PRENTICE S. SANDERS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. DYLON RADTKE, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 20-1451
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
ARGUED JANUARY 20, 2022 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 1, 2022
Before ROVNER, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 20-cv-00122 — William C. Griesbach, Judge.
I
State Trial Proceedings. In 2011 Sanders drove a U-Haul truck into his sister and her boyfriend and was charged with two counts of attempted first degree intentional homicide. At the time of the offense, Sanders suffered from schizophrenia and was not taking his prescribed medication. He had not completed high school, and his precise educational level was unknown. The state trial court ordered a competency evaluation, and the Wisconsin Forensic Unit reported initially that Sanders lacked the mental capacity to proceed or to assist in his defense. Sanders received treatment, was reevaluated, and a second report suggested he was “malingering” or intentionally producing false symptoms. It also concluded that Sanders was competent to proceed. Rather than contest his competency, Sanders entered into a negotiated agreement to plead guilty to both counts and a plea hearing was held.
In a plea questionnaire, Sanders agreed:
- he had read the criminal complaint and his attorney had read it to him;
- he understood the charges to which he was pleading guilty had elements the State would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, and his attorney had explained those elements to him; and
he had three years of schooling, and he did not have a high school diploma or equivalent degree.
In response to questions from the state trial court, Sanders reiterated he had read and understood the criminal complaint. When asked whether he had discussed the elements of the charges with his counsel, Sanders replied: “Not really. I would like to go over that again.” The court then read the relevant jury instructions to Sanders twice (once for each count). Sanders confirmed he understood that by pleading guilty, he was admitting to the elements of those charges. The state trial court then accepted Sanders‘s guilty pleas on each count.
Although not discussed at the plea hearing, Sanders‘s cognitive abilities and educational level were considered at his sentencing hearing. Also discussed at sentencing was whether Sanders could have pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.1 Specifically, his trial counsel said he and Sanders had conferred on a “not guilty by mental defect claim,” but that “[u]ltimately [Sanders] decided to reject that.” The state trial court imposed two consecutive terms of seven years initial confinement in prison followed by a total of ten years extended supervision.
State Postconviction Proceedings. On July 13, 2012, the day after sentencing, Sanders gave notice of his intent to pursue postconviction relief and he was appointed new counsel. That attorney filed a no-merit report, concluding that Sanders lacked a meritorious claim that his pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered. Sanders filed three responses to the no-merit report, the last on April 30, 2015. He
On January 13, 2016, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the no-merit report, denied appointed counsel‘s motion to withdraw, and dismissed the appeal. The state appellate court reasoned that Sanders had pointed to facts outside the record to support his plea withdrawal claim, so it could not resolve the factual disputes. For example, while trial counsel had stated at sentencing that Sanders declined to plead not guilty by reason of mental defect, Sanders argued this was an “outright lie.” Sanders further maintained that contrary to his plea questionnaire, trial counsel had not gone over the elements of the homicide charges with him. According to Sanders, he did not know that acting with a specific intent to kill was an element of the offense. And even though the state trial court had reviewed the jury instructions with Sanders, the state appellate court was not convinced he understood the charges. It had “sufficient concerns about whether [Sanders‘s] pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Accordingly, the state appellate court remanded the case so Sanders could pursue postconviction relief and an evidentiary hearing in the state trial court.
