ANTHONY PRUITT v. STRONG STYLE FITNESS, ETC., ET AL.
No. 96332
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
October 13, 2011
[Cite as Pruitt v. Strong Style Fitness, 2011-Ohio-5272.]
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-717666
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, P.J., Keough, J., and E. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 13, 2011
Michael D. Goldstein
Ladi Williams
Goldstein & Goldstein Co., L.P.A.
55 Public Square
Suite 1575
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
For Strong Style Fitness
Shawn W. Schlesinger
Koeth, Rice & Leo Co., LPA
1280 West Third Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
For Magnum Fitness Systems
Daniel R. Haude
Reminger Co., LPA
1400 Midland Building
101 Prospect Avenue, West
Cleveland, Ohio 44115
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
{1} Appellant Anthony Pruitt appeals the decision of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by appellee Juggernaut Enterprises, LLC, d.b.a. Strong Style Fitness and Training Center (“Strong Style“). Fоr the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
“Release. * * * On behalf of yourself and your minor children, you hereby agree to voluntarily release and discharge Strong Style Fitness and Training Center (and all its affiliates, employees, representatives, agents, successors, and assigns) from any and all claims, causes of action, and other liabilities of any kind whatsoever ([sic] whether known or unknown, which may occur as a result of your or your minor children engaging in any bodybuilding or fitness activity, or any aсtivity incidental thereto, upon or within the Facilities, whether arising from the negligence of Strong Style Fitness and Training Center or otherwise, and whether or not related to exercise, including, without limitation, any bodily injury or death caused by any present or future medical condition of yours or your minor children whether known or unknown. * * * Yоu acknowledge that you carefully read this Waiver and Release and fully understand that it is a release of liability. You are waiving any right that you may have to bring a legal action to assert a claim against Strong Style Fitness and Training Center for our negligence.”
{3} Immediately preceding the signature line containing Pruitt‘s signature, the document contains a paragraph certifying that Pruitt read and understood the terms of the rules and regulations.
{4} Pruitt participated in four personal training sessions prior to the ill-fated session. During this fifth session, Pruitt was using the incline leg press machine under Lyons‘s supervision. The machine required Pruitt to sit at a 45-degree anglе with his legs extending upwards. The weights were hung on a 90-pound platform that Pruitt pushed with his legs.
{5} During the fifth session, Pruitt pressed 350 pounds. After finishing his sets, Pruitt engaged the safety catch and rested momentarily. Pruitt was unable to visually verify whether the catch was fully engaged from his seated position. Likewise, Lyons, who was standing next to the weight platfоrm to “spot” Pruitt, was unable to visually verify whether the safety catch was fully engaged. Lyons heard the catch engage as if it was properly activated. Pruitt then attempted to exit the machine by grabbing the foot platform. Inexplicably, the platform disengaged from the safety catch and fell on Pruitt‘s knee, cаusing severe injuries. The parties speculated that either the safety catch was not fully engaged or Pruitt somehow lifted the platform enough to raise it off the safety catch as he was getting up, which would cause the catch to disengage. Both theories are based on conjecture. Pruitt‘s claims are based on Lyons‘s failure to ensure the machine was secured prior to Pruitt‘s attempt to exit the machine.
{6} Strong Style filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted its motion and held that Pruitt failed to demonstrate that Strong Style, through Lyons, was negligent and that the release contained in the rules and regulations documеnt was enforceable, thereby prohibiting Pruitt from maintaining his action. Pruitt timely appealed, raising one assignment of error that provides as follows: “The trial court erred
{7} Appellate review of summary judgment is de novo, governed by the standard set forth in
{8} Generally in Ohio, exculpatory clauses, which relieve a party from its own negligence, are not against public policy despite being disfavored in the law. Lamb v.
{9} A party waiving his right to recover for another‘s negligent acts must make a conscious choice to accept the consequences of the other party‘s negligence. Lamb, Cuyahoga App. No. 73144, citing Cain v. Cleveland Parachute Training Ctr. (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 27, 28, 457 N.E.2d 1185. If the terms of the contract are ambiguous, the intention of the parties is a factual inquiry for the trier of fact. Id. Recovery for willful or wanton misconduct cannot be waived. Id.
{10} Moreover, as with all contracts, the party against whom the contract is being enforced may seek rescission of the contract if the terms are unconscionable. “Unconscionability is generally recognized as the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties to a contract, combined with contraсt terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Short v. Resource Title Agency, Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 95839, 2011-Ohio-1577, ¶ 21. Whether a clause is unconscionable is a question of law. Id. The party challenging the
“Substantive unconscionability involves those factors which relate to the contract terms themselves, and whether they are commercially reasonable. Procedural unconscionability involves those factors bearing on the relative bargaining position of the contracting parties. These factors may include agе, education, intelligence, business acumen and experience, relative bargaining power, who drafted the contract, and whether the terms were explained to the weaker party.”
(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 23.
{11} Pruitt raises several arguments attacking the validity of the exculpatory clause. He argues that the agreement is ambiguous, inconspicious, against public policy, and unconscionable.
{12} Although Pruitt claims the release is against public policy, Ohio courts have consistently held to the contrary. See Lamb, Cuyahoga App. No. 73144. “Additionally, we note that, although an exculpatory clause to limit one‘s liability due to negligence may be valid and еnforceable, Ohio law finds that such a clause is ineffective where the party seeking protection failed to exercise any care whatsoever, where there was willful or wanton misconduct, or where the clause is against important public policy concerns, unconscionable, or vague and ambiguous.” Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. D & J Distrib. & Mfg. Inc., Lucas App. No. L-08-1104, 2009-Ohio-3806, ¶ 36. Pruitt‘s sole claim advanced is one for negligence; therefore, our review is limited to whether the exculpatory clause is unconscionable, vague, or ambiguous.
{14} In Siefert, the defendant rented a skid steer, a piece of heavy equipment. The defendаnt wrecked the engine on the skid steer, and the insurance company asserted its subrogation right against him. The defendant claimed that the rental company was negligent in failing to ensure that he was an acceptable operator of the machine and to properly demonstrate safe handling techniques. This court, albeit after finding that the release was unenforceable, found that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the rental company was negligent. This alone distinguishes Siefert from the facts of this case. Whether the contract in Siefert was enforceable was moot because of the lack of negligence. However, in deciding that the release wаs not enforceable, this court relied on Orlett v. Suburban Propane (1989), 54 Ohio App.3d 127, 561 N.E.2d 1066, which cites Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones (1966), 9 Ohio Misc. 113, 223 N.E.2d 381.
{15} The Motorists court teaches that “[g]enerally, a contractual provision which exempts a party from liability for his negligence will be enforced when: [(1)] [t]he
{16} For that determination, we rely on the doctrine of unconscionability. In order to rescind an unconscionable contract, the party seeking rescission must show both prоcedural and substantive unconscionability. Short, 2011-Ohio-1577, ¶ 21. Simply relying on the unequal bargaining position of the parties, part of the procedural unconscionability analysis, is insufficient. Id.
{17} Pruitt simply argues that Strong Style drafted the contract and had unequal bargaining power. The facts of this case do not support his argument. Pruitt served in the military, attended college, and was employed. Moreover, even though he argues that he did not understand the terms of the release, Pruitt claims to have not read the terms because the release was “buried within the small print of a separate document.”
{18} In reviewing the exculpatory clause, we agree with the trial court that the terms and conditions are clearly set forth. The release is on the front page of a double-sided document, and the entire clause is underlined to ensure it stood out from the rest of the non-underlined text. The last sentence specifically notifies Pruitt that he is
{19} Finally, the terms of the release are clear and unambiguous. The release provides the following: “You acknowledge that you carefully read this Waiver and Release and fully understand that it is a release of liability. You are waiving any right thаt you may have to bring a legal action to assert a claim against Strong Style Fitness and Training Center for our negligence.”
{20} The terms of the contract are clear.2 Pruitt released Strong Style and its employees, representatives, and agents from all claims of negligence, and the contract
{21} Because the release provision of the agreement is enforceable, we need not determine whether Pruitt established a prima facie claim of negligence. Even if he did, the release prohibits rеcovery.
{22} Pruitt released Strong Style from liability for any negligent act. The facts of this case are unfortunate, but the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Strong Style based on the release. The terms of the agreement were not inconspicious, unconscionable, ambiguous, or against public policy. There being no genuine issue of material fact, Strong Style was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It appears from the undisputed evidence, construed most strongly in Pruitt‘s favor, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion adverse to Pruitt. The terms of the
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a spеcial mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR