WILFREDO QUINONES v. R. W. THOMPSON COMPANY, INC.
(AC 38256)
Appellate Court of Connecticut
Argued December 4, 2018—officially released February 26, 2019
Lavine, Keller and Bishop, Js.
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Syllabus
The plaintiff, who was injured while he was employed by the defendant company, appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner denying the plaintiff‘s motion to preclude the defendant from contesting the extent of the plaintiff‘s injuries. The defendant did not contest the plaintiff‘s claim for certain workers’ compensation benefits by filing a form 43, as required by statute ([Rev. to 2009]
- The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that because the parties stipulated that the case would be decided on the original record before T, D improperly opened the record, ignored the stipulation and conducted a hearing de novo: D‘s opening of the record solely in order to question the plaintiff regarding payments that he received from the defendant was not a hearing de novo, and the board did not clearly err in finding that the letters that the parties sent separately to the commission did not constitute a contract between the parties that could be considered a stipulation, as there was no firm understanding between the parties nor a quid pro quo, and the letters were merely a statement by the parties of their respective positions at that time; moreover, even if a stipulation existed between the parties, it would not have prohibited D from opening the record, as D recalled the plaintiff as a witness so that he could hear evidence he believed was essential to a proper evaluation of the case, and it was fully within D‘s power and authority, as a commissioner, to do so; accordingly, the board correctly determined that it was not improper for D to have opened the record.
- The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the board improperly affirmed the denial of his motion to preclude, which was based on his claim that the defendant, by failing to file a form 43 to contest the compensability of the plaintiff‘s claim for benefits, failed to comply with
§ 31-294c and was, therefore, precluded from contesting the compensability or extent of the plaintiff‘s claimed injury; the defendant had no duty to file a form 43, as the compensability of the plaintiff‘s claim was not and had never been contested, the plaintiff timely received benefits until the commission approved a timely filed form 36, and there was no reason for the defendant to contest the extent of the plaintiff‘s injury until obtaining the information alleged in the form 36, namely, that the plaintiff was able to return to work.
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Sixth District denying the plaintiff‘s motion to preclude the defendant from contesting the extent of the plaintiff‘s injury and denying the plaintiff‘s motion to correct, brought to the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the commissioner‘s decision, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Nicholas C. Varunes, with whom was Christopher Young, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On March 16, 2010, during the course of his employment with the defendant, the plaintiff sustained compensable injuries when the deck of a road paving machine fell on him. He began to receive workers’ compensation benefits on March 23, 2010. Although the plaintiff timely filed a form 30C1 claiming benefits on October 25, 2010, he refiled a form 30C on February 10, 2011, because he lost the return receipts from the postal service related to his first filing. The defendant did not contest the plaintiff‘s claim by filing a form 432 and began paying the plaintiff weekly indemnity payments in the amount of $328.58 from March 23, 2010, until November 8, 2011. On October 17, 2011, the defendant, however, sought to discontinue the benefits it was paying the plaintiff by filing a form 36,3 alleging that the plaintiff was able to return to work.4 The form 36 was approved without objection on November 2, 2011. Consequently, the plaintiff received no more compensation benefit payments after November 8, 2011. On February 29, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion to preclude the defendant from denying him further compensation benefits. Commissioner Clifton Thompson conducted a formal hearing on April 18, 2012. After the hearing, but before the parties submitted posttrial briefs, Commissioner Thompson died, and the case was assigned to Commissioner Delaney.5
When the Workers’ Compensation Commission (commission) contacted the parties regarding the former commissioner‘s death, the parties were told that they could have a hearing de novo or request
On August 31, 2012, the commissioner scheduled a formal hearing to open the record for articulation of the parties’ positions and arguments. On September 7, 2012, the plaintiff filed an objection to the commissioner‘s order to open the formal hearing. At a formal hearing on October 1, 2012, the commissioner heard the plaintiff‘s objection, and ruled that he had the authority to open the record and was recalling the plaintiff for further questioning. The plaintiff thereafter filed an appeal to the board on October 19, 2012, challenging the right of the commissioner to open the record and take further evidence. The board issued a decision on January 16, 2014, concluding that the matter was not ripe for review. On May 15, 2014, the commissioner held a formal hearing. On July 11, 2014, he issued his decision denying the plaintiff‘s motion to preclude. The plaintiff appealed to the board, arguing that the commissioner improperly opened the record in contravention of the parties’ stipulation and denied his motion to preclude. On July 29, 2015, the board found that there was no stipulation between the parties, and even if there was a stipulation, the commissioner had the authority to open the record. The board affirmed his denial of the motion to preclude. This appeal followed.
