Memorandum Decision
T1 Todd Rupper (Husband) appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss a protective order. We affirm.
T2 Husband and Katherene Richardson (Wife) married in 1998 and had one child together (Child). In 20083, Wife filed for divorce and petitioned for a protective order against Husband. The district court issued a protective order in April 2008, pursuant to the Cohabitant Abuse Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1 to -14 (Lexis 1998 & Lexis-Nexis Supp.2002) (current version at Utah Code Aun. §§ 78B-7-101 to -116 (LexisNex-is 2012)). The protective order granted custody of Child to Wife and prohibited Husband from "directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, or otherwise communicating with [Wife], except as provided for in the Divorce Action." Consequently, the type and scope of communication permitted under the protective order was to be defined in the parties' divorce action. The district court's first order in the divorce action (the 2008 Divorcee Court Order) stated, "The parties may communicate with each other by telephone, or in writing, notwithstanding the protective order...."
13 Following the entry of a bifurcated divorcee decree in 2004, the district court modified the protective order in 2005 (the 2005 Modified Protective Order). The 2005 Modified Protective Order maintained the restriction on Husband from "directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, or otherwise communicating with [Wife], except as provided for in the divorce action." In a minute entry from the hearing to modify the protective order, the commissioner explained that this restriction meant that "the parents can communicate with each other only as to scheduling and exercising visitation." Over the course of the next few years, Husband filed multiple motions to dismiss the protective order, all to no avail, As a result, the 2005 Modified Protective Order remained in effect.
T4 In June 2009, Husband and Wife reached an agreement (the Stipulation) to settle the remaining issues in the divorcee action. The Stipulation required Husband and Wife to "'communicate via email or phone calls'" and explained that " '[t)he communication shall be civil and relating only to
15 Husband again moved to dismiss the protective order, seeking to enforce the district court's order in the 2010 Final Divorce Decree that the protective order "'shall be dismissed provided there are no violations of the protective order between June 18, 2009 and January 1, 2011)" At a hearing before the district court, Husband argued that he had not violated the protective order. Wife opposed Husband's motion, arguing that Husband's June 2010 email asking Wife to drop the protective order was a violation of the 2010 Final Divorce Decree. Husband did not deny having sent the email, but he asserted that it did not violate the protective order because the 2008 Divorce Court Order governed and did not restrict the subject matter of his permitted written and verbal communication with Wife.
T6 The district court denied Husband's motion to dismiss the protective order. The court reasoned that the parties' communications were governed by the Stipulation and not the 2008 Divorcee Court Order because the Stipulation "was immediately binding upon the parties as a contract, even though not reduced to a signed order until December 2010." The court concluded that Husband was not entitled to a dismissal of the protective order because Husband's June 2010 email to Wife addressed issues unrelated to Child, violated the protective order, and did not comport with the stipulated requirements for dismissal. Husband timely appeals.
17 Husband argues on appeal that the district court erred by failing to dismiss the protective order. When reviewing challenges to a district court's decision regarding a protective order under the Cohabitant Abuse Act, the "appellate court is entrusted with ensuring legal accuracy and uniformity and should defer to the trial court on factual matters." Bailey v. Bayles,
1 8 Husband asserts that the district court should have granted his motion to dismiss the protective order because the court's decision was based on its erroneous conclusion that his June 2010 email violated the protective order. Husband argues that the 2003 Divorce Court Order limited only the form of his communication with Wife, not its subject matter. He further asserts that the Stipulation's provision that the parties' " 'communication shall be civil and relating only to [Child] " did not take effect until the court incorporated it into the 2010 Final Divorce Decree, which was filed after his June 2010 email. In response, Wife argues that the Stipulation was effective when signed in June 2009 and thus that the district court properly
T9 Whether Husband's June 2010 email violates the protective order depends on how the controlling protective order defined the permitted communications between Husband and Wife. If, as Husband contends, the provisions of the 2008 Divorcee Court Order remained in place in June 2010, then the controlling protective order limited the parties to written and telephonic communications, and Husband's email would fall within the term permitting written communication.
110 When the parties signed the Stipulation in June 2009, it was binding upon Husband and Wife. "A stipulation is construed as a contract," Coalville City v. Lundgren,
111 Because the Stipulation conditions removal of the protective order on compliance with that order, Husband is not entitled to dismissal of the protective order under the terms of the Stipulation. A party cannot accept the benefits of a contract and reject its burdens. See Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
{ 12 Affirmed.
Notes
. Because a copy of the Stipulation is not in the record on appeal, we quote the relevant provisions of the Stipulation as they appear in the order from which Husband appeals.
. A copy of the email is not included in the record on appeal. Our description of the email's content is therefore based on Wife's counsel's reading of it into the record at the hearing on Husband's motion to dismiss the protective order.
. Initially, Husband argued that his June 2010 email and its context related to Child. The district court was not persuaded by Husband's claim, and Husband does not advance that argument on appeal.
. We do not have the entire record from the divorce action before us. Husband contends that the 2003 Divorce Court Order remained in effect in the divorce action until December 2010 and provided that "[the parties may communicate with each other by telephone, or in writing, notwithstanding the protective order entered in [the protective order action]." However, the commissioner's minute entry for the 2005 Modified Protective Order suggests that the court in the divorce action already limited Husband and Wife to child-related subjects when it stated, "[The parents can communicate with each other only as to scheduling and exercising visitation."