Quesinberry v. QuesinberryQuesinberry v. Quesinberry
ROBERT M. HARRELSON, Atty. Reg. No. 0003302 and WILLIAM H. HARRELSON, II, Atty. Reg. No. 0087957, 9 West Water Street, Troy, Ohio 45373 Attorneys for First Petitioner/Appellant, Anna Carol Quesinberry
THOMAS G. EAGLE, Atty. Reg. No. 0034492, 3400 North State Route 741, Lebanon, Ohio 45036 Attorney for Second Petitioner/Appellee, Nathan Quesinberry
MICHELLE M. MACIOROWSKI, Atty. Reg. No. 0067692, 7333 Paragon Road, Suite 170, Centerville, Ohio 45459 Attorney for Appellee, Ariel Quesinberry
OPINION
Rendered on the 4th day of March, 2022.
{1} Anna Carol Quesinberry appeals from the trial court‘s judgment sustaining appellee Nathan Quesinberry‘s objections to a magistrate‘s decision and overruling her
{2} Anna contends the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to vacate the dissolution decree in its entirety.1 She also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief based on material misrepresentations made by Nathan while negotiating the separation agreement.
{3} We conclude that the trial court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction to vacate the entire dissolution decree under
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{4} Anna and Nathan married in 2001 and had four children together. In April 2018, they petitioned the trial court for dissolution of their marriage. Along with the petition, they submitted financial-disclosure affidavits and other documents. Nathan reported income of $149,000, and Anna reported no income. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the petition and filed a dissolution decree on May 23, 2018. The decree incorporated a separation agreement that the parties had submitted.
{6} On May 22, 2019, Anna filed a
{7} A magistrate held a two-day hearing on Anna‘s motion in November 2020. The only witnesses at the hearing were Anna and Nathan. Based on the evidence presented, the magistrate found the existence of mutual mistakes insofar as the separation agreement (1) failed to note the parties’ sale of their respective vehicles prior to entry of the dissolution decree and (2) omitted the existence of savings bonds and college-savings accounts. The magistrate also found that Nathan had made material misrepresentations to Anna concerning (1) her not being entitled to both child support and spousal support and (2) the need for a 50-percent downward deviation on child support to account for the 50/50 shared parenting. The magistrate further noted that Anna received none of the home equity, which the magistrate found was about $100,000. The magistrate also found that Anna‘s share of all of Nathan‘s various retirement accounts should have been $95,989.24 whereas she only received $85,000 from one account. Finally, the magistrate found that Anna would have been entitled to one-half of two bank accounts with a combined value in excess of $7,000. The magistrate then reasoned:
Anna ended up with no home, no vehicle, no spousal support, no health care, and half the amount of child support with an obligation to pay one-half of uninsured medical after the first $100.00. She drives borrowed cars. She lived in a camper outside her parents’ home for three months until they purchased a home for her to rent from them. She is cleaning houses, living paycheck to paycheck.
There is no question that Anna did not take steps to protect her interest during the dissolution. She signed the documents without understanding them. She stood in front of Magistrate Turrell and under oath confirmed that she read and understood the documents, and that she was satisfied with the terms of their agreement [Exhibit PP]. This was based on what she understood she was entitled to receive as misrepresented to her by Nathan. Nathan took on a lot of debt, but kept most of the assets. Nathan‘s misrepresentations to Anna, and other misconduct as outlined above, resulted in an outcome that was very favorable to Nathan.
(December 29, 2020 Magistrate‘s Decision at 12.)
{8} For the foregoing reasons, the magistrate found Anna entitled to relief from judgment under
{9} In a June 14, 2021 decision and judgment entry, the trial court found Nathan‘s objections well taken in part and overruled Anna‘s motion for
{10} The trial court next considered the possibility of vacating the entire dissolution decree (as Anna‘s
{11} The trial court concluded, however, that various omissions in the parties’ separation agreement were relatively minor and did not warrant vacating the dissolution decree in its entirety. The trial court also found that both parties had acknowledged and agreed to the terms of the separation agreement, despite the fact that it contained some omissions, that Nathan did not knowingly conceal information from Anna regarding their assets and liabilities, and that Anna willingly and voluntarily signed the agreement. Therefore, the trial court found no fraud or knowing misrepresentation by Nathan regarding the terms of the separation agreement.
