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JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
Appearances:
Background
Law and Analysis

E.J.V. v. S.R.E.J.V. v. S.R.

Ohio Court of Appeals, 8th District
Apr 23, 2020
108615
Versions:

Petitioner-Appellee, v. Respondent-Appellant.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 23, 2020

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-17-885888

Appearances:

Todd D. Cipollo, for appellee.

David M. Leneghan and K. Scott Carter, for appellant.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

{¶ 1} Respondent-appellant S.R. appeals the decision of the trial court to issue a civil stalking protection order (“CSPO“) against him. Upon review, we affirm the trial court‘s decision and uphold the CSPO and its terms.

Background

{¶ 2} On September 14, 2017, petitioner-appellee E.V. filed a petition to obtain a CSPO on behalf of herself, her husband, and her two minor children. A temporary, ex parte protection order was issued and extended during the pendency of the matter. The parties agreed to a continuance, and the trial court conducted a full hearing in April 2019.

{¶ 3} The transcript reflects that petitioner and her family lived next door to respondent in Broadview Heights before they moved. From late 2016 until early 2019, petitioner and her family experienced a number of incidents with respondent that are detailed in the record. Respondent‘s conduct included verbally accosting and intimidating petitioner and her husband, yelling at the children and videotaping the children getting off their school bus, spitting toward members of petitioner‘s family and their vehicle, and other unsettling behavior. Testimony was presented regarding the children being visibly upset from encounters with respondent. Testimony was also presented regarding the stress experienced by petitioner‘s entire family and the “atmosphere of fear” that was created by respondent‘s conduct. As a result of respondent‘s conduct, the police were contacted on a number of occasions, the petitioner attempted to have the bus stop for her children moved to a new location, and ultimately the petitioner and her family made the decision to move.

{¶ 4} On April 30, 2019, the trial court granted the petition and issued a CSPO against respondent for a period of four years. The protected persons include petitioner, her husband, and their two children. In the journal entry, the trial court found as follows:

The court found the testimony of petitioner [E.V.] and her husband [C.V.] to be credible. After review of all testimony and evidence in this matter, the court hereby finds by a preponderance of evidence that the respondent has knowingly engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused petitioner and her family to believe that the respondent will cause physical harm or cause or has caused mental distress. Evidence of the pattern of conduct was supported by testimony, including the following: The incidents of spitting or aggressive behavior toward the petitioner and her family; the testimony regarding the filming of the children and the attempt to move the bus stop location; the emotional testimony of [the petitioner] indicating that she had “one reason to move – [respondent S.R.]” and where she described her fear and “unsettling” feelings; testimony regarding the emotional distress that respondent caused petitioner and her family members; testimony from [petitioner‘s husband] that respondent caused an “atmosphere of fear,” and the verbal confrontations (including aggressive language) toward the petitioner.

{¶ 5} Respondent timely appealed the trial court‘s decision. The matter is now before us for review.

Law and Analysis

{¶ 6} Respondent raises two assignments of error. Under his first assignment of error, respondent claims the trial court erred when it granted the CSPO because he believes it was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

{¶ 7} R.C. 2903.214 allows a person to seek a civil protection order by filing a petition alleging that the respondent engaged in a violation of R.C. 2903.211, menacing by stalking. The petitioner may seek relief on behalf of any other family or household member. R.C. 2903.214(C). However, it must be established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent committed a violation of R.C. 2903.211 against each family or household member to be protected. M.J.W. v. T.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108014, 2019-Ohio-3573, ¶ 21, citing Prater v. Mullins, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-13-04, 2013-Ohio-3981, ¶ 8.

{¶ 8} In relevant part, R.C. 2903.211 defines menacing by stalking as follows: “No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person * * * or cause mental distress to the other person * * *.” R.C. 2903.211(A)(1). A person acts “knowingly” when “the person is aware that the person‘s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22.

{¶ 9} A “[p]attern of conduct” is defined as “two or more actions or incidents closely related in time” regardless of a prior conviction. R.C. 2903.211(D)(1). “‘[T]he temporal period within which the two or more actions or incidents must occur * * * [is a] matter to be determined by the trier of fact on a case-by-case basis.‘” Elkins v. Manley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104393, 2016-Ohio-8307, ¶ 16, quoting Ellet v. Falk, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-09-1313, 2010-Ohio-6219, ¶ 22.

{¶ 10} “Mental distress” is defined to include “[a]ny mental illness or condition that would normally require psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health services, whether or not any person requested or received psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health services.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(2)(b). Expert testimony is not required to establish mental distress, and the trier of fact can rely on its own knowledge and experience in determining whether mental distress has been caused. Smith v. Wunsch, 162 Ohio App.3d 21, 2005-Ohio-3498, 832 N.E.2d 757, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.).

{¶ 11} In this case, although respondent claims that there was a lack of evidence showing a pattern of conduct as to each of the family members, the record reflects multiple incidents involving each family member. We do not, as appellant suggests, view each action in isolation. Rather, “‘[a] court must take everything into consideration‘” when determining whether the respondent‘s conduct constitutes a pattern of conduct, even though certain actions, in isolation, may not seem particularly threatening. Guthrie v. Long, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-913, 2005-Ohio-1541, ¶ 12, quoting Miller v. Francisco, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2002-L-097, 2003-Ohio-1978. Furthermore, although a petitioner cannot obtain a CSPO protecting other family members “‘simply by presenting evidence as to one of the persons to be covered,‘” in the case of a pattern of conduct directed at multiple persons, “‘the same evidence may establish the elements of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) as to multiple persons to be protected under a CSPO.‘” M.J.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108014, 2019-Ohio-3573, at ¶ 21, quoting Prater, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-13-04, 2013-Ohio-3981, at ¶ 8.

{¶ 12} The record reflects that petitioner testified to her and her family members being repeatedly harassed and intimidated by appellant. She testified to being verbally accosted by respondent while clearing leaves and described the incident as being “pretty unsettling when you‘re being verbally attacked like that from somebody next door to you and they‘re throwing leaves and pine needles and dirt into your face with a rake.” She testified that she went to the police because she was “afraid.” She testified to another incident where respondent was playing loud music in his garage, verbally accosted her, made her feel “very unsettled,” and the police were called. She testified to incidents when driving that respondent would be “gesturing toward us and walking toward us and spitting on our car.” She testified to the emotional distress caused to her and her family by respondent‘s conduct, which ultimately was the “one reason” that led them to move.

{¶ 13} Although the petitioner‘s two children did not testify in the matter, the petitioner testified to repeated instances where respondent intimidated her children by yelling at them while on the sidewalk, staring them down, spitting at them, and videotaping them at the bus stop. She described her son as being “very upset” and testified to trying to get the location of their bus stop moved so her children “could feel safe when they got off the bus and weren‘t being stared down and being spat at when they got off the bus.” She also testified to her daughter‘s stress and stated that “this situation next door brings a lot of stress * * * to the house.”

{¶ 14} Petitioner‘s husband testified to two specific incidents involving respondent. He testified to being verbally accosted by respondent in regard to leaf blowing and to an incident in which respondent spat at his car. Petitioner‘s husband testified to being “intimidated” by respondent‘s conduct and to respondent creating “an atmosphere of fear where we don‘t want to be out in our yard.”

{¶ 15} Our review reflects that competent, credible evidence was presented to establish respondent committed menacing by stalking against petitioner and each family member to be protected. Moreover, there is ample competent, credible evidence to support each element of menacing by stalking and the trial court‘s finding “by a preponderance of evidence that the respondent has knowingly engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused petitioner and her family to believe that the respondent will cause physical harm or cause or has caused mental distress.” Undoubtedly, the fear, intimidation, and mental distress experienced by petitioner and her family was reasonable.

{¶ 16} Accordingly, we uphold the trial court‘s decision to grant the petition for a CSPO against respondent. The first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 17} Under the second assignment of error, respondent claims the trial court erred by issuing a civil stalking protection order for a period in excess of five years from the date the ex parte order was issued. He cites no legal authority for this claim, and a plain reading of R.C. 2903.214 dictates otherwise.

{¶ 18} R.C. 2903.214(D)(1) permits a court, upon request, to issue a temporary, ex parte protection order after a petition has been filed. Any protection order that is issued on the merits after a full hearing is a separate order. It is not a continuation of the ex parte order as respondent suggests. R.C. 2903.214(E)(2)(a) provides that “[a]ny protection order issued pursuant to this section shall be valid until a date certain but not later than five years from the date of its issuance.” The trial court complied with the statute and issued a CSPO for a period of four years from the date of issuance. Respondent‘s second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 19} Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., and MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR

Case Details

Case Name: E.J.V. v. S.R.
Court Name: Ohio Court of Appeals, 8th District
Date Published: Apr 23, 2020
Citations: 2020-Ohio-1612; 108615
Docket Number: 108615
Court Abbreviation: Ohio Ct. App. 8th
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