QUICK CHARGE KIOSK LLC AND JEREMY HAHN v. JOSH KAUL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL
Case No. 2018AP947
COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
August 13, 2019
2019 WI APP 51
Brash, P.J., Brennan and Dugan, JJ.
PUBLISHED OPINION; †Petition for review filed
Opinion Filed: August 13, 2019
Submitted on Briefs: March 1, 2019
JUDGES: Brash, P.J., Brennan and Dugan, JJ.
Appellant ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Ohioma Emil Ovbiagele and Samantha Huddleston in Milwaukee.
Respondent ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Brad D. Schimel and Colin T. Roth of the Wisconsin Department of Justice in Madison.
QUICK CHARGE KIOSK LLC AND JEREMY HAHN, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. BRAD SCHIMEL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Appeal No. 2018AP947
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
August 13, 2019
Cir. Ct. No. 2016CV6655
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: JOHN J. DiMOTTO, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Brash, P.J., Brennan and Dugan, JJ.
BACKGROUND
¶2 In 2014 Hahn founded Quick Charge, which operates the Machines and places them in retail establishments throughout the State. The Machines resemble video gambling machines commonly found in casinos or taverns, and they function in same manner. The Machines and their electronic video displays look similar to those of a mechanical slot machine. The major components of the Machines are (1) a cabinet structure; (2) electronic parts and associated software; and (3) electronic device charging ports that fit almost all portable electronic devices, including mobile phones and tablets.
¶3 When a customer puts one dollar into the Machine, that customer receives 100 credits to play the video chance game, and
¶4 Based on аn Attorney General opinion that the Machines are unlawful gambling machines, the City of Greenfield ordered Quick Charge to remove three Machines from a retail location in Greenfield. In Brown County, representatives of the State obtained a search warrant for removal of the Machines based on a probable cause finding that the Machines were illegal gambling machines.
¶5 In August 2016, Quick Charge filed an action in Milwaukee County Circuit Court seeking declaratory judgment that its Machines complied with the “in-pack chаnce promotion” statute,
¶6 The trial court heard oral arguments from the parties on the summary judgment motions and then issued a written decision granting the Attorney General‘s summary judgment motion. The trial court held that the Machines do not comply with the “in-pack chance promotion exception” in
DISCUSSION
¶7 Quick Charge argues that its Machines are lotteries, not gambling machines, under
¶8 The Attorney General argues that because the lottery definition in
¶9 As we further explain, we agree with the Attorney General.
I. Standard of review and principles of statutory construction
¶10 Whether summary judgment has been properly granted is a question of law which we review de novo, applying the same methodology as the trial court, but benefiting from its analysis. See Eichenseer v. Madison-Dane Cty. Tavern League, Inc., 2008 WI 38, ¶30, 308 Wis. 2d 684, 748 N.W.2d 154. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material faсt and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
¶11 Here, the parties disagree over the interpretation and application of
statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry. Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.
See id., ¶45 (citation omitted); see also
II. The Machines qualify as illegal gambling machines under WIS. STAT. § 945.01(3)(a); they are not exempted lotteries under § 945.01(5) and WIS. STAT. § 100.16(2)
A. The statutory scheme
¶12
Gambling machine definition—WIS. STAT. § 945.01(3)
¶13
Lottery definition —WIS. STAT. § 945.01(5)
¶14 Separate from the gambling machine definition,
“Consideration” in this subsection means anything which is a commercial or financial advantage to the promоter or a disadvantage to any participant, but does not include any advantage to the promoter or disadvantage to any participant caused when any participant learns from newspapers, magazines and other periodicals, radio or television where to send the participant‘s name and address to the promoter.
(Emphasis added.) Moreover,
Prohibition of sales with the pretense of a prize—WIS. STAT. § 100.16
¶15
No person shall sell or offer to sell anything by the representation or pretense that a sum of money or something
of value, which is uncertain or concealed, is enclosed within or may be found with or named upon the thing sold, or that will be given to the purchaser in addition to the thing sold, or by any representation, pretense or devise by which the purchaser is informed or induced to believe that money or something else of value may be won or drawn by chance by reason of the sale.
