[¶ 1] This is аn appeal from an order admitting a will to probate. We dismiss the appeal because the order was not a final appealable order as contemplated by W.R.A.P. 1.04 аnd 1.05.
FACTS
[¶ 2] In 1992, Thelma McLean (McLean) was “befriended” by EuGene Benson (Benson) and his daughter, Heather. Both Ben-sons were stockbrokers. From 1992 until her death in 1998, McLean transferred practically all of her financial dealings, not to mention most of her assets, to the Bensons.
[¶ 3] In 1999, McLean’s nephew, David Hall (Hall), petitioned the district court for appointment as personal representative of McLean’s intestate estate. Hall then immediately filed, on behalf of the estate, a civil action against the Bensons, alleging breach of fiduciary duties, undue influence, constructive fraud, cоnstructive trust, breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, intentional interference with expected inheritance, civil conspiracy, negligence, and fraudulent transfers. Several months later, Benson filed the purported Last Will and Testament of McLean, and eventually sought appointment as personal representative of McLean’s testate estate.
[¶4] On December 7, 2001, the district court ordered the two probate actions and the civil suit consolidated. Three months later, aftеr summary judgment motions left most of the issues extant, the district court signed an Order Admitting Will to Probate and Appointing Personal Representative, and a separate Order on Motion for Summary Judgment. Hall became personal representative in both probates. All proceedings in the civil action were stayed pending resolution of any will contest in the combined probate. This аppeal followed.
ISSUES
[¶ 5] Hall and the McLean Estate raise the following issues:
I. Whether it was error to enter an order admitting a will, about which the Court had serious reservations, to probate nearly two and one-half years after the will was filed, and three years after an intestate probate was opened?
II. Whether it was error not to hold the order admitting the will to probаte in abeyance until the conclusion of the civil action instituted by the Personal Representative appointed in the intestate proceeding, when that civil action is against thе devisees under the purported will?
III.Whether the civil action instituted by the Personal Representative of the intestate estate, which action was consolidated into the combined intestate and testate probates, acts as a will contest for purposes of W.S. § 2-6-301?
[¶ 6] The Bensons raise the following issues:
A. Does appellant lack standing to object to the probate court admitting the will into probаte and to bring this appeal?
B. Did the probate court, in accordance with the Wyoming Probate Code, properly admit the will into probate after letters of administration had been issued to appellant at appellant’s request and a petition to probate the will had been filed?
C. [Are appellees] entitled to recover against appellant for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by appellee[s] in defending a baseless appeal by appellant, in accordance with Wyoming Rules of Appеllate Procedure Rule [10.05]?
DISCUSSION
[¶ 7] We will not address most of the issues raised by the parties because this appeal must be dismissed for want of a final appealable order. 1 W.R.A.P. 1.04 reads, in pertinent part:
(a)A judgment renderеd, or appealable order made, by a district court may be: reversed, vacated, remanded, or modified by the supreme court for errors appearing on the record.
In turn, W.R.A.P. 1.05 dеfines “appealable order” as follows:
(a) An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment; or
(b) An order affеcting a substantial right made in a special proceeding; or
(c) An order made upon a summary application in an action after judgment; or
(d) An order, including a conditional order, grаnting a new trial on the grounds stated in Rule 59(a)(4) and (5), Wyo. R. Civ. P.; if an appeal is taken from such an order, the judgment shall remain final and in effect for the purposes of appeal by another party; or
(e) Interlocutory orders and decrees of the district courts which:
(1) Grant, continue, or modify injunctions, or dissolve injunctions, or refuse to dissolve or modify injunctions; or
(2) Appoint receivers, or issue orders to wind up receiverships, or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposition of property.
[¶ 8] This Court has hаd numerous occasions to apply this definition to particular circumstances. We have stated, for instance, that an order is not final if it does not affect a substantial right of either party.
Stone v. Stone,
[¶ 9] The McLean Estate contends that the Order Admitting Will to Probate and Appointing Personal Representative is a final appealable order under either W.R.A.P. 1.05(a) or (b). First, the McLean Estate cites
First Wyoming Bank, N.A.
— Cheyenne
v. First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Wyoming,
[¶ 10] In response, the Bensons rely on several cases that define a final order as one that reaches the merits of the controversy.
See, for example, Woods v. Woods,
[¶ 11] This appeal must be dismissed because it falls squarely into that category of cases to which W.R.A.P. 1.04 and 1.05 do not apply. Deciding whether the probate court was cоrrect in admitting the will to probate will not resolve any of the substantive issues and will not affect substantial rights of the parties. Whether administration of the estate is testate or intestate, the allеgations of
[¶ 12] Although we dismiss this appeal because the order from which the appeal was taken was not a final order, we decline to impose sanctions under W.R.A.P. 10.05. The McLean Estate’s brief was not so lacking in cogent argument or pertinent authority that it constituted that rare circumstance where sanctions are appropriate.
See Amen, Inc. v. Barnard,
Notes
. The Bensons raised this contention as a sub-part of their "standing” argument.