R.C., a minor, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Court of Appeals No. A-12323
Trial Court No. 3AN-14-111 DL
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
November 23, 2018
No. 2625
Judge ALLARD
Aрpeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Kevin M. Saxby, Judge, and Sidney Billingslea, Magistrate Judge.
NOTICE
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OPINION
Appearances: Laurence Blakely, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock, Superior Court Judge.*
When R.C. was fifteen years old, he and another juvenile started a fire on the playground of an elementary school in Anchorage, causing extensive damage. R.C. returned to the playground later that same day and started another fire by himself.
R.C. admitted his conduct and was adjudicated a delinquent minor. Following a restitution hearing, the court ordered R.C. to pay $159,161.17 in restitution to the schоol district and its insurance company.
On appeal, R.C. argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider his ability to pay when it ordered this restitution amount. R.C.‘s case requires us to resolve a question of statutory interpretation that we discussed (but did not resolve) in W.S. v. State — whether
For the reasons explained here, we conclude that
Background facts and prior proceedings
Early on the morning of July 26, 2014, fifteen-year-old R.C. and his friend, L.G. started a fire on the playground of Willowcrest Elementary School in Anchorage. Later that afternoon, R.C. returned and started a second fire on the playground by himself. Both R.C. and L.G. admitted the charges of attempted third-degree criminal mischief and second-degree criminally negligent burning, and they were adjudicated delinquent minors.2
R.C.‘s attorney objected to R.C. being personally liable for the full amount of restitution. The attorney argued, in particular, that R.C. did “not have any savings or the ability to earn any money,” and he asserted that restitution should be set at an amount that R.C. could “realistically” pay during his juvenile probationary periоd. In support of his attorney‘s argument, R.C. testified at the restitution hearing that he had never held a job before and he was not sure how much money was in his bank account. (It was later determined that the bank account contained around $100.) R.C. indicated that he wanted to pay restitution, and he thought he might be able to get a job at Subway. R.C. also indicated that eventually he hoped to work in construction, doing drywall.
Magistrate Judge Sidney Billingslea presided as a master over the restitution hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, she issued a rеport and recommendation on restitution for R.C. This report detailed R.C.‘s limited assets in a section entitled “Minor‘s ability to pay.” The report also recommended that the superior court order the Department of Law to set up a payment schedule that addressed R.C.‘s ability to pay. But the report otherwise adopted the State‘s proposed restitution orders, and made no adjustment to the amount of restitution that R.C. would personally owe.
The superior court adopted the magistrate judge‘s recommendаtion and ordered the full restitution requested by the State.
Thus, under the current restitution order, R.C. is jointly and severally liable with his parents for $159,161.17 in restitution. He also shares joint and several liability with L.G. and L.G.‘s parents for $108,325.92 of that amount. Although R.C.‘s liability is joint with these other parties, R.C. will remain personally liable for whatever remains to be paid until the full amount is paid.4 This personal liability will continue into R.C.‘s adult life, and when R.C. reaches adulthood the restitution judgment can be enforced through the civil process.5
R.C. now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it fаiled to consider his limited ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution R.C. would personally owe. We note that R.C.‘s parents filed a separate appeal challenging their restitution judgment. But this appeal was dismissed after R.C.‘s parents negotiated a private settlement with the school district for an undisclosed restitution amount. It is unknown whether L.G. or L.G.‘s parents have negotiated similar settlements. However, for purposes of our analysis here, R.C.‘s liability for the full $159,161.17 remains unchanged.6
The State‘s waiver arguments
Before we reach the merits of R.C.‘s claim on appeal, we must first address the State‘s argument that R.C. waived this claim by failing to adequately argue it in the restitution proceedings.
The purpose of the rule requiring parties to preserve an argument in the trial court is to ensure that the trial court has the opportunity to respond to the argument, and to ensure that there is a sufficient legal ruling
Here, R.C. argued that he did not have the ability to pay the full restitution amount requested by the State, and he requested that restitution be set in an amount that he could realistically be expected to pay. This same argument was also presented, in more detail, in his co-defendant L.G.‘s brief. L.G.‘s attorney also raised many of the same legal arguments raised here. Although R.C. did not explicitly join L.G.‘s “ability to pay” argument, R.C.‘s parents did. Moreover, the magistrate judge issued nearly identical restitution reports for R.C. and L.G., documenting their assets in sections entitled “Minor‘s ability to pay.” Given all this, we conclude that the trial court had adequate notice of the arguments that R.C. now raises in this appeal, and there is a sufficient record for us to meaningfully review this question of law.
