Morris v. Morris (Slip Opinion)Morris v. Morris (Slip Opinion)
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} This case was accepted as a certified conflict between judgments of the Second District Court of Appeals and the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The Second District certified the issue in conflict as follows:
“Does a trial court have jurisdiction underCiv.R. 60(B) to vacate or modify an award of spousal support in a decree of divorce or dissolution where the decree does not contain a reservation of jurisdiction to modify the award of spousal support pursuant toR.C. 3105.18(E) ?”
{¶ 2} The conclusion of the Second District that relief under
{¶ 3} We therefore answer the certified question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals.
{¶ 4} On July 25, 2000, appellee, Jill Morris, and appellant, Michael Morris, jointly filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the Greene County Court of Common Pleas. The petition alleged that the parties had been married since 1985 and had three children born of the marriage. A separation agreement entered into by the parties was attached and incorporated into the petition. The separation agreement included the following provision:
The parties agree that the Husband shall pay as and for spousal support the sum of $1,300.00 a month for [the Wife’s] lifetime. Said spousal support shall commence with the month a final decree is rendered herein and continue for until [sic] the Wife dies or the Husband dies, whichever event occurs first. The Court shall not have continuing jurisdiction on this subject. For income tax purposes, the Husband shall NOT claim this spousal support as support but treat it as property settlement and the Husband shall pay all the income taxes on same.
(Capitalization sic.)
{¶ 5} On October 10, 2000, the trial court entered a decree of dissolution approving and incorporating the separation agreement that the parties had attached to their petition.
{¶ 6} Less than a year after the dissolution was finalized, appellant filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to
{¶ 7} On March 22, 2012, almost 111/2 years after the dissolution was finalized, the prosecutor’s office filed in the trial court a motion for contempt of court based in part on appellant’s failure to abide by the spousal-support provision of the separation agreement. In response, appellant filed a-motion for relief from judgment pursuant to “
{¶ 8} Appellant’s motion was based on a series of employment-related events in his life that caused his annual income to become increasingly lower than it had been at the time of the dissolution. During the 11 1/2 years, his annual income decreased from about $100,000 to less than $4,000.
{¶ 10} Overruling appellant’s objections, the trial court adopted the decision of the magistrate. From that decision, appellant timely appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision as to this issue.
{¶ 11} Thereafter, the Second District granted appellant’s motion to certify a conflict, concluding that its holding in this case was in direct conflict with the holding of the Tenth District in Noble v. Noble, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-1045,
Analysis
I. Divorce and Dissolution Generally
A. Divorce
{¶ 12} The 1802 Ohio Constitution included no provision for divorce or spousal support. Dillingham v. Dillingham,
{¶ 13} In 1824, legislation was first enacted vesting this court with exclusive jurisdiction to grant a divorce when one of the enumerated causes for divorce was demonstrated. 22 Ohio Laws 341. The act also provided for custody, child support, and spousal support. Id. Eventually, in 1853, jurisdiction to grant a divorce was vested in the courts of common pleas. See 51 Ohio Laws 377.
{¶ 14} The divorce statutes have gone through countless iterations since 1824. Today, there are 11 grounds on which divorce may be granted for cause. See
{¶ 15} The parties may also enter into a separation agreement that fully resolves all issues or that leaves certain issues for the trial court to determine. See, e.g., Eddington v. Eddington, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-572,
*142 “find the separation agreement fair, just, and reasonable or equitable, and incorporate it by reference so that it becomes a part of the decree. * * * [It can] reject some of the terms of the separation agreement, make an independent ruling on those issues, and incorporate the independent rulings and partial separation agreement into the decree. * * * [It can] reject the entire separation agreement and make its own findings regarding the issues set forth in the complaint. Lastly, the trial court may acknowledge the existence of a separation agreement, identify it and attach it to the decree, without incorporating it by reference. Under these circumstances, the trial court has not repudiated or rejected the separation agreement, nor has it found the agreement fair, just, and equitable and incorporated it into the decree. It has merely acknowledged the separation agreement and attached it as an exhibit.”
(Ellipses and brackets sic.; emphasis deleted.) Welly v. Welly,
B. Dissolution
{¶ 16} In 1974, the General Assembly enacted provisions making dissolution of marriage permissible through a no-fault-divorce proceeding. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 233, 135 Ohio Laws, Part II, 603, 615-616. An “[a]greement between the spouses [was] the linchpin of the procedure.” In re Adams,
{¶ 17} A petition for dissolution must be signed by both spouses and incorporate a separation agreement agreed to by both spouses.
{¶ 18} The trial court has limited authority at the dissolution hearing. See
A. Divorce versus Dissolution — The Trial Court’s Authority to Award Spousal Support
{¶ 19} The distinctions between divorce and dissolution in the context of spousal support were succinctly stated by the Tenth District Court of Appeals in Alban v. Alban,
In a divorce case, where a divorce is granted, not only may the trial court reject, predicated upon sufficient evidence, a separation agreement entered into by the parties as being unfair, but the court may make its own determination predicated upon sufficient evidence as to the need for and amount of periodic alimony payments to be made by one spouse to the other. In other words, in a divorce case, the matter of periodic alimony payments is one for determination by the court.
In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, however, the court has no jurisdiction to grant a dissolution unless the parties have entered into a separation agreement either providing for alimony or providing that none shall be paid, which shall be incorporated into the dissolution agreement if approved by the trial court. There can be no decree of dissolution unless there is a separation agreement voluntarily agreed to by the parties and approved by the trial court. The trial court has no power to determine the amount of periodic alimony payments as the court would have in a divorce case, but, instead, this is a matter for a voluntary agreement between the parties.
B. Divorce versus Dissolution — The Trial Court’s Authority to Modify a Spousal-Support Award
1. Divorce
{¶ 20} Prior to legislative enactments, a trial court’s authority to modify an award of spousal support was controlled by common law. In Olney v. Watts, this court examined the authority of a trial court to modify a divorce decree awarding spousal support when the decree was silent as to that issue.
{¶ 21} In considering a spousal-support agreement 16 years later in Law v. Law, this court held that absent “fraud or mistake,” the parties’ agreement was not subject to modification.
{¶ 22} In 1959, this court held that the equitable power of the trial court may be invoked to modify a spousal-support award when a wife remarries, even though the parties had agreed to a nonterminable award of spousal support that was not part of a division of property and did not reserve jurisdiction in the trial court to modify. Hunt v. Hunt,
{¶ 23} In Wolfe v. Wolfe, this court traced the foregoing historical development of the common law granting trial courts authority to modify an award of spousal support on certain conditions when the parties’ agreement was silent.
{¶ 24} In response to Wolfe, the General Assembly enacted former
2. Dissolution
{¶ 25} As noted above, the ability of the parties to dissolve their marriage was statutorily created in 1974. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 233, 135 Ohio Laws, Part II, 603, 615-616. In that same act, the General Assembly authorized the trial court to “enforce its decree” and provided that the court “retains jurisdiction to modify all matters of custody, child support, visitation, and periodic alimony payments.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 616. One year later, in 1975, the General Assembly restricted the court’s ability to modify an award of spousal support when it amended the 1974 statute and removed the words “and periodic alimony payments.” Am.H.B. No. 370, 136 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2451, 2452.
C. Death of the Common Law — Former
{¶ 27} In the same 1986 act, the General Assembly enacted former
If a continuing order for periodic payments of money as alimony is entered in a divorce or dissolution of marriage action that is determined on or after the effective date of this amendment, the court that enters the decree of divorce or dissolution of marriage does not have jurisdiction to modify the amount or terms of the alimony unless the court determines that the circumstances of either party have changed and unless one of the following applies:
(1) In the case of a divorce, the decree or a separation agreement of the parties to the divorce that is incorporated into the decree contains a provision specifically authorizing the court to modify the amount or terms of alimony.
(2) In the case of a dissolution of a marriage, the separation agreement that is approved by the court and incorporated into the decree contains a provision specifically authorizing the court to modify the amount or terms of alimony.
141 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 3389. In 1991, when the General Assembly redesig-nated former
{¶ 28} In Mcmdelbaum, we acknowledged that the General Assembly had enacted former
*146 While, [formerR.C. 3105.18(D) ] codified the common-law requirement of a change in circumstances, its foremost purpose was to declare that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify the amount or terms of an order of spousal support unless a provision in either the divorce decree or the separation agreement incorporated into the decree of divorce or dissolution specifically authorizes modification.