As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard of review. “It is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers’ compensation statutes by the commissioner and [the board]. . . . A state agency is not entitled, however, to special deference when its determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny. . . . Where . . . [a workers’ compensation] appeal involves an issue of statutory construction that has not yet been subjected to judicial scrutiny, this court has plenary power to review the administrative decision.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Day v. Middletown, 59 Conn. App. 816, 819, 757 A.2d 1267 (2000), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 945, 762 A.2d 900 (2000). “We [accord] deference to . . . a time-tested agency interpretation of a statute, but only when the agency has consistently followed its construction over a long period of time, the statutory language is ambiguous, and the agency‘s interpretation is reasonable.” State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 208 Conn. 709, 719, 546 A.2d 830 (1988).
“When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case . . . . In seeking to determine that meaning . . . [we] first . . . consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of
such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . .”
“Moreover, [i]n applying these general principles, we are mindful that the [Workers’ Compensation Act (act),
“The powers and duties of workers’ compensation commissioners are conferred upon them for the purposes of carrying out the stated provisions of the [act]. . . . It is well settled that the commissioner‘s jurisdiction is confined by the . . . act and limited by its provisions.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tufaro v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 24 Conn. App. 234, 236, 587 A.2d 1044 (1991).
I
The plaintiff first claims that the commissioner improperly opened the record. Specifically, he argues that he and the defendant stipulated that the case would be decided on the record before the former commissioner, and that the commissioner improperly ignored that stipulation and conducted a hearing de novo. We disagree.
As an initial matter, we reject the plaintiff‘s characterization that the commissioner‘s opening of the record was a hearing de novo. After the matter was assigned to him, the commissioner reviewed the record and concluded that there was not enough evidence for him to make a decision. He stated that the record consisted of “a very short transcript [of the April 18, 2012 formal hearing], very short direct and [cross-examination] of the [plaintiff], and [that he had] a lot of questions [for] the [plaintiff].”7 As a result,
about the payments he received. The plaintiff was unable to answer the commissioner‘s questions, even when shown his testimony from the October 1, 2012 hearing. The commissioner then asked counsel whether they could provide the information he requested concerning what payments the plaintiff received. Surprisingly, the plaintiff‘s counsel did not respond. The defendant‘s counsel offered a history of the benefits the defendant had paid the plaintiff. The commissioner accepted the history into evidence, which indicated that the plaintiff received weekly payments in the amount of $328.58, for a total of $28,257.88, as well as payment of medical bills totaling $66,996.09, for an overall total of $95,253.97.8
We also reject the plaintiff‘s characterization of the May 24, 2012 letters the parties sent separately to the commission as a stipulation. “[A stipulation] may be defined as a contract of the parties acknowledged in open court and ordered to be recorded by a court of competent jurisdiction. . . . [It is] the result of a contract and its embodiment in a form which places it and the matters covered by it beyond further controversy. . . . The essence of the [stipulation] is that the parties to the litigation have voluntarily entered into an agreement setting their dispute or disputes at rest and that, upon this agreement, the court has [rendered] judgment conforming to the terms of the agreement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Healy, 158 Conn. App. 113, 118, 118 A.3d 637 (2015).
“Absent a clearly expressed intention of the parties, the construction of a stipulation is a question of fact committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . Unless the language is so clear as to render its interpretation a matter of law, the question of the parties’ intent in entering into a stipulation is a question of fact that is subject to the ‘clearly erroneous’ scope of review.” (Citations omitted.) Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 229 Conn. 771, 780, 643 A.2d 1253 (1994).
In its opinion affirming the denial of the motion to preclude, the board stated that its “examination of the documentary evidence . . . which purportedly serves as a ‘stipulation’ reveals that the May 24, 2012 correspondence from [the plaintiff‘s] counsel to the commission was primarily a position statement reflecting [the plaintiff‘s] objection to a trial de novo, while correspondence to the commission from [the defendant‘s] counsel of the same date indicates that the [defendant] ‘[had] no objection to [the] matter [being] reassigned to a new commissioner for a finding on the papers based on the April 18, 2012 formal hearing transcript and the briefs submitted by the parties.’ . . . [N]either of these documents rises to a level of a ‘stipulation,’ and the evidentiary record contains no other document which even remotely resembles
cluded that even if there had been a stipulation, the commissioner would not have been bound by its terms in light of the powers entrusted to him by statute.