As previously mentioned,
B. The definition оf “consideration” for a gambling machine is not the same as the definition of “consideration” for a lottery
¶16 As we stated above, four elements are required to establish a gambling machine under
Quick Charge‘s argument regarding “consideration” for a gambling machine
¶17 Quick Charge acknowledges that
¶18 Quick Charge further argues that when two separate statutes interact, rules of statutory interpretation require that courts reasonably construe the statutesto avoid a conflict. It argues that the only reasonable interpretation of the meaning of consideration, under both the lottery and gambling machine definitions, is that “consideration” must have an identical meaning in both subsections of
¶19 The problem with Quick Charge‘s argument is that it contravenes the principles of statutory construction. Our supreme court has emphasized that “[i]n construing
¶20 Looking at the structure of
¶21 Furthеr, the language limiting the exceptions to “consideration in this subsection” in
¶22 In sum, a plain language interpretation of
The Machines involve “consideration” for purposes of the gambling machine subsection
¶23 We next address whether the Machines involve consideration under
¶24 The trial court noted that Quick Charge made a brief argument that its Machines are not gambling machines even if they do not qualify for the in-pack chance promotion exemption. On appeal, Quick Charge does not make that argument and, therefore, has abandoned it. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 491, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998).7
¶25 Insteаd, Quick Charge pursues an alternative argument that the Machines are lotteries, not gambling machines. In addressing this issue, Quick Charge discusses whether its Machines meet the definition of consideration underthe lottery subsection. It asserts that its Machines do not involve consideration under the lottery subsection because its Machines use in-pack chance promotions, which the lottery subsection exempts from its definition of consideration. To qualify for the exemption as an in-pack chance promotion, the рromotion must meet seven conditions, including the option for free play. See
¶26 The Attorney General responds that Quick Charge‘s argument about its free play option is absurd. However, the Attorney General has misconstrued the argument.
¶27 In fact, Quick Charge does not attempt to refute the Attorney General‘s argument that if the in-pack chance promotion in
¶28 Quick Charge‘s argument is not that the free play option removes the Machines from the definition of a gambling machine. Rather, it argues that the Machines constitute a lottery not a gambling machine. It then argues that the lottery subsection‘s
¶29 Thus, we conclude that Quick Charge‘s Machines involve consideration for the purposes of the gambling machine subsection because, as noted above, the in-pack chance promotion exemption does not apply to gambling machines. We next discuss whether Quick Charge‘s Machines constitute gambling machines оr a lottery.
C. Quick Charge‘s machines are gambling machines, not a lottery
¶30 As noted above, Quick Charge argues that its Machines are lotteries, rather than gambling machines. In Quick Charge‘s view, the Machines can use the lottery exception for in-pack chance promotions and, as a result, they are not prohibited lotteries.
¶31 Chapter 945 of the Wisconsin Statutes defines a gambling machine and a lottery differently.
¶32 The statute does not define either term and, therefore, we look to dictionary definitions. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶53. The dictionary defines a “contrivance” as a “mechanical device,” and an “enterprise” as an “undertaking that … has a strong element of risk.” See Contrivance, WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabr. 1993); see Enterprise, id. Therefore, machines—mechanical devices—can be a “gambling machine.” This interpretation is supported by prior decisions applying the gambling machine provision to machines, analyzing a video poker machine as a gambling machine and a pinball machine as a gambling machine. See State v. Hahn, 221 Wis. 2d 670, 679, 586 N.W.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1998) (applying the subsection to video poker machines); State v. Lake Geneva Lanes, Inc., 22 Wis. 2d 151, 153, 125 N.W.2d 622 (1963) (applying the subsection to a pinball machine). By contrast, traditional prize drawings or other non-mechanical schemes—an enterprise—can be a lottery (i.e., pull tab contests as a lottery.) See Bohrer v. City of Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 237, ¶¶2-3, 248 Wis. 2d 319, 635 N.W.2d 816.
¶33 Quick Charge responds that this definition of contrivance is too narrow and that it should be read to mean “a thing that has some intended purpose.” The Attorney General argues that such interpretation cannot be correctfor two reasons. First,
¶34 The gambling machine and lottery subsections are strikingly similar. Aside from the differences related to “consideration,” the only meaningful difference is that a gambling machine is a contrivance, while a lottery is an enterprise. The only way to give effect to both provisions is to give those two terms different meanings. Quick Charge‘s preferred reading would effectively give them the same meaning, improperly rendering one or the other surplusage. “Statutory language is read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage.” Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. When the legislature chooses to use two different words, this court generally сonsiders each separately and presumes that different words have different meanings. See Augsberger, 359 Wis. 2d 385, ¶17.
¶35 “We assume that the legislature‘s intent is expressed in the statutory language.” See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44. Given the plain language differences between the gambling machine subsection and the lottery subsection, we conclude that the legislature intended to treat the gambling machine subsection differently than the lottery subsection. This interpretation is the one that is the mostconsistent with the statutory structure. Thus, we conclude that Quick Charge‘s Machines are gambling machines, not lotteries.9
CONCLUSION
¶36 For the reasons explained above, we conclude that the definition of “consideration” in
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
Notes
The Attorney General points out an apparent anomaly by which Wisconsin taverns appear to freely operate gambling machines and indicates that this anomaly can be explained by
We have concluded that the Machines are gambling machines and that
