Ralph Laverne HUNNICUTT-CARTER, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
No. S-12-0271
Supreme Court of Wyoming
Aug. 29, 2013
2013 WY 103
that must be met. First, there must be “a clear statement of the facts agreed on.” 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agreed Case § 12 at 732; see Fugate v. Mayor and City Council of Town of Buffalo, Wyo., 348 P.2d 76, 81, 97 A.L.R.2d 243 (1959). Second, the statement of facts must “be sufficient in itself to enable the court directly to draw conclusions of law determinative of the matter in controversy.” 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agreed Case § 14 at 733. Finally, “the statement of facts constituting an agreed case should be made part of the record in the proceeding, lest there be no basis for review of the judgment.” Id. § 16 at 734.
It is clear from the record that the parties did not present an agreed case that could produce a just result. They did not enter a stipulation of facts from which the district court could draw legal conclusions. Nor can a stipulation be found in the record upon which we can ground our appellate review. The district court rendered judgment on its assumption that the parties had submitted the case for determination on the briefs. Yet there was no motion by either party indicating that the facts had been sufficiently developed for such a decision. Consequently, the surprise order was based only on conflicting and inadequate affidavits. The adjudication may have been speedy and inexpensive as encouraged by
[¶ 10] In the absence of a hearing transcript, and in accordance with
If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means including appellant‘s recollection. The statement shall be filed and served on appellee within 35 days of the filing of the notice of appeal. Appellee may file and serve objections or propose amendments within 15 days after service. The trial court shall, within 10 days, enter its order settling and approving the statement of evidence, which shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal.
[¶ 11] Although Father certified in his Notice of Appeal that he intended to procure a statement of the evidence, he did not do so. Our hands are tied. This Court cannot assess whether or not the district court was presented with adequate facts or “context” to decide the issue and satisfy the Koontz requirements, if we are to assume this was an “agreed case.” Given the lack of transcript and no statement of evidence, we must presume the context presented to the district court was adequate to satisfy the requirements of Koontz.
CONCLUSION
[¶ 12] Affirmed.
tern, of the Prosecution Assistance Clinic. Argument by Ms. Gilbert.
Before KITE, C.J., and HILL, VOIGT, BURKE, and DAVIS, JJ.
DAVIS, Justice.
[¶ 1] Appellant Ralph Laverne Hunnicutt-Carter entered a conditional plea to a charge of felony possession of methamphetamine, thereby reserving the right to appeal the district court‘s denial of his motion to suppress the results of a vehicle inventory which yielded the methamphetamine. Appellant contends that impoundment of the vehicle was unnecessary under the circumstances, and that the search was conducted in bad faith. He also claims that police officers should be required to inquire into less intrusive means of safeguarding a vehicle before inventorying one in anticipation of impoundment.
[¶ 2] We hold that inventory of a vehicle‘s contents pending impoundment is constitutional when it is authorized by statute or when it is conducted pursuant to the general policy of a law enforcement agency. In this case, a state trooper had both a statutory basis to impound a vehicle whose driver had been arrested, and he was also required to inventory the vehicle‘s contents before impounding it by a general Wyoming Highway Patrol policy. We also find that the district court‘s ruling that the trooper acted in good faith is supported by the record and is not therefore clearly erroneous. Consequently, we affirm.
Representing Appellee: Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Theodore R. Racines, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Prof. Darrell D. Jackson, Faculty Director; Emily N. Thomas, Student Director; and Courtney Gilbert, Student In-
ISSUE
[¶ 3] Did the district court err in denying Appellant‘s motion to suppress the results of an inventory search preceding the planned impoundment of a vehicle but after its driver had been arrested?
FACTS
[¶ 4] Shortly after midnight on April 5, 2012, Highway Patrol Trooper Scott Templeton observed a Chevrolet Cavalier which appeared to be travelling above the posted speed limit on Highway 51 outside of Gillette,
[¶ 5] Templeton left Hunnicutt-Carter in his vehicle and contacted his dispatcher from his patrol car. The dispatcher advised him that Hunnicutt-Carter had an outstanding warrant from Campbell County.1 Templeton confirmed the validity of the warrant with the dispatcher, arrested Hunnicutt-Carter, and placed him in the patrol car. According to the police report, only eleven minutes transpired between the initial stop and the arrest.
[¶ 6] Trooper Templeton planned to impound the vehicle as required by Highway Patrol policy, and pursuant to that policy he conducted what was intended to be a pre-impoundment inventory of the vehicle. He discovered a small plastic bag of a crystalline substance he suspected to be methamphetamine in the driver‘s console. He also found an unlocked strongbox which contained five more baggies of suspected methamphetamine, a syringe, a glass pipe, a digital scale, several cotton swabs, and a spoon in the front passenger seat area. A field test indicated that the baggies in fact contained crystal methamphetamine. This was later confirmed by laboratory testing.
[¶ 7] Hunnicutt-Carter‘s father arrived to take possession of the vehicle shortly after Trooper Templeton completed the inventory which revealed the drugs and paraphernalia, but before a tow truck arrived to take the vehicle to an impoundment yard. Hunnicutt-Carter had called his father to ask him to pick the vehicle up while Trooper Templeton was in his patrol car checking for warrants. Trooper Templeton released the vehicle to Appellant‘s father, and he drove it away. Appellant was then charged with possession of three or more grams of methamphetamine, a felony under
[¶ 8] Appellant pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine as the product of an illegal search. He claimed that a warrantless vehicle search was unreasonable under the circumstances, and that an inventory was unnecessary because his father was available to take the vehicle.
[¶ 9] At the suppression hearing, the State called Trooper Templeton as its only witness. He testified that the Wyoming Highway Patrol (WHP) has a policy requiring impoundment of vehicles when no one is available to drive the vehicle after an arrest, and that the policy also requires troopers to inventory the contents of vehicles to be impounded before releasing them to a towing company or any other person or entity.
That policy provides that we will do an inventory of the vehicle, its contents, prep it for being towed.
. . . .
The procedure is to go completely through the vehicle either by audio or write it down what‘s in the vehicle.
. . . .
[W]e go through there [the vehicle], we talk about anything of value, any loose items, things like that that are in the vehicle that could be taken from the vehicle.
Trooper Templeton stated that the purpose of an inventory is to “hold everyone accountable when they take possession of the vehicle.”
[¶ 10] Trooper Templeton testified that no one was available to take the car until after the inventory. He indicated that he did not know that Appellant‘s father was on his way to pick up the car when he performed the inventory. He testified that he was simply complying with the WHP‘s established policy for inventorying vehicles when he discovered the methamphetamine and assorted paraphernalia.
[¶ 11] Cross-examination elicited that Trooper Templeton saw that Appellant was on his phone while his license was being
[¶ 12] Defense counsel asked, “Now, don‘t you have to impound the car before you have the right to do an inventory search?” Trooper Templeton responded “No, sir.” He clarified that once an arrest is made, the arrestee‘s vehicle is technically in his possession under the WHP inventory policy. At that point, he is required by the policy to conduct an inventory before he can release the vehicle to anyone but the driver or a passenger.
[¶ 13] Trooper Templeton admitted that the vehicle was not stolen, abandoned, or a hazard to other drivers. It was parked approximately six feet from the roadway, and it could have been moved further from traffic. He believed that the car might have been safe for the night, but reiterated that Highway Patrol policy does not permit troopers to leave cars on the side of the road when an arrest is made. He also admitted that the car was never impounded. The court questioned Trooper Templeton on the meaning of the word “impound,” and he clarified, “We did not impound the car, take it, have a tow truck come and take it and put it in our safe keep.”
[¶ 14] The district court held that Trooper Templeton conducted an inventory in good faith pursuant to a valid inventory policy, and denied the motion to suppress. Hunnicutt-Carter entered into a conditional plea agreement, pleading no contest to the felony possession charge, but reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. See
DISCUSSION
[¶ 15] The
[¶ 16] Vehicle inventories are an exception to the general warrant requirement. Johnson v. State, 2006 WY 79, ¶ 13, 137 P.3d 903, 906 (Wyo. 2006) (citing Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 481 (Wyo. 1988)). The inventory exception allows police officers to inventory the contents of a vehicle in the possession of law enforcement if the inventory “is conducted pursuant to a standardized police procedure.” See Vargas-Rocha v. State, 891 P.2d 763, 767 (Wyo. 1995) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3100, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)).
[¶ 17] Probable cause is unnecessary to conduct an inventory, but the inventory cannot be a bad faith pretext for general
[¶ 18] Appellant first contends that the inventory was conducted in bad faith because impounding the vehicle was unnecessary under the circumstances. In support of this argument, he suggests that police officers should be required to inquire into less intrusive means before inventorying a vehicle for impoundment. If Trooper Templeton had done so in this case, he would presumably have learned that Appellant‘s father was on his way to pick up the vehicle. Appellant claims that an inquiry would have proven the inventory unnecessary, which he claims would require exclusion of the evidence.
[¶ 19] In Opperman, the United States Supreme Court stated that automobiles must be in “lawful police custody” before an inventory search takes place. 428 U.S. at 373, 96 S.Ct. at 3099; see also Woodford v. State, 752 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (Ind. 2001) (“In determining the propriety of an inventory search, the threshold question is whether the impoundment itself was proper.“). The district court found that the WHP had custody of the vehicle after Appellant‘s arrest, and that Trooper Templeton did not act in bad faith because he inventoried the vehicle in anticipation of impounding it. The court also observed that no one was available to take possession of the car after Appellant was arrested, and that the inventory was complete by the time Appellant‘s father arrived. The court therefore concluded that the inventory was appropriate and done in good faith under the circumstances.
[¶ 20] We review the district court‘s factual findings on a motion to suppress for clear error. We defer to those findings and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party because the district court is in the best position to weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions. However, “we review the ultimate determination regarding the constitutionality of a particular search or seizure de novo.” Sen, ¶ 25, 301 P.3d at 117 (citing Owens, ¶ 8, 269 P.3d at 1095). See also Lovato v. State, 2010 WY 38, ¶ 11, 228 P.3d 55, 57-58 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Yoeuth v. State, 2009 WY 61, ¶ 16, 206 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Wyo. 2009)); Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶ 23, 65 P.3d 33, 40 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 362 (Wyo. 1998)).
[¶ 21] The district court believed Trooper Templeton‘s testimony that he did not know that Appellant‘s father was coming to retrieve his automobile, that a general policy required that the vehicle be inventoried and then towed, and it therefore concluded that the officer acted in good faith. There was nothing incredible about the testimony, and it was certainly not erroneous for the district judge to believe it.
[¶ 22] Appellant contends, however, that this Court should adopt a rule which would have required Trooper Templeton to inquire into less intrusive means of safeguarding a vehicle, directing us to State v. Branstetter, 40 Kan.App.2d 1167, 199 P.3d 1272 (2009) in support of this proposition:
If the owner, operator, or person in charge of the vehicle is readily available to make a determination as to the disposition of the vehicle then he may do so. If the person responsible for the vehicle desires that the vehicle be left lawfully parked upon the streets or that it be turned over to some other person‘s custody, then, absent some other lawful reason for impounding the vehicle, his or her wishes must be followed. Only when a vehicle is found illegally parked and unattended, or where the person responsible for its possession is unable or unwilling to instruct the arresting officers as to the vehicle‘s disposition or some other legal reasonable justifying im-
poundment
exists should the officers assume control over the vehicle.
Id. at 1276 (quoting State v. Fortune, 236 Kan. 248, 689 P.2d 1196, 1203 (1984)) (emphasis omitted). See also United States v. Abbott, 584 F.Supp. 442, 448 (W.D.Pa. 1984) (“[S]ince an inventory search is to protect the owner‘s property, the owner, whenever available, should be given the opportunity to determine how he wants his property secured.“); State v. Rome, 354 So.2d 504, 506 (La. 1978) (inventory search not sufficiently restricted in scope where officer did not attempt to ascertain wishes of driver).
[¶ 23] The United States Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987), stating that “while giving [the vehicle owner] an opportunity to make alternative arrangements would undoubtedly have been possible . . . [t]he reasonableness of particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative less intrusive means.” Id. at 373-74, 107 S.Ct. at 742 (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accord United States v. Davis, 882 F.2d 1334, 1339 (8th Cir. 1989); People v. Clark, 65 Ill.2d 169, 2 Ill.Dec. 578, 357 N.E.2d 798, 800-01 (1976). See also Johnson, ¶ 17, 137 P.3d at 907 (“[I]n order to fulfill the purposes behind inventory searches, it is reasonable to conduct an inventory before releasing any items from an impounded vehicle.“).
[¶ 24] We also decline to adopt a rule which would require police officers to explore alternative means of safeguarding a vehicle before beginning the process of impounding it, and instead hold that “[a]n impoundment is warranted when it is part of routine administrative caretaking functions of the police . . . or when it is authorized by state statute.” Woodford, 752 N.E.2d at 1281 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We believe that “[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375, 107 S.Ct. at 743 (quoting Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648, 103 S.Ct. at 2610).
[¶ 25] Appellant further contends that Trooper Templeton was not authorized by statute to impound the vehicle, claiming that
[¶ 26]
[¶ 27] As already discussed, the record also reflects that Trooper Templeton
[¶ 28] This testimony provided an adequate basis for the district court to determine the requirements of the WHP inventory policy and that Trooper Templeton complied with it. See Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1165 (Wyo. 1996) (“We have not required that standard police procedures with respect to impoundment and inventory searches be in writing. Instead, we have accepted testimony by police officers of the standards and their testimony that the appropriate procedures were followed in a particular situation.“) (citations omitted). The inventory policy does not permit “so much latitude that inventory searches are turned into a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime,” and it in fact vests very little discretion in the individual officer. See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4, 110 S.Ct. at 1635 (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376, 107 S.Ct. at 743 (Blackmun, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 29] In summary, we agree with the district court that the untimely arrival of Hunnicutt-Carter‘s father is simply an instance of bad timing from Appellant‘s perspective, and that the inventory was not a ruse to allow Trooper Templeton to rummage through the vehicle in search of contraband. Cf. United States v. Beal, 430 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 2005) (inventory search reasonable where sole occupant of vehicle arrested, even though the registered owner appeared after the search to claim the vehicle before actual impoundment). The district court did not therefore err in finding that a good-faith inventory took place pursuant to a valid policy.
CONCLUSION
[¶ 30] The district court did not err in denying Appellant‘s motion to suppress, and the judgment and sentence of the district court are therefore affirmed.