{12} The trial court did find, however, that Anna had relied to her detriment on Nathan‘s statement to her about being allowed to receive child support or spousal support, but not both. Based on Anna‘s testimony, the trial court found it reasonable to infer that Nathan may “have meant that he couldn‘t afford both child and spousal support, not that he intentionally misrepresented the law to Anna.” (June 14, 2021 Decision and Judgment Entry at 14.) The trial court also noted that Anna could have investigated the truth of what Nathan told her. For these reasons, the trial court found no proof that Nathan knowingly misrepresented the law and no reasonable reliance by Anna on what he told her regarding spousal support.
{13} In conclusion, the trial court found it inequitable to vacate the dissolution decree based on Anna‘s challenge to the separation agreement. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court found it relevant that Nathan had remarried. The trial court also pointed to Anna‘s acknowledgement at the dissolution hearing that she had read the agreement, that she understood it, and that she was satisfied with its terms. The trial court found that Anna made these representations voluntarily and not out of duress. Under the circumstances, the trial court found the need for “finality of judgments” paramount, reasoning:
The court has struggled with this decision which demanded the weighing of fairness, accuracy, and equity with the need for finality of the court‘s judgment and the law regarding the use of a 60(B) motion in a dissolution. As the magistrate stated, “there is no question that Anna did not take steps to protect her interest during the dissolution.” However, she went further than that. She represented to the court that she understood and was satisfied with the terms of the Separation Agreement, the Judgment Entry, and the Shared Parenting Plan submitted to the court. That she sought counsel and advice a year after her request to the court to accept the documents as ratified by her, is, in this court‘s view, insufficient to entirely vacate the dissolution for purposes of inequity in hindsight.
(Id. at 17.)
II. Analysis
{14} Anna advances the following four assignments of error:
II. The Trial Court abused its discretion in denying Appellant‘s
III. The Trial Court abused its discretion in denying Appellant‘s
IV. The Trial Court abused its discretion in denying Appellant‘s
{15} Under
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.
{16} To prevail on a
{17} Here the trial court correctly recognized that
{18} We need not dwell on the foregoing issue, however, because Anna does not claim the trial court should have altered the terms of the separation agreement. Her
{19} For his part, Nathan accuses Anna of engaging in semantics by drawing a distinction between “modifying” and “vacating.” He reasons that vacating the entire dissolution decree is modifying the parties’ agreement regarding spousal support and the division of property. (Appellee‘s Brief at 5-6.) Nathan argues that Anna had “X” (no spousal support) and now wants “Y” (spousal support). He contends what Anna seeks is a change (or modification) to the parties’ separation agreement, which she cannot obtain absent the consent of both parties. Nathan insists that “changing it is changing it, whether you call it vacating it or something else.” (Appellee‘s Brief at 6.) In support, he relies largely on Walsh v. Walsh, 157 Ohio St.3d 322, 2019-Ohio-3723, 136 N.E.3d 460. In Walsh, the trial court modified a provision in a divorce decree specifying the duration of the marriage for purposes of dividing a pension. The Ohio Supreme Court held that this modification to the decree could not be made under
{20} Contrary to Nathan‘s assertion, we are unpersuaded that vacating an entire dissolution decree is the same as modifying the terms of a separation agreement contained within a decree. Anna is not seeking to change the terms of the separation agreement. Her argument is broader and more fundamental. In essence, she claims no valid separation agreement exists. Therefore, the dissolution decree is subject to being vacated under
{21} We recently recognized that fraud or material mistake can invalidate a separation agreement and entitle a party to relief from a dissolution decree under
A decree of dissolution is founded on an agreement of the parties. As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated, “mutual consent is the cornerstone of our dissolution law.” Knapp v. Knapp, 24 Ohio St.3d 141, 144, 493 N.E.2d 1353 (1986). “[I]f consent or mutuality did not exist when the parties entered into the separation agreement because of fraud or material mistake or misrepresentation, then there was no agreement upon which the dissolution decree could have been based. This lack of mutuality undermines the integrity of the dissolution proceeding and may constitute sufficient grounds to set aside the decree under
Civ.R. 60(B) .” In re Whitman, 81 Ohio St.3d 239, 241, 690 N.E.2d 535 (1998). * * *
Molnar-Satterfield v. Molnar, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2020-CA-52, 2021-Ohio-2698, ¶ 14.