On remand, Sanders brought two postconviction motions to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting first that he did not understand the elements of the offenses to which he pleaded, and second that his trial counsel was ineffective. The issues were briefed, and the state trial conducted a Machner hearing
In an exceptionally thorough written decision, the state trial court denied both postconviction motions. That court began by making two credibility determinations. It found Sanders‘s trial counsel “very credible in all regards.” To his credit, trial counsel admitted that he could recall some—but not all—of the facts from Sanders‘s plea hearing about five years earlier, which “demonstrated that he was testifying honestly about what he recalled.” In contrast, the court found Sanders‘s testimony “was generally not credible, and, specifically on critical issues, [his] testimony was evasive, exaggerated, non-specific and/or otherwise not credible.” The court “found Sanders to be an intelligent person,” who was “quite capable of verbally jousting with the State‘s attorney and parsing his words on cross examination.” Throughout questioning, “Sanders demonstrated that he understood the important issues and that he ... had prepared to respond to significant questions in [a] way that was favorable to his position,” repeatedly emphasizing his lack of education and other “themes” supporting his arguments. To the court, these responses “sounded contrived, coached and/or insincere,” and “at several points in his cross examination, Sanders admitted that he was untruthful in his responses to [the] Judge.” Sanders‘s testimony, in the court‘s view, was also fraught with
Following these credibility determinations, the state trial court made seven factual findings, each supported by extensive analysis:
- Trial counsel “read the criminal complaint to Sanders and discussed the factual allegations of the complaint with Sanders in detail prior to the plea hearing“;
- Trial counsel “provided Sanders with a copy of the criminal complaint to read, and Sanders read the complaint himself prior to the plea hearing“;
- Trial counsel “explained the factual elements of the offense of Attempted First Degree Intentional Homicide to Sanders prior to the plea hearing“;
- Trial counsel “explained to Sanders the Constitutional rights that are waived by ... entering a ‘guilty’ plea“;
- “At the time of the guilty plea hearing, Sanders had an education level that went beyond the third grade“;
- “Sanders did not have intellectual limitations that would have prevented him from understanding the elements of the offense when those elements were read to Sanders by the judge at the plea hearing“; and
Trial counsel “discussed the possible motions and defenses to the charges with Sanders.”
Based on these credibility determinations and factual findings, the trial court reached three legal conclusions. First, trial counsel “provided effective representation.” Second, even if trial counsel‘s representation was deficient, “the defendant was not prejudiced by any alleged deficiency.” And third, “[t]he defendant‘s guilty pleas were made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.” Therefore, the court denied Sanders‘s postconviction motions.
Sanders then appealed, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. While Sanders had previously “argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel” before the state trial court, the state appellate court pointed out that “Sanders d[id] not appeal this aspect of the circuit court‘s decision.” So, the only issue before the state appellate court was whether Sanders‘s guilty pleas were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
On this point, Sanders argued that the state trial court‘s factual findings about his education level and comprehension abilities were clearly erroneous because his testimony on those topics was unrebutted. The state appellate court disagreed. After pointing to several inconsistencies and overstatements in his contentions, that court concluded “all of Sanders‘s arguments suffer from a fatal flaw in that they rely on Sanders‘s own assertions and testimony about his cognitive abilities.” Given the state trial court‘s thorough credibility findings—which Sanders did not adequately call into question—the state appellate court reasoned that “the [state trial] court was entitled to disregard Sanders’ non-credible
Sanders also contended that his “long and extensive mental health history” should be considered. On that topic, the state appellate court stated “Sanders was competent at the time of the plea hearing,” and he had failed to make “any developed argument as to how his past mental health issues relate to his comprehension abilities and intellectual limitations when competent.” Because no evidence suggested that Sanders was experiencing mental health issues during the plea hearing, the court saw “no basis for treating Sanders‘s past history as evidence that he did not understand the proceeding or that his intellectual ability was limited.” “Such a conclusion is particularly illogical,” the state appellate court concluded, “in light of the record evidence suggesting that Sanders was malingering and intentionally producing false symptoms to avoid prosecution.”
