Robert Slentz, Appellant, v. City of Republic, Missouri; Greg D. Chadwell, Individually and in his official capacity as Interim City Administrator, Appellee.
No. 05-1663
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Submitted: November 17, 2005 Filed: May 12, 2006
Before SMITH, HEANEY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
Robert Slentz sued the City of Republic, Missouri, and Interim City Administrator Greg D. Chadwell alleging that the defendants violated his rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA“). The district court1 granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
Robert Slentz, a full-time police officer for the City of Republic, Missouri, injured his shoulder while off duty. Slentz took sick leave due to the injury and eventually underwent corrective surgery on his shoulder. Following his surgery, Slentz received a letter from the City designating his sick leave as FMLA leave based upon the City‘s Personnel Policy. The letter also informed Slentz that, among other things, he must submit a fitness-for-duty certificate from his physician prior to being restored to employment.
By a second letter, the City informed Slentz of the approaching expiration date for his FMLA leave and reminded him that he would need to provide a fitness-for-duty certificate at least one day prior to returning to work. The letter stated further that if such a certificate were not provided, Slentz would be expected to resign at the expiration of his FMLA leave. Unfortunately, Slentz‘s physician dеclined to certify Slentz as fit for duty until he had recuperated—several weeks after the expiration of his leave. Accordingly, Slentz submitted his letter of resignation.
Slentz sued, alleging that the defendants wrongfully interfered with his rights under the FMLA. The district court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion. The court held that it was permissible to run sick leave and FMLA leave concurrently, that Slentz was given proper notice, and that the defendants did not otherwise wrongfully interfere with Slentz‘s exercise of FMLA leave. Finding no error, we affirm.
II. Discussion
A. Concurrent Leave
Slentz contends that the City violated his FMLA rights by extending him only twelve weeks of leave despite his having mоre than twelve weeks of accrued sick leave. We disagree. The FMLA provides that an “eligible employee“—e.g., one with a “serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions
In this case, the City elected to run Slentz‘s FMLA leave concurrently with his accrued sick leave2 as authorized under the FMLA. Id. A contrary result “would unduly and unfairly burden employers.” Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1206. “[T]he FMLA was intended only to be a statute that provided a minimum labor standard; an assurance that employers would provide employees with twelve weeks of leave every year.” Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 939 (8th Cir. 2000), aff‘d 535 U.S. 81 (2002). “Under the FMLA, twelve weeks of leave is both the minimum the employer must provide and the maximum that the statute requires.” Ragsdale, 218 F.3d at 938; accord Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1206 (“To balance the needs of employers and sick employees, Congress intended that the FMLA provide employees with a minimum entitlement оf 12 weeks of leave, while protecting employers against employees tacking their FMLA entitlement on to any paid leave
B. Estoppel
Slentz also argues that the City‘s reprеsentations to him in its initial notice letter estops the City from claiming that he was limited to twelve total weeks of leave. The letter, in relevant part, read:
Family Medical Leave will begin on January 30, 2003, and is expected to continue until you are released from your doctor‘s care.
Exсept as explained below, you have a right under the FMLA for up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in a twelve month period. . . .
Pointing to the first sentence above, Slentz asserts that (1) the City knew when it sent the letter that Slentz was expected to be off work until approximately May 17, 2003; and (2) that he hаd accrued unused sick and vacation leave that would have covered him beyond May 17, 2003.3 Slentz contends that his reliance on this sentence presents a genuine issue of material fact, making the grant of summary judgment improper.
However, the City correctly points out in its brief, as did the district court in its decision, that the very next sentence of that letter undermines Slentz‘s argument because it unambiguously states that Slentz was entitled to a maximum of twelve weeks of FMLA leave.
For legal support, Slentz cites Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481, 493 (8th Cir. 2002). However Duty is distinguishable because it dealt with an employer‘s letter that informed the employee that his entire 34-week sick leave quаlified under the FMLA. In Duty, this court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying equitable estoppel to prevent an employer from claiming
C. Record Keeping
Slentz next posits that summary judgment was improper because the City has not given Slentz records required by
We hold that the City was permitted to run Slentz‘s sick leave concurrent with his FMLA leave, that the City was not estopped by its February letter, and that the City was not required to submit any records to Slentz pursuant to
I respectfully dissent. The majority disregards both the plain language and the plain purpose of the FMLA in holding that the City of Republic did not violate Robert Slentz’s rights under the statute.
“Our starting point in interpreting a statute is always the language of the statute itself.” United States v. S.A., 129 F.3d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Hennepin County Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 81 F.3d 743, 748 (8th Cir. 1996).
The canons of statutory construction also state that “‘it is well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute . . . and the objects and policy of the law . . . .’” Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 (1857) (emphasis added in Bob Jones)). The FMLA therefore must be analyzed and construed against the background of the Congressional purposes of the Act.
The final Senatе report on section 2614(a)(2) “makes explicit that an employer may not deprive an employee who takes leave of benefits accrued before the date on which the leave commenced.” S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 32 (1993). The House of Representatives echoed thе Senate’s intent concerning section 2614(a)(2). H.R. Rep.
The Act’s legislаtive history clearly states Congress’s intent behind the FMLA. The House of Representatives explained that “[a]n employer is required to continue any pre-existing health benefit coverage during the leave period, and at the conclusion of leave, to reinstate the employee to the same or an equivalent position.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(I), at 16 (1993). The Senate’s intent was just as plain: “[t]he taking of leave may not deprive the employee of any benefit accrued before the leave, nor does it entitle the employee to any right or benefit other than that to which the employee would have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave.” S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 3 (1993).
The majority correctly notes the congressional intent was to balance the concerns of both employers and employees. Employees are entitled tо a minimum of 12 weeks of leave, but are prevented from tacking their FMLA entitlement to the paid leave benefits offered by the employer. See
However, the majority ignores the plain language of the statute, which indicates that the FMLA cannot be used to deny Slentz’s benefits that he earned prior to his FMLA leave. The majority additionally suggests that Slentz was attempting to improperly tack on FMLA leave to sick leave he had earned as part of the collective bargaining agreement that Republic negotiated with Slentz’s union. I do not agree. Slentz has conceded that his 12 weeks of FMLA leave ran concurrently with the first 480 hours, or 12 weeks, of his earned sick leave.
In Strickland, the dispute centered on whether the plaintiff was entitled to take FMLA leave in addition to the paid leave available under his employer’s sick leave policy. 239 F.3d at 1201-02. The court held that the FMLA permits employers to provide the additional weeks necessary to reach the 12 work weeks of leave that is required in
The majority opinion misapplies Strickland. Slentz has not requested FMLA leave to reach the 12-week minimum of leave; rather, Slentz asks that his FMLA
The majority opines that the FMLA is not only a minimum labor standard, but also a maximum one. This may be correct absent a collective bargaining agreement that does not provide additional leave rights. But when greater medical or leave rights are bargained for, Congress clearly stated that the FMLA could not be used to erase those rights. See
The majority’s decision disregards the congressional purpose behind the FMLA. While it rightly attempts to balance employee and employer concеrns, it wrongly excludes from its interpretation of the FMLA the congressional intent to protect Slentz’s rights to the 282 hours of sick leave he had remaining after his FMLA leave expired. Consequently, Republic is allowed to use the FMLA as a knife to whittle away the benefit plan it provided its employee. I would rеverse the grant of summary judgment and remand to the district court with instructions to enter an order reinstating Slentz to his former position with equivalent pay, benefits, status, and the other terms and conditions of his employment.
Notes
“In all cases where applicable, sick/emergency leave will be subject to and designated by the City of Republic as FMLA leave and counted against an eligible employee‘s FMLA leave entitlement.”