QUB STUDIOS, LLC and ERIC ROBERT, Plaintiffs v. PHILLIP MARSH and ASHLEY JENKINS, Defendants
No. COA18-205
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
Filed: 6 November 2018
Guilford County, No. 16 CVS 614
CALABRIA, Judge.
Roberson Haworth & Reese, P.L.L.C., by Christopher C. Finan and Shane T. Stutts, for plaintiff-appellees.
Teague, Rotenstreich, Stanaland, Fox & Holt, PLLC, by Kara V. Bordman and Lyn K. Broom, for defendant-appellant Ashley Jenkins.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Where plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider was premised upon clerical error, and not an error of law, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider it. Where defendant does not challenge the trial court‘s decision to grant a motion for relief pursuant to
Where defendant failed to offer any evidence that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him, and in fact participated in the prior litigation in this matter, the trial court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Where no material issues of fact remained to be resolved, the trial court did not err in granting plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Where the trial court entered judgment on the pleadings, the entry of findings of fact would have been inappropriate, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant‘s request for written findings of fact. We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On 20 June 2006, summary judgment was entered against Phillip Marsh (“Marsh“) and Ashley Jenkins (“Jenkins“) (collectively, “defendants“), in favor of QUB Studios, LLC (“QUB“) and Eric Robert (“Robert“) (collectively, “plaintiffs“). This judgment ordered defendants to pay damages to plaintiffs. On 8 June 2016, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants, alleging that defendants had failed to pay, and
On 19 September 2016, Jenkins filed his answer, denying the allegations in the complaint, and moving to dismiss pursuant to
On 17 November 2016, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. On 10 March 2017, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs against Marsh, against whom default had been entered. That same day, in a separate order, the trial court held that plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted with respect to Jenkins. It therefore granted Jenkins’ motion to dismiss pursuant to
On 22 March 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider, seeking relief from judgment and to amend their complaint, alleging that Jenkins’ motion to dismiss was successful due to “a mere technicality of pleading.” On 17 April 2017, the trial court granted the motion, set aside its prior order, and allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint. On 16 June 2017, plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings. On 17
On 18 August 2017, the trial court entered its order on plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and Jenkins’ motions to dismiss and for relief from judgment. The court denied Jenkins’ motions, with prejudice, granted plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, and awarded damages to plaintiffs. Jenkins appeals.
II. Jurisdiction
In his first argument, Jenkins contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider and motion to amend. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
“Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.” McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010).
B. Analysis
Plaintiffs’ motions for relief and reconsideration were filed pursuant to
Jenkins contends, and we recognize, that ”
It is here that we must disagree with Jenkins. It is true that
Because plaintiffs’ motion sought relief based upon plaintiffs’ inadvertent clerical error, and not an error of law, relief pursuant to
III. Motions for Relief
In his second and third arguments, Jenkins contends that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion for relief, and in denying Jenkins’ motions for relief. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
B. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider
Jenkins contends that plaintiffs “did not submit any evidence/facts to meet the requirements of
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
. . .
(6) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
If Jenkins made such a showing, however, that argument would apply only to plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to
C. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend
Jenkins further contends that allowing the amendment of the complaint to relate back was prejudicial and erroneous. However,
In the instant case, the original complaint named each of the parties, the judgments, and the events central to plaintiffs’ claim. The only difference between the original complaint and the complaint plaintiffs sought to introduce as amended was the reference, in the complaint itself, to the attached exhibits. Clearly, the complaint gave notice of the subject matter to both defendants, and
D. Jenkins’ Motions for Relief
In response to plaintiffs’ complaint and amended complaint, Jenkins sought relief from the original summary judgment motion upon which the entire complaint was predicated, pursuant to multiple subsections of
We note that, unlike plaintiffs’ standalone
All this said, Jenkins’ unsuccessful
“‘A collateral attack is one in which a plaintiff is not entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint unless the judgment in another action is adjudicated invalid.‘” Clayton v. N.C. State Bar, 168 N.C. App. 717, 719, 608 S.E.2d 821, 822 (2005) (quoting Thrasher v. Thrasher, 4 N.C. App. 534, 540, 167 S.E.2d 549, 553 (1969)). “North Carolina does not allow collateral attacks on judgments.” Id. (quoting Regional Acceptance Corp. v. Old Republic Surety Co., 156 N.C. App. 680, 682, 577 S.E.2d 391, 392 (2003)). Jenkins’ motions for relief in the instant case could not have been granted unless the judgment in the prior case was adjudicated invalid. Jenkins’ motions, had they been made in the prior case, may have been appropriate, but here they constituted an impermissible collateral attack. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Jenkins’
IV. Motions to Dismiss
In his fourth argument, Jenkins contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
“We review
B. Analysis
Jenkins moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, we first note that the instant complaint, seeking enforcement of the prior judgment, was proper. Jenkins does not challenge it, and such challenge is therefore deemed abandoned. See
With respect to failure to state a claim, Jenkins contends that the amended complaint would have been dated 2017, more than the ten-year statute of limitations beyond the original 2006 order which plaintiffs sought enforced. Jenkins contends that the amended complaint does not relate back to the original, and thus fails to satisfy the statute of limitations on its face. Again, however, we have addressed this argument above. The amended complaint properly related back to the original complaint, and therefore complied with the necessary statute of limitations. We hold that the trial court therefore did not err in denying Jenkins’ motion to dismiss pursuant to
Lastly, with respect to personal jurisdiction, Jenkins’ argument is oddly conclusory. Jenkins cites North Carolina‘s two-prong analysis to determine whether a non-resident is subject to personal jurisdiction. Jenkins then cites the case of Whitener v. Whitener, 56 N.C. App. 599, 289 S.E.2d 887 (1982), along with a brief summary of its facts. Jenkins then concludes, simply, that “[o]n these facts, our Court of Appeals concluded that there was no personal jurisdiction, . . . and there is none here with regard to Jenkins.” Thus, although Jenkins offers case law concerning personal jurisdiction generally, he offers no factual basis as to why the trial court
For all these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Jenkins’ motions to dismiss.
V. Judgment on the Pleadings
In his fifth argument, Jenkins contends that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
“This Court reviews a trial court‘s grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo.” Carpenter v. Carpenter, 189 N.C. App. 755, 757, 659 S.E.2d 762, 764 (2008). “[A] motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minor v. Minor, 70 N.C. App. 76, 78, 318 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1984).
B. Analysis
Jenkins additionally contends that the trial court “took judicial notice of the entire contents of the court file for the 2006 matter which converted the motion to one for summary judgment.” Jenkins contends that the trial court erred in doing so.
Although there is not significant case law on point within our jurisdiction, we note that the Supreme Court of the United States has addressed this issue unambiguously, stating that “courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 168 L. Ed. 2d 179, 193 (2007). We find this reasoning persuasive, and agree. The distinction between a
Jenkins presents no other purported issues of fact which might preclude a judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
VI. Request for Findings
In his sixth argument, Jenkins contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for findings of fact. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
“Although it would be the better practice to do so when ruling on a
B. Analysis
Prior to the entry of the trial court‘s written order, Jenkins filed a motion pursuant to
Jenkins notes, and we agree, that it is appropriate for the trial court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law when ruling on motions for relief pursuant to
However, this Court has noted that, where judgment is appropriate as a matter of law, the entry of findings of fact is contraindicated. For example, this Court has held that ”
In the instant case, the matter was decided on the pleadings pursuant to
VII. Conclusion
We hold that the trial court possessed subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. The trial court did not err in granting plaintiffs’
AFFIRMED.
Judges TYSON and ZACHARY concur.