The State also argues that we should reject R.C.‘s claim under the doctrine of invited error. We find no merit to this argument. The State‘s invited error argument is based on one sentence in R.C.‘s opposition to the State‘s restitution memorandum, in which R.C. stated that “suitable restitution” for purposes of the juvenile delinquency statutes “is essentially the restitution imposed in adult criminal cases.” As we have previously emphasized, the invited errоr doctrine only comes into play “when the trial court takes erroneous action at the request of the party claiming error on appeal.”8 From our review of the restitution record, it is apparent that the court did not interpret this sentence in R.C.‘s pleading as a concession by R.C. that his ability to pay could not be considered in determining the amount of restitution. The invited error doctrine is therefore inapplicable.
Lastly, the State argues that R.C.‘s claim is moot because (according to the State) the court did properly consider R.C.‘s ability to pay in setting the restitution amount. The State points out that the magistrate judge was clearly aware of R.C.‘s limited ability to pay because she documented R.C.‘s limited earning potential in her report, and because she recommended that payment schedules be set up for each party in accordance with their individual ability to pay.
But the question before us in this appeal is whether the trial court had the authority to take into account R.C.‘s limited financial resources whеn setting the amount of restitution that R.C. would personally owe, not just how that limited ability to pay should impact his payment schedule.9 We previously addressed this question in W.S. v. State, a decision from 2008.10 However, in that case, we concluded that we did not need to resolve this question of statutory interpretation because the restitution at issue in W.S. — $3,185 — was well within the minor‘s ability to pay.11
The same cannot be said of the restitution amount in R.C.‘s case. Here, the restitution amount is $159.161.17, far above what R.C. could ever realistically be expected to pay in the discernible future given the evidence R.C. submitted regarding his financial status and limited future earning potential. Accordingly, we do not find the question of whether the trial court has any authority to reduce this amount based on R.C.‘s demonstrated inability to pay a moot question.
Why we conclude that the statutory prohibition against considering a criminal defendant‘s ability to pay does not apply to restitution judgments in juvenile delinquency cases
When we interpret a statute, our task is “to ascertain the legislature‘s intent and
Chapter AS 12.55 governs sentencing in criminal proceedings in Alaska. Chapter AS 47.12 governs juvenile delinquency proceedings. Alaska Statute 12.55.045(g) declares, “The court may not, in ordering the amount of restitution, consider the defendant‘s ability to pay.” This prohibition was enacted in 2004, and it has since been upheld as constitutional by this Court.15 Prior to the enactment of this provision, Chapter 12.55 permitted courts to consider a defendant‘s ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution in certain situations.16
There is no provision equivalent to
Under
Thus, the plain language of AS 47.12 suggests that, unlike in criminal cases, the legislature expects courts to consider a minor‘s ability to pay when determining the amount of restitution in a juvenile case.
This interpretation is supported by the legislative history that accompanied the various legislative changes to
Restitution should not only compensate the victim for the harm inflicted by the offender, but should further the rehabilitation of the offender. If restitution is ordered in an amount that is clearly imрossible for the offender to pay, the offender‘s rehabilitation will be inhibited and not furthered. If the offender is haled into court for nonpayment of restitution under AS 12.55.051(a) , or if the offender petitions the court underAS 12.55.051(c) to avoid this sanction, his reintegration into society will be disrupted. Also, an offender might simply give up and make no payments at all if the restitution ordered is clearly impossible to pay.20
Thus, restitution orders were viewed as serving the dual purposes of compensating the victim and furthering the rehabilitation of the offender. These two goals were traditionally viewed as mutually rеinforcing. Paying restitution was seen as helpful to the victim and to the rehabilitative process, while setting restitution above what could ever be paid was seen as detrimental to the rehabilitative process without providing any additional advantage to the victim, who cannot recover restitution that a defendant cannot pay.21 As the California Court of Appeal noted in People v. Kay: “to subject a defendant to a judgment which he cannot pay and has no reasonable prospect of paying ... is of little use to the victim of the crime, and is apt to be either frustrаting to a repentant probationer or perversely satisfying to a rebellious one.”22
This same reasoning is evident in a 1994 decision by this Court, J.C.W. v. State. In J.C.W., we held that trial courts were required to consider a minor‘s ability to pay before determining the amount of “suitable restitution” in a juvenile delinquency case.23 We based this decision, in large part, on the fact that, at that time, the criminal code still required sentencing courts to inquire into a defendant‘s ability to pay when setting restitution.24 We also noted that other states appeared to require inquiry into earning capacity in delinquency cases and to prohibit restitution orders exceeding a minor‘s ability to pay.25
By the time J.C.W. was issued, the Alaska legislature had amended Chapter 12.55 to partially restrict a trial court‘s consideration of an adult defendant‘s ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution.26 We noted this legislative change in J.C.W., but we also made clear that we expressed no view “on whether this restriction would affect juvenile delinquency proceedings.”27 In the years
The substantive changes to the statutory provisions that govern restitution in juvenile cases occurred in 1996, 1998, 2001, and 2002. In 1996, the Alaska legislature enacted
In 2002, the legislature also amended
[A]t the request of the department, the Department of Law, the victims’ advocate, or on its own motion, the court shall, at any time, order the minor and the minor‘s parent, if applicable, to submit financial information on a form approved by the Alaska Court System to the court, the department, and the Department of Law for the purpose of establishing the amount of restitution or enforcing an order of restitution under
AS 47.12.170 . (Emphasis added).