Mendelbaum,
D. Substantive Law versus Procedural Rule
{¶ 29} Adopted by this court in 1970,
{¶ 30} While the 1968 Modern Courts Amendment, which added Article IV, Section 5(B) to the Ohio Constitution, conferred authority on this court “to promulgate rules relating to matters of procedure in courts of Ohio * * * the right to establish the substantive law in Ohio remained with the legislative branch.” Havel v. Villa St. Joseph,
{¶ 31} In Crouser, this court held that
{¶ 32} In contrast,
III. Case Law Regarding Modification of a Spousal-Support Award
{¶ 33} It is impossible to correctly answer the certified question without examining four decisions of this court. These precedents support the conclusion that
A. McClain v. McClain
{¶ 34} In 1984, in a certified-conflict case, this court considered whether a trial court may modify a provision for periodic spousal support contained within a dissolution-of-marriage decree. McClain v. McClain,
{¶ 35} Tracing the history of
B. Knapp v. Knapp
{¶ 36} Two years later, this court considered Knapp,
{¶ 37} Almost five years later, Mr. Knapp’s obligation of spousal support had lapsed into arrears, and Ms. Knapp filed a motion in contempt. In response to the motion for contempt, Mr. Knapp sought relief from judgment pursuant to
{¶ 38} The issue presented was whether this court’s decision in McClain that a trial court does not have jurisdiction to modify a provision for spousal support in a decree of dissolution may be “circumvented by a motion filed pursuant to
{¶ 39} The lead opinion in Knapp rejected Mr. Knapp’s argument that he was entitled to relief pursuant to
{¶ 40} The lead opinion in Knapp also recognized the perils of permitting
*149 A decision, contrary to the one we make today, would open a veritable Pandora’s box of problems. For instance, litigants, armed with the knowledge thatCiv.R. 60(B)(4) would relieve them of the consequences of their voluntary, deliberate choices, would be encouraged to litigate carelessly. Judgment winners would be unable to rely on their victories. Those financially able to do so could crush their less affluent adversaries under a pile ofCiv.R. 60(B)(4) motions. All of this would be a subversion of judicial economy and an opening of the proverbial floodgates, causing Ohio’s courts to drown in a sea of duplicative, never-ending litigation.
Knapp at 145-146.
{¶ 41} Accordingly, a majority of the Knapp court foreclosed
C. Crouser v. Crouser
{¶ 42} In Crouser, we considered whether a trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to
The issue before us — modification of a periodic alimony award — falls within that body of law traditionally denominated as substantive, since the authority to grant or modify an alimony award in a divorce proceeding is provided underR.C. 3105.18. The standards or requirements established by the General Assembly under this substantive law will control since the legislature has specifically provided, by statute, mechanisms for review and modification of periodic sustenance alimony awards. In contrast,*150 Civ.R. 60(B)(4) is a procedural mechanism which allows parties to seek relief from judgments that are unmodifiable through substantive law.
Id. at 178-179.
{¶ 43} While Crouser involved the modification of a spousal-support award contained in a decree of divorce, the court found the situation in Knapp “analogous.” Crouser at 179. Accordingly, the court concluded that substantive law controlled the modification of a spousal-support award contained in a divorce decree: “The mechanism for review and modification of an alimony award is properly under the substantive law of
D. In re Whitman
{¶ 44} The final case that it is necessary to examine for a proper resolution of the issue before us today is Whitman,
{¶ 45} In Whitman, the separation agreement provided: “ ‘This Agreement shall not be altered, modified, or amended unless it is done so in writing, signed by both parties, or by Court Order.’ ” Id. at 239, quoting the separation agreement. Five months later, Mrs. Whitman filed a motion for relief from judgment under
{¶ 46} Relying on the language “or by Court Order” of the separation agreement, we held that when “the parties have incorporated into the separation agreement a clause that allows the court to modify the agreement * * * the court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce this clause.” Id. at 244. Because the parties had specifically reserved to the court jurisdiction to modify, “
*151 [i]n order to further promote finality in dissolution proceedings, today’s holding is limited to motions brought underCiv.R. 60(B)(1) , (2), and (3). This limitation, in effect, provides permanency to any dissolution that has remained unchallenged for one year.Civ.R. 60(B) . Further, it preserves the rights of the moving party to [seek]Civ.R. 60(B) relief without sacrificing the general finality of a dissolution decree and without creating any undue hardship for the opposing party. By limiting our holding in this way, we also remain consistent with our holding in Knapp * * *, which precluded a party from using the “it is no longer equitable” clause ofCiv.R. 60(B)(4) to modify a decree of dissolution that was entered into voluntarily.
Id.
IV. The Holding in Noble v. Noble Lacks Support in Our Precedents
{¶ 47} A thorough examination of the conflict case, Noble,
{¶ 48} In both Crouser and Noble, the movant attempted to vacate a spousal-support award contained in a decree of divorce relying on a provision of
{¶ 49} This court decided Crouser 20 years prior' to the Tenth District’s decision in Noble. Without distinguishing or even citing Crouser, the Noble court extended an artificial distinction between the terms “modif[y] or terminat[e]” in
{¶ 50} In Crawford, the Eleventh District held that a party who seeks relief from a judgment pursuant to
{¶ 51} McKinnon was decided in 1983 and interpreted the common law that was in effect at that time.
{¶ 52} Moreover, in a divorce proceeding, the trial court is required to ensure that a spousal-support obligation is in accord with
{¶ 53} In the realm of domestic-relations law, “modification order” has a particular meaning:
[a] post-divorce order that changes the terms of child support, custody, visitation, or alimony. A modification order may be agreed to by the parties or may be ordered by the court. The party wishing to modify an existing order must show a material change in circumstances from the time when the order sought to be modified was entered.
Black’s Law Dictionary 1157 (10th Ed.2014). Accordingly, vacating an order that awards spousal support is a modification of the award in domestic-relations parlance. “Modify” in
{¶ 54} This is exemplified in Crouser. When considering whether a trial court had jurisdiction under
V. The Trial Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Vacate the Dissolution Decree
{¶ 55} The Crouser court engaged in a thoughtful discussion of the interplay between substantive law and procedural rules, concluding that
{¶ 56} Our precedent therefore establishes that substantive law controls the issue of when a trial court has jurisdiction to modify a spousal-support award contained in a decree of divorce or dissolution.
{¶ 57} In
{¶ 58} There are two problematic issues that would result from a contrary conclusion. The first is the effect of granting a
{¶ 59} In the case before us today, jurisdiction to modify the decree was not reserved in the trial court. Therefore, if we reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and upon remand, the trial court determined that appellant was entitled to relief under
{¶ 60} The second problem that would be created by a conclusion contrary to that which we reach today would be the Pandora’s box that was warned against in Knapp. Those with foreknowledge of
{¶ 61} We have long recognized that a trial court has no unilateral authority to modify any provision of a separation agreement filed with a petition of dissolution that is later incorporated into a decree of dissolution. See Adams,
{¶ 62} It has been nearly 28 years since this court announced its holding in Crouser that
Conclusion
{¶ 63} The conclusion of the Second District Court of Appeals that relief under
{¶ 64} We therefore answer the certified question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the Second District.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Justice Ralph Locher, who did not join the lead opinion in Knapp, did join the syllabus.
. Interestingly, the author of McKinnon, former Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer, interpreting the common law in effect in 1983, would later become the author of this court’s 1988 majority opinion in Crouser.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 65} In vacating a spousal-support award under
{¶ 66} In this case, there is a court order that, without question, has become unjust in its application, and I refuse to believe that by statute the legislature can simply say, “Tough.” This is not child support. It is spousal support, and it is
{¶ 67} We are talking about a person’s financial ruin and a former spouse using the court system to say, “We don’t care.” In short, I think it is wrong to base our ability to do justice on whether the phrase “the court shall retain jurisdiction” happens to have been included in the original judgment. The domestic-relations court should always be responsive enough within the support context to adjust an order as justice requires. Otherwise, why not have formulaic computer robots review the facts of every case? The job of a judge is to ensure that justice prevails. That did not happen here, and as a matter of law, I would hold that all judges in Ohio have the authority to utilize
{¶ 68} Based on the foregoing analysis, I respectfully dissent.