Sanders argued last that the state trial court improperly assessed his cognitive abilities at the evidentiary hearing, rather than as of the guilty plea five years earlier. He insisted his “current capabilities” were due “entirely to the education he ha[d] received while in prison,” which made his intellectual abilities at the Machner hearing “thoroughly irrelevant” in assessing his mental capacity at the guilty plea hearing. But to the state appellate court, that argument strained credulity: “While we appreciate Sanders’ vote of confidence in the prison education system, we disagree that the [state trial]
The state appellate court affirmed, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied his petition for review.3
Federal Habeas Proceedings. Following these state court rulings, Sanders filed a handwritten, pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
The district court summarily denied Sanders‘s habeas petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, without requiring the State to respond. The district court noted that Sanders did not argue that the state appellate court‘s decision was contrary to, or unreasonably applied, federal law. Instead, Sanders labeled as erroneous the factual determination that his pleas were knowing and voluntary. The district court recognized the state trial court‘s “thorough decision” on postconviction review, finding that it “fully explained the basis for its factual findings, and the court of appeals likewise fully explained why the evidence supported the [trial] court‘s findings.”
On appeal Sanders argues the district court erred in entering a summary denial of his petition. Relief is appropriate, he claims, because his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective and his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. Sanders requests habeas relief, or at a minimum that we vacate the district court‘s dismissal of his petition and remand with instructions requiring the State to respond and provide relevant transcripts.4
II
“When reviewing a district court‘s ruling on a habeas corpus petition, we review the district court‘s factual findings for clear error and rulings on issues of law de novo.” Lee-Kendrick v. Eckstein, 38 F.4th 581, 585–86 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Stern v. Meisner, 812 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2016)). This standard applies equally to a district court‘s summary dismissal of a habeas petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004).
Rule 4 provides that a district court “must” summarily dismiss a habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” This rule “enables the district court to dismiss a petition summarily, without reviewing the record at all, if it determines that the petition and any attached exhibits either fail to state a claim or are factually frivolous.” Small, 998 F.2d at 414. In deciding whether a habeas petition must be dismissed under this rule, the district court “need not examine the trial records if two conditions are satisfied: (1) the state court opinions summarize the trial testimony or relevant facts; and (2) the petitioner does not quarrel with that summary and instead contends only that the trier of fact should have reached a different conclusion.” Id. Dismissal under Rule 4 should be rare and is reserved for petitions that, when taken together with any attached exhibits, seem “extremely unlikely” on their face to have merit. Dellenbach v. Hanks, 76 F.3d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 1996).
The district court considered attachments to Sanders‘s petition, including his handwritten “Supporting Facts,” the 2017 state trial court decision, and the 2018 state appellate court‘s opinion and order. Sanders argues his petition plausibly states two claims: for ineffective assistance of counsel, and that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary.
A
Sanders contends he presented a plausible claim to the district court that his trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance in two ways. His attorney did not review the
The State responds that Sanders‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not properly before us. First, notwithstanding Sanders‘s single citation to Strickland, his federal habeas petition did not set forth a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, any such claim is procedurally barred because it was not fairly presented to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
We need not decide whether Sanders raised a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in his
If a petitioner fails to properly assert a federal claim at each level in the state court system, the claim is procedurally defaulted. King v. Pfister, 834 F.3d 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2016). “A procedural default will bar federal habeas relief unless the petitioner can demonstrate both cause for and prejudice stemming from that default or he can establish that the denial of relief will result in a miscarriage of justice.” Lewis, 390 F.3d at
Here, the district court had the benefit of reviewing the state appellate court‘s decision affirming the state trial court dismissal of Sanders‘s postconviction motions. These state court decisions were included as exhibits to Sanders‘s habeas petition. Importantly, the decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated:
Sanders also argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the circuit court found that Sanders’ attorney provided effective representation and, in the alternative, that any deficiency in his performance did not prejudice Sanders. Sanders does not appeal this aspect of the circuit court‘s decision.
Sanders attempts to introduce ambiguity into this language, but there is none. The state appellate court unmistakably ruled that although Sanders had previously raised a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, he abandoned it in his request to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
A review of Sanders‘s briefs before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals confirms this. His only argument to that court pertained to the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty pleas. While Sanders‘s state appellate court briefing is not part of the record before us, his counsel acknowledged during oral argument what our court has long recognized—we may take judicial notice of state court dockets.5 520 S. Michigan Ave.
Because Sanders did not raise his claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, it is procedurally defaulted. Sanders does not attempt to show cause or prejudice for his default, nor does he attempt to demonstrate that denying relief would result in a miscarriage of justice. So, the district court did not err in summarily dismissing Sanders‘s habeas petition on his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
B
Sanders argues next that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary, and that he presented a plausible claim on that front in the district court. There is no dispute that Sanders advanced this claim to the state appellate court, and that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decided that claim on the merits. So that court‘s decision is entitled to deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See
To obtain habeas relief, Sanders must show that the state appellate court‘s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,” or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
Sanders does not argue that the decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law in violation of
For example, Sanders argues his trial counsel‘s failure to adequately explain the charges resulted in him pleading guilty to charges he did not understand. To support this contention, Sanders points to trial counsel‘s testimony at the Machner hearing that he did not specifically remember reading the complaint to Sanders.
But on postconviction review, the state trial court directly addressed this point. It found that although trial counsel did not have a “specific recollection of actually reading the criminal complaint to Sanders, he credibly testified that it has been his long-standing policy and practice to read through the entire criminal complaint to his clients.” To the state trial court, trial counsel‘s admission that he could recall certain details but not others from the plea hearing five years earlier bolstered his credibility and showed his honesty. Such credibility determinations are “notoriously difficult to overturn under
Sanders responds that the state trial court improperly assessed his cognitive capabilities as of the plea hearing based on his performance five years later at the Machner hearing. He claims he “improved his ability to read and write” during this time, so it “is not unreasonable that Sanders performed better at [the] evidentiary hearing” because he “likely walked into the evidentiary hearing more prepared.”
But the state trial court pointed to Sanders‘s demonstrated intellectual capacity at the 2012 plea hearing, citing three examples where Sanders requested additional clarification. This
Next, the state trial court referenced one of Sanders‘s responses to appointed counsel‘s no-merit report, prepared two years after the plea hearing. Sanders testified he had written the response “with just a little help.” Aside from some typographical and grammatical errors, the state trial court found that Sanders‘s response “la[id] out his factual and legal arguments in a relatively cogent and persuasive manner.” “In order to draft the objection,” the state trial court reasoned, “Sanders must have read and understood the plea hearing transcript, read the relevant law, read the No-merit report and then distilled all of this information into his objection.” Importantly, “Sanders‘s objection was so persuasive that it convinced the Court of Appeals to reject the No-merit Report and order that a Machner hearing be held.” This further demonstrated Sanders‘s cognitive abilities and convinced the state trial court that “Sanders was not being honest when he testified ... that he did not understand the elements of the offense when they were explained to him by [the] Judge“—a credibility determination that is entitled to significant deference.
As a last resort, Sanders argues that even if his habeas petition ultimately lacked merit, the district court should not have summarily dismissed it without examining the state court transcripts. But a district court is not required to examine state trial records when “(1) the state court opinions summarize the trial testimony or relevant facts; and (2) the
As for the district court‘s decision to summarily dismiss under Rule 4, that outcome is the exception not the norm. A summary dismissal should not follow just because the district court concludes that a habeas petition is unlikely to be granted. Rather, the petition must “plainly show” it is “factually frivolous,” Small, 998 F.2d at 414, and “extremely unlikely” on its face to have merit. Dellenbach, 76 F.3d at 823. That accurately describes Sanders‘s petition. He has not identified any facts the state courts overlooked. He also has not shown why any of the state trial court‘s factual findings were unreasonable. Those findings were fortified with credibility determinations, which are nearly unassailable on habeas review. Even more, the state trial court thoughtfully explained the bases for its conclusions. Thus, the district court was able to assess the merits of the state trial court‘s postconviction
Given the state trial court‘s comprehensive postconviction opinion—along with Sanders‘s inability to show by any metric, let alone by clear and convincing evidence, that the court‘s findings were incorrect—we conclude that the district court did not err in summarily dismissing Sanders‘s habeas petition.
* * *
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.