MORRIS, APPELLEE, v. MORRIS, APPELLANT.
No. 2014-0688
Supreme Court of Ohio
July 19, 2016
2016-Ohio-5002
{139} The procedural rules established in the Ohio Administrative Code, consistent with the grant of authority by the General Assembly, are to ensure that opposing parties are litigating on a level playing field. “Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). Discovery rules “prevent unfair surprise and the secreting of evidence by ensuring the free flow of information.” Weckel v. Cole & Russell Architects, 2013-Ohio-2718, 994 N.E.2d 885, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.). All litigants, especially pro se litigants like the Krehnbrinks, are entitled to have these rules complied with and enforced.
{40} While it is clear that the BTA did not rely on exhibits B, D, and E in rendering its decision, in my view, the tax commissioner and the BTA shirked their respective legal obligations as outlined above. “No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.” United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220, 1 S.Ct. 240, 27 L.Ed. 171 (1882).
{41} Accordingly, I concur in judgment only.
Robert G. Krehnbrink, pro se.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Sophia Hussain, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
MORRIS, APPELLEE, v. MORRIS, APPELLANT.
[Cite as Morris v. Morris, 2016-Ohio-5002.]
KENNEDY, J.
{¶ 1} This case was accepted as a certified conflict between judgments of the Second District Court of Appeals and the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The Second District certified the issue in conflict as follows:
“Does a trial court have jurisdiction under
Civ.R. 60(B) to vacate or modify an award of spousal support in a decree of divorce or dissolution where the decree does not contain a reservation of jurisdiction to modify the award of spousal support pursuant toR.C. 3105.18(E) ?”
139 Ohio St.3d 1427, 2014-Ohio-2725, 11 N.E.3d 283, quoting 2d Dist. Greene No. 2013-CA-29 (Apr. 3, 2014).
{¶ 2} The conclusion of the Second District that relief under
{¶ 3} We therefore answer the certified question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals.
{¶ 4} On July 25, 2000, appellee, Jill Morris, and appellant, Michael Morris, jointly filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the Greene County Court of Common Pleas. The petition alleged that the parties had been married since 1985 and had three children born of the marriage. A separation agreement entered into by the parties was attached and incorporated into the petition. The separation agreement included the following provision:
The parties agree that the Husband shall pay as and for spousal support the sum of $1,300.00 a month for [the Wife‘s] lifetime. Said spousal support shall commence with the month a final decree is rendered herein and continue for until [sic] the Wife dies or the Husband dies, whichever event occurs first. The Court shall not have continuing jurisdiction on this subject. For income tax purposes, the Husband shall NOT claim this spousal support as support but treat it as property settlement and the Husband shall pay all the income taxes on same.
(Capitalization sic.)
{¶ 5} On October 10, 2000, the trial court entered a decree of dissolution approving and incorporating the separation agreement that the parties had attached to their petition.
{¶ 6} Less than a year after the dissolution was finalized, appellant filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to
{¶ 7} On March 22, 2012, almost 11 1/2 years after the dissolution was finalized, the prosecutor‘s office filed in the trial court a motion for contempt of court based in part on appellant‘s failure to abide by the spousal-support provision of the separation agreement. In response, appellant filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to ”
{¶ 8} Appellant‘s motion was based on a series of employment-related events in his life that caused his annual income to become increasingly lower than it had been at the time of the dissolution. During the 11 1/2 years, his annual income decreased from about $100,000 to less than $4,000.
{¶ 10} Overruling appellant‘s objections, the trial court adopted the decision of the magistrate. From that decision, appellant timely appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision as to this issue.
{¶ 11} Thereafter, the Second District granted appellant‘s motion to certify a conflict, concluding that its holding in this case was in direct conflict with the holding of the Tenth District in Noble v. Noble, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-1045, 2008-Ohio-4685, 2008 WL 4233915. We agreed and ordered the parties to brief the issue as framed by the Second District.
Analysis
I. Divorce and Dissolution Generally
A. Divorce
{¶ 12} The 1802 Ohio Constitution included no provision for divorce or spousal support. Dillingham v. Dillingham, 9 Ohio App. 248, 259 (1st Dist.1917). Instead, the legislature would pass a special act providing for the divorce of a married couple. Id.
