94 F. App'x 187
4th Cir.
2004

Allen WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO/CLC (“USWA“), Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-1250

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

April 16, 2004

95 Fed. Appx. 187

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Allen Williams appeals the district court‘s order granting summary judgment in favor of United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO/CLC (“USWA“), on his complaint alleging violations of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(2), 412, 529, and race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp.2002) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). Williams does not raise the Title VII and § 1981 claims on appeal.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir.1988). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, the joint appendix, and the district court‘s order. We conclude the district court properly concluded Williams failed to establish that removal from the office of president of the Local union and the decision to impose an administratorship were a direct result of his speech against display of the Confederate flag. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int‘l Assoc. v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 354 (1989). Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Williams v. United Steelworkers of Amer., AFL-CIO/CLC, 234 F.Supp.2d 542 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 31, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

Lori D. RHOADS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, in its capacity as receiver for Standard Federal Savings Bank and Standard Federal Savings Association, Defendant-Appellee, and Resolution Trust Corporation, a/k/a Standard Federal Savings & Loan Association, as Receiver, Defendant.

No. 03-2373

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

April 16, 2004

94 Fed. Appx. 187

Lori D. Rhoads, Appellant pro se.

Ashley Doherty, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Lori D. Rhoads again appeals to this court following our reversal and remand, in part, so that she could pursue her claim that she was retaliated against in her employment in violation of the anti-retaliation provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA“). See Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373 (4th Cir.2001). On remand, Rhoads was awarded $120,006 in back pay from the jury. Nonetheless, Rhoads again appeals raising several issues. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Rhoads contests the district court‘s denial of her motion to reconsider under Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b). As noted by the district court, the claims raised in Rhoads’ Rule 60(b) motion are barred by the law of the case doctrine, United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655, 661 (4th Cir.1999), as this court previously considered the claims in her prior appeal.

Rhoads’ claim that she was entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages in her trial for violation of the ADA‘s anti-retaliation provision fails because such relief is unavailable. Kramer v. Banc of Am. Sec., 355 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir.2004). Thus, Rhoads’ claim that the district court erred in limiting her evidence to prove these damages also fails.

Next, Rhoads alleges that she was entitled to prejudgment interest on her award, attorney‘s fees, expenses, and costs. We have reviewed the record and arguments made by the parties on appeal and find no reversible error. Thus, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Rhoads v. FDIC, 286 F.Supp.2d 532, 540-44 (D.Md.2003).

Finally, Rhoads alleges numerous errors regarding this court‘s decision in her prior appeal. These issues are now the law of the case and may not be reasserted in her second appeal. Aramony, 166 F.3d at 661.

Accordingly, we affirm. We deny Rhoads’ motion for oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED