Rinehimer v. Cemcolift IncRinehimer v. Cemcolift Inc
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Gary Rinehimer appeals various adverse rulings of the District Court in his case against his former employer, Cemcolift, Inc., brought under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990,
I.
BACKGROUND
Rinehimer worked for Cemcolift, a manufacturer of residential elevators, starting in October 1990. In December 1994, he was promoted from the position of technician to the position of working foreman. As a foreman, he worked in the part of the company‘s facilities where elevators were manufactured. As the result of sawing and painting involved in the construction of elevators, there were paint fumes and sawdust in his work environment.
In late 1995, Rinehimer developed pneumonia. Starting December 30, 1995, he spent twenty-two days in the hospital and nine days in a rehabilitation facility. Rinehimer told Cemcolift that he was hospitalized with pneumonia and that he did not know when he would be
On March 4, 1996, Rinehimer submitted a letter to Kenneth Hermann from his doctor saying that Rinehimer could return to work full-time but that he should avoid unusual dust and fumes. Thereafter, for two weeks, Rinehimer was assigned to a filing job, and, subsequently, he was assigned to a job assembling a cylinder-grinding machine. While neither of these jobs were equivalent to the job of a working foreman, Rinehimer was paid the same salary as when he was a working foreman.
On April 1, 1996, Rinehimer was given a pulmonary function test to determine if he could wear a respirator, a type of mask that helps to filter out dust and other particles. On April 3, Rinehimer asked Walter Hermann, Jr., a vice-president at Cemcolift, if he could return to his job as a working foreman. Walter Hermann informed him that, because, in light of his pulmonary condition, he was not able to wear a respirator, he could not return to his previous work environment unless he either (1) received permission from his doctor to work around dust and fumes or (2) signed a statement saying that he would take “responsibility for [his] presence in the workplace provided by [Cemcolift].” App. at 131. Rinehimer did neither and was terminated. Thereafter, he filed this suit.
II.
JURISDICTION
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
III.
DISCUSSION
In this appeal, Rinehimer argues that the District Court erred in (1) granting Cemcolift‘s motion for summary judgment on his ADA and PHRA claims, (2) admitting hearsay testimony into evidence at the jury trial on his FMLA claim regarding what Cemcolift‘s doctor allegedly told one of the company‘s managers about Rinehimer‘s condition, (3) denying Rinehimer‘s motion for judgment as a matter of law and his motion for a new trial in light of (a) the jury‘s erroneous finding that Rinehimer was given an equivalent position at Cemcolift after he returned to work, (b) the jury‘s finding that Rinehimer failed to prove he made an implied request for additional medical leave, and (c) a jury instruction that Cemcolift need not make a reasonable accommodation to Rinehimer under the FMLA.
A. Summary Judgment on ADA and PHRA Claims
On March 17, 1999, the District Court granted Cemcolift‘s motion for summary judgment concerning Rinehimer‘s ADA and PHRA claims under
We review decisions of the district court granting summary judgment de novo. Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 1999).
The ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual.”
Rinehimer argues that he satisfies clause (A) of the definition of disability because his ability to breathe, which is, according to federal regulations, a major life activity,
not dispute.
Rinehimer also argues that Cemcolift regarded him as having a disability and thus he is disabled under prong (C) of the three-pronged definition of disability.
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by the covered entity as constituting such limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or
(3) Has [no such impairment] but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.
Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting
In the present case, the District Court correctly noted that to be covered under the “regarded as” prong of the ADA the employer must “regard[ ] the employee to be suffering from an impairment within the meaning of the statutes, not just that the employer believed the employee to be somehow disabled.” Rinehimer, No. 98-562, slip op. at 2 (quoting Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997)). As we discussed above, pneumonia is a temporary condition and is not protected by the ADA. If Cemcolift regarded Rinehimer as having pneumonia, that would not be enough to bring him under the protections of the ADA. On the other hand, if Cemcolift regarded Rinehimer as having asthma, that might be enough to bring him under the protections of the ADA. However, Cemcolift argues that it did not know that Rinehimer had asthma and Rinehimer admitted that he did not tell anyone at Cemcolift that he had asthma. There was thus no basis for a court to find that Cemcolift regarded him as suffering from asthma.
In Taylor, we held that there were material issues of fact about whether a supermarket employee who hurt his ankle and needed to take regular rests and avoid long periods of standing was “regarded as” disabled by his employer. 177 F.3d at 183. We reached this conclusion because we held that “an employer‘s perception that an employee cannot perform a wide range of jobs suffices to make out a ‘regarded as’ claim.” Id. at 188. We further held that an
Rinehimer has not shown that Cemcolift believed that he could not perform a wide array of jobs. In fact, the record shows that Cemcolift had Rinehimer perform various jobs after he returned from his absence due to pneumonia. It was Rinehimer who was dissatisfied and wished to return to his former position and he sued because Cemcolift would not let him do so unconditionally. He does not claim that Cemcolift refused to give him employment in a position that did not involve exposure to dust and fumes. Whereas Pathmark fired Taylor because it perceived “his disability [to be] too severe to accommodate,” id. at 189, here Rinehimer has offered no evidence about Cemcolift‘s perception about the severity of his condition.
Rinehimer argues that various statements from Cemcolift managers about their perceptions that Rinehimer was sick, wheezing, and had difficulty breathing establish that they regarded him as disabled. The awareness that an employee is sick combined with some change in his work assignments is not enough to satisfy the “regarded as” prong of the ADA. Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1996), involved an employee whose hip injury caused him to limp and to have some difficulty walking, but who presented no evidence that he required any special device, like a cane or crutches, to aid him in walking. In Kelly, we held that the mere fact that the employer was aware of the employee‘s visible walking impairment was insufficient to show that the employer regarded the employee as disabled within meaning of ADA. Id. at 109. The fact that Cemcolift knew Rinehimer had been sick with pneumonia and was still having some difficulties breathing does not show that the company regarded him as disabled for the purposes of the ADA. The District Court did not err when it determined that Rinehimer had not established that he satisfied any of the prongs of the ADA‘s definition of disability.
The PHRA is basically the same as the ADA in relevant respects and “Pennsylvania courts . . . generally interpret the PHRA in accord with its federal counterparts.” Kelly, 94 F.3d at 105 (citations omitted). Therefore, our disposition of Rinehimer‘s ADA claim applies with equal force to his PHRA claim.
B. Admission of Evidence Concerning a Doctor‘s Evaluation
At trial on the FMLA claim, which survived summary judgment, the District Court, over Rinehimer‘s objection, permitted Walter Hermann, Jr. to testify that Cemcolift was told by the company‘s physician who examined Rinehimer
We generally review decisions of a district court concerning the admission and exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1997). When a ruling on the admission of evidence implicates the interpretation of a legal standard, such as the Federal Rules of Evidence, our review is plenary. United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 402 (3d Cir. 1996).
The District Court allowed Hermann to testify about what the doctor allegedly said about Rinehimer‘s condition because the testimony explained why Hermann did not allow Rinehimer to return to his job as a working foreman and wear a respirator. As such, the statement is not hearsay because it was not offered to prove that Rinehimer could not wear a respirator.
Rinehimer implicitly argues that Hermann‘s statement allows the doctor‘s opinion about Rinehimer‘s condition to get in through the back door. He argues that the jury in essence ignored the District Court‘s limiting instructions and took Hermann‘s statement as evidence of the doctor‘s opinion about whether Rinehimer could use a respirator. In general, however, “we must assume that the jury understood and followed the court‘s instructions.” Loughman v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 6 F.3d 88, 105 (3d Cir. 1993). See also Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 (1987). We thus conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Hermann‘s statement
C. Denial of Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for a New Trial
Both parties agree that Rinehimer was not returned to an equivalent position. The jury, however, found that Rinehimer had not proven that he was not given an equivalent position upon his return to work after an FMLA absence. Both parties agree that the jury‘s finding was erroneous. After the jury returned its verdict that Cemcolift did not violate the FMLA, Rinehimer asked the District Court to direct entry of judgment as a matter of law in accordance with
We conduct a plenary review of the decisions of a district court concerning a judgment as a matter of law and determine whether “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving [the nonmovant] the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could” reach the conclusions that it did. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). This court reviews a district court‘s order ruling on a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1167.
To succeed on his FMLA claim, Rinehimer had to establish not only that he was not returned to an
Rinehimer makes two additional arguments, contending that the District Court erred in not granting his motion for judgment as a matter of law or his motion for a new trial. At trial, Rinehimer claimed he had made an implied request for additional medical leave. The jury found that Rinehimer had not “prove[n] by a preponderance of the evidence that he made an express or implied request for additional leave [under the FMLA].” Rinehimer, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1165, at *15 n.8. Subsequently, the District Court held that the jury‘s finding was not against the weight of the evidence. Id. at *17. We agree.
Additionally, before the jury deliberated, the District Court instructed the jury that the FMLA did not require Cemcolift to make reasonable accommodations to Rinehimer upon his return from medical leave. Id. at *20-21. Rinehimer argues that this instruction confused the issues because he was not asking for an accommodation in the ADA sense of the term. The District Court stated, and Rinehimer does not dispute, that the FMLA does not require “an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation to an employee to facilitate his return to the same or equivalent position at the conclusion of his medical leave.” Id. at 21. See
We conclude that we have no basis to reverse either the District Court‘s denial of Rinehimer‘s motion for a new trial or its denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given herein, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
A True Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit