Rickey Carroll v. John Logan
735 F.3d 147
4th Cir.
2013
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Rickey Dean CARROLL; Cheri Carroll, Debtors-Appellants, v. John Fletcher LOGAN, Trustee-Appellee.

No. 13-1024

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Argued: Sept. 17, 2013. Decided: Oct. 28, 2013.

735 F.3d 147

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Simply put, the Court had to determine whether was retroactive to decide if the motion filed by Powell was timely. In doing so, the Court went on to reason that did not alter the “range of conduct” nor the “class of persons” that could be punished. Instead, simply recognized that the recidivist nature of a prior conviction had to be apparent on the face of the record in order to trigger enhanced punishment. . Therefore, , in this context, looks only at whether a certain procedure was followed in obtaining a prior conviction; it does not narrow the scope of a criminal statute such that it places a class of persons beyond the State‘s power to punish or exposes a defendant to punishment that the law cannot impose upon him. However, does not necessarily mean that did not announce a substantive rule. Although the Court took note of the case, the Court did not consider—and was not asked to consider—whether announced a new substantive rule. . The retroactivity of was irrelevant to because Powell‘s § 2255 petition could be sustained only by a retroactive Supreme Court decision.

In fact, did announce a substantive rule when it applied principles and then narrowed the class of offenders and range of conduct that can be subject to punishment. This additional application and analysis distinguishes from . In sum, even though determined that is a procedural rule that is not retroactive, this does not mean that , in applying , did not announce a substantive rule that is retroactive.

III.

In conclusion, because announced a new substantive rule that is retroactive on collateral review, we vacate Miller‘s conviction and remand with instructions to the district court to grant his petition.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

KING, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I write separately to reiterate my view that the Supreme Court‘s decision in , is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. See (King, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part). I also acknowledge and appreciate that the panel majority‘s contrary ruling in is the law of this Circuit. Nevertheless, as Judge Floyd so ably explains today, did not answer the distinct question now before us, that is, whether this Court‘s decision in (en banc), has retroactive applicability. I unequivocally agree with my fine colleagues that it does.

ARGUED: Cortney I. Walker, Sasser Law Firm, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellants. John Fletcher Logan, Office of the Chapter 13 Trustee, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Travis Sasser, Sasser Law Firm, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellants. Michael Brandon Burnett, Office of the Chapter 13 Trustee, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WYNN wrote the opinion, in which Judge NIEMEYER and Judge FLOYD joined.

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal concerns whether Bankruptcy Code Section 1306(a) extends the 180-day time limit under Bankruptcy Code Section 541 for identifying property that may be included in a bankruptcy estate. Appellants Rickey Dean Carroll and Cheri Carroll argue that the bankruptcy court erred by including an inheritance that postdated their Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition by more than 180 days as part of their bankruptcy estate. Because Section 1306(a) plainly extends the timeline for including “the kind” of property “specified in” Section 541 in Chapter 13 bankruptcy estates, we affirm the bankruptcy court‘s inclusion of the inheritance in the Carrolls’ Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate.

I.

In February 2009, the Carrolls filed a joint petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Under that reorganization chapter, debtors with regular income pay back a portion of their debts through a repayment plan. The Carrolls’ repayment plan, approved in August 2009, required them to pay $2,416 for 6 months followed by $2,480 for 54 months.

In August 2012, over three years after filing their Chapter 13 petition, the Carrolls notified the bankruptcy court that Mr. Carroll‘s mother had died in December 2011 and that, as a consequence, Mr. Carroll anticipated an inheritance of approximately $100,000. Because Mr. Carroll acquired the inherited interest before their bankruptcy case was closed, dismissed, or converted to a proceeding under another bankruptcy code chapter, the Chapter 13 trustee moved to modify the Carrolls’ repayment plan to include “an amount of the Inheritance, if and when received, sufficient to pay in full all of the allowed general unsecured claims....” J.A. 76.

Over the Carrolls’ objection, the bankruptcy court held that Mr. Carroll‘s inheritance was property of the bankruptcy estate. . The bankruptcy court thus ordered that the inheritance be included in the Carrolls’ plan to pay unsecured creditors, who, under the original repayment plan, were expected to receive payment on 3.8% of their allowed claims. . The Carrolls noticed their appeal, and the bankruptcy court stayed its order and certified a direct appeal to this Court.

II.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the bankruptcy court properly included Mr. Carroll‘s inheritance, which postdated the Carrolls’ bankruptcy petition by more than 180 days, in the bankruptcy estate. We review this issue of law de novo. .

The interplay of Bankruptcy Code Sections 541 and 1306 is at the heart of this dispute. We begin our analysis with the statutes’ plain language. “In arriving at the plain meaning, we ... assume that the legislature used words that meant what it intended; that all words had a purpose and were meant to be read consistently; and that the statute‘s true meaning provides a rational response to the relevant situation.” .

Bankruptcy Code Section 541 identifies the property included in bankruptcy estates generally. 11 U.S.C. § 541. The statute, which is not specific to any particular type of bankruptcy proceeding, includes in estates:

(5) Any interest in property that would have been property of the estate if such interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date of the filing of the petition, and that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after such date---

(A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance [.]

11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (emphasis added).

Section 1306(a) then expands the definition of estate property for Chapter 13 cases specifically, stating:

(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property specified in section 541 of [the Code]--

(1) all property of the kind specified in such section that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of [the Code], whichever occurs first; and

11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (emphasis added).

Congress has harmonized these two statutes for us. With Section 541, Congress established a general definition for bankruptcy estates. With Section 1306, it then expanded on that definition specifically for purposes of Chapter 13 cases. Thus, “Section 1306 broadens the definition of property of the estate for chapter 13 purposes to include all property acquired and all earnings from services performed by the debtor after the commencement of the case.” S.Rep. No. 95-989, at 140-41 (1978).

The statutes’ plain language manifests Congress‘s intent to expand the estate for Chapter 13 purposes by capturing the types, or “kind,” of property described in Section 541 (such as bequests, devises, and inheritances), but not the 180-day temporal restriction. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a). This is because “[t]he kind of property is a distinct concept from the time at which the debtor‘s interest in the property was acquired.” . And on its face, Section 1306(a) incorporates only the kind of property described in Section 541 into its expanded temporal framework.

In essence, Section 1306 is a straightforward formula for calculating Chapter 13 estates:

A Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Estate=Property described in Section 541+The kind of property (e.g., inheritances) described in Section 541 and acquired before the Chapter 13 case is closed, dismissed, or converted

See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a).

Section 1306‘s extension of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate‘s reach until the Chapter 13 case is closed, dismissed, or converted constitutes “a rational response to the relevant situation.” . Chapter 13 proceedings provide debtors with significant benefits: For example, debtors may retain encumbered assets and have their defaults cured, while secured creditors have long-term payment plans imposed upon them and unsecured creditors may receive payment on only a fraction of their claims. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325.1

In exchange for those benefits, a Chapter 13 debtor makes a multi-year commitment to repay obligations under a court-confirmed plan. The repayment plan remains subject to modification for reasons including a debtor‘s decreased ability to pay according to plan, as well as the debtor‘s increased ability to pay. See 11 U.S.C. § 1329. As we have stated before, “[w]hen a [Chapter 13] debtor‘s financial fortunes improve, the creditors should share some of the wealth.” .2

The overwhelming majority of courts to have addressed this issue “agree that § 1306 modifies the § 541 time period in Chapter 13 cases.” (collecting cases); see also (noting that “[t]he large majority of courts to address the issue agree” and collecting cases). Several treatises state the proposition matter-of-factly. See, e.g., Hon. Joan N. Feeney, Bankruptcy Law Manual § 13:13 (5th ed. 2013) (“Significantly, property of the estate in Chapter 13 cases is a broader concept as it includes property also described in § 1306, which supplements § 541‘s definition of property of the estate of Chapter 13 debtors.“); 8A Corpus Juris Secundum Bankruptcy § 561 (2013) (“In a Chapter 13 individual debt adjudgment case, the estate includes property of the kind generally included in estates, notwithstanding the fact that such property is acquired by the debtor after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under Chapter 7, 11, or 12....“). And even this Court has indicated that Section 1306(a) “adds certain property to a § 541 bankruptcy estate in the Chapter 13 context.” .3

The Carrolls nevertheless contend that Mr. Carroll‘s inheritance should be excluded from their Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate under two principles of statutory interpretation: the principle that courts “must give effect to every word of a statute,” and the principle that “specific language in a statute governs general language.” Appellants’ Br. at 8-9. We are convinced by neither argument.

Unquestionably, we agree that courts should give effect to every word of a statute whenever possible. . And doing so here requires us to reject the Carrolls’ argument. For if Section 541‘s 180-day rule restricts what is included in a Chapter 13 estate, then Section 1306(a), which expands the temporal restriction for Chapter 13 purposes, loses all meaning. By contrast, neither statute is rendered superfluous, and both are given effect, if Section 1306(a)‘s extended timing applies to Chapter 13 estates and supplements Section 541 with property acquired before the Chapter 13 case is closed, dismissed, or converted.

Further, while we know well the “canon of construction that ‘the specific governs the general,‘” , applying that canon here does not further the Carrolls’ cause. In particular, we reject the Carrolls’ contention that Section 541(a)(5) is “specific” while Section 1306(a) is “general.” On the contrary, Section 1306(a) is specific to Chapter 13 bankruptcies and defines estates solely for purposes of that reorganization chapter. Section 541, by contrast, is a general provision that provides generic contours for bankruptcy estates. Thus, even under the two statutory interpretation principles the Carrolls press, the bankruptcy court properly included the inherited property in the Carrolls’ bankruptcy estate.

III.

The Supreme Court has eschewed interpreting the Bankruptcy Code such that it “would deny creditors payments that the debtor could easily make.” . The plain language of Section 1306(a) blocks the Carrolls from depriving their creditors a part of their windfall acquired before their Chapter 13 case was closed, dismissed, or converted. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court correctly held that Mr. Carroll‘s inheritance was property of the bankruptcy estate under Section 1306(a).

AFFIRMED.

Notes

1
By contrast, in Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings, a debtor‘s estate is largely subject to liquidation. Generally, the estate is “identified with a snapshot taken of the debtor‘s property when his petition for relief is filed.” . And the secured creditors are soon free to foreclose on mortgages and repossess encumbered cars and other property. In turn, the debtor is not subject to multi-year repayment obligations.
2
In , we did not address Sections 541 and 1306. Nevertheless, we had to decide whether a $120,000 increase in the debtor‘s annual income warranted modification of his Chapter 13 repayment plan. We held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by increasing the debtor‘s plan payments to account for his substantially increased income. “It is grossly unfair for a debtor, who experiences an increase in yearly income of $120,000, to refuse to share some of that with creditors who are getting no more than 20 cents on the dollar for their claims under the original Chapter 13 plan.” .
3
We recognize that a couple of courts have taken a contrary view. See ; ; and . However, we find those outlier cases unconvincing.
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