Riverkeeper, Inc. v. JohnsonRiverkeeper, Inc. v. Johnson
In the Matter of RIVERKEEPER, INC., et al., Petitioners, v CARL JOHNSON, as Deputy Commissioner of Environmental Conservation, et al., Respondents. [861 NYS2d 155]—
Rose, J. Proceeding pursuant to
In 2006, petitioners commenced this
After Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to this Court pursuant to
Upon revisiting the mootness claim, we conclude that dismissal of the petition is warranted to the extent that it alleges causes of action relating to DEC‘s failure to find that a closed-cycle cooling system would be the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impacts at the Danskammer plant. In reaching this conclusion, we note that petitioners do not dispute that Dynegy‘s renewed permit required modification of its existing cooling system, that the required modification has been completed by installation of variable speed pumps at a cost of over $1 million, and that petitioners failed to move in Supreme Court or this Court for a preliminary injunction or stay that would enjoin the requirements of the permit or otherwise preserve the status quo while this matter was pending. Contrary to petitioners’ contention that the issues raised are not moot because they seek a remand to DEC for a new determination of Dynegy‘s application for renewal of the plant‘s permit and such a redetermination might not require an alternate cooling system, the record makes clear that the third, fourth and fifth causes of action of the petition rest upon petitioners’ claim that DEC should not have accepted the plant‘s existing cooling system and, instead, should have mandated the use of the best technology available, which they maintain is a
As to the claims which have not been rendered moot, petitioners argue that DEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in calculating the reduction in the amount of cooling water flow at the Danskammer plant based upon its full-flow capacity and in crediting the plant with the alleged survival of a percentage of the river organisms entrained in the existing system. In reviewing such administrative determinations, our role is limited to ascertaining whether there is any rational basis for the decision (see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 230-231 [1974]; Matter of Lane Constr. Corp. v Cahill, 270 AD2d 609, 611 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 765 [2000]). In addition, the determination of an agency acting pursuant to its authority and within its area of expertise is entitled to judicial deference (Matter of Salvati v Eimicke, 72 NY2d 784, 791 [1988]; Matter of Tockwotten Assoc. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 7 AD3d 453, 454 [2004]). This is so even where conflicting inferences can be drawn from the scientific evidence adduced, for we will not substitute our judgment for that of the agency when the agency‘s determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record (see Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. v Jorling, 85 NY2d 382, 396 [1995]; Matter of Tolliver v Kelly, 41 AD3d 156, 158 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 809 [2007]).
Here, as to DEC‘s use of a full-flow baseline, petitioners’ contention is that since the Danskammer plant‘s cooling system has historically used much less than the maximum quantity of
Similarly, as to the allowance of an entrainment survival credit, DEC cites evidence contradicting petitioners’ claim that there is no study which has found that a significant percentage of organisms have survived entrainment at the Danskammer plant. Inasmuch as the record contains substantial evidence supporting DEC‘s determinations as to both the calculation of required flow reductions and allowance of an entrainment credit, we defer to those determinations even though the evidence presented by petitioners could lead to a contrary conclusion (see Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 77 NY2d 411, 417 [1991]; Matter of Save Our Forest Action Coalition v City of Kingston, 246 AD2d 217, 221 [1998]). Accordingly, we find that DEC‘s determinations were both supported by substantial evidence in the record and reasonable under the circumstances.
We have considered petitioner‘s other arguments and find them unpersuasive.
Mercure, J.P., Peters and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.