REBECCA PAINTER, M.D., Aрpellant (Petitioner), v. JODY McGILL and KRISTINA STEFKA, M.D., ex rel. WYOMING BOARD OF MEDICINE, Appellees (Respondents). JODY McGILL and KRISTINA STEFKA, M.D., ex rel. WYOMING BOARD OF MEDICINE, Appellants (Respondents), v. REBECCA PAINTER, M.D., Appellee (Petitioner).
S-19-0040 S-19-0041
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
October 24, 2019
2019 WY 108
The Honorable Thomas W. Rumpke, Judge
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2019. Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County.
Representing Appellant in Case No. S-19-0040:
Stephen H. Kline of Kline McCorkle, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Representing Appellees in Case No. S-19-0040:
Bill G. Hibbler, Bill G. Hibbler, P.C., Special Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publiсation in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
[¶1] Following an investigation and hearing, the Wyoming Board оf Medicine (Board) suspended Dr. Rebecca Painter’s physician’s license for a minimum of five years, fined her $15,000, and ordered her to pay one-half of the costs of the proceedings. Dr. Painter filed a petition for review with the district court, which affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reversed and remanded in part the Board’s decision. Dr. Painter appealed from the district court’s order and the Board filed a cross-appeal. Because we conclude the district court’s order is not an “appealable order” under Rule 1.05 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure (W.R.A.P.), we dismiss these appeals for want of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
[¶2] The рarties raise multiple issues but only one is determinative:
Is the district court’s order an “appealable order” under
FACTS
[¶3] The facts of this case are convoluted but, for our purposes, only a brief summary of the facts as found by the Board is necessary.1
[¶4] In 2007, Dr. Painter became Patient’s primary care physician. At that time, Patient was 77 years old, had decreased mobility, suffered from congestivе heart failure, headaches and dizziness, and was unable to manage her money, assets, or property without assistance. Over the next eight years, until Patient’s death in January 2015, Dr. Painter, while still serving as Patient’s primary care physician, became intimately involved in Patient’s personal and financial affairs. Among other things, Dr. Painter toоk Patient to lunch, had her over for dinner and to spend the night, invited Patient to attend her church and to spend holidays with Dr. Painter and her family, and called Patient “her little friend.” Dr. Painter became Patient’s attorney in fact pursuant to a general durable power of attorney and a durable power of attorney for health сare. She was named co-trustee of Patient’s revocable trust, personal representative of Patient’s estate, and a joint owner of Patient’s bank accounts. Dr. Painter charged Patient $60 an hour for “financial management services” and paid herself approximately $42,725 from Patient’s bank accounts for these services; this amount included a $35,000 payment after Patient’s death.
[¶5] Patient’s niece complained about Dr. Painter to the Board. Following a six-day contested hearing, the Board concluded Dr.
[¶6] Dr. Painter filed a petition for review with the district court. The court affirmed the Board’s decision that Dr. Painter had exploited Patient under
[¶7] The court reversed and remanded the Board’s decision that Dr. Painter had violated
[¶8] The court also reversed and remanded the Board’s decision assessing Dr. Painter one-half of the costs of the proceedings. It decided there was no stаtutory authority for the Board to assess attorney fees and hearing examiner expenses as “costs.” Additionally, the court determined the Board abused its discretion in assessing costs prior to receiving an itemized list of costs. Without the list, the court reasoned, the Board could not have determined the reasonableness and necessity of the costs. The court remanded for the Board to “make an initial determination whether the amount charged for certain costs [sans attorney fees and hearing examiner expenses was] reasonable and . . . necessary for the preparation of the contested case hearing.” Thesе appeals followed.
DISCUSSION
[¶9] Dr. Painter challenges the contested case hearing procedure as well as the substance of the Board’s decision. The Board cross-appeals seeking to uphold the entirety of the Board’s decision. However, it also argues we lack jurisdiction over these appеals because the district court’s order is not an “appealable order” under
[¶10] Our jurisdiction “is limited to appeals from final appealable orders.” Matter of Estate of Inman, 2016 WY 101, ¶ 9, 382 P.3d 67, 69 (Wyo. 2016). An “appealable order” is “[a]n order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment[.]”
