ROBERTO MATA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TYRONE BAKER, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 20-3151
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
July 19, 2023
ARGUED FEBRUARY 7, 2023 — DECIDED JULY 19, 2023
Before HAMILTON, BRENNAN, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. In 2005, Roberto Mata was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm. In this appeal from the* denial of his habeas petition under
A. Underlying Crime and Investigation
In the early morning of March 16, 2002, Mata fired shots at Adrian Padilla, Sandar Mosqueda,1 and Edwin Delgado, killing Padilla and Mosqueda and injuring Delgado. Chicago police officers arrested Mata that evening, and the following day Mata agreed to give a videotaped statement.
In the statement, Mata explained he had attended a housewarming party with his girlfriend on the evening of March 15. After leaving the party, Mata was walking down the street when he heard his friend Reynaldo Mares call out his name from behind. He turned around and saw two men holding Mares by his arms while two other men surrounded him. Mata took out his gun and fired one shot in their direction. The men backed away, but one man reached for his pocket. Believing the man intended to draw a weapon, Mata fired five more shots in the group‘s direction. He then ran toward his girlfriend‘s car. According to Mata, all the men were walking away with their backs to him when he fired the
Prior to the videotaped statement, several times investigators apprised Mata of his Miranda rights. Detective Kevin Bor read Mata his Miranda rights following his arrest, and Mata said he understood them. Later, at the police station, Detective Patrick Smith and Assistant State Attorney Lisa Mojica interviewed Mata on separate occasions, during which they again informed Mata of his Miranda rights. In both instances, Mata stated he understood his rights.
After those interviews, Mata agreed to give the videotaped statement. He began by confirming on camera that Mojica had advised him of his constitutional rights. Mojica then read Mata his Miranda rights again on tape. Mata said he understood his rights and confirmed he wanted to make the statement on camera. After detailing the events surrounding the shooting, he closed the 22-minute video by saying the police had treated him “well and fairly,” and that he had been given food, water, and bathroom access. He affirmed he gave the statement “freely and voluntarily” without any threats or promises by the police or the detectives.
1. Motion to Suppress
Before trial, defense counsel moved to suppress Mata‘s “oral, videoed, and written statements” as well as any evidence seized at his home after his arrest. Counsel alleged that Mata‘s videotaped “confession was not voluntary” because he “was subjected to physical and mental abuse by the Chicago Police Department for two days prior to being given any Miranda warnings;” “was poked and profaned by the Chicago police;” and “was forced to stand handcuffed to a cell
The trial court held a hearing on the suppression motion but addressed only the evidence obtained at Mata‘s home. Because Mata had not consented to a home search, the trial court suppressed the evidence seized there. At a later date, Mata‘s counsel asked the trial court to resolve his request to suppress Mata‘s oral, written, and videotaped statements, including his videotaped confession. The trial court said it would decide when to hear the remaining portion of the suppression motion at an upcoming status conference. At that status conference, Mata‘s trial counsel flagged the unresolved “other half of [Mata‘s] Motion To Suppress.” The trial court made no statement about the suppression motion and instead said the parties had agreed to a trial date.
2. Trial
The State called Delgado as its sole eyewitness at trial. He testified he was walking down the street with his friend Padilla when Padilla spotted Mata and Mares and asked them who they were. Mares ran toward Delgado and struck him in the chest, and Delgado pinned Mares to the ground. When Mares called for Mata‘s help, Mata drew a gun and pointed it at Delgado, prompting Delgado to let go of Mares and back away. Delgado claimed Mata then shot him in his buttocks. As Delgado ran away, he heard six shots fired in his direction and witnessed Padilla fall “like a brick” after getting hit by gunfire. Delgado also witnessed Mata shoot his other friend, Mosqueda.
As part of its case, the State played Mata‘s videotaped confession. Bor, Smith, and Mojica each testified they had
Mata chose to testify. He did not contest that he shot Delgado, Padilla, or Mosqueda. Instead, he argued the need to defend his friend Mares justified the use of deadly force. If deadly force was unreasonable given the circumstances, Mata contended he was guilty of only second-degree, as opposed to first-degree, murder.
In contrast to his videotaped confession, Mata testified he witnessed the men kicking and punching Mares. He then fired a warning shot in the air at which point the men backed up but did not leave. When he saw one of the men reach for his waist, Mata fired a few more times. He said he heard gunshots as he ran toward his girlfriend‘s car. Once inside the car, he testified he saw a man running down the street shooting a gun.
The jury found Mata guilty on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm. Mata was sentenced to life in prison for the first-degree murder convictions and 10 years’ imprisonment for the aggravated battery conviction. On direct appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected Mata‘s claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to impeach Delgado with prior inconsistent statements.
B. State Postconviction Proceedings
In 2008, Mata filed a pro se postconviction petition, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue the
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. Citing People v. Harris, 862 N.E.2d 960 (Ill. 2007), the court first determined that Mata waived his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim by not raising it on direct appeal. Because the State played Mata‘s videotaped confession at trial and Mata testified at trial about his earlier statements to the state‘s attorney and police, the appellate court considered “[t]he motion to suppress and [Mata‘s] videotaped confession … matters in the trial record.” As such, Mata “could have raised the present claim” of trial counsel‘s ineffective assistance “on direct appeal.” By not doing so, Mata waived the claim.
The state appellate court then addressed Mata‘s claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The court reasoned that the motion to suppress Mata‘s videotaped statement would not have succeeded because the record contradicted Mata‘s claims of abuse. Bor, Smith, and Mojica all testified they had advised Mata of his Miranda rights and that, each time, Mata confirmed he understood them. Mata also acknowledged on video that Mojica had informed him of his constitutional rights. Because the motion would not have succeeded, trial counsel presumably abandoned the motion as part of a sound trial strategy. Consequently, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel‘s ineffectiveness on direct appeal.
C. Federal District Court
In 2012, Mata sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, raising claims for ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The district court concluded that Mata had procedurally defaulted his claim that trial counsel was ineffective because the Illinois Appellate Court‘s finding of waiver served as an independent and adequate state procedural ground for the claim‘s dismissal. As to the other claim, the district court determined that the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in deciding that appellate counsel was not ineffective. Accordingly, the district court denied Mata habeas relief.
At Mata‘s request, we granted a certificate of appealability under
II. Analysis
Mata challenges the district court‘s denial of his habeas petition. He argues his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when his trial counsel failed to pursue a hearing on the motion to suppress his videotaped confession. “When reviewing a district court‘s ruling on a habeas corpus petition,
We first consider whether Mata procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Because we conclude that he did, we examine whether Mata shows cause to excuse that default. “As to whether a claim is procedurally defaulted, our review is de novo.” Wilson v. Cromwell, 69 F.4th 410, 418 (7th Cir. 2023).
A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
Federal courts “may not review federal claims that were procedurally defaulted in state court—that is, claims that the state court denied based on an adequate and independent state procedural rule.” Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2017);
The parties disagree as to whether the Illinois Appellate Court‘s application of the waiver doctrine constitutes an adequate state law procedural ground. A state ground is “adequate” if it is “firmly established and regularly followed.” Wilson, 69 F.4th at 419 (quoting Clemons v. Pfister, 845 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2017)). And the state ground “must not have been applied in a manner that ‘impose[s] novel and unforeseeable requirements without fair or substantial support in prior state law’ or ‘discriminate[s] against claims of federal rights.‘” Id. (quoting Clemons, 845 F.3d at 820). When examining adequacy, we limit our review to whether the state ground “is a firmly established and regularly followed state practice at the time it is applied, not whether the review by the state court was proper on the merits.” Id. (quoting Lee v. Foster, 750 F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir. 2014)).
We have repeatedly held that “[a] finding of waiver by [an Illinois] postconviction court is enough to establish an adequate and independent state ground.” Sturgeon v. Chandler, 552 F.3d 604, 611 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Daniels v. Knight, 476 F.3d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 2007); Schaff v. Snyder, 190 F.3d 513, 526 (7th Cir. 1999). “Under Illinois law, ‘failure to raise a claim which could have been addressed on direct appeal is a procedural default which results in a bar to consideration of the claim‘s merits in a post-conviction proceeding.‘” Sturgeon, 552
In examining Illinois state court decisions, we have also recognized Illinois‘s firmly established practice of applying its waiver doctrine to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See, e.g., Sturgeon, 552 F.3d at 611; Smith v. Gaetz, 565 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 2009); Martin v. Evans, 384 F.3d 848, 855 (7th Cir. 2004). Thus, when an Illinois postconviction court declines to consider a claim for the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because it could have been raised on direct appeal, that determination is an “adequate … state ground” for the claim‘s dismissal which precludes federal habeas review. Sturgeon, 552 F.3d at 611.
