HAMILTON, CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE v. LANNING
No. 08-998
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued March 22, 2010—Decided June 7, 2010
560 U.S. 505
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 524.
Jan Hamilton, petitioner, argued the cause pro se. With him on the briefs was Teresa L. Rhodd.
Thomas C. Goldstein argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Patricia A. Millett, Peter J. Gurfein, Amy Howe, Kevin K. Russell, G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., and Collin O’Connor Udell.
Sarah E. Harrington argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of respondent. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Kagan, Assistant Attorney General West, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, William Kanter, Edward Himmelfarb, Ramona D. Elliott, and P. Matthew Sutko.*
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code provides bankruptcy protection to “individual[s] with regular income” whose debts fall within statutory limits.
Section 1325 of Title 11 specifies circumstances under which a bankruptcy court “shall” and “may not” confirm a plan.
We granted certiorari to decide how a bankruptcy court should calculate a debtor’s “projected disposable income.” Some lower courts have taken what the parties term the “mechanical approach,” while most have adopted what has been called the “forward-looking approach.” We hold that the “forward-looking approach” is correct.
I
As previously noted,
The Code did not define the term “projected disposable income,” and in most cases, bankruptcy courts used a mechanical approach in calculating projected disposable income. That is, they first multiplied monthly income by the number of months in the plan and then determined what portion of the result was “excess” or “disposable.” See 2 K. Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy § 164.1, p. 164-1, and n. 4 (3d ed. 2000) (hereinafter Lundin (2000 ed.)) (citing cases).
In exceptional cases, however, bankruptcy courts took into account foreseeable changes in a debtor’s income or expenses. See In re Heath, 182 B. R. 557, 559-561 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA9 1995); In re Richardson, 283 B. R. 783, 799 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Kan. 2002); Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. Accord, 1 Lundin § 35.10, at 35-14 (2000 ed.) (“The debtor should take some care to project estimated future income on Schedule I to include anticipated increases or decreases [in income] so that the schedule will be consistent with any evidence of income the debtor would offer at a contested confirmation hearing“).
BAPCPA left the term “projected disposable income” undefined but specified in some detail how “disposable income” is to be calculated. “Disposable income” is now defined as “current monthly income received by the debtor” less “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended” for the debtor’s maintenance and support, for qualifying charitable contributions, and for business expenditures.
II
A
Respondent had $36,793.36 in unsecured debt when she filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection in October 2006. In the six months before her filing, she received a one-time buyout from her former employer, and this payment greatly inflated her gross income for April 2006 (to $11,990.03) and for May 2006 (to $15,356.42). App. 84, 107. As a result of these payments, respondent’s current monthly income, as averaged from April through October 2006, was $5,343.70—a figure that exceeds the median income for a family of one in Kansas. See id., at 78. Respondent’s monthly expenses, calculated pursuant to
On the form used for reporting monthly income (Schedule I), she reported income from her new job of $1,922 per month—which is below the state median. Id., at 66; see also id., at 78. On the form used for reporting monthly expenses (Schedule J), she reported actual monthly expenses of $1,772.97. Id., at 68. Subtracting the Schedule J figure from the Schedule I figure resulted in monthly disposable income of $149.03.
Respondent filed a plan that would have required her to pay $144 per month for 36 months. See id., at 93. Petitioner, a private Chapter 13 trustee, objected to confirmation of the plan because the amount respondent proposed to pay was less than the full amount of the claims against her, see
B
The Bankruptcy Court endorsed respondent’s proposed monthly payment of $144 but required a 60-month plan period. In re Lanning, No. 06-41037 etc., 2007 WL 1451999, *8 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Kan. 2007). The court agreed with the majority view that the word “projected” in
Petitioner appealed to the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, which affirmed. In re Lanning, 380 B. R. 17, 19 (2007). The panel noted that, although Congress redefined “disposable income” in 2005, it chose not to alter the pre-existing term “projected disposable income.” Id., at 24. Thus, the panel concluded, there was no reason to believe that Congress intended to alter the pre-BAPCPA practice under which bankruptcy courts determined projected disposable income by reference to Schedules I and J but considered other evidence when there was reason to believe that the schedules did not reflect a debtor’s actual ability to pay. Ibid.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. In re Lanning, 545 F. 3d 1269, 1270 (2008). According to the Tenth Circuit, a court, in calculating “projected disposable income,” should begin with the “presumption” that the figure yielded by the mechanical approach is correct, but the court concluded that this figure may be rebutted by evidence of a substantial change in the debtor’s circumstances. Id., at 1278-1279.
This petition followed, and we granted certiorari. 558 U. S. 989 (2009).
III
A
The parties differ sharply in their interpretation of
First, respondent’s argument is supported by the ordinary meaning of the term “projected.” “When terms used in a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.” Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U. S. 179, 187 (1995). Here, the term “projected” is not defined, and in ordinary usage future occurrences are not “projected” based on the assumption that the past will necessarily repeat itself. For example, projections concerning a company’s future sales or the future cashflow from a license take into account anticipated events that may change past trends. See, e. g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U. S. 308, 316 (2007) (describing adjustments to “projected sales” in light of falling demand); Innovair Aviation, Ltd. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 498, 502, 504-506 (2008) (calculating projected cashflow and noting that past sales are “not necessarily the number of sales” that will be made in the future). On the night of an election, experts do not “project” the percentage of the votes that a candidate will receive by simply assuming that the
Second, the word “projected” appears in many federal statutes, yet Congress rarely has used it to mean simple multiplication. For example, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 defined “projected national yield,” “projected county yield,” and “projected farm yield” as entailing historical averages “adjusted for abnormal weather conditions,” “trends in yields,” and “any significant changes in production practices.”
By contrast, we need look no further than the Bankruptcy Code to see that when Congress wishes to mandate simple multiplication, it does so unambiguously—most commonly by using the term “multiplied.” See, e. g.,
12“);
Third, pre-BAPCPA case law points in favor of the “forward-looking” approach. Prior to BAPCPA, the general rule was that courts would multiply a debtor’s current monthly income by the number of months in the commitment period as the first step in determining projected disposable income. See, e. g., In re Killough, 900 F. 2d 61, 62-63 (CA5 1990) (per curiam); In re Anderson, 21 F. 3d 355, 357 (CA9 1994); In re Solomon, 67 F. 3d 1128, 1132 (CA4 1995). See 2 Lundin § 164.1, at 164-1 (2000 ed.) (“Most courts focus on the debtor’s current income and extend current income (and expenditures) over the life of the plan to calculate projected disposable income“). But courts also had discretion to account for known or virtually certain changes in the debtor’s income. See Heath, 182 B. R., at 559-561; Richardson, 283 B. R., at 799; In re James, 260 B. R. 498, 514-515 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Idaho 2001); In re Jobe, 197 B. R. 823, 826-827 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Tex. 1996); In re Crompton, 73 B. R. 800, 808 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Pa. 1987); see also In re Schyma, 68 B. R. 52, 63 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Minn. 1985) (“[T]he prospect of dividends ... is not so certain as to require Debtors or the Court to consider them as regular or disposable income“); In re Krull, 54 B. R. 375, 378 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Colo. 1985) (“Since there are
This judicial discretion was well documented in contemporary bankruptcy treatises. See 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1325.08[4][a], p. 1325-50 (rev. 15th ed. 2004) (hereinafter Collier) (“As a practical matter, unless there are changes which can be clearly foreseen, the court must simply multiply the debtor’s current monthly income by 36 and determine whether the amount to be paid under the plan equals or exceeds that amount” (emphasis added)); 3 W. Norton, Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 75.10, p. 64 (1991) (“It has been held that the court should focus upon present monthly income and expenditures and, absent extraordinary circumstances, project these current amounts over the life of the plan to determine projected disposable income” (emphasis added)); 2 Lundin § 164.1, at 164-28 to 164-31 (2000 ed.) (describing how reported decisions treated anticipated changes in income, particularly where such changes were “too speculative to be projected“); see also In re Greer, 388 B. R. 889, 892 (Bkrtcy. Ct. CD Ill. 2008) (“‘As a practical matter, unless there are changes which can be clearly foreseen, the court must simply multiply the debtor’s current monthly income by thirty-six’” (quoting 5 Collier ¶ 1325.08[4][a] (15th ed. 1995))); James, supra, at 514 (same) (quoting 8 Collier ¶ 1325.08[4][a] (rev. 15th ed. 2000)); Crompton, supra, at 808 (same) (citing 5 Collier ¶ 1325.08[4][a], [b], at 1325-47 to
from an individual retirement account during the plan period to be “speculative” and “hypothetical.” Id., at 1132. There is no reason to assume that the result would have been the same if future disbursements had been more assured. That was certainly true of In re Killough, 900 F. 2d 61 (1990) (per curiam), in which the Fifth Circuit declined to require inclusion of overtime pay in projected disposable income because it “was not definite enough.” Id., at 65; see also id., at 66 (“[T]here may be instances where income obtained through working overtime can and should appropriately be included in a debtor’s projected and disposable income“). See also Education Assistance Corp. v. Zellner, 827 F. 2d 1222, 1226 (CA8 1987) (affirming bankruptcy court’s exclusion of future tax returns and salary increases from debtor’s projected and disposable income because they were “speculative“).
1325-48 (15th ed. 1986)). Accord, 8 id., ¶ 1325.08[4][b], at 1325-53 (rev. 15th ed. 2007) (“As with the income side of the budget, the court must simply use the debtor’s current expenses, unless a change in them is virtually certain” (emphasis added)). Indeed, petitioner concedes that courts possessed this discretion prior to BAPCPA. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.
Pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy practice is telling because we “‘will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure.’” Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U. S. 443, 454 (2007); Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U. S. 526, 539 (2004); Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U. S. 213, 221 (1998); see also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U. S. 279, 290 (1991); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 36, 47 (1986). Congress did not amend the term “projected disposable income” in 2005, and pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy
B
The mechanical approach also clashes repeatedly with the terms of
First,
Second,
Third, the requirement that projected disposable income “will be applied to make payments” is most naturally read to contemplate that the debtor will actually pay creditors in the calculated monthly amounts.
C
The arguments advanced in favor of the mechanical approach are unpersuasive.
Petitioner faults the Tenth Circuit for referring to a rebuttable “presumption” that the figure produced by the mechanical approach accurately represents a debtor’s “projected disposable income.” See 545 F. 3d, at 1278-1279. Petitioner notes that the Code makes no reference to any such presumption but that related Code provisions expressly create other rebuttable presumptions. See
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis, however, simply heeds the ordinary meaning of the term “projected.” As noted, a person making a projection uses past occurrences as a starting point, and that is precisely what the Tenth Circuit prescribed. See, e. g., Nowlin, supra, at 260, 263.
Petitioner argues that only the mechanical approach is consistent with
Petitioner also notes that
D
In cases in which a debtor’s disposable income during the 6-month lookback period is either substantially lower or higher than the debtor’s disposable income during the plan period, the mechanical approach
In order to avoid or at least to mitigate the harsh results that the mechanical approach may produce for debtors, petitioner advances several possible escape strategies. He proposes no comparable strategies for creditors harmed by the mechanical approach, and in any event none of the maneuvers that he proposes for debtors is satisfactory.
1
Petitioner first suggests that a debtor may delay filing a petition so as to place any extraordinary income outside the 6-month lookback period. We see at least two problems with this proposal.
First, delay is often not a viable option for a debtor sliding into bankruptcy.
“Potential Chapter 13 debtors typically find a lawyer’s office when they are one step from financial Armageddon: There is a foreclosure sale of the debtor’s home the next day; the debtor’s only car was mysteriously repossessed in the dark of last night; a garnishment has reduced the debtor’s take-home pay below the ordinary requirements of food and rent. Instantaneous relief is expected, if not necessary.” K. Lundin & W. Brown, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy § 3.1[2] (rev. 4th ed. 2009), http://www.ch13online.com/Subscriber/Chapter_13_
Bankruptcy_4th_Lundin_Brown.htm (as visited June 3, 2010, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
See also id., § 38.1 (“Debtor’s counsel often has little discretion when to file the Chapter 13 case“).
Second, even when a debtor is able to delay filing a petition, such delay could be risky if it gives the appearance of bad faith. See
2
Petitioner next argues that a debtor with unusually high income during the six months prior to the filing of a petition could seek leave to delay filing a schedule of current income (Schedule I) and then ask the bankruptcy court to exercise its authority under
3
Petitioner suggests that a debtor can dismiss the petition and refile at a later, more favorable date. But petitioner offers only the tepid assurance that courts “generally” do not find this practice to be abusive. Brief for Petitioner 53. This questionable stratagem plainly circumvents the statutory limits on a court’s ability to shift the lookback period, see supra, at 522, and n. 6, and should give debtors pause. Cf. In re Glenn, 288 B. R. 516, 520 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Tenn. 2002) (noting that courts should consider, among other factors, “whether this is the first or [a] subsequent filin[g]” when assessing a debtor’s compliance with the good-faith requirement).
