender institution.
CONCLUSION
Because the statute is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations, I would apply the rule of lenity in favor of the youthful offenders in this state. I would further decline the invitation to recede from the principles espoused in Arnette.
Accordingly, although I concur in part as to the majority‘s holding that Eustache is entitlеd to resentencing, I dissent as to the majority‘s interpretation of the statute.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fourth District - Case No. 4D15-2596
(Palm Beach County)
Peter D. Webster, David L. Luck, and Jorge A. Perez-Santiago of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., Miami, Florida, for Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia A. Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Rachael Kaiman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Respondent