{¶ 13} In 1824, legislation was first enacted vesting this court with exclusive jurisdiction to grant a divorce when one of the enumerated causes for divorce was demonstrated.
{¶ 14} The divorce statutes have gone through countless iterations since 1824. Today, there are 11 grounds on which divorce may be granted for cause. See
{¶ 15} The parties may also enter into a separation agreement that fully resolves all issues or that leaves certain issues for the trial court to determine. See, e.g., Eddington v. Eddington, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-572, 2015-Ohio-1233, 2015 WL 1432607, ¶ 13. Even if the parties partially or fully settle their divorce, the trial court can
“find the separation agreement fair, just, and reasonable or equitable, and incorporate it by reference so that it becomes a part of the decree. * * * [It can] reject some of the terms of the separation agreement, make an independent ruling on those issues, and incorporate the independent rulings and partial separation agreement into the decree. * * * [It can] reject the entire separation agreement and make its own findings regarding the issues set forth in the complaint. Lastly, the trial court may acknowledge the existence of a separation agreement, identify it and attach it to the decree, without incorporating it by reference. Under these circumstances, the trial court has not repudiated or rejected the separation agreement, nor has it found the agreement fair, just, and equitable and incorporated it into the decree. It has merely acknowledged the separation agreement and attached it as an exhibit.”
(Ellipses and brackets sic.; emphasis deleted.) Welly v. Welly, 55 Ohio App.3d 111, 112-113, 562 N.E.2d 914 (6th Dist.1988), quoting Greiner v. Greiner, 61 Ohio App.2d 88, 99, 399 N.E.2d 571 (8th Dist.1979).
B. Dissolution
{¶ 16} In 1974, the General Assembly enacted provisions making dissolution of marriage permissible through a no-fault-divorce proceeding.
{¶ 17} A petition for dissolution must be signed by both spouses and incorporate a separation agreement agreed to by both spouses.
{¶ 18} The trial court has limited authority at the dissolution hearing. See
A. Divorce versus Dissolution—The Trial Court‘s Authority to Award Spousal Support
{¶ 19} The distinctions between divorce and dissolution in the context of spousal support were succinctly stated by the Tenth District Court of Appeals in Alban v. Alban, 1 Ohio App.3d 146, 147-148, 439 N.E.2d 963 (10th Dist.1981):
In a divorce case, where a divorce is granted, not only may the trial court reject, predicated upon sufficient evidence, a separation agreement entered into by the parties as being unfair, but the court may make its own determination predicated upon sufficient evidence as to the need for and amount of periodic alimony payments to be made by one spouse to the other. In other words, in a divorce case, the matter of periodic alimony payments is one for determination by the court.
In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, however, the court has no jurisdiction to grant a dissolution unless the parties have entered into a separation agreement either providing for alimony or providing that none shall be paid, which shall be incorporated into the dissolution agreement if approved by the trial court. There can be no decree of dissolution unless there is a separation agreement voluntarily agreed to by the parties and approved by the trial court. The trial court has no power to determine the amount of periodic alimony payments as the court would have in a divorce case, but, instead, this is a matter for a voluntary agreement between the parties.
B. Divorce versus Dissolution—The Trial Court‘s Authority to Modify a Spousal-Support Award
1. Divorce
{¶ 20} Prior to legislative enactments, a trial court‘s authority to modify an award of spousal support was controlled by common law. In Olney v. Watts, this court examined the authority of a trial court to modify a divorce decree awarding spousal support when the decree was silent as to that issue. 43 Ohio St. 499, 507, 3 N.E. 354 (1885). The Olney court concluded that whether a trial court had the authority to modify depended on whether the decree was in the nature of spousal support or part of the parties’ agreement dividing property. Id. at 508. We remanded for the trial court to make that determination but held that if the
{¶ 21} In considering a spousal-support agreement 16 years later in Law v. Law, this court held that absent “fraud or mistake,” the parties’ agreement was not subject to modification. 64 Ohio St. 369, 60 N.E. 560 (1901), syllabus. Reaffirming Law, this court in Newman v. Newman held that absent “mistake, misrepresentation or fraud,” a spousal-support decree based on an agreement between the parties was not subject to modification by the court. 161 Ohio St. 247, 118 N.E.2d 649 (1954), syllabus, citing Law.