{22} This court recognized the issue again in Wuebben v. Wuebben, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2017-CA-62, 2018-Ohio-4768, observing:
“Dissolution is a creature of statute that is based upon the parties’ mutual consent.” In re Whitman, 81 Ohio St.3d 239, 241, 690 N.E.2d 535 (1989). An integral part of the dissolution proceeding is the separation agreement agreed to by both spouses. Id., citing
R.C. 3105.63(A)(1) . The separation agreement, a binding contract between the parties, must provide for a division of all property. Id. at 241. Thus, Ohio courts have held that “if consent or mutuality did not exist when the parties entered into the separation agreement because of fraud or mutual mistake or misrepresentation, then there was no agreement upon which the decree of dissolution could have been based. This lack of mutuality undermines the integrity of the dissolution proceeding and may constitute grounds to set aside the decree underCiv.R. 60(B) .” Id. at 241 * * *.
{23} In Nardecchia v. Nardecchia, 155 Ohio App.3d 40, 2003-Ohio-5410, 798 N.E.2d 1198 (2d Dist.), this court found a party entitled to
{24} Finally, in Ouellette v. Ouellette, 2020-Ohio-705, 152 N.E.3d 528 (6th Dist.), the parties were granted a divorce pursuant to a consent decree. The property-division portion of the parties’ agreement awarded the wife a lump-sum payment from her husband‘s pension. Following the divorce, the parties discovered that a lump-sum payment was not possible. The wife then sought relief under
* * * In other words, appellant argues that a trial court will never have authority to set aside—upon a timely motion—an agreed entry that resulted from mutual mistake regarding a material term, unless all parties consent. Where, as in this case, a party demonstrates facts that challenge the very formation of a consent decree, a motion for relief under
Civ.R. 60(B)(1) is appropriate. Whitman, 81 Ohio St.3d at 241, 690 N.E.2d 535 (without mutuality, “there was no agreement upon which [the decree] could have been based.“) We therefore conclude that the trial court did have jurisdiction to consider appellee‘sCiv.R. 60(B)(1) motion, even if the remedy of modification was improperly ordered.
{25} In the present case, Anna sought vacation of the dissolution decree based on multiple alleged deficiencies in the separation agreement. As set forth above, she claimed the separation agreement failed to account for and divide all of the parties’ assets and debts. She also argued that it failed to award her a proper share of the home equity and Nathan‘s pension. With regard to these issues, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s denial of
{26} The trial court noted that the parties sold their respective vehicles after submitting their separation agreement and before the trial court issued its dissolution decree. Technically, then, the separation agreement was inaccurate at the time of the dissolution because it listed the two sold vehicles as assets. We see no prejudice to Anna, however, because the separation agreement gave each party one of the vehicles, along with any corresponding debt, free and clear from any claim of the other party. The fact that the parties both sold their own vehicles before the dissolution was finalized is not a material omission from the decree.
{27} The trial court also noted that the separation agreement omitted reference to certain savings bonds and college-saving accounts as well as a “GAP” store credit-card debt and a debt owed to Anna‘s parents. Under the separation agreement, however, Nathan assumed all debt, and the record reflects that he took responsibility for the missing credit-card debt. He also signed an agreement to repay Anna‘s parents. As for the savings bonds and college-savings accounts, Anna appears to have had knowledge of their existence. In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding them relatively de minimus in light of the parties’ overall financial situation and insufficient to justify vacating the entire dissolution decree.
