Defendants Danny Redding and Durante Gay were tried jointly before a jury and convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Defendant Redding was also convicted of felony obstruction of an officer. The evidence which authorized these convictions, construed so as to uphold these verdicts
{Mills v. State,
At about 10:00 in the morning on March 20, 1997, City of Atlantá Police Officers Michael Giugliano and A. L. Dorsey, while conducting a covert surveillance operation in an area known for illegal drug activity, observed defendants Redding and Gay execute several deals which appeared to be illegal curbside drug transactions. The officers observed defendant Gay collect money from approaching customers and then direct them to defendаnt Redding, who was standing nearby. The officers then watched defendant Redding open a clear plastic bag and give each customer what appeared “to be a hit of crack cocaine.” After one such customer began consuming his purchase (“hit the pipe”), Officers Giugliano and Dorsey moved in to investigate — but not without trouble.
When the officers approached, defendant Gay turned and walked away. But defendant Redding “turned and spit [a] clear plastic bag [from his mouth], which contained 21 hits of suspected crack cocaine *719 to the ground, turned back and swung at [Officer Giugliano] and struck [him] in the chest.” Officers Giugliano and Dorsey wrestled with defendant Redding and exposed him to a debilitating “pepper spray.” The officers handcuffed Redding аnd then radioed for an ambulance and additional police support. After this help arrived, defendant Gay returned to the scene and joined a crowd of bystanders. Officer Giugliano spotted him and directed another officer to arrest defendant Gay. This officer complied, but a search of defendant Gay revealed no drugs or money.
Defendants filed these aрpeals after the denial of their motions for new trial. Held:
Case No. A99A1562
1. Defendant Redding’s sole defense at trial was that Officers Giugliano and Dorsey are falsely prosecuting him for the charged offenses because he refused to provide information against a suspected drug dealer whom the officers had targeted for arrest — Grady Blackwell. Citing
Walker v. State,
Walker
and
Henderson
provide that it is error to exclude evidence relevant to an accused’s sole defense, but explain that exclusion of such evidencе is reversible only when the evidence would have been enough to raise a reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt.
Henderson v. State,
Although Officer Giugliano’s proffered testimony reveals that he arrested Grady Blackwell on more than one occasion before the incident аt issue in the case sub judice, this proffer does not directly or indirectly support defendant Redding’s theory that any law enforcement officer is falsely accusing him of the crimes charged based on his refusal to provide information against Grady Blackwell. Since proof of Officer Giugliano’s law enforcement efforts against Grady Blackwell would have done nothing but cast a bare suspicion in support of defendant Redding’s defense, the trial court did not err in excluding Officer Giugliano’s proffered testimony. See
Croom v. State,
*720
2. Relying on
Batson v. Kentucky,
all throughout individual voir dire . . . she had a bad attitude [and she] was continually banging on the podium thing there as if she didn’t want to be here in the first place [and] the State’s position is that she would not have made an attentive juror and give all consideration to the evidence presented. . . .
Defendant argues that this explanation was contrived, pointing out that this prospective juror was otherwise articulate, educated and straightforward.
Under
Batson v. Kentucky,
Although there are indications that the prospective juror in question would have been well suited for jury service, these factоrs alone do not demand a finding that the State’s attorney improperly employed a peremptory strike to exclude this prospective juror. Consequently, since the State’s attorney’s explanation for excluding the prospective juror in question — perceived hostility, impatience and inattentiveness — have been found to be a fair basis for exercising a peremptory strike
(Jones v. State,
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant Redding5s motion for mistrial based on Officer Dorsey’s testimony regarding defendant Redding’s custodial admission that he was selling drugs “for himself.” Although the State did not provide defendant with notice of this admission in accordance with OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (1), defendant Redding made no showing at trial that he was prejudiced as a result of the State’s failure to make the custodial
*721
admission available to him prior to trial or that the State acted in bad faith in failing to comply with OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (1). Indeed, the State did not even offer defendant Redding’s custodial admission into evidence at trial. Defendant Redding’s incriminating custodial statement was elicited by defendant Gay’s attorney during Officer Dorsey’s cross-examination. In the absence of a showing of prejudice and bad faith, the trial court is not authorized to sanction the State for failing to comply with OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (1).
Bell v. State,
Case No. A99A1563
4. Because defendant Redding invoked the Fifth Amendment at trial, defendant Gay contends the trial court’s denial of his motion to sever the parties is reversible error because a joint trial excluded the possibility of testimony from defendant Redding that defendant Gay had nothing to do with the alleged curbside drug operation.
The deсision to sever was within the trial court’s discretion, and we will not disturb that ruling absent a showing of clear abuse of that discretion. OCGA § 17-8-4;
Stephens v. State,
The factors a trial court must consider in exercising its discretion in regard to a motion to sever are (1) whether the number of defendants will create confusion аs to the evidence and the law applicable to each, (2) whether there is a danger that evidence admissible against one defendant will be considered against the other despite the court’s instructions, and (3) whether the defendants’ defenses are antagonistic to each other or to each other’s rights.
Cain v. State,
There was no danger of confusion based on the numbеr of defendants because there were only two. There was no evidence *722 admissible against one defendant which was inadmissible against the other. And the defenses of the respective defendants were not antagonistic. They both denied operating a curbside drug operation — defendant Gay alleged that he was an innocent bystander and defendant Redding alleged thаt he was being set up by the police. These circumstances demonstrate that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant Gay’s motion to sever.
5. Defendant Gay contends a proper chain of custody was not established so as to authenticate the bag of cocaine defendant Red-ding discharged frоm his mouth at the crime scene. There being no evidence of tampering, the chain of custody was adequately established by testimony indicating that proper security procedures were followed by law enforcement authorities at the police department and the State Crime Laboratory.
Montgomery v. State,
Judgments affirmed.