R.R. v. J.H.R.R. v. J.H.
J.H., Jr., pro se.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
{¶ 1} Respondent-appellant J.H., Jr. (“J.H.”) appeals from the judgment of the common pleas court granting a civil stalking and sexually oriented offense protection order to petitioner-appellee R.R. J.H. contends thаt the trial court erred in granting the protection order. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On December 3, 2019, R.R. filed a petition for a civil stalking protection order pursuant to
{¶ 3} Both R.R. and J.H. appeared pro se at the hearing. In her opening statement, R.R. testified that she and J.H. had been romantically involved before she remarried her former husband, L.G., on November 9, 2019. R.R. testified that she and J.H. had agreed to remain friends after her wedding, but he was angry she had remarried and, as a result, he attacked her, forced her to have sex, and beat her on November 26, 2019, while she was at his apartment. R.R. showed the trial court pictures of bodily injuries she sustained as a result of the assault. She also produced the police report taken at the Cleveland Clinic after the rape.
{¶ 4} B.C., R.R.’s youngest son, testified that he knew J.H., but refused to speak or interact with him if he came to R.R.’s apartment while he was there because he had “tried to kill” R.R., had “tossed” her out of cars, and consistently spoke to her in a “very condescending and really nasty” way. (Tr. 25.) B.C. testified that within
{¶ 5} On cross-examination by J.H., B.C. testified that although he had never seen J.H. try to kill R.R., he had seen J.H. try to drag R.R. into a car. (Tr. 36.) B.C. testified further that he is afraid of J.H. and believes that J.H. would harm him. (Tr. 37-38.)
{¶ 6} A.R., R.R.’s sister, testified that she lived in the same apartment building as R.R. and had seen her every day for the past seven years. (Tr. 39.) A.R. testified that she was at R.R.’s apartment on November 26, 2019, when J.H. picked R.R. up in his car. (Tr. 40.) She stated that R.R. called her in the early morning hours of November 27, 2019, and told her she was at the Cleveland Clinic because J.H. had raped and bеaten her. (Tr. 41.) A.R. testified that she saw R.R. the afternoon of November 27, 2019, and she was “in a bad condition.” (Tr. 43.) A.R. testified that she observed a three-inch raised bruise on R.R.’s neck, ten or more lumps on her back, and scratches on her arm and hand. Id. A.R. testified further that she observed blood from R.R.’s rectum in the toilet. (Tr. 44.) A.R. testified that R.R. was in significant pain, and in the following weeks, she accompаnied R.R. to her doctor’s appointments for treatment of injuries sustained during the rape and assault. (Tr. 50-51.)
{¶ 7} M.C., Jr. (“M.C.”), one of A.R.’s sons, testified that R.R. called him in the early morning hours of November 27, 2019, and told him she was in distress and
{¶ 8} On cross-examination, M.C. admitted that J.H. had texted him аt 3:17 a.m. on November 27, 2019, and informed him that R.R. was walking in the area of 84th Street and Carnegie Avenue in Cleveland and had asked J.H. to pick her up, but he had told her no. (Tr. 62.) M.C. admitted that J.H. also informed him in the text that R.R. had told J.H. that if he did not pick her up, she would go to the Cleveland Clinic and report that he had raped her. Id.
{¶ 9} L.G., R.R.’s husband, testified that he and R.R. agreed that after their wedding on November 9, 2019, R.R. and J.H. would be friends, but there would be no sexual relationship between them. (Tr. 69.) He testified further that R.R. went to J.H.’s apartment several times after the wedding, including on November 26, 2019. Id. He said that R.R. called him in the early morning hours of November 27, 2019, and told him she was walking near the University-Cedar RTA station, and had been raped and beaten. (Tr. 71.) L.G. stated that when he saw R.R. later at the Cleveland Clinic, she was “very traumatized” and “upset.” Id. L.G. testified that he observed scars on R.R.’s body from the attack, and that she had not been eating or sleeping since the attack. (Tr. 72.) He said he was aware that R.R. had been undergoing counseling at the Rape Crisis Center, and that he accompanied her to several doctor’s visits after the rape. Id. He also picked up pаin medication for R.R. from the pharmacy after the rape. (Tr. 73.)
{¶ 10} In her closing, R.R. testified as follows:
[J.H.] raped me; he attacked me. I showed you all the pictures. And the thing is, when I called him, and yes, I did call him that night to come get me when I walked all the way down 84th, if he had came [sic] and gotten me, I don’t know if I would have told this time. But I broke, and I did. And I said no more. And I looked you in your eyes where I was shaking. No more. It’s over. No more secret. So [if] I walk out of here with a piece of paper keeping you away from me, or if I walk out of here without one, my God walks with me, and I am free. I’m done.
Id. at 79.
{¶ 11} On cross-examination, R.R. admitted that she spent two weeks with J.H. prior to her wedding on November 9, 2019, as a “final farewell” for both of them. (Tr. 81.) She stated that she and J.H. had talked about turning their relationship into a friendship, so when she went to his house on November 26, 2019, she thought he was a friend. (Tr. 80.)
{¶ 12} During his direct testimony, J.H. stated that R.R. sent him a text on November 26, 2019, in which she said that she had taken a drug overdose because she wanted to kill herself, and that she loved him. (Tr. 89.) J.H. testified that he immediately texted R.R. and told her he would pick her up. Id. J.H. said that when he brought R.R. to his apartment, she stripped to her underwear, laid on his bed, and “one thing led to another.” (Tr. 91.) He said that R.R. eventually decided she wanted to leave, so she called the police. (Tr. 92.) He said that the police came and talked to them separately, and he gave them $10 to give to R.R. so she could take the bus home. (Tr. 92.) He testified that R.R. refused the money, so the police dropped her off at a location to which she directed them. Id. He said he next heard from R.R. when she called and asked him to pick her up at a Sunoco gas station at 84th Street
{¶ 13} On cross-examination, when asked why he would take someone who had allegedly just overdosed back to his apartment, J.H. responded that he was just doing what R.R. wanted him to do. He denied that he grabbed R.R. by her neck and arm as she exited his car at his apartment and told her “bitch, get your ass in the house.” (Tr. 96.) He further denied that he beat R.R. after he raped her. (Tr. 98.)
{¶ 14} After the hearing, the trial court entered a full civil stalking and sexually oriented offensе protection order effective until December 16, 2024. This appeal followed.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 15} In his single assignment of error, J.H. contends that the trial court erred in granting the civil protection order.
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17} The Order of Protection signed by the trial court indicates that the court issued both a civil stalking and a sexually oriented offense protection order.
{¶ 18} To be granted a civil sexually oriented offense protection order, the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent committed a sexually oriented offense against the petitioner. Spahr v. Martin, 5th Dist. Licking No. 18-CA-42, 2019-Ohio-962, ¶ 17. “‘Preponderance of the evidence’ is ‘evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”’ Id., quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1182 (6th Ed.1990).
{¶ 19} When assessing whether a protection order should have been issued, the reviewing court must determine whether there was sufficient evidence to
{¶ 20} R.R. offered her own testimony about what happened on November 26 and 27, 2019. She testified that she went to J.H.’s apartment on November 26 thinking that he was her friend, but that he forced her to have anal and vaginal sex with him and beat her. She testified that she walked away from J.H.’s apartment in the early morning hours of November 27 after the rape and, when he refused to pick her up, she went to the Cleveland Clinic for treatment. She acknowledged that if J.H. had picked her up as she asked him to she may not have reported the rape, but said she sought treatment because she decided she was finally done with J.H.’s abuse.
{¶ 21} Other evidence produced by R.R. corroborated this testimony. A.R. testified that she observed J.H. pick R.R. up аt her apartment on November 26, and that R.R. called her early in the morning on November 27 and told her J.H. had raped her. A.R. testified that when she saw R.R. the afternoon of November 27, she observed R.R.’s extensive injuries, including blood from her rectum, and saw that she was in significant pain. L.G. likewise testified that R.R. was traumatized and
{¶ 22} On appeal, J.H. contends, as he did in the trial court, that he and R.R. engaged in consensual sex. He also contends that her testimony about the rape and assault was not credible because she allegedly perjured herself to the grand jury years ago in a criminal case against him that was eventually dismissed by the state; she only claimed he raped her because he would not pick her up on November 27; and she sent him birthday and other cards in 2019 that indicate she was not afraid of him.
{¶ 23} Decisions regarding credibility fall within the province of the trier of fact. Nguyen v. Chaffee, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 08 CO 35, 2009-Ohio-3352, ¶ 8. Here, the trial court, as the factfinder, was ablе to listen to each witness and judge their credibility. It was within the trial court’s province as factfinder to discredit J.H.’s testimony and believe R.R.’s version of events, especially given the witnesses she presented who corroborated her testimony and observed her injuries. State v. Carradine, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101940, 2015-Ohio-3670, ¶ 36. The record contains nothing to suggest that we should not defer to the credibility determinations made by the trial сourt.
{¶ 24} J.H.’s argument that R.R. accused him of rape only because he would not pick her up the morning of November 27 is rebutted by the record. R.R. admitted that if J.H. had picked her up, she likely would not have reported the rape,
{¶ 25} With respect to the cards, the record reflects that R.R. denied that she sent J.H. a birthday or any other card in 2019. (Tr. 82.) In addition, the trial court refused to admit into evidence the photocоpies of the cards that J.H. contended R.R. sent him in 2019 because they were not properly authenticated. (Tr. 101.) Thus, although the cards are attached to J.H.’s appellate brief, they are not part of the record, and we will not consider them on appeal. See
{¶ 26} The evidence presented by R.R. at the hearing was sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that J.H. committed a sexually oriented offense against her, and that a civil protection order was warranted. Thus, the trial court properly issued the protection order, even if, as J.H. contends, R.R. did not present sufficient evidence to establish that she was entitled to a stalking protection order. Upon our review of the record, however, we conclude that R.R. also presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate by a preponderance of thе evidence that J.H. had menaced her by stalking such that she was also entitled to a civil stalking protection order.
{¶ 28} “Pattern of conduct” is defined as “two or more actions or incidents closely related in time.”
{¶ 29} “Mental distress” is defined as including “any mental illness or condition that would normally require * * * mental health services,” even if the person did not request such services.
{¶ 30} The record clearly refutes J.H.’s argument that R.R. did not prеsent sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused her mental distress. The evidence clearly established that R.R. suffered mental distress as a result of J.H.’s actions: she testified that she was subjected to “economical, emotional, verbal, and sexual abuse” throughout her relationship with J.H. and that as a result of the abuse, she now suffers from a “disorder” for which she is in counseling. (Tr. 9.) She testified further that the attack on November 26 was wholly unprovoked, and as a result, she did not “feel safe as long as this man is walking around.” (Tr. 78.)
{¶ 31} R.R. presented evidence at the hearing that demonstrated a basis for her fear. The evidence was clear that not only did J.H. actually cause R.R. physical harm when hе raped and assaulted her on November 26, he also threatened physical harm to her on other occasions, including to “beat your ass.”
{¶ 32} In addition, R.R. presented evidence that J.H. planted “bombs” in her apartment. A.R. testified that she took care of R.R. after her knee surgery in June 2018, and that the only people who entered R.R.’s apartment for six to eight months whilе she was recuperating were family members. (Tr. 47.) A.R. said that J.H. was the only person other than family members to visit R.R.’s apartment when her recuperation ended. Id. She testified further that R.R. has never used Easy Off oven cleaner because she knows it would cause her to have a severe asthma attack. (Tr.
{¶ 33} A court does not view each action in isolation when determining whether the respondent’s conduct constitutes a pattern of conduct sufficient to demonstrate menacing by stalking, but “must take everything into consideration.” E.J.V., 2020-Ohio-1612 at ¶ 11, citing Guthrie v. Long, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-913, 2005-Ohio-1541, ¶ 12. In this case, taking everything into consideration, we find that R.R. demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that J.H. knowingly engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused her to believe he would cause physical harm to her, and that as a result, she suffered mental distress. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court’s decision to grant the civil protection order. The assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 34} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J., and FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR