Randall v. Cantwell Mach. Co.Randall v. Cantwell Mach. Co.
Rendered on June 27, 2013
Mark A. Adams, LLC, and Mark A. Adams, for appellant.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and LaTawnda N. Moore, for appellee Administrator, Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Michael A. Randall (“appellant“), appeals from a decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to quash and/or for a protective order and granting a motion filed by defendant-appellee Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“appellee“) to compel appellant to sign an unaltered medical release. Because we conclude that the trial court erred by not granting appellant‘s proposed protective order or implementing other measures to protect records potentially subject to the physician-patient privilege, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
{¶ 2} Appellant suffered an industrial accident and sustained injuries to his neck and shoulder while employed by defendant-appellee Cantwell Machinery Co. (“Cantwell“) in 2009. Appellant filed a workers’ compensation claim, which was allowed for the condition of left shoulder sprain. The claim was subsequently allowed for additional
{¶ 3} After filing an answer to appellant‘s complaint, appellee served subpoenas on ten medical providers, requesting complete certified medical records for appellant. Appellant filed a motion to quash the subpoenas and for a protective order. Appellant also sought sanctions against appellee, arguing that appellee misrepresented the scope of the authorization for release of medical records that appellant agreed to by submitting a first report of injury form to file his claim. Appellee subsequently withdrew the subpoenas. Appellee later filed a motion to compel appellant to sign an unaltered copy of a medical release authorizing the release of any and all medical reports, records, files, and information pertaining to appellant. After conducting a status conference with the parties, the trial court issued orders addressing various pending discovery motions. The trial court denied appellant‘s motion to quash and/or for a protective order and request for sanctions. The trial court granted appellee‘s motion to compel appellant to provide an unaltered medical release.
{¶ 4} Appellant appeals from the trial court‘s decision, assigning three errors for this court‘s review:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
In this workers’ compensation case, the trial court erred by ordering plaintiff-appellant to produce an unlimited, unrestricted global release of all medical records relating to plaintiff-appellant, including statutorily privileged irrelevant
medical records, even though the only body part at issue in the case involves plaintiff-appellant‘s neck.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
In this workers’ compensation case, the trial court erred by denying plaintiff-appellant‘s motion for a protective order that would allow defendant-appellee to obtain all medical records but which placed reasonable restrictions on the use and disclosure of those records on defendant-appellee.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
In this workers’ compensation case, the trial court erred in denying plaintiff-appellant‘s motion for sanctions where defendant-appellee‘s counsel subpoenaed all of plaintiff-appellant‘s medical records and misrepresented the scope of the an [sic] initial authorization signed by plaintiff-appellant as defendant appellee‘s conduct was in direct contradiction of plaintiff-appellant‘s consent.
{¶ 5} In appellant‘s first assignment of error, he asserts that the trial court erred by granting appellee‘s motion to compel him to grant an unaltered medical release authorizing the release of all medical reports, records, files, and information related to him. In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a protective order. We conclude that these two assignments of error are interrelated because they address appellant‘s claims of privilege and the measures taken to identify and protect any privileged documents; we will address these assignments of error together.
{¶ 6} Generally, discovery orders are not final and appealable. Concheck v. Concheck, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-896, 2008-Ohio-2569, ¶ 8. Therefore, we begin by considering whether the trial court‘s decision constitutes a final, appealable order. A trial court order is final and appealable if it meets the requirements of
{¶ 7}
{¶ 8} After determining that these portions of the trial court‘s decision constitute final orders under
{¶ 10} The physician-patient privilege is governed by
{¶ 11} Ohio law generally provides for a broad scope of discovery, allowing parties to obtain discovery regarding any matter that is not privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of an action. Hope Academy at ¶ 24. However, under
{¶ 12} In this case, appellee issued subpoenas to several medical providers requesting copies of appellant‘s complete medical records. Appellee indicated that these subpoenas were issued to medical providers identified by appellant in response to appellee‘s interrogatories as having treated or examined him for injuries related to his claim or to medical providers identified in appellant‘s workers’ compensation claim file. Presumably, the records possessed by medical providers who treated appellant only for the injuries that gave rise to his workers’ compensation claim would be causally and historically related to issues in the claim. However, appellee also subpoenaed records from Dr. Maurice Mast, whom appellant identified in response to appellee‘s interrogatories as his family care physician since 1993. In its brief, appellee conceded that Dr. Mast may have treated appellant for unrelated conditions, but argues that it is entitled to Dr. Mast‘s entire file on appellant because he previously treated appellant for shoulder problems that may be causally and historically related to the workers’ compensation claim. Although appellee subsequently withdrew its initial subpoenas, some of the medical providers had already responded. Under the trial court‘s order compelling appellant to grant an unaltered medical release, appellee will be able to obtain the same records sought under its initial subpoenas.
{¶ 13} Appellant concedes that, by filing a workers’ compensation claim, he has waived the physician-patient privilege with respect to records that are causally or historically related to the injuries giving rise to that claim. However, appellant argues that, under the unaltered medical release the trial court ordered, appellee will be able to obtain additional records that are not causally or historically related to the injuries giving rise to the workers’ compensation claim. In addition to seeking to quash the subpoenas, appellant proposed a protective order under which he would agree to sign the medical authorization. Under the proposed protective order, the parties would seek to reach agreement on which documents were subject to physician-patient privilege or otherwise not subject to discovery. If the parties were unable to agree on a particular document, appellant would submit his objections to the court for an in camera
{¶ 14} In determining this appeal, we are guided by our prior decision in Mason. That case involved a discovery dispute about medical records in a personal injury lawsuit. Mason at ¶ 2-3. The defendant sought certain medical records that the plaintiff claimed were privileged and irrelevant to the complaint. Id. at ¶ 3. The defendant filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to grant releases authorizing the release of her medical records and the trial court granted the motion to compel. Id. at ¶ 3-4. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by granting the motion to compel production of all medical records and by failing to conduct an in camera inspection of the records to determine which records were causally or historically related to the claimed injuries. Id. at ¶ 8. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff never requested an in camera inspection, but this court concluded that the plaintiff informally requested that the trial court inspect at least some of the records and the trial court refused. Id. at ¶ 19. Although acknowledging that there are many methods for obtaining medical records and determining their relevance, and that trial courts have broad authority to determine the most appropriate method to protect privileged medical records, the court concluded that “[a] trial court may not, however, simply ignore the requirements of
{¶ 15} In this case, as in Mason, appellant asserts that some of the records appellee seeks in discovery may be protected by the physician-patient privilege. As noted above, appellee concedes that the records sought from Dr. Mast may include communications regarding unrelated conditions. Under these circumstances, the trial court should take measures to ensure that privileged medical records are protected from disclosure. We conclude that the trial court did not err by granting appellee‘s motion to compel the unaltered medical release, but that it was also necessary to protect any privileged medical records that might be produced under that release. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by not granting appellant‘s protective order or implementing some other measure, such as an in camera review, to determine whether certain records were privileged. As in Mason, we recognize that the trial court is in the best position to
{¶ 16} Accordingly, we overrule appellant‘s first assignment of error and sustain appellant‘s second assignment of error.
{¶ 17} In appellant‘s third assignment of error, he asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion for sanctions. Once again, we begin by considering whether this portion of the trial court‘s decision constitutes a final, appealable order.
{¶ 18} In relevant part,
{¶ 19} As explained above, the trial court‘s decision could also constitute a final order under
{¶ 20} Accordingly, appellant‘s third assignment of error is not ripe for review because the portion of the trial court‘s order denying his motion for sanctions is not a final, appealable order.
{¶ 21} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant‘s first assignment of error, sustain appellant‘s second assignment of error, and dismiss appellant‘s third assignment of error as not ripe for review. We affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, and this matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings in accordance with law and consistent with this decision.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.
TYACK and BROWN, JJ., concur