RIGOBERTO MEJIA v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
DOCKET NO. A-0710-13T4
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
August 11, 2016
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION August 11, 2016 APPELLATE DIVISION
Argued June 16, 2016 - Decided August 11, 2016
Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz and Gilson.
On
Alеxander Shalom argued the cause for appellant (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Mr. Shalom, Edward Barocas, Jeanne LoCicero, and Rebecca Livengood, on the brief; Rigoberto Mejia, on the pro se brief).
Joseph Micheletti, Assistant Chief Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney Genеral, of counsel; Dianne M. Moratti, Deputy Attorney General, and Alex J. Zowin, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KOBLITZ, J.A.D.
In this prison disciplinary appeal, Rigoberto Mejia argues that the sanction of three and one-half years in administrative segregation was improper. Mejia is a prisoner at New Jersey State Prison currently serving a sentence with a mandatory minimum of forty years imposed in 1995 for murder and associated crimes. Mejia was originally sentenced to death for the shooting of another undocumented worker over $750 in December 1991.1 Mejia, who is now fifty-seven years old and whose first
Department of Corrections (DOC).2 We reverse the sanction imposed because it was arbitrary and unreasonable.
On July 15, 2013, Mejia threw a bucket of hot water, urine and feces on a corrections officer who was walking by his cell. The substance also made contact with another corrections officer who was below Mejia‘s cell. Mejia claimed he had done so because he was fearful that the “officer wanted to jump him.”
A five-man extraction team was called to remove Mejia from his cell. Initially, officers were unable to enter the cell because Mejia had tied a bedsheet to the door, which had tо be cut by the responding officers. Officers also utilized “OC spray,” a chemical agent, to subdue Mejia before finally extracting him.
Mejia was charged with several asterisk offenses:3 1) two counts of *.012, “throwing bodily fluid at any person or otherwise purposely subjecting such person to contact with a bodily fluid“; 2) *.154, “tampering with or blocking any locking device“; and 3) *.306, “conduct which disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly running of the correctional
facility.” See
The hearing officer sanctioned Mejia to the maximum period of administrative segregation4 on each charge, all consecutive to each other. On the first bodily fluid charge, Mejia received fifteen days of disciplinary detention, 365 days loss of commutation time, 365 days of administrative segregation, and 90 days loss of television, phone and radio privileges. On the
second bodily fluid charge, Mejia received fifteen days of disciplinary detention, 365 days loss of commutation time, 365 days administrative segregation, and 30 days loss of recreation privileges. On the tampering with a locking device charge, Mejia received time served in disciplinary detention,
Under the “reasons for sanctions” portion of the adjudication form, the hearing officer noted Mejia “must be held responsible for his actions,” the behavior was “disgusting,” and it had caused the corrections officers to seek medical attention. Although the two officers were medically examined, the record contains no evidence of any injuries to either of them due to this incident.
On July 22, 2013, Mejia filed an administrative appeal of the disciplinary decision written in Spanish. Within three weeks, the Assistant Superintendent of New Jersey State Prison upheld thе decisions regarding both the adjudication and the sanctions in general language without directly addressing any issue raised. In the “explanation” portion of the form, the Assistant Superintendent stated: “My review of this issue reveals that there was compliance with the New Jersey Administrative Code on inmate discipline, which prescribes procedural safeguards, and the charge was adjudicated accordingly. The preponderance of evidence presented supports the decision of the Hearing Officer and the sanction rendered is appropriate. There appears to be no violation of standards.”
In October 2013, Mejia filed an appeal to this court. Six months later, the DOC filed a successful motion for a remand to reconsider Mejia‘s administrative appeal after its translation into English. On June 6, 2014, after the appeal was translated, the Office of the Administrator for New Jersey State Prison again upheld the hearing officer‘s decision, this time rejecting the specific arguments raised by Mejia almost a year earlier.5
In his pro se appeal to this court Mejia argued he had mental health needs and had not received the mental health screening required by
In response to Mejia‘s supplemental brief raising the argument that he suffered from mental illness and was particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of long-term solitary confinement in administrative segregation, the DOC for the first time revealed Mejia had been screened for
The DOC further informed us at oral argument that, pursuant to an August 14, 2015 “Request for Rule Exemption”6 (Rule Exemption), Mejia had been returned to the general population housing at an unknown date prior to oral argument, but after February 8, 2016, when the records reflect he remained in administrative segregation. The Rule Exemрtion, submitted to us after oral argument, eliminated disciplinary detention and limited administrative segregation “for multiple offenses imposed as a result of the same incident” to 365 days. The Rule Exemption also states:
Studies have shown that isolation, under certain circumstances, exacerbates mental health deterioration. As such, the elimination of [disciplinary] detention, and the immediate transport of an inmate tо a less restrictive administrative segregation unit upon adjudication, will have a positive impact on the inmate population.
Similarly, maximizing inmate exposure to no more than 365 days of administrative segregation per incident, rather than per infraction, will decrease the likelihood of isolation.
