RALPH HARRISON BENNING, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, MARGARET PATTERSON, Georgia Department of Corrections, JENNIFER EDGAR, Georgia Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees,
No. 21-11982
United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
June 23, 2023
[PUBLISH]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 5:18-cv-00087-TES-CHW
Before JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,* District Judge.
JORDAN, Circuit Judge:
An email, as the term itself implies, is a message, note, or letter sent by electronic means over a computer system. See, e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 582 (4th ed. 2009). The questions presented in this appeal largely revolve around how emails generated by inmates in the custody of the Georgia Department of Corrections are to be treated for purposes of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
An inmate in a Georgia Department of Corrections facility is “allowed to send emails through JPay kiosks . . . or through Georgia Offendеr Alternative Learning (‘GOAL’) devices which are provided to [inmates].” D.E. 64-4, Exh. B at 3. JPay Kiosks and GOAL devices are electronic devices used for, among other things, “sending and receiving email messages.” D.E. 64-4, Attachment B-1 at 10. Each email costs 37 cents to send, with the GDC receiving 15% of the fees. See D.E. 64-3, Exh. A at 38.
One of the GDC’s Standard Operating Procedures, SOP 204.10, governs the use of JPay Kiosks and GOAL devices. SOP 204.10, which became effective on August 15, 2017, “explains the rules and sanctions that can be imposed if a [GOAL] device or [JPay] Kiosk is misused.” D.E. 64-4, Attachment B-1 at 10. It sets out, among other things, 16 policies governing video visitations and emails. Two of those policies are relevant here: (1) “[o]ffenders shall not request emails to be forwarded, sent, or mailed to others;” and (2) “[c]ustomers and offenders shall not request or send information on behalf of or about another offender.” Id. at 14–15.
Under SOP 204.10, “[a]ll communicatiоns sent or received via the GOAL device or the [JPay] Kiosk are subject to inspection and review for security reasons, and neither the sender, nor receiver, has an expectation of privacy in any of these communications.” Id. at 13. Any communications that violate SOP 204.10 “will be intercepted without explanation and no refund will be provided to the sender.” Id. at 15. The screening and review of inmate
A
Ralph Harrison Benning is serving a life sentence in Georgia and is in the custody of the GDC. As an inmate, his communications with those on the outside are governed by GDC policies and regulations.
In September and October of 2017, Mr. Benning attempted to send three emails to his sister, Elizabeth Knott—one on September 24, 2017, and two on October 9, 2017. Those emails were intercepted by the GDC and never delivered to Ms. Knott due to violations of SOP 204.10. All three emails were about gang problems and fraud and corruption in the GDC.
Margaret Patterson, a GDC analyst, intercepted the September 24 email because Mr. Benning had asked Ms. Knott to forward it to third parties. See D.E. 64-6, Exh. D at ¶¶ 11–13. Jennifer Edgar, another GDC analyst, intercepted the October 9 emails for the same reason. See D.E. 64-5, Exh. C at ¶¶ 10–12. Neither Ms. Patterson nor Ms. Edgar notified Mr. Benning that his emails had been intercepted and withheld. Nor did they give him an opportunity to appeal their decisions to a different GDC official. See, e.g., D.E. 80-5 at ¶ 14.
Another email Mr. Benning tried to send, this time to the Aleph Institute on February 6, 2018, was similarly intercepted and
Mr. Benning mailed Ms. Knott handwritten copies of the emails he had tried to send her in September and October of 2017. See D.E. 64-3, Exh. A at 74–75. To Mr. Benning’s knowledge, his sister received those letters. See id. at 76. Mr. Benning did not send a handwritten version of his February 2018 email to the Aleph Institute. See D.E. 80-5 at 4.
B
In 2018, Mr. Benning filed a pro se civil rights suit pursuant to
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. They argued in part that Mr. Benning did not have a constitutional right to communicate through email and that, even if he did, the interception and withholding of his emails was constitutional. Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar also asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity from Mr. Benning’s claims for damages.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Mr. Benning appealed, and counsel thereafter appeared on his behalf.
II
We review questions of constitutional law de novo. See Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2018). The same plenary standard governs our review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment. See Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is warranted “when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter of law in
We first address Mr. Benning’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, and then turn to the First Amendment claims.
III
As noted, in September and October of 2017 Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar censored (i.e., intercepted) three emails which Mr. Benning sought to send to his sister. They did so because the emails violated SOP 204.10’s prohibition against requesting forwarding to third parties. Mr. Benning alleged that Ms. Edgar and Ms. Patterson did not provide him with any notice that his emails had been intercepted and were not going to be sent, and did not provide him with an opportunity to appeal their decisions to a different GDC official. He alleged that these failures violated his Fourteеnth Amendment due process rights.1
The district court entered summary judgment against Mr. Benning and in favor of Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar on the due process claims. The court concluded that Mr. Benning did not have
We hold that Mr. Benning had a protected liberty interest in his outgoing emails, and as a result he was entitled to notice and other procedural safeguards when the three emails to his sister were intercepted and withheld. But we agree with the district court that Ms. Edgar and Ms. Patterson are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Benning’s due process claims for damages because the law to that effect was not clearly established in September and October of 2017.2
A
The first question is whether Mr. Benning had a liberty interest in his emails that triggered due process protections. See Dorman v. Aronofsky, 36 F.4th 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Before
The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he interest of prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter, grounded as it is in the First Amendment, is plainly a ‘liberty’ interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even though qualified of necessity by the circumstance of imprisonment. As such, it is protected from arbitrary governmental invasion.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 418 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–414 (1989). As we have explained, under Martinez “both prisoners and their correspondents have a liberty interest in uncensored communication by letter[.]” Perry v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 664 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2011). See also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500 (1952) (“[T]he liberty of speech and of the press which the First Amendment guarantees against abridgment by the federal government is within the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.”).
When an inmate’s outgoing correspondence is censored, Martinez requires prison officials to provide certain procedural safeguards to satisfy the Due Process Clause. Here is how we have described those safeguards: “(1) the inmate must receive notice of the rejection of a letter written by or addressed to him; (2) the author of the letter be given ‘reasonable opportunity to protest that
This case, of course, involves the censoring of emails rather than physical letters. So, like the district court, we must decide whether emails are the equivalent of physical letters for purposes of a liberty interest.
We conclude that under Martinez Mr. Benning had a protected liberty interest, grounded in the First Amendment, in the emails he generated and sought to send to his sister. We do so for a number of reasons.
First, those emails—which contained communications from Mr. Benning to his sister—undoubtedly constituted speech under the First Amendment. The First Amendment “protects material disseminated over the [I]nternet as well as by the means of communication devices used prior to the high-tech era.” Clement v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 364 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)). See also Jeremy Harris
Second, it seems to us that the rationale of Martinez is concerned with correspondence from inmates, regardless of the form (or medium) the correspondence takes. See Bonner v. Outlaw, 552 F.3d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Although [Martinez] discusses letters, that is because letters were simply the form of cоrrespondence at issue in that specific case. Nothing about the reasoning of [Martinez] justifies treating packages differently than letters for purposes of the notice that should be given an inmate when correspondence addressed to that inmate is rejected.”). As the Eighth Circuit persuasively explained in rejecting an argument that Martinez applies only to letters and does not govern packages, the “reasoning of [Martinez] applies to all forms of correspondence addressed to an inmate. It is the inmate’s interest in ‘uncensored
In the 1970s, when Martinez was decided, correspondence consisted only of physical letters (or similar notes or messages) handwritten or typed on paper and sent by regular mail. Today, almost 50 years later, correspondence is not so limited and emails serve as the electronic equivalent of physical letters (i.e., correspondence). See Johnson, Jail (E)Mail, 11 Wash. J.L., Tech. & Arts at 288 (explaining that by 2017 the number of email accounts was expected to rise to 4.9 billion). Thanks to computers and the Internet, we can now correspond with others digitally through email, and for due process purposes it makes both doctrinal and practical sense to treat outgoing email the same as physical letters. See, e.g., Tory v. Davis, 2020 WL 2840163, at *4 (W.D. Va. June 1, 2020) (“[A]n inmate has a due process right to recеive notice when his email communication has been censored.”). Just as the Fourth
Third, GDC officials themselves treat outgoing emails from inmates like physical letters for screening and review. Inmate emails are not immediately transmitted to their intended recipients, but instead go to the Central Intelligence Unit for screening and inspection by way of an intranet system. Emails are sent on their way only when GDC analysts at the Unit are satisfied that they comply with SOP 204.10.
In other words, just as a physical letter is not immediately delivered when an inmate places it in the prison’s mail system, an email is not immediately transmitted as soon as an inmate hits “send.” SOP 204.10 makes clear that “[b]ecause of the need” for inspection, email “communications may not be received by the intended recipient on the same day as sent by the sender.” D.E. 64-4, Attachment B-1 at 13. From the perspective of the GDC, emails are the functional equivalent of letters written or typed on paper. And we can think of no persuasive reason why prison officials should not be required to provide notice and other procedural safeguards when they intercept or otherwise censor emails sent by inmates.4
The defendants argue that Mr. Benning did not have a protected liberty interest because using the email system is a privilege, and not a right, for inmates in the custody of the GDC. See Br. for Appellees at 39–40. This argument misses the mark, and does so by the proverbial country mile. For over 50 years the Supreme Court has “fully . . . rejected the wooden distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘privileges’ that оnce seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights.” Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972). “[T]he question,” therefore, “is
As a result, whether Mr. Benning had a free-standing constitutional or statutory right to use the GDC email system does not affect or resolve the procedural due process question under Martinez. In any event, it is the First Amendment—and not state law—which creates a liberty interest here. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 418. And as we have explained, email is a form of correspondence.
C
We next take up whether Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar denied Mr. Benning his due process rights under Martinez. On this summary judgment record, a jury could reasonably find that they did.
When outgoing physical letters are intercepted or censored by prison officials, Martinez requires that the inmate be “notified of the rejection of [the] letter written by . . . him,” and that he be “given a reasonable opportunity to protest that decision,” with his complaint being “referred to a prison official other than the person who originally disapproved the correspondence.” 416 U.S. at 418–
Mr. Benning submitted an affidavit stating that, when the emails to his sister were intercepted in September and October of 2017, he was denied (a) “any process” and (b) an “administrative remedy” to challenge the decisions because of SOP 204.10. See D.E. 80-5 at ¶ 14. That affidavit, based as it was on Mr. Benning’s personal knowledge, sufficed to create an issue of fact. See United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
The evidence in the summary judgment recоrd also supports the lack-of-notice and lack-of-remedy assertions. SOP 204.10 expressly states that “communications which violate [the] policy will be intercepted without explanation.” D.E. 64-4, Attachment B-1 at 15 (emphasis added). Richard Wallace, a GDC supervisor, confirmed in his declaration that SOP 204.10 provides for no explanation when emails are intercepted for a violation. See D.E. 64-4, Exh. B at ¶ 13. Moreover, Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar stated in
Given this evidence, the district court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Pattеrson and Ms. Edgar on whether they violated Mr. Benning’s due process rights. Mr. Benning had a protected First Amendment liberty interest in his outgoing emails, and a reasonable jury could find that he was not provided any notice of the interceptions or of his right to challenge the decisions. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 418–19; Perry, 664 F.3d at 1367–68 & n.2.
But that does not end the matter, for Ms. Edgar and Ms. Patterson asserted qualified immunity as to Mr. Benning’s claims for damages for the alleged procedural due process violations. We therefore turn to qualified immunity.