[¶11] In general, “a judgment of the district court remanding an administrative рroceeding to the agency for further proceedings is not an appealable order under
[¶12] The general rule applies here. The district court’s order remands the case to the Board to clarify certain matters, make further findings as tо certain violations, and to decide matters in the first instance. In other words, the remand requires the Board to exercise its judgment and discretion; it is not ministerial. See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ministerial (defining “ministerial” as “relating to or being an act done after ascertaining the existence of a specified state of facts in obedience to a legal order without exercise of personal judgment or discretion” (emphasis added)); see also In re Hartmann, 2015 WY 1, ¶ 15, 342 P.3d 377, 381 (Wyo. 2015) (order remanding the matter to the agency for reconsideration of all of the issues under the second compensable injury rule was a substantive remand and therefore the order was not a final appealable order); Schwab, ¶ 13, 312 P.3d at 794 (order was not an appealable order because it remanded the matter to the agency for a contested case hearing, which was not a mere ministerial matter); Martin, ¶¶ 7, 16, 60 P.3d at 1275, 1277 (order remanding the matter to the agency to allow the employee to provide additional evidence to defend against termination was not a mere ministerial matter and rendered the order non-appealable). Compare Wilson Advisory Comm. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 2012 WY 163, ¶ 14 n.2, 292 P.3d 855, 860 n.2 (Wyo. 2012) (order remanding the case to the Teton County Board of Commissioners for a minor correction did not render the order non-appealable).
[¶13] The district cоurt concluded its written order with, “This final order constitutes the Judgment of the Court.” Focusing on the words “final” and “judgment,” Dr. Painter argues the order is final and appealable because the district court said so. But the district court initially announced its decision orally. Several weeks later, it followed up with a written order. By referring to the written order as “final,” the court may have been simply explaining it was the last order it would be issuing in the matter. In any event, Dr. Painter’s argument improperly elevates form over substance. Stone v. Stone, 842 P.2d 545, 548 (Wyo. 1992). “Instead of emphasizing the name given to an action below, we . . . concentrate on the effect the order has on the parties’ rights.” Id.
[¶14] Dr. Painter contends the ultimate effect of the district court’s order is to uphold the Board’s suspension of her license based on the Board’s findings she exploited Patient and improperly terminated the physician-patient relationship. The remand, she argues, will not change that result, only the number of violations. Moreover, while the district court dеcided the Board had improperly included attorney fees and hearing examiner expenses as costs, Dr. Painter maintains it otherwise upheld the Board’s decision assessing costs. As a result, she argues the Board on remand need only engage in the simple ministerial matter of removing those fees from the cost assessment. We disagree on both counts.
[¶15] The ultimate effect of the district court’s order is to leave substantial matters unresolved, namely, the number and nature of violations supporting the Board’s decision
[¶16] Dr. Painter is simply mistaken on the cost issue. The district court remanded the case to the Board to remove the attorney fees and hearing examiner expenses from the cost assessment. However, it also remanded for the Board to determine in the first instance whether the costs assessed were reasonable and necessary. While the former involves the ministerial task of removing certain fees from the cost assessment, the latter involves an exercise of discretion and judgment. As we have already explained, tasks involving the exercise of discretion and judgment are not mere ministerial acts.4
[¶17] Dr. Painter altеrnatively asks us to convert the notices of appeal into petitions for review under
[¶18]
A writ of review may be granted by the reviewing court to review an interlocutory order of a trial court in a civil or criminal action, . . . which is not otherwise appealable under these rules, but which invоlves a controlling question of law as to which there are substantial bases for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance resolution of the litigation.
Whether to issue a writ of review is within our discretion. See Hartmann, ¶¶ 16-17, 342 P.3d at 381-82. We do not exercise that discretion “regularly, only whеn the case raises a question of law and appellate review of the district court’s order would materially advance resolution of the litigation.” Snell v. Snell, 2016 WY 49, ¶ 15, 374 P.3d 1236, 1240 (Wyo. 2016). We decline to exercise our discretion in this case.
[¶19] These appeals raise several questions of law but also ask us to decide whether the Board’s decision is arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not supрorted by substantial evidence. Resolution of the latter is not a question of law but instead requires a comprehensive review of the agency’s record. See Dale v. S&S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 2008) (“When we consider an appeal from a district court’s review of an administrative agency’s decision, we give no special deference to the distriсt court’s decision. Instead, we review the case as if it had come directly to us from the administrative agency.” (quotations omitted)).
[¶20] Moreover, resolution of these appeals will not necessarily materially advance the litigation as violations remain outstanding and clarification of certain violations is neсessary. As a result, immediate review of these appeals is not in the interest of judicial economy. Compare Snell, ¶ 16, 374 P.3d at 1240 (converting notice of appeal into petition for review where question presented was a distinct question of law and resolution of that question would materially advance the litigation as our dеcision would either result in a dismissal of the action or provide
CONCLUSION
[¶21] The district court’s order is not a final appealable order. We decline to convert the notices of appeal into petitions for review. These appeals are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.