RICHARD DUANE JOYCE, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 0390-19-2
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
APRIL 14, 2020
Sarah L. Deneke, Judge; RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR., Judge
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges O‘Brien and AtLee; Argued at
PUBLISHED
OPINION BY JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAROLINE COUNTY
Sarah L. Deneke, Judge
Christopher M. Reyes (SMK Lawgroup, PLC, on brief), for appellant.
A. Anne Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Richard Duane Joyce, Jr. appeals his convictions of driving under the influence (“DUI“), second offense within five years, in violation of
I. BACKGROUND
On December 11, 2017, Deputy McGhee of the Caroline County Sheriff‘s Office received a “be on the lookout” call. An anonymous caller had reported that a small green sedan with a male driver was heading towards Bowling Green “to get more beer.” The caller stated that the car was coming from an address on Farmer Drive, and the call originated from an address on Farmer Drive.
Deputy McGhee headed towards one of three locations in Bowling Green that sells beer. He observed a small green sedan, a Ford Focus, in the parking lot of the Rite Aid. One man was sitting inside the vehicle drinking from a blue can. When Deputy McGhee pulled into the parking lot “to get a closer look,” the driver of the green sedan immediately drove off.
Deputy McGhee followed the green sedan as it turned right out of the parking lot and pulled onto the road without incident. The green sedan stopped at a red light and signaled to turn left. Deputy McGhee stopped behind the green sedan, and, while waiting for the light to change, he ran the license plate and discovered the car was registered to an address on Farmer Drive.
When the light turned green, the green sedan remained stationary “for approximately six or seven seconds with the turn signal on and did not move.” There were no other vehicles in the intersection. The green sedan eventually completed the left turn onto Main Street. Deputy McGhee initiated a traffic stop for failure to obey a green light.
Deputy McGhee observed numerous open alcoholic beverage containers throughout the vehicle. Joyce had glassy eyes, slurred speech, and an odor of alcohol. Joyce failed three field sobriety tests, and a subsequent blood alcohol test revealed his blood alcohol content was .134. In addition to a failure to obey a traffic signal charge, Joyce was charged with driving under the influence, second offense within five years, and driving on a revoked driver‘s license.
Joyce filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence arising from the traffic stop. The circuit court held a hearing on the motion, during which Deputy McGhee testified. Joyce argued that the information provided by the anonymous caller was not sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to stop the car. He also argued that a six or seven second pause at a green light was not sufficient to justify the stop because he could have been waiting to make sure the intersection was clear. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic offense had occurred, which justified the stop.
The circuit court convicted Joyce of the charges, and sentenced him to ten years of incarceration, with seven years suspended. Joyce now appeals to this Court.
Joyce argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress because a six to seven second pause at a green light is not sufficient to provide reasonable, articulable suspicion that a traffic violation occurred.
“On appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.” Carlson v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 749, 757 (2019) (quoting McCracken v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 254, 258 (2002)). Joyce “has the burden of showing that even when the evidence is reviewed in that light, denying the motion to suppress was reversible error.” Branham v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 273, 279 (2012). We review the “evidence adduced at both the trial and the suppression hearing.” Carlson, 69 Va. App. at 758 (quoting Greene v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 606, 608 (1994)). “We give deference to the trial court‘s factual findings and review de novo the application of law to those facts.” Id.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop “must be based upon specific and articulable facts.” Mason, 291 Va. at 368.
The test is not what the officer thought, but rather whether the facts and circumstances apparent to him at the time of the stop were such as to create in the mind of a reasonable officer in the same position that a violation of the law was occurring or was about to occur.
Id. Reasonable suspicion “is more than a ‘mere hunch’ but less than ‘proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.‘” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 23 Va. App. 598, 610-11 (1996). The “mere ‘possibility of an innocent explanation’ does not necessarily exclude a reasonable suspicion that the suspect might be violating the law.” Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 732, 736 (2011).
Here, Deputy McGhee was behind Joyce at a red light. Deputy McGhee testified that after the light turned green, Joyce remained motionless at the green light for six or seven seconds before he proceeded through the light. Deputy McGhee did not observe any other vehicles in the intersection. Given these facts, Deputy McGhee had reasonable suspicion to believe that Joyce violated
Joyce argues that his extended stop at the green light was an exercise of reasonable care. He argues that
does not . . . mean that a green light is an unqualified command to a motorist to move in the direction indicated under any and all circumstances. It is only a command to do so in the exercise of reasonable care and when the movement indicated is not calculated to cause injury or damage to another. It is a conditional directive which is to be obeyed with reasonable care.
Arney v. Bogstad, 199 Va. 460, 463 (1957) (discussing an earlier version of
Joyce is correct that a green light is not an unconditional command to proceed. The statute itself contains conditional language requiring a driver to proceed ”except that such traffic shall yield to other vehicles and pedestrians lawfully within the intersection.”
In Mason, a police officer observed a vehicle with a 3” by 5” parking pass dangling from his rearview mirror. 291 Va. at 366. The officer initiated a traffic stop, based on
Like in Mason, some prolonged stops at a green light may violate
Here, Joyce remained stationary at a green light for six or seven seconds, and Deputy McGhee did not observe any vehicles in the intersection that would justify Joyce‘s prolonged stop. Therefore, Deputy McGhee had reasonable suspicion to believe that Joyce violated
III. CONCLUSION
Because the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, the circuit court did not err in denying Joyce‘s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.