4
Petitioner argues that respondent might have been able to obtain relief by filing under Chapter 7 or by converting her Chapter 13 petition to one under Chapter 7. The availability of Chapter 7 to debtors like respondent who have above-median incomes is limited. In respondent’s case, a presumption of abuse would attach under
right to file a motion requesting that the court dismiss your case under
IV
We find petitioner’s remaining arguments unpersuasive. Consistent with the text of
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting.
The Bankruptcy Code requires a debtor seeking relief under Chapter 13, unless he will repay his unsecured cred-
itors in full, to pay them all of his “projected disposable income” over the life of his repayment plan.
I
A
A bankruptcy court cannot confirm a Chapter 13 plan over the objection of the trustee unless, as of the plan‘s effective date, either (1) the property to be distributed on account of the unsecured claim at issue exceeds its amount or (2) “the plan provides that all of the debtor‘s projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.”
In the Court‘s view, this modifier makes all the difference. Projections, it explains, ordinarily account for later developments, not just past data. Ante, at 513-514. Thus, the Court concludes, in determining “projected disposable income” a bankruptcy court may depart from
That interpretation runs aground because it either renders superfluous text Congress included or requires adding text Congress did not. It would be pointless to define disposable income in such detail, based on data during a specific 6-month period, if a court were free to set the resulting figure aside whenever it appears to be a poor predictor. And since “disposable income” appears nowhere else in
The Court insists its interpretation does not render
B
The only reasonable reading that avoids deleting words Congress enacted, or adding others it did not, is this: Setting aside expenses excludable under
Such analogies do not establish that carrying current monthly income forward to determine a debtor‘s future ability to pay is not a “projection.” They show only that relying exclusively on past data for the projection may be a bad idea. One who is asked to predict future results, but is armed with no other information than prior performance, can still make a projection; it may simply be off the mark. Congress, of course, could have tried to prevent that possibility by prescribing, as it has done in other contexts, that a debtor‘s projected disposable income be determined based on the “best available evidence,”
The Court contends that if Congress really meant courts to multiply a static figure by a set number of months, it would have used the word “multiplied,” as it has done elsewhere—indeed, elsewhere in the same subsection, see, e. g.,
In any event, we are not put to that choice here. While under my reading a court must determine the income half of the “projected disposable income” equation by multiplying a fixed number, that is not necessarily true of the expenses excludable under
In short, a debtor‘s projected disposable income consists of two parts: one (current monthly income) that is fixed once for all based on historical data, and another (the enumerated expenses) that at least arguably depends on estimations of the debtor‘s future circumstances. The statute thus requires the court to predict the difference between two figures, each of which depends on the duration of the commitment period, and one of which also turns partly on facts besides historical data. In light of all this, it seems to me not at all unusual to describe this process as projection, not merely multiplication.
C
The Court‘s remaining arguments about the statute‘s meaning are easily dispatched. A “mechanical” reading of projected disposable income, it contends, renders superfluous the phrase “to be received in the applicable commitment period” in
Similarly insubstantial is the Court‘s claim regarding the requirement that the plan provide that the debtor‘s projected disposable income “will be applied to make payments” toward unsecured creditors’ claims,
The Court also argues that
Text aside, the Court also observes that Circuit practice prior to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), 119 Stat. 23, aligns with the atextual approach the Court adopts today. Ante, at 515-517. That is unsurprising, since the prior version of the relevant provisions was completely consistent with that approach. The Court is correct that BAPCPA “did not amend the term ‘projected disposable income,‘” ante, at 517. But it did amend the definition of that term. Before 2005,
II
Unable to assemble a compelling case based on what the statute says, the Court falls back on the “senseless results” it would produce—results the Court “do[es] not think Congress intended.” Ante, at 520. Even if it were true that a “mechanical” reading resulted in undesirable outcomes, that would make no difference. Lewis v. Chicago, ante, at 217. For even assuming (though I do not believe it) that we could know which results Congress thought it was achieving (or avoiding) apart from the only congressional expression of its thoughts, the text, those results would be entirely irrelevant to what the statute means.
In any event, the effects the Court fears are neither as inevitable nor as “senseless” as the Court portrays. The Court‘s first concern is that if actual or anticipated changes in the debtor‘s earnings are ignored, then a debtor whose income increases after the critical 6-month window will not be required to pay all he can afford. Ante, at 520. But as Lanning points out, Brief for Respondent 22-23, Chapter 13 authorizes the Bankruptcy Court, at the request of unsecured creditors, to modify the plan “[a]t any time after confirmation” to “increase the amount of payments” on a class of claims or “reduce the time for such payments.”
The Court also cringes at the prospect that a debtor whose income suddenly declines after the 6-month window or who, as in this case, receives a one-off windfall during that window, will be barred from Chapter 13 relief because he will be unable to devote his “disposable income” (which turns on his prior earnings) to paying his unsecured creditors going forward. Ante,
Moreover, even apart from the availability of modification it requires little imagination to see why Congress might want to withhold relief from debtors whose situations have suddenly deteriorated (after or even toward the end of the 6-month window), or who in the midst of dire straits have been blessed (within the 6-month window) by an influx of unusually high income. Bankruptcy protection is not a birthright, and Congress could reasonably conclude that those who have just hit the skids do not yet need a reprieve from repaying their debts; perhaps they will recover. And perhaps the debtor who has received a one-time bonus will thereby be enabled to stay afloat. How long to wait before throwing the debtor a lifeline is inherently a policy choice. Congress confined the calculation of current monthly income to a 6-month period (ordinarily ending before the case is commenced), but it could have picked 2 or 12 months (or a different end date) instead. Whatever the wisdom of the window it chose, we should not assume it did not know what it was doing and accordingly refuse to give effect to its words.
Even if one insists on making provision for such debtors, the Court is wrong to write off four alternative strategies the trustee suggests, Brief for Petitioner 50-54:
- Presumably some debtors whose income has only recently been reduced, or who have just received a jolt that causes a temporary uptick in their average income, can delay filing a Chapter 13 petition until their “current monthly income” catches up with their present circumstances. The Court speculates that delay might “giv[e] the appearance of bad faith,” ante, at 522 (citing
§ 1325(a)(7) ), but it offers no explanation of why that is so, and no authority supporting it.4 - Even if bad faith were a real worry, or if it were essential to a debtor‘s prospects that he invoke
§ 362 ‘s automatic stay immediately, the debtor might ask the bankruptcy court to excuse him from filing a statement of current income, so that it determines his “current monthly income” at a later date. See§ 101(10A)(A)(ii) . The Court dismisses this alternative, explaining that if the Code requires a mechanical approach this solution would “improperly undermine” it, and if the Code allows exceptions for changed circumstances the solution is unnecessary. Ante, at 522. The second premise is correct, but the first is not. Congress does not pursue its purposes at all costs. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-526 (1987) (per curiam). Here it may have struck the very balance the Court thinks critical by creating a fixed formula but leaving leeway as to the time to which itapplies.5
- A debtor who learns after filing that he will be unable to repay his full projected disposable income might also be able to dismiss his case and refile it later.
§ 1307(b) . The Court worries that this alternative also might be deemed abusive, again with no pertinent authority for the speculation.6 Its concern is based primarily on its belief that this “circumvents the statutory limits on a court‘s ability to shift the lookback period.” Ante, at 523. That belief is mistaken, both because the Court exaggerates the statutory limitations on adjusting the lookback period, and because, just as it does not defeat the disposable-income formula‘s rigidity to allow adjustments regarding the time of determining that figure, it would not undermine the limitations on adjustment applicable in a pending case to allow the debtor to dismiss and refile.7
- A debtor unable to pursue any of these avenues to Chapter 13 might still seek relief under Chapter 7. The Court declares this cold comfort, noting that some debtors—including Lanning—will have incomes too high to qualify for Chapter 7. Ante, at 523-524. Some such debtors, however, may be able to show “special circumstances,”
§ 707(b)(2)(B) , and still take advantage of Chapter 7. Aside from noting the absence of authority on the issue, the Court‘s answer is unsatisfyingly circular: It notes that the special-circumstances exception is available only if the debtor has “no reasonable alternative,”§ 707(b)(2)(B)(i) , which will not be true after today given the Court‘s holding that bankruptcy courts can consider changes in a debtor‘s income. As for those who cannot establish special circumstances, it is hard to understand why there is cause for concern. Congress has evidently concluded that such debtors do not need the last-ditch relief of liquidation, and that they are not suitable candidates for repaying their debts (at least in part) under Chapter 13‘sprotective umbrella. We have neither reason nor warrant to second-guess either determination.
* * *
Underlying the Court‘s interpretation is an understandable urge: Sometimes the best reading of a text yields results that one thinks must be a mistake, and bending that reading just a little bit will allow all the pieces to fit together. But taking liberties with text in light of outcome makes sense only if we assume that we know better than Congress which outcomes are mistaken. And by refusing to hold that Congress meant what it said, but see Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253-254 (1992), we deprive it of the ability to say what it means in the future. It may be that no interpretation of
I respectfully dissent.