The legislative history that accompanied the enactment of this provision makes clear that the legislature intended to streamline the restitution process in juvenile cases and to require full financial disclosures from the minor and the minor‘s parents only in those cases where there were legitimate concerns that the restitution amount was beyond what either could pay.33
Subsection (C) was an addition to House Bill 297, a 2002 legislative bill that primarily dealt with statutory aggravating factors in criminal cases. This amendment to the juvenile code was included as one of several “non-controversial” amendments to the restitution statutes in Title 12 and Title 47.34 A staff member to Rep. Kevin Meyer (the sponsor of the bill) explained the purpose of
Current law requires juveniles and parents to submit full financial statements when restitution is being decided. This amendment will require full financial statements only in cases where one party requests them, that being the Department of Law, the court, or the defendant. Full financial statements, in most cases, are usually unnecessary if the amount of the restitution is comparable to the permanent fund dividend. If damage is in the tens of thousands, one of those parties would likely request full financial disclosure.35
Thus, as of 2002, it appears that the legislature expected courts to continue to consider a minor‘s ability to pay when setting restitution amounts that would likely exceed the minor‘s ability to pay, despite the additional restrictions that the legislature had placed on considerations of ability to pay in adult criminal cases.
Instead, a review of the 2004 legislative history indicates that the legislature expected that juvenile courts would continue to consider a minor‘s ability to pay when setting restitution amounts in juvenile cases. During the debate on House Bill 357, the members of the House Judiciary Committee considered amending
Despite this legislative history, the State takes the position that the Alaska legislature intended courts to treat adult offenders and juvenile offenders the same, and that the legislature intended the same prohibition against considering ability to pay to apply equally to both. In support of this claim, the State points to the Alaska Constitution, which grants victims the right to receive “restitution from the accused.”39 The State argues that if the drafters of this constitutional provision had intendеd a victim‘s right to restitution to be limited by an offender‘s ability to pay, the drafters would have included that limitation in the text of the provision.
We are unpersuaded by this argument. A victim‘s right to restitution was added to the Alaska Constitution in 1994 as part of a larger victims’ right amendment. At that time, the criminal code still permitted courts to consider an adult offender‘s ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution. It was not until 2004 that the Alaska legislature amended
The State‘s briefing also relies on
As already mentioned, when we interpret a statute, our task is “to ascertain the legislature‘s intent and then to construe the statute so as to implement that intent.”44 Here, the plain language of the relevant statutes, the accompanying legislative history, and the underlying purposes of the juvenile justice system indicate that the legislature did not intend to prohibit courts from considering a juvenile‘s ability to pay when setting restitution amounts in juvenile cases. The courts are therefore authorized to consider all relevant factors when setting rеstitution orders in juvenile cases, including but not limited to the minor‘s ability to pay, the detrimental effect of setting restitution at an amount beyond what the minor could ever realistically be expected to pay, and a victim‘s constitutional right to restitution. In cases such as the present one, where the minor affirmatively presents evidence of inability to pay and the amount of damages is substantially beyond what could be paid anytime in the foreseeable future, the court has the responsibility to take the minor‘s limited ability to pay intо account when setting the amount of restitution that the minor will personally be required to pay.45
Because the trial court does not appear to have recognized that it had this responsibility in the current case, we vacate the restitution order entered against R.C. and we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Conclusion
The restitution judgment against R.C. is VACATED and this case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Notes
If a court proposes to order a defendant to pay restitution under this section of more than $5,000, and the defendant‘s sentence includes a period of unsuspended incarceration exceeding 90 days, the court may take into account at the time of sentencing the defendant‘s present and future ability to pay the restitution proposed.