The Rule Exemption attachments include “a replacement list of prohibited acts found in
The scope of our review of an agency decision is limited. Capital Health Sys., Inc. v. N.J. Dep‘t of Banking & Ins., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2016) (slip op. at 14). “Ordinarily, an appellate court will reverse the decision of the administrative agency only if it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.” Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980). “Normally, when reviewing agency decisions, we defer to matters that lie within the special competence of an administrative tribunal.” Balagun v. N.J. Dep‘t of Corr., 361 N.J. Super. 199, 202 (App. Div. 2003).
“[S]uch deference is appropriate because it recognizes that ‘agencies have the specialized expertise necessary to enact regulations dealing with technical matters and are “particularly well equipped to read . . . and to evaluate the fаctual and technical issues that . . . rulemaking would invite.“‘” N.J. Soc‘y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep‘t of Agric., 196 N.J. 366, 385 (2008) (quoting In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 489 (2004)). “Our role is to
Mejia argues his appeal of administrative segregation is not moot7 because, should he be convicted of any further infraction, the severity of his prior sanction will be considered when imposing punishment. This argument raises the question of what criteria are used in imposing sanctions.
(a) The disciplinary action may be individualized by considering such factors as the:
- Offender‘s past history of correctional facility adjustment;
- Setting and circumstances of the prohibited behavior;
- Involved inmate‘s account;
- Correctional goals set for the inmate; and
- The inmate‘s history of, or the presence of, mental illness.
[(Emphasis added).]
The DOC also provided us with a copy of an “internal policy” statement, ADM.008.000, titled “Inmate Disciplinary Hearing Program: Mission, Goals and Objectives,” revised on April 28,
2011, and reviewed in September 2015, which states “[t]he mission of the Inmate Disciplinary Hearing Program is to ensure that . . . all inmate disciplinary hearings are conducted fairly and impartially . . . .” One of the “Goals and Objectives” is “[t]o ensure fair and equitable sanctioning of inmates . . . .” To accomplish those ends, “monthly reports containing a statistical breakdown of infractions, comments, and recommendations are generated, analyzed, and distributed to appropriate administrative staff.” The DOC has provided no information stating hearing officers are required to impose sanctions based on the factors set forth in
Mejia was given the longest possible period of administrative segregation available at the time based on the articulated reasons that his behavior was “disgusting,” he “must be held responsible for his actions,” and corrections officers had been medically examined. Mejia was convicted of two counts of throwing bodily fluids on another person, which is arguably “disgusting” in any of its manifestations. See State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 74-75 (2014) (holding “a sentencing court must scrupulously avoid ‘double-counting’ facts that establish the elements of the relevant offense“). All inmates should be held accountable for their actions, and the fact that the
officers hit by Mejia‘s bodily fluids were examined medically does not in itself reflect any injury to either of them. A bedrock principle of fair
Our criminal statutes provide aggravating and mitigating factors that must be considered and articulated on the record prior to sentencing.
“the sanction rendered is appropriate.” For a sentence to be “appropriate,” it is not enough that the sentence be within the maximum limits set forth in the Administrative Code. With such totally discretionary sanctioning factors, a hearing officer is not guided to distinguish among inmates convicted of the same infraction, as evidenced by the articulated reasons for the maximum period of isolation imposed on Mejia. Without any regulation requiring the articulation of sanctioning factors, we have no way to review whether a sanction is imposed for permissible reasons and is located at an appropriate point within the allowable range. See In re Issuance of Permit by Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 120 N.J. 164, 172-73 (1990) (stating an administrative agency that is performing a quasi-judicial function is obligated to set forth basic findings of facts supporting the ultimate conclusion so the reviewing tribunal may sufficiently review whether the actions were arbitrary and capricious, and whether they were within the agency‘s scope of authority); see also Bailey v. Bd. of Review, 339 N.J. Super. 29, 33 (App. Div. 2001) (stating this court should not defer to an administrative determination unless it has “confidence that there has been a careful consideration of the facts in issue and appropriate findings addressing the critical issues in dispute“).
We therefore reverse the sanctions imposed for Mejia‘s commission of various infractions in a single incident. Under current rules Mejia could not have been sanctioned to more than a total of 365 days of administrative segregation. He could not have received any time in disciplinary detention. He has thus served more than the maximum sanction presently available. We reverse the penalties imposed on Mejia, but affirm his guilt.
Mejia raises two other issues in his appeal: the quality of the mental health screening and mental health services he has been provided in prison, and the related issue of whether an interpreter was provided to him to allow him to take advantage of the mental health sеrvices otherwise available.8 The record
provided to
Not denying his commission of at least one of the infractions from the beginning of the appellate process, Mejia sought relief from the penalty imposed. We have given Mejia the relief he requested. As is true all too often, the time taken in this appeal, including the time necessitated by the failure of the DOC to translate Mejia‘s agency appeal initially, has nullified any practical effect of this relief. Nonetheless, we anticipate that the requirement for the consideration and articulation of sanctioning factors by hearing officers this opinion imposes will assure the sanctioning of state prisoners becomes more “fair and equitable,” a stated goal of the DOC.
We affirm the findings of guilt and reverse and remand as to the penalties imposed. We do not retain jurisdiction.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION