RYAN RIBSTEIN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MIA MARX, Defendant and Appellant.
B338174
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
Filed 2/27/26
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23VERO01759)
Mia Marx, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Ryan Ribstein, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Alleged Fraud on Marx
Marx and Ribstein are former “business associates.” Marx is also the former girlfriend of Ribstein’s friend and business associate, Jonathan Yu. Marx contends that, between August 2022 and September 2023, Ribstein “transferred $165,657.13 . . . from her bank account[s] without her authorization.” According to Marx, Ribstein “conspired” with Yu and another business associate, James Swink, to accomplish this. Marx learned of “the account takeover” on August 16, 2023 and “notified” various authorities, including the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Trade Commission, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and Franchise Tax Board.
B. Ribstein’s CHRO Petition
On October 17, 2023, Ribstein filed a petition for a CHRO against Marx. The petition requested protection for Ribstein, Swink, and another of Ribstein’s business associates, Eric London. It alleged Marx “and her mother, Lorain Denise Rozniak Rice,” were “on a vendetta against [Ribstein, Swink, and London] and ha[d] reached out to a number of business associates and colleagues disparaging and defaming them.” It further alleged that Marx and her mother had “called, harassed, and physically gone to the homes of [Ribstein, Swink, and London] on repeated occasions” and
C. Marx’s Lawsuit Against Ribstein
On October 30, 2023, the same date Ribstein served his CHRO petition, Marx filed a complaint against Ribstein asserting tort causes of action based on the allegedly fraudulent bank transfers.
Marx requested the court consolidate her lawsuit and Ribstein’s CHRO petition. The court denied the request.
D. Hearing
At Marx’s request, the court required Ribstein and Marx to exchange witness and exhibit lists and serve copies of all exhibits five days before the hearing. The court’s order warned the parties that failure to comply with the order could result in the court excluding evidence.
The court heard the CHRO petition on February 8, 2024, approximately three months after it was filed.
1. Evidentiary Rulings Involving Marx’s Mother
Out the outset of the hearing, Marx asked the court to exclude testimony “that refers to [her] mother.” Marx argued she should not be held responsible for her mother’s actions. Ribstein’s counsel argued that “Marx and her mother act in unison and interchangeably in harassing individuals.” The court declined to exclude testimony about Marx’s mother “as part of a preliminary motion,” but invited Marx to object during the testimony.
2. Ribstein’s Evidence
a. August 17, 2023 phone call to Ribstein
Ribstein testified that on August 17, 2023, he received a phone call from Marx’s mother. He believed she “was calling [him] on behalf of [Marx].” Marx’s mother “said that she had reported [Ribstein] to the [Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]], the [DOJ], the IRS, [and] the police department, and that [he] would get what [he] had coming.” Ribstein “felt very threatened.”
b. August 29, 2023 phone call to Ribstein’s mother
Ribstein’s mother testified that a woman identifying herself as “[Marx’s] mother” had called her on August 29, 2023 saying, ” ‘I’m going to call the FBI, . . . the [DOJ;] [Ribstein is going to] get what’s coming to [him].” Ribstein’s mother felt threatened by this call, “because [Marx] and her mother had been showing up at houses and getting into houses by telling people stuff.”
Ribstein testified his mother told him the caller also stated “that [Ribstein] had stolen $150,000,” that “[the caller] had called the FBI[,] and that [Ribstein] was under investigation and would be going to jail.” Ribstein referred to the caller as both Marx’s mother and Marx herself. When the court asked for clarification, Ribstein explained: “[I]n some of the evidence we have, I don’t know who it [was] directly. It could be her [(i.e., Marx)] or her mother, because it’s the same person identifying themself in many
c. September 13, 2023 incident
Ribstein played security camera footage (without audio) depicting two women he identified as Marx and Marx’s mother arriving by car in front of his home, located in a gated community. The footage is approximately eight minutes long. The two women “look[ ] at [Ribstein’s] mailbox,” which is on the curb, “then wander[ ] around” in the street, apparently “search[ing] for somebody to talk to,” then return to their car and drive away.
Ribstein and his wife both testified that they were not home when they received an alert from the security camera showing Marx and her mother in front of the couple’s house. Ribstein believed Marx and her mother “were there to possibly speak with [him]” or that there was some “misunderstanding.” The couple decided to return home, and “as [they] were approaching [their] neighborhood [they] saw the same car [they] noticed in the video.” They “turned around” and began following the car. Ribstein “was trying to figure out why [Marx and her mother] were there and if [Marx and her mother] wanted to talk about something.”
Ribstein “pulled up next to [Marx and her mother] and asked them to pull over.” According to both Ribstein and his wife, Marx “called [Ribstein] a fat effing Jew” and told him he “would get what [he had] coming.” Ribstein called 911. The operator advised him to stop following Marx and her mother, and he did.
Ribstein testified that he and Marx’s mother were present when a process server served the CHRO petition on Marx. Marx’s mother “came up to [him] and . . . whispered . . . ‘you’ll get what you have coming.’ ”
e. Phone calls to Ribstein’s business associates between August and October 2023
Ribstein testified that Marx called “several” of his business associates and friends. He identified three of these by name. First, Marx called Eric London “several times” and said Ribstein was a “fraudster” who “stole her identity.” She told London that she was going to “file a claim against [London’s] insurance license, which she ended up doing.” Second, a man Ribstein knew only as “Sonny” told Ribstein about a call Sonny had received from someone identifying herself as “Lisa McDaniel with the LAPD” and asking about Marx. When Sonny pressed the caller for further identification, she stated she was a private investigator, and ultimately hung up on him. Ribstein believed Marx made this call. Third, in January 2024, an acquaintance named Audi Kawowski approached Ribstein at a conference and told Ribstein “Marx had been frequently calling [Kawowski],” telling him she knew he and Ribstein were friends because she had ” ‘seen [Kawowski] like [Ribstein’s] social media comments.’ ”
Ribstein did not testify as to the specific dates on which Marx called these or any other of Ribstein’s business associates or acquaintances. Rather, he testified generally that, from August 2023 until October 30, 2023, he was “consistent[ly]” learning of calls to business associates.
Ribstein testified that, between August and October 2023, he received approximately 10 calls from blocked numbers “at all hours of the night” that he assumed were from Marx. He never answered any of these calls.
g. Need for a restraining order
Ribstein testified that he needed a restraining order “because the only reason [the harassment] stopped is [that] . . . [Marx] was served [on October 30, 2023], but up until then it was consistent things.”
Ribstein described Marx’s conduct as “terrifying” and that he now worries for his wife’s safety when he is not home. “[B]ecause of the stuff that was going on . . . [he] lost testosterone . . . [and] had to go on medicine for that.” Ribstein described feeling like “a criminal,” feeling “terrible about [him]self” and being “in a constant state of alertness.” He believed Marx’s conduct had harmed his business reputation as well.
3. Marx’s Testimony
Marx denied much of Ribstein’s version of events, including that she had made any calls to Ribstein or anyone associated with him between August and October 2023. Marx acknowledged, however, that after she and her mother learned of the allegedly fraudulent bank transfers, her mother “began doing inquiries into what these wires were for” by calling the recipients of the transfers. Marx did not participate in these calls.
Marx recalled hearing her mother receive a call from Ribstein on September 13, 2023, during which he asked Marx’s mother to meet with him. Ribstein’s and his wife’s cell phone records do not
The court permitted Ribstein to cross-examine Marx using an audio recording in which a female voice appears to leave a voicemail message for Eric London. The court did not accept the recording as evidence, however. The female voice identifies herself as “Mia Marx.” Marx testified that the voice sounded like her mother’s.
E. CHRO
The court concluded Ribstein had met his burden under
Marx timely appealed the court’s order granting the CHRO.
DISCUSSION
Marx asks us to reverse the order granting Ribstein’s CHRO petition or, in the alternative, that we limit the scope of the CHRO. She argues (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the findings
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Arguments
A petitioner seeking a
” ’ [W]hen presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence, [we] must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by this standard of proof.’ ” (Hansen v. Volkov (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 94, 104 (Hansen), quoting Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005 (O.B.).)
Marx contends substantial evidence does not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Marx, rather than Marx’s mother acting independently, engaged in any of the offending conduct except the September 13 incident. She points to evidence supporting that Marx’s mother or someone identifying herself as such made the calls at issue. The court heard conflicting testimony from Ribstein and Marx as to who was involved in these calls. It also heard Marx’s testimony denying that she made the calls or instructed her mother to make the calls, and Ribstein’s testimony that he believed Marx and her mother were acting in concert. The court apparently deemed Ribstein’s testimony to be more credible. In reviewing for substantial evidence—even to support a finding by the heightened clear and convincing standard—“we must ‘not reweigh the evidence itself’ ([O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1008] . . . ), but must instead ‘view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.’ ” (E.G. v. M.L. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 688, 699.)
The court could also reasonably infer from other evidence that Marx’s mother was acting together with Marx or at Marx’s direction. For example, that Marx and her mother went together to Ribstein’s home supports such an inference. That a court could have reasonably reached a different conclusion does not render the evidence insufficient. Nor do we agree with Marx’s assessment that the court was confused as to whether testimony described Marx or her mother; to the contrary, the court asked Ribstein to refrain from
Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that Marx was sufficiently involved in the calls, either because she was herself the caller, or because she was acting in concert with her mother.
2. Probability of Future Harm
Marx argues substantial evidence does not support the requisite ” ’ “reasonable probability” ’ ” the conduct Ribstein complains of will continue. (Yost, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 527; see Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 496 [harassment must be “likely to recur in the future“].) According to Ribstein’s testimony—which the court deemed credible—the offending conduct only stopped when Ribstein served Marx with the CHRO petition. This suggests that, in the absence of a CHRO, it is reasonably probable the offending conduct will continue. Moreover, other evidence supports a reasonable probability that the offending conduct will continue. Namely, the ” ’ “circumstance[ ]” ’ ” that ” ’ “precipitat[ed]” ’ ” (Yost, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 528) the offending conduct—the dispute between Ribstein and Marx regarding the allegedly fraudulent wire transfers—continues to exist, Marx’s initial filing of a lawsuit notwithstanding. This dispute was also the topic of virtually all offending communications. Thus, ” ‘the nature of the unlawful [harassment] evaluated in the light of the relevant surrounding circumstances of its commission and whether precipitating circumstances continue to exist’ ” suggests ” ’ “it is reasonably probable” ’ ” these unlawful acts will continue ” ’ “in the future.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Marx argues the conduct Ribstein presented as harassment does not meet section 526.7’s definition of the term. ” ’ [W]hether the facts, when construed most favorably in [petitioner’s] favor, are legally sufficient to constitute civil harassment under
Marx argues the calls to Ribstein’s associates were constitutionally protected petitioning activity with a legitimate purpose in that they reflect efforts to gather information about the allegedly fraudulent wire transfers. (See
Finally, we disagree with Marx that the harm Ribstein claims to have suffered does not constitute substantial emotional distress. The court credited Ribstein’s testimony that he was anxious and worried about the safety of his family and maintaining the tranquility of his family home. We cannot say a reasonable person would not react in this way after Marx and her mother entered Ribstein’s locked, gated community without permission and appeared at his home uninvited. Ribstein also testified that the accusations of fraud were damaging his reputation as a businessman, and that his testosterone levels had dropped. Accepting, as we must, the truth of this testimony, it provides substantial evidence of substantial emotional distress.
C. Due Process Arguments
” ‘We review procedural due process claims de novo because “the ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a question of law.” [Citation.]’ ” (Severson & Werson, P.C. v. Sepehry-Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 944.) Marx argues the CHRO petition was insufficiently detailed to allow her to adequately prepare, resulting in a hearing at which she was “ambush[ed].” She notes that the petition does not ask the court to include Marx’s
“[S]
D. Evidentiary and Procedural Issues at the Hearing
Marx argues the court committed numerous errors during the hearing.
First, she argues the court improperly permitted hearsay evidence. But “[s]
Second, Marx contends the court prevented her from offering evidence regarding her lawsuit against Ribstein or the alleged fraud underlying it. The hearing transcript does not support this. To the contrary, it reflects the court inquiring about the status of the lawsuit for “a little bit of context,” and Marx testifying that the lawsuit was “not currently” pending because she had withdrawn it with the intention of refiling in a different jurisdiction. Marx cites no instance in which she attempted to offer evidence of the lawsuit or underlying fraud, but the court declined to consider it. Rather, Marx implies that the court’s pre-hearing denial of her request to relate the CHRO petition and the lawsuit limited her ability to reference the lawsuit at the hearing. But she does not explain how the two matters being related would have assisted her when the lawsuit was no longer pending at the time of the CHRO hearing.
Marx also argues the court improperly declined to permit testimony that Marx has Jewish heritage and testimony and recordings establishing that Ribstein performs stand-up comedy, during which he uses antisemitic language and references to having had fertility issues for some time. Marx argues these were relevant to impeach Ribstein’s claims that the alleged harassment caused his testosterone levels to drop and that Marx using an antisemitic slur could cause him emotional distress. The court acted within its discretion in deeming these topics insufficiently relevant. (See
Finally, Marx argues the court improperly placed the burden on Marx to prove she was not involved in or responsible for her mother’s conduct. But the court repeatedly stated the burden of
E. Scope of the CHRO
Marx argues that the CHRO is overly broad because “[s]he [can] only be enjoined from that which she has been found to have done.” Marx offers no support for this contention.
Marx next argues that the CHRO will impede her ability as a self-represented litigant to pursue her lawsuit against Ribstein. But Marx characterized conduct the court found to be harassing as efforts to pursue that lawsuit as well. The court thus did not act outside the scope of its discretion in declining to make an exception to the CHRO for such efforts—particularly when, at the time of the hearing, no lawsuit was pending.
The exception in the CHRO for “service of legal papers” is sufficient to permit Marx to refile and serve her lawsuit, as she represented to the court she intends to do. After doing so, with a lawsuit pending, the issue of whether additional exceptions to the CHRO are necessary will be ripe, and Marx may file a petition
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
M. KIM, J.