{28} The trial court also found that Anna had knowledge of Nathan‘s retirement accounts and negotiated with him to receive $85,000 from them. The fact that an equal division of the accounts would have resulted in her receiving roughly $10,000 more does not justify vacating the dissolution and relieving Anna from her voluntary agreement. At a minimum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reaching such a conclusion. The trial court likewise did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate the dissolution decree based on Nathan‘s keeping the
{29} In our view, the closer questions are whether Anna is entitled to
{30} It is unclear whether Nathan was saying the law required a 50-percent adjustment or whether he was making what he believed was an equitable proposal. The terms of the separation agreement suggest, however, that the parties entered into what they believed was a fair agreement, not that the law required the deviation. In the separation agreement, the parties mutually agreed that the worksheet amount would be “unjust or inappropriate” in their case in light of the shared parenting. They also agreed that the 50-percent deviation would allow both parties to maintain the children‘s standard of living and that doing so was in the children‘s best interest. This language suggests that Anna voluntarily agreed to a 50-percent reduction for personal reasons, not that Nathan misled her into believing such a deviation was required by law. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s denial of
{31} With regard to spousal support, Anna testified: “Nathan told me that I had to choose either child support or alimony, that I wasn‘t allowed to have both.” (Hearing Tr. Vol. I at 95.) According to Anna, he recommended her choosing child support, which would be better for her financially. (Id.) Anna also testified that Nathan told her he could not afford a lump-sum payment if she elected to take alimony. (Id. at 120.) Finally, she testified that he offered to pay for their children‘s health care, sports fees, and other necessities if she chose child support and did not demand any compensation for home equity. (Id.) For his part, Nathan denied telling Anna anything about having to pick either child support or spousal support.
{32} As noted above, the magistrate found that Nathan did tell Anna she was not allowed to have child support and spousal support. When reviewing Nathan‘s objections, the trial court agreed that Nathan had made the statement. The trial court inferred, however, that Nathan may “have meant that he couldn‘t afford both child and spousal support, not that he intentionally
{33} Upon review, we believe the trial court‘s inference about the meaning of Nathan‘s statement was unreasonable. Anna testified that Nathan said she ”wasn‘t allowed to have” both child support and spousal support and that she ”had to” choose one or the other. (Emphasis added.) This testimony does not support a reasonable inference that Nathan meant he could not afford to pay both.
{34} If Nathan truly believed that Anna was not allowed to receive child support and spousal support, then his statement to her would not constitute fraud or a knowing misrepresentation. But the magistrate and the trial court both found that Nathan made the statement,4 which undoubtedly was incorrect, as nothing in domestic-relations law precluded Anna from receiving both child support and spousal support. Therefore, the parties’ separation agreement was the product of a mutual mistake with regard to spousal support.
{35} The parties’ mistake about spousal support was a material one. The separation agreement awarded Anna a vehicle (which she sold, apparently because she could not afford the debt), $85,000 from Nathan‘s retirement account, and 50-percent of the “worksheet” child-support amount for four children. In light of the parties’ 17-year marriage and the disparity in their incomes, Anna almost certainly would have been entitled to a substantial spousal-support award.
{36} Once approved and incorporated into the trial court‘s dissolution decree, the separation agreement became a binding contract. A mutual mistake of fact or law regarding a material term of a contract is grounds for rescission:
“A contract may be rescinded under the doctrine of mutual mistake when the agreement is based upon a material mistake of fact or law.” In re Estate of Stamm, 11th Dist. No. 2005-T-0098, 2006-Ohio-5176, at ¶ 25 (citation omitted). “A mistake is material to a contract when it is ‘a mistake * * * as to a basic assumption on which the contract was made [that] has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances.‘” Reilley v. Richards, 69 Ohio St.3d 352, 353, 632 N.E.2d 507, 1994-Ohio-528 (citation omitted). Regarding settlement agreements, “[i]f each party is mistaken as to a material fact of settlement, then there could be no meeting of the minds, and thus no valid contract for settlement.” Connolly v. Studer, 7th Dist. No. 07 CA 846, 2008-Ohio-1526, at ¶ 24.