{¶ 22} In 1959, this court held that the equitable power of the trial court may be invoked to modify a spousal-support award when a wife remarries, even though the parties had agreed to a nonterminable award of spousal support that was not part of a division of property and did not reserve jurisdiction in the trial court to modify. Hunt v. Hunt, 169 Ohio St. 276, 159 N.E.2d 430 (1959), paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.
{¶ 23} In Wolfe v. Wolfe, this court traced the foregoing historical development of the common law granting trial courts authority to modify an award of spousal support on certain conditions when the parties’ agreement was silent. 46 Ohio St.2d 399, 415-416, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976). Relying on that common law, the Wolfe court held that when a spousal-support award based on an agreement between the parties is not part of the property division and the decree provides that the remarriage or death of the spouse to whom support is awarded will terminate the support, there is an “implied” reservation of jurisdiction in the trial court to modify the award. Id.
{¶ 24} In response to Wolfe, the General Assembly enacted former
2. Dissolution
{¶ 25} As noted above, the ability of the parties to dissolve their marriage was statutorily created in 1974.
C. Death of the Common Law—Former R.C. 3105.18(D)
{¶ 27} In the same 1986 act, the General Assembly enacted former
If a continuing order for periodic payments of money as alimony is entered in a divorce or dissolution of marriage action that is determined on or after the effective date of this amendment, the court that enters the decree of divorce or dissolution of marriage does not have jurisdiction to modify the amount or terms of the alimony unless the court determines that the circumstances of either party have changed and unless one of the following applies:
(1) In the case of a divorce, the decree or a separation agreement of the parties to the divorce that is incorporated into the decree contains a provision specifically authorizing the court to modify the amount or terms of alimony.
(2) In the case of a dissolution of a marriage, the separation agreement that is approved by the court and incorporated into the decree contains a provision specifically authorizing the court to modify the amount or terms of alimony.
{¶ 28} In Mandelbaum, we acknowledged that the General Assembly had enacted former
While [former
R.C. 3105.18(D) ] codified the common-law requirement of a change in circumstances, its foremost purpose was to declare that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify the amount or terms of an order of spousal support unless a provision in either the divorce decree or the separation agreement incorporated into the decree of divorce or dissolution specifically authorizes modification.
Mandelbaum, 121 Ohio St.3d 433, 2009-Ohio-1222, 905 N.E.2d 172, at ¶ 24. Therefore, the General Assembly swept away all the common law enunciated in Wolfe, including this court‘s holding in Law that a trial court had the authority to modify a spousal-support award if there was fraud or mistake even though the decree did not reserve jurisdiction, Law, 64 Ohio St. 369, 60 N.E. 560, and this court‘s holding in Newman that a trial court had the authority to modify a spousal-support award if there was “mistake, misrepresentation or fraud” even though the decree did not reserve jurisdiction, Newman, 161 Ohio St. 247, 118 N.E.2d 649, at syllabus.
D. Substantive Law versus Procedural Rule
{¶ 29} Adopted by this court in 1970,
{¶ 30} While the 1968 Modern Courts Amendment, which added
{¶ 31} In Crouser, this court held that
{¶ 32} In contrast,
III. Case Law Regarding Modification of a Spousal-Support Award
{¶ 33} It is impossible to correctly answer the certified question without examining four decisions of this court. These precedents support the conclusion that
A. McClain v. McClain
{¶ 34} In 1984, in a certified-conflict case, this court considered whether a trial court may modify a provision for periodic spousal support contained within a dissolution-of-marriage decree. McClain v. McClain, 15 Ohio St.3d 289, 290, 473 N.E.2d 811 (1984). The McClain court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the award of spousal support. Id. at 291. “Just as a court lacks authority to set the original amount of alimony payments in a dissolution case, a court also lacks authority to modify the amount of alimony payments originally agreed to by the parties.” Id. at 290.
{¶ 35} Tracing the history of
B. Knapp v. Knapp
{¶ 36} Two years later, this court considered Knapp, 24 Ohio St.3d 141, 493 N.E.2d 1353. The Knapps were granted a dissolution, and the trial court ordered their separation agreement incorporated into the decree of dissolution. The separation agreement provided for the payment of spousal support and contained a specific provision acknowledging that the parties had “freely and voluntarily” entered into the agreement with the intention to be bound and that “[n]o
{¶ 37} Almost five years later, Mr. Knapp‘s obligation of spousal support had lapsed into arrears, and Ms. Knapp filed a motion in contempt. In response to the motion for contempt, Mr. Knapp sought relief from judgment pursuant to
{¶ 38} The issue presented was whether this court‘s decision in McClain that a trial court does not have jurisdiction to modify a provision for spousal support in a decree of dissolution may be “circumvented by a motion filed pursuant to
{¶ 39} The lead opinion in Knapp rejected Mr. Knapp‘s argument that he was entitled to relief pursuant to
{¶ 40} The lead opinion in Knapp also recognized the perils of permitting
A decision, contrary to the one we make today, would open a veritable Pandora‘s box of problems. For instance, litigants, armed with the knowledge that
Civ.R. 60(B)(4) would relieve them of the consequences of their voluntary, deliberate choices, would be encouraged to litigate carelessly. Judgment winners would be unable to rely on their victories. Those financially able to do so could crush their less affluent adversaries under a pile ofCiv.R. 60(B)(4) motions. All of this would be a subversion of judicial economy and an opening of the proverbial floodgates, causing Ohio‘s courts to drown in a sea of duplicative, never-ending litigation.
{¶ 41} Accordingly, a majority of the Knapp court foreclosed
C. Crouser v. Crouser
{¶ 42} In Crouser, we considered whether a trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to
The issue before us—modification of a periodic alimony award—falls within that body of law traditionally denominated as substantive, since the authority to grant or modify an alimony award in a divorce proceeding is provided under
R.C. 3105.18 . The standards or requirements established by the General Assembly under this substantive law will control since the legislature has specifically provided, by statute, mechanisms for review and modification of periodic sustenance alimony awards. In contrast,
Civ.R. 60(B)(4) is a procedural mechanism which allows parties to seek relief from judgments that are unmodifiable through substantive law.
{¶ 43} While Crouser involved the modification of a spousal-support award contained in a decree of divorce, the court found the situation in Knapp “analogous.” Crouser at 179. Accordingly, the court concluded that substantive law controlled the modification of a spousal-support award contained in a divorce decree: “The mechanism for review and modification of an alimony award is properly under the substantive law of
D. In re Whitman
{¶ 44} The final case that it is necessary to examine for a proper resolution of the issue before us today is Whitman, 81 Ohio St.3d 239, 690 N.E.2d 535. In Whitman, this court considered whether a trial court may modify a property division pursuant to
{¶ 45} In Whitman, the separation agreement provided: “‘This Agreement shall not be altered, modified, or amended unless it is done so in writing, signed by both parties, or by Court Order.‘” Id. at 239, quoting the separation agreement. Five months later, Mrs. Whitman filed a motion for relief from judgment under
{¶ 46} Relying on the language “or by Court Order” of the separation agreement, we held that when “the parties have incorporated into the separation agreement a clause that allows the court to modify the agreement * * * the court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce this clause.” Id. at 244. Because the parties had specifically reserved to the court jurisdiction to modify, ”
[i]n order to further promote finality in dissolution proceedings, today‘s holding is limited to motions brought under
Civ.R. 60(B)(1) ,(2) , and(3) . This limitation, in effect, provides permanency to any dissolution that has remained unchallenged for one year.Civ.R. 60(B) . Further, it preserves the rights of the moving party to [seek]Civ.R. 60(B) relief without sacrificing the general finality of a dissolution decree and without creating any undue hardship for the opposing party. By limiting our holding in this way, we also remain consistent with our holding in Knapp * * *, which precluded a party from using the “it is no longer equitable” clause ofCiv.R. 60(B)(4) to modify a decree of dissolution that was entered into voluntarily.
IV. The Holding in Noble v. Noble Lacks Support in Our Precedents
{¶ 47} A thorough examination of the conflict case, Noble, 2008-Ohio-4685, 2008 WL 4233915, reveals that the Tenth District Court of Appeals did not consider Crouser and that the law underpinning the Tenth District‘s holding—namely, a decision of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals—resurrected the common law as it existed in 1983.
{¶ 48} In both Crouser and Noble, the movant attempted to vacate a spousal-support award contained in a decree of divorce relying on a provision of
{¶ 49} This court decided Crouser 20 years prior to the Tenth District‘s decision in Noble. Without distinguishing or even citing Crouser, the Noble court extended an artificial distinction between the terms “modif[y] or terminat[e]” in
{¶ 50} In Crawford, the Eleventh District held that a party who seeks relief from a judgment pursuant to
{¶ 51} McKinnon was decided in 1983 and interpreted the common law that was in effect at that time.2 Three years after that decision, the General Assembly displaced the common law by enacting former
{¶ 52} Moreover, in a divorce proceeding, the trial court is required to ensure that a spousal-support obligation is in accord with
{¶ 53} In the realm of domestic-relations law, “modification order” has a particular meaning:
[a] post-divorce order that changes the terms of child support, custody, visitation, or alimony. A modification order may be agreed to by the parties or may be ordered by the court. The party wishing to modify an existing order must show a material change in circumstances from the time when the order sought to be modified was entered.
Black‘s Law Dictionary 1157 (10th Ed.2014). Accordingly, vacating an order that awards spousal support is a modification of the award in domestic-relations parlance. “Modify” in
{¶ 54} This is exemplified in Crouser. When considering whether a trial court had jurisdiction under
V. The Trial Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Vacate the Dissolution Decree
{¶ 55} The Crouser court engaged in a thoughtful discussion of the interplay between substantive law and procedural rules, concluding that
{¶ 56} Our precedent therefore establishes that substantive law controls the issue of when a trial court has jurisdiction to modify a spousal-support award contained in a decree of divorce or dissolution.
{¶ 57} In
{¶ 58} There are two problematic issues that would result from a contrary conclusion. The first is the effect of granting a
{¶ 59} In the case before us today, jurisdiction to modify the decree was not reserved in the trial court. Therefore, if we reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and upon remand, the trial court determined that appellant was entitled to relief under
{¶ 60} The second problem that would be created by a conclusion contrary to that which we reach today would be the Pandora‘s box that was warned against in Knapp. Those with foreknowledge of
{¶ 61} We have long recognized that a trial court has no unilateral authority to modify any provision of a separation agreement filed with a petition of dissolution that is later incorporated into a decree of dissolution. See Adams, 45 Ohio St.3d 219, 543 N.E.2d 797;
{¶ 62} It has been nearly 28 years since this court announced its holding in Crouser that
Conclusion
{¶ 63} The conclusion of the Second District Court of Appeals that relief under
{¶ 64} We therefore answer the certified question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the Second District.
Judgment affirmed.
PFEIFER, O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, and BALDWIN, JJ., concur.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., concurs in judgment only.
O‘NEILL, J., dissents, with an opinion.
CRAIG R. BALDWIN, J., of the Fifth Appellate District, sitting for FRENCH, J.
O‘NEILL, J., dissenting.
{¶ 65} In vacating a spousal-support award under
{¶ 66} In this case, there is a court order that, without question, has become unjust in its application, and I refuse to believe that by statute the legislature can simply say, “Tough.” This is not child support. It is spousal support, and it is
{¶ 67} We are talking about a person‘s financial ruin and a former spouse using the court system to say, “We don‘t care.” In short, I think it is wrong to base our ability to do justice on whether the phrase “the court shall retain jurisdiction” happens to have been included in the original judgment. The domestic-relations court should always be responsive enough within the support context to adjust an order as justice requires. Otherwise, why not have formulaic computer robots review the facts of every case? The job of a judge is to ensure that justice prevails. That did not happen here, and as a matter of law, I would hold that all judges in Ohio have the authority to utilize
{¶ 68} Based on the foregoing analysis, I respectfully dissent.
Flanagan, Lieberman, Hoffman & Swaim and Richard Hempfling, for appellant.
ONDERKO, APPELLEE, v. SIERRA LOBO, INC., APPELLANT.
[Cite as Onderko v. Sierra Lobo, Inc., 2016-Ohio-5027.]