Richardson v. Rupper
318 P.3d 1218
Utah Ct. App.2014Background
- Husband and Wife divorced after marrying in 1998; Wife obtained a protective order in 2008 under the Cohabitant Abuse Act that prohibited Husband from contacting Wife except "as provided for in the Divorce Action."
- A 2008 divorce-court order stated the parties could communicate "by telephone, or in writing, notwithstanding the protective order." A 2005 modification had earlier clarified communications were limited to scheduling and visitation.
- In June 2009 the parties executed a Stipulation requiring communications be by email or phone, "civil and relating only to [the minor child]," and conditioning dismissal of the protective order on no violations between June 18, 2009 and January 1, 2011.
- Husband sent an email in June 2010 urging Wife to "drop" the protective order; Wife's counsel read the email into the record (the email itself is not in the appellate record).
- Husband moved to dismiss the protective order based on the Final Divorce Decree provision that would dismiss the order if there were no violations in the specified period; the district court denied the motion, concluding the Stipulation governed and Husband violated its limitation by sending the June 2010 email.
- Husband appealed, arguing the earlier 2008 divorce-court order controlled (permitting written communications regardless of subject) and that the Stipulation’s child-limited communication term was not effective until incorporated into the final decree after his email.
Issues
| Issue | Husband's Argument | Wife's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Stipulation or the earlier 2008 divorce order defined the scope of permissible communications (and thus whether Husband's June 2010 email violated the protective order) | The 2008 order governed in June 2010 and permitted writing regardless of subject; the Stipulation’s child-subject limitation did not take effect until it was incorporated into the final decree after the email | The Stipulation was immediately binding as a contract when signed in June 2009 and limited communications to child-related matters; Husband's June 2010 email violated that restriction | The Stipulation was binding upon signing and, because it limited communications to child-related, civil email/phone contact, Husband's June 2010 email violated the protective order; denial of dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158 (Utah 2002) (appellate review of protective-order decisions: legal questions reviewed for correctness; factual findings deferred to trial court)
- Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (a stipulation is construed as a contract)
- Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm’n, 20 P.3d 287 (Utah 2001) (parties are bound by their stipulations unless relieved by the court)
- Richlands Irrigation Co. v. Westview Irrigation Co., 80 P.2d 458 (Utah 1938) (contractual stipulations may be binding even before they are entered as an order)
- Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 325 P.2d 899 (Utah 1958) (a party cannot accept contract benefits while rejecting contract burdens)