KMV V Ltd. v. DeBolt, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2010-P-0032, 2011-Ohio-525, ¶ 27; see also State ex rel. Walker v. Lancaster City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 79 Ohio St.3d 216, 220, 680 N.E.2d 993 (1997) (“The mistake here is a mutual mistake of fact and law permitting rescission.“); Reed v. Triton Servs., Inc., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2018-07-049, 2019-Ohio-1587,
{37} As explained above,
{38} In opposition to our analysis, Nathan argues that Anna signed the separation agreement willingly and voluntarily. He stresses her admission at the hearing that she did not read everything in the agreement. He also asserts that Anna had a general understanding of the parties’ assets and debts as well as his income. He argues that she cannot rely on her own failure to determine the value of known assets. He further asserts that she is responsible for the agreement she signed, regardless of whether she read or understood it. Finally, Nathan notes that he remarried shortly after the dissolution decree in reliance on it.
{39} With regard to “mistake” as it pertains to spousal support, Nathan faults Anna for accepting his alleged representation and not taking independent action to discover the truth. He cites Reilley v. Richards, 69 Ohio St.3d 352, 632 N.E.2d 507 (1994) for the proposition that even a mutual mistake will not justify rescission of a contract if the complaining party was negligent in not discovering the mistake. He also argues that Anna should not be permitted to rescind the separation agreement because she has obtained substantial benefits from it. He draws an analogy to cases holding that a party who signs a release cannot attack its validity without tendering back any consideration received.
{40} Upon review, we agree with Nathan‘s arguments about Anna voluntarily accepting the terms of the separation agreement and having general knowledge of the parties’ assets and liabilities. But those issues have no impact on Anna‘s spousal-support argument. She is not suggesting unawareness that the separation agreement omitted spousal support. Her argument concerns the reason the agreement omitted spousal support, namely the existence of a mutual mistake regarding her eligibility for it. The fact that Anna voluntarily entered into the agreement and accepted its terms does not undermine this argument.
{41} In the Reilley case cited by Nathan, the parties entered into a real-estate purchase contract. Following the transaction, the buyer sought rescission on the basis that a significant portion of the subject property was in a floodplain, which precluded him from building a home. The
{42} Here the parties’ mutual mistake regarding Anna‘s purportedly not being allowed to receive child support and spousal support was a material one. We also see no negligence on Anna‘s part. She testified below that she trusted Nathan and believed what he said about her being required to elect child support or spousal support. She explained: “I trusted everything he said. I mean we, we went into this as a friendly like separation. I had no—there was no, you know, I hate you, all of that kind of stuff, you know, that maybe some divorces go through. We said we wanted to keep things on a friendly level. We had four kids. We needed to be able to work together so I trusted everything that he told me.” (Tr. Vol. I at 101.)
{43} The record demonstrates that Nathan took the lead in structuring the terms of the dissolution and that Anna trusted him and reasonably believed what he told her. Nothing suggests that Anna had any cause to question Nathan‘s representations. She had no experience in domestic-relations law and was an unsophisticated party in that regard. Absent any reason to question the veracity of what Nathan told her, we also see no negligence in Anna‘s failure to consult with an attorney about the issue.
{44} We note too that while Nathan‘s remarriage is a relevant consideration, remarriage does not preclude granting
{45} Finally, we are unpersuaded that Anna‘s receipt of benefits under the separation agreement precludes her from obtaining
{46} We are unconvinced that case law involving the return of consideration paid for the release of a cause of action applies equally to dissolution decrees. In the case of a release, a party receives compensation in exchange for signing a release of legal claims. Here Nathan did not pay Anna any money in exchange for agreeing to forego spousal support or as consideration for agreeing to end the marriage. The parties’ simply agreed on a division of their joint marital property and child support. If the dissolution decree is vacated, Anna does not “owe” Nathan the return of any money, which belonged to both of them while they were married. In the absence of a valid dissolution decree, all marital assets still would belong to them jointly, regardless of which party was holding the asset. In short, Nathan‘s analogy to cases involving releases is unworkable in the domestic-relations context, and we have not found any case applying a tender-back requirement when a party seeks relief from a dissolution decree under
III. Conclusion
{47} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain Anna‘s assignments of error insofar as she contends the trial court erred in failing to grant her relief under
DONOVAN, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.
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Robert M. Harrelson
William H. Harrelson, II
Thomas G. Eagle
Michelle M. Maciorowski
Hon. Timothy D. Wood