For example, in Sturgeon, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that a defendant waived his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim by not raising it on direct appeal. 552 F.3d at 611. In federal court, the defendant argued that the state court‘s waiver decision was not based on an adequate and independent state ground because he presented “extra record evidence” in his postconviction petition. Id. But by the defendant‘s own admission, his claim relied on evidence “within the scope of the appellate court‘s review on direct appeal.” Id. His claim therefore did not fall within the waiver exception articulated in Whitehead for “matters which … depended upon facts not within the trial record.” Id. (quoting
Similarly, in Smith v. Gaetz, the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that a defendant waived his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim because “although available to [the defendant] on direct appeal, he did not raise it.” 565 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 2009). This court determined that the state court‘s decision not to review the defendant‘s claim based on waiver “rest[ed] upon a ground that is both independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Id. (quoting Willis v. Aiken, 8 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 1993)). A similar conclusion was reached in Martin v. Evans, another instance where an Illinois postconviction court concluded a defendant waived his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim because the claim “involved matters of record which could have been raised on direct appeal.” 384 F.3d at 855. “The [state] court‘s express reliance on the established rule of waiver render[ed] the claims procedurally defaulted” under the independent and adequate state ground doctrine. Id. As in Sturgeon, Smith, and Martin, the Illinois Appellate Court‘s conclusion of waiver here constitutes an adequate state law ground.
Mata argues the Illinois Appellate Court‘s waiver decision departed from the state‘s firmly established practices, as Illinois state courts have “repeatedly noted that a default may not preclude an ineffective-assistance claim for what trial counsel allegedly ought to have done in presenting a defense.” People v. West, 719 N.E.2d 664, 670 (Ill. 1999) (emphasis added).
West and Erickson do not support Mata‘s argument. As he points out, claims about what counsel ought to have done may depend on evidence outside the record. Erickson and West recognize as much. But Mata misunderstands the proper focal point of those cases. The exception to Illinois‘s waiver rule turns on whether a claim is based on evidence outside the trial record—not on whether the claim makes allegations about what counsel ought to have done. To avoid default on postconviction review, a petitioner must present evidence “not in the trial record” supporting the claim and must demonstrate “why the claim it supports could not have been raised on direct appeal.” Id. at 458. Here, the Illinois Appellate Court did not deviate from its firmly established practice of asking whether Mata supported his claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel with evidence outside the trial record. Because Mata did not, the state appeals court considered the claim waived on postconviction review.
Mata also contends his postconviction petition asserted facts outside the trial record because it pointed to “evidence of coercion that was not developed” at trial, such as allegations that the Chicago police officers made promises and threats related to his girlfriend and child. But federal courts may not “reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Kimbrough v. Neal, 941 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2019)
Here, Mata did not allege any new facts about the voluntariness of his videotaped confession in his postconviction petition. He first claims officers made threats about his girlfriend and his child in his federal habeas petition, not his postconviction petition. Given the lack of new factual allegations in Mata‘s postconviction petition, the Illinois Appellate Court did not apply the state‘s waiver doctrine in a “novel and unforeseeable” manner. We therefore conclude that the court‘s waiver determination served as an adequate and independent state ground to dismiss Mata‘s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. So, his claim is procedurally defaulted, precluding our review of the claim‘s merits.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
Mata initially argued that—even if he defaulted his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim—the failure of his appellate counsel to raise that claim on direct appeal excused the procedural default. Federal courts may review a procedurally defaulted claim if a petitioner demonstrates “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation
Before seeking federal habeas relief, state prisoners must “exhaust[] the remedies available in the courts of the State.”
The State argues Mata failed to raise his claim of appellate counsel‘s ineffectiveness in his petition for leave to appeal. After review of the record, we agree. Mata did not allege that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in his petition for leave to appeal with the Illinois Supreme Court. Instead, he argued the Illinois trial court erred in summarily dismissing Mata‘s pro se petition because he made a colorable claim that his “trial attorney acted ineffectively in abandoning, without explanation, a written motion to suppress” which had “arguable merit.” As mentioned, “[t]o exhaust state remedies in the Illinois courts, the prisoner must include his claims in a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois
In his reply brief before us, Mata conceded he “defaulted his appellate-ineffectiveness claim by failing to raise it in his petition for leave to appeal.” He has therefore abandoned the argument on appeal.4 We acknowledge we need not “accept a concession when the point at issue is a question of law.” Deen v. Darosa, 414 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2005). But our independent review of the record confirms that Mata defaulted this claim by not exhausting the state remedies available. Thus, any alleged error by Mata‘s appellate counsel cannot excuse the procedural default on his trial counsel claim.
III. Conclusion
The Illinois Appellate Court dismissed Mata‘s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on an adequate and independent state ground, so the claim is procedurally defaulted. As to the ineffectiveness of Mata‘s appellate counsel, Mata did not raise the claim for one complete round of state court review, so that claim is also procedurally defaulted. For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court‘s denial of Mata‘s petition for federal habeas relief.