Upon review of the evidence, we conclude that the board did not clearly err in finding that the May 24, 2012 letters did not constitute a contract between the parties that could be considered a stipulation. There was no firm understanding between the parties nor a quid pro quo, just a statement by the parties of their respective positions at that time. We also agree with the board that, even if a stipulation existed between the parties, such a stipulation would not prohibit the commissioner from opening the record.
“[U]pon the death, disability or resignation of a judge9 . . . during the pendency of a trial or hearing to the court, a successor judge should take the following steps pursuant to the authority granted by [
“Although . . . a successor judge [has the power] to make his or her findings of fact based solely on transcribed testimony and exhibits, no Connecticut court has . . . defined the power of litigants to stipulate to such a procedure, thereby circumventing the procedures required under
In the present case, the commissioner recalled the plaintiff as a witness so that he could hear evidence he believed was essential to a proper evaluation of the case, that is, evidence of what payments had been made to the plaintiff. The plaintiff‘s testimony was material as to whether the defendant met the requirements of
II
The plaintiff‘s second claim is that the board improperly affirmed the denial of his motion to preclude, as the defendant failed to file a form 43. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that by failing to file a form 43 to contest the compensability of his original claim, the defendant failed to comply with
“In deciding a motion to preclude, the commissioner
must engage [in] a two part inquiry. First, he must determine whether the employee‘s notice of claim is adequate on its face. See
” ‘The first two sentences of
“Our Supreme Court, in discerning the legislative intent behind the notice requirement of
explained that the statute is meant to ensure (1) that employers would bear the burden of investigating a claim promptly and (2) that employees would be timely apprised of the specific reasons for the denial of their claim. . . . The court noted that the portion of the statute providing for a conclusive presumption of liability in the event of the employer‘s failure to provide timely notice was intended to correct some of the glaring inequities of the workers’ compensation system, specifically, to remedy the disadvantaged position of the injured employee . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lamar v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., 138 Conn. App. 826, 840, 54 A.3d 1040, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 943, 56 A.3d 951 (2012).
“The language of form 43 indicates that it is to be used by employers who are contesting their liability to pay alleged compensation benefits. The form does not
“Although we have no doubt that employers may have previously used form 43 to disclaim only the extent of a disability and not liability, amending the form to suit their specific disclaimer needs, that procedure unfairly requires such employers either to amend the form or to state untruthfully their intention to contest liability in order to preserve their ability to later challenge the extent of disability. The legislature, however, designed preservation of such challenges by allowing an employer, instead of filing a form 43, to commence payment of compensation for the alleged injury within the twenty-eight day period; and granting the employer who timely commences payment a one year period in which to contest the employee‘s right to receive compensation on any grounds or the extent of his disability . . . .” (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., supra, 145 Conn. App. 271-73.
The commissioner found that while the defendant did not file a form 43, the plaintiff timely, within twenty-eight days, received benefits until the commission approved a form 36. In its decision, the board stated: “In light of the evidence presented, the . . . commissioner reasonably concluded that because the compensability of the claim was not and had never been contested, the [defendant was] never obligated to file a form 43.” We agree.
In the present case, the defendant did not contest the liability of the plaintiff‘s injury and compensated him until the approval of a form 36. Additionally, there was no reason for the defendant to contest the extent
of the plaintiff‘s injury until obtaining the information alleged in the form 36, which was filed less than a year after receiving the plaintiff‘s form 30C.12 The plaintiff, therefore, was never in a disadvantaged position. “It is well settled that notice provisions under the [act] should be strictly construed. . . . As this court has recognized, however, [o]ur requirement of strict compliance . . . has presumed the possibility of compliance.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., supra, 145 Conn. App. 274. Considering the facts of the present case, the board did not misapply the law to the subordinate facts or draw an unreasonable conclusion. Therefore, we agree with the decision of the board.
The decision of the Compensation Review Board is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
form 36 and has disingenuously attempted to keep evidence of such payments from being considered.