D
Government officials sued in their individual capacities for money damages “are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to ‘discretionary functions’ [they have] performed[.]” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 150 (2017). In intercepting and withholding Mr. Benning’s three emails pursuant to SOP 204.10, Ms. Patterson and
In this case qualified immunity “turns on thе ‘objective legal reasonableness’” of the actions of Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar. See Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 151 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court recently summarized this aspect of the qualified immunity inquiry:
Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. A right is clearly established when it is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right. Although this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7–8 (2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For purposes of qualified immunity, decisions of the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the appropriate state supreme court can announce clearly established law. See Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 2017).
Email is created and transmitted in a different medium than physical mail. Although we have concluded that the Martinez due process requirements apply to email correspondence in the prison setting, before today there were no Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit, or Georgia Supreme Court decisions on point. As far as we can tell, only two district courts have specifically ruled that the Martinez due process framework governs emails generated by inmates, and those courts issued their decisions in June of 2020 and November of 2018, well after Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar intercepted Mr. Benning’s emails. See, e.g., Tory, 2020 WL 2840163, at *4; Emery v. Kelley, 2018 WL 5779593, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 5779505 (E. D. Ark. Nov. 2, 2018). So even if district court decisions from other jurisdictions could create clearly established law—they cannot and do not—those two cases do not help Mr. Benning overcome
In sum, at the time Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar acted there was no governing and materially similar precedent concerning the due process implications of confiscating, intercepting, оr censoring outgoing emails generated by inmates. We recognize that a prior case on all fours (or nearly all fours) is not always necessary to give an official fair notice that his conduct is wrongful. See, e.g., Taylor v. Rojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53–54 (2020) (reversing grant of qualified immunity to officers who violated the Eighth Amendment by placing inmate in a “shockingly unsanitary” cells for six days). Although the issue is close, we conclude that this is not one of those cases where the lack of notice and procedural safeguards “so obviously violates [the] [C]onstitution that prior case law is unnecessary.” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019). The law, as it existed in September and October of 2017, did not place the constitutionality of the conduct at issue “beyond debate.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590. See also Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1344–45 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that qualified immunity gives government officials “the benefit of the doubt, provided that the conduct was not so obviously illegal in the light of then-existing law”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
E
In addition to seeking damages against Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar, Mr. Benning requested declaratory relief with respect to his due process claims. He asked that the district court issue a
As we have explained, qualified immunity “is only a defense to personal liability for monetary awards resulting from government officials performing discretionary functions,” and “may not be effectively asserted as a defense to a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief.” Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995). See also D‘Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877, 879 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[B]ecause qualified immunity is a defense only to claims for monetary relief, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.“). So the entitlement of Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar to qualified immunity with respect to damages does not resolve the requests for declaratory relief.
The district court, having rejected Mr. Benning‘s due process claims on the merits, did not have to confront the issue of
We note that Mr. Benning asserted his due process claims against all of the defendants, including the Commissioner of the GDC. See D.E. 28 at 11-12. Insofar as he is being sued in his official capacity for declaratory relief, and due to his implementation of SOP 204.10, the Commissioner may not assert qualified immunity as a defеnse. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985) (“The only immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment.“);
Although a prayer for declaratory relief generally seeks a declaration of both past and future conduct, the Supreme Court has explained that such relief is permitted in an official-capacity suit against a state official for prospective relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), because “[i]nsofar as the exposure of the State is concerned,” it adds “nothing to the prayer for [an] injunction.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Com‘n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 646 (2002). Mr. Benning did not seek injunctive relief as to his due process claims, but his requests for declaratory relief as to those claims are worded in the present tense, and do not simply seek a declarаtion of past wrongdoing. We therefore cannot say on this record that declaratory relief against the Commissioner is barred should Mr. Benning prevail on his due process claims. See S&M Brands, Inc. v. Georgia ex rel. Carr, 925 F.3d 1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Some suits requesting injunctive or declaratory relief against state officials are not considered suits against the state and thus are not barred by sovereign immunity.“) (citing Ex parte Young and Verizon Md.). Should Mr. Benning prevail on his due process claims against Ms. Patterson, Ms. Edgar, and the Commissioner on remand, the district court will need to address the requests for declaratory relief.
We now pivot to Mr. Benning‘s First Amendment claims. Mr. Benning alleged that two of the policies set out in SOP 204.10—the prohibition on requesting forwarding to third parties and the prohibition on sending information about other inmates—violated his First Amendment rights. The parties, as they did below, debate which of two Supreme Court cases provides the proper standard for addressing the censorship of inmates’ outgoing emails.
Martinez, which has been limited to outgoing correspondence, see Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413, holds that “censorship of prisoner mail is justified” if “the regulation or practice . . . further[s] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression” and if “the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [are] . . . no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.” Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413. On the other hand, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), holds that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Mr. Benning argues that Martinez provides the governing standard, while the defendants assert that Turner governs.
A
Mr. Benning alleged that two policies set out in SOP 204.10 violated his First Amendment rights under Martinez. As stated, these were the policy prohibiting inmates from asking recipients to
The defendants responded that Mr. Benning did not have a constitutional right to communicate through email. And they asserted that even if he had such a right, the challenged policies would survive constitutional scrutiny under Turner. That is, they argued that the two policies are “rationally related to [the] GDC‘s security interest“—“[b]oth policies exist to curb criminal activity and ensure security and are therefore ‘rationally connected to [GDC‘s] security and safety interests.‘” D.E. 64-1 at 11-12. See also D.E. 64-4, Exh. B at 7. Specifically, the forwarding policy “prevents [inmates] from communicating with those who have not been cleared by GDC‘s security personnel and who may have a record of criminal activity,” and the inmate-information policy “prevents
Ms. Edgar and Ms. Patterson additionally argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity. In their view, “there [was] no clearly established law that would have put them on notice that performing their job responsibilities of withholding emails that did not comply with the email [policies] was clearly unlawful.” Id. at 15.
The district court decided to apply the standard set out in Turner and ruled that the challenged policies were constitutional under thаt standard. The district court alternatively concluded that Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar were entitled to qualified immunity such that Mr. Benning would not be entitled to damages from them. See D.E. 108 at 10-29.
On appeal, the parties essentially restate the positions they took in the district court.
The defendants argue that “straightforward application of the Turner standard cоnfirms that [the] GDC‘s modest email regulations are reasonably related to security and safety for inmates, security guards, and members of the public.” Br. for Appellees at 13-14. They also contend that the district court correctly found that Ms. Edgar and Ms. Patterson were entitled to qualified immunity. See id. at 41-45.
B
As set out earlier, the Supreme Court‘s cases provide that qualified immunity “attaches when an official‘s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” and explain that for a right to be clearly established “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Rivas-Villegas, 142 S. Ct. at 7-8 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Mr. Benning cannot point to any materially similar cases—and we have not found any ourselves—but he argues that a reasonable prison official would have understood that emails are a form of outgoing correspondence under Martinez. See Br. for Appellant at 56. But we have already rejected Mr. Benning‘s similar argument against qualified immunity with respect to the due process claims. And the recognition that emails constitute correspondence for due process purposes says little about the constitutionality of the forwarding and inmate-information policies under the First Amendment. Under the circumstances, the unconstitutionality of those policies was not “beyond debate.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590. See also Rodriguez v. Burnside, 38 F.4th 1324, 1334 (11th Cir. 2022) (granting qualified immunity, in a First Amendment free exercise case, to prison officials implementing policies that limited and
Thus, because the law was not clearly established, we affirm the district court‘s ruling that Ms. Edgar and Ms. Patterson are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Benning‘s First Amendment claims for damages. In light of our decision, we need not and do not аddress the constitutionality of the forwarding and inmate-information policies.
C
That leaves the First Amendment claims against the Commissioner in his official capacity. Mr. Benning did not seek declaratory relief on those claims, but he did seek certain injunctive relief. See Whole Woman‘s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 532 (2021) (explaining that Ex parte Young “allows certain private parties to seek judicial orders in federal court preventing state executive officials from enforcing state laws that are contrary to federal law“).
As relevant here, Mr. Benning requested that the district court (1) “order the defendants to not limit the length of outgoing emails,” (2) “order the defendants to allow [him] to email anyone except for persons who have specifically requested to be restricted to [him],” and (3) “order the defendants to not impose restrictions on the use of [his] electronic communications by non-incarcerated persons.” D.E. 28 at 13.
While the case was pending in the district court, the GDC rescinded the policy in SOP 204.10 preventing inmates from emailing anyone not cleared to physically visit them at their facility. See D.E. 80-5 at 1. The district court concluded that, as to this aspect of SOP 204.10, Mr. Benning‘s request for injunctive relief was moot. See D.E. 108 at 7. Mr. Benning does not challenge that conclusion on appeal, so we address only his other two requests, unrelated to monetary damages, for injunctive relief—ordering the GDC not to limit the length of outgoing emails and not to impose restrictions on the use of his communications by non-incarcerated persons.
Mr. Benning argues that the district court acted prematurely in rejecting his claims for injunctive relief, and asserts that it should have waited to see if he prevailed on any of his First Amendment claims. See Br. for Appellant at 58-60. If a preliminary injunction is not sought, it generally makes sense for a district court to leave the matter of equitable remedies until the end of the case. At that point the court will know what claims, if any, the plaintiff has
Under
“[T]he scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). And that remains the case under the PLRA. See
Although we review pro se filings liberally, we cannot “rewrite [a] . . . pleading” to request a different form of relief. See Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014). Given the complete lack of connection between the сlaims pled and the injunctive relief requested, the district court did not err in ruling that such relief was overbroad and inappropriate. See
V
On Mr. Benning‘s due process claims, we affirm in part and reverse in part. Mr. Benning had a First Amendment liberty interest in his outgoing emails. As a result, he was entitled to procedural safeguards when his emails in September and October of 2017 were intercepted. Although Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar are entitled to
With respect to Mr. Benning‘s First Amendment claims relating to the forwarding and inmate-information policies, we affirm. Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar are entitled to qualified immunity, and the requested injunctive relief against the Commissioner was not connected to the policies that Mr. Benning challenged.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
I concur in the result and agree with much in the majority opinion. But I write separately because I would affirm the district court‘s determination that Turner rather than Martinez controls. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 418 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-414 (1989).
This case presents an opportunity to address how prison officials should treat First Amendment issues. The majority concludes, “under Martinez Mr. Benning had a protected liberty interest grounded in the First Amendment, in the emails he generated and sought to send to his sister.” Maj. Op. at 10. But the issue is not so plain. Other Circuits have recently addressed similar instances and have followed Turner. See Murdock v. Thompson, No. 20-6278, 2022 WL 17352171, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 1, 2022) (relying on Turner to affirm the denial of an inmate‘s claim his right of access to the court was violated when he was prohibited from sending a “Motion for a Speedy Trial” by certified mail); White v. True, 833 F. App‘x 15, 18 (7th Cir. 2020) (considering a First Amendment claim, in a Bivens action, of an inmate barred from sending mail to his daughter, but the court, citing Turner, determined “the restriction on outgoing mail” served “a legitimate penological interest“); Sebolt v. Samuels, 749 F. App‘x 458, 459 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Turner when addressing an inmate‘s contention his First Amendment rights were violated because he was denied access to the institution‘s email program because of his criminal history and
It is for this reason, and to provide sharper guidance to district courts, I suggest we should have more fully developed whether Turner applies to Mr. Benning‘s claim. In my view the challenged email policies survive constitutional scrutiny under Turner.
Notes
As far as we can tell, no federal court has applied Turner in the due process context. That is not surprising, for Turner does not govern the procedural due process claims of inmates. See Laura Rovner, On Litigating Constitutional Challenges to the Federal Supermax: Improving Conditions and Shining a Light, 95 Denver L. Rev. 457, 479 (2018) (explaining that Turner does not apply to “procedural due process issues” in the prison setting). Indeed, the Supreme Court’s more recent due process cases involving inmates do not apply Turner. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–230 (2005) (applying framework from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to determine the process due to inmates whom the state seeks to place in so-called “supermax” prisons).