PROTECT AGRICULTURAL LAND, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STANISLAUS COUNTY LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMMISSION, Defendant and Respondent; CITY OF CERES, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
No. F066544
Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California
Jan. 28, 2014
223 Cal.App.4th 550
FRANSON, J.
Law Office of Rose M. Zoia and Rose M. Zoia for Plaintiff and Appellant.
John P. Doering, County Counsel, William Dean Wright and Thomas Boze, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.
Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson, Edward Grutzmacher; and Michael L. Lyions for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
OPINION
FRANSON, J.-
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Protect Agricultural Land (PAL) filed a petition for writ of mandate to challenge the decision by the Stanislaus County Local Agency Formation Commission (Stanislaus LAFCO) to approve the application submitted by real party in interest City of Ceres (City) for the West Landing Specifiс Plan Reorganization to the City of Ceres. PAL alleged the approval of modifications to City‘s sphere of influence and the approval of the annexation of 960 acres violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Local Government Reorganization Act of 2000 (Reorganization Act).1
Defendants Stanislaus LAFCO and City filed a demurrer, contending that (1)
We therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff PAL alleges that it (1) is an unincorporated group of citizens who are residents and property owners within Stanislaus County and (2) was formed for the purpose of protecting and preserving the environmental resources, including agricultural resources, located within Stanislaus County.
The subject matter of this litigation is City‘s proposal to expand its territory to the southwest. The proposed expansion was set forth in the West Landing Specific Plan, a policy document adopted by City to guide the future growth, land use, infrastructure, and public service planning and investment in a 960-acre area that, prior to this litigation, was adjacent to City in an unincorporated part of Stanislaus County. The 960 acres are bounded by Whitmore Avenue on the nоrth, the Union Pacific Railroad right-of-way on the east, Service Road on the south, and Ustick Road on the west.
City acted as the lead agency and prepared an environmental impact report (EIR) for the West Landing Specific Plan. In June 2011, the Ceres city council adopted resolutions certifying the final EIR for the West Landing Specific Plan. The EIR identified significant environmental impacts that could not be eliminated or mitigated to a level of insignificance, including impacts to agricultural land. For example, the EIR stated that (1) the proposal would result in the conversion of approximately 660 aсres of farmland and the development of approximately 187 acres of land currently under Williamson Act (
After City certified the EIR, adopted the statement of overriding considerations and approved the West Landing Specific Plan, City filed a notice of determination, triggering the 30-day statute of limitations for CEQA challenges to those actions. (
City‘s application to Stanislaus LAFCO requested it to (1) adopt a municipal service review for City, (2) approve the modification to City‘s sphere of influence, and (3) approve the annexation of the 960 acres to City and simultaneous detachment from the Westport Fire Protection District. For purposes of CEQA, Stanislaus LAFCO acted as a “responsible agency” in connection with the application. (See
Stanislaus LAFCO considered City‘s application in two parts-the first concerning the municipal service review and sphere of influence modification and the second concerning the proposed annexation.
In February 2012, Stanislaus LAFCO approved the municipal services review and sphere of influence modification and adopted findings regarding the environmental impacts and the statement of overriding considerations, as adopted by the city council.
In March 2012, Stanislaus LAFCO adopted a resolution approving the proposed reorganization and annexation and adopting the findings regarding the environmental impacts and the statement of overriding considerations, as adopted by the city council.
In April 2012, PAL filed a petition for writ of mandate containing two causes of action. The first alleged that Stanislaus LAFCO violated CEQA and the second alleged that Stanislaus LAFCO violated the Reorganization Act. PAL‘s prayer for relief requested that Stаnislaus LAFCO be ordered to set aside and void its approvals of the project and comply with applicable law prior to further consideration of the project. Within 60 days of the filing of its
In August 2012, defendants filed notice of a demurrer and motion to strike, that asserted PAL‘s petition failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Defendants contended that, pursuant to
In September 2012, the trial court held a hearing on the demurrer and motion to strike. After the hearing, the court filed a written ruling that stated the demurrer and motion to strike were untimely and the court, in an exercise of its discretion, would deem the demurrer and motion to strike to be a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted the motion without leave to amend. The court reasoned that it did not have jurisdiсtion to overturn a completed annexation because PAL‘s petition did not name “all persons interested” in the area subject to annexation or timely comply with the service requirements applicable to reverse validation actions. The court found no good cause under
In November 2012, the trial court filed a judgment disposing of all claims in PAL‘s petition for writ of mandate. PAL thereafter filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The trial court treated defendants’ demurrer and motion to strike as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Motions for judgment on the pleadings are authorized by
Appellatе courts review the grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings by applying the same rules that govern review of an order sustaining a general demurrer. (Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146
In Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32 [105 Cal.Rptr.3d 181, 224 P.3d 920] (Committee for Green Foothills), the California Supreme Court indicated that a demurrer to a cause of action alleging a violation of CEQA was subject to the same standard of review that applies to general demurrers raised in other types of lawsuits. Specifically, the Supreme Cоurt stated that appellate review of an order sustaining a demurrer involved a de novo examination of the pleading to determine whether the facts alleged were sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory, such facts being assumed true for purposes of review. (Committee for Green Foothills, supra, p. 42.) “We may also consider matters that have been judicially noticed.” (Ibid.)
We will apply the foregoing standards to both the cause of action alleging CEQA violations and the cause of action alleging violations of the Reorganization Act.
II. Pal‘s Claim Under the Reorganization Act
A. Background
1. Reorganization Act
The Reorganization Act was enacted to encourаge planned, well-ordered, efficient urban development patterns with appropriate consideration of preserving open space and prime agricultural lands within those patterns and to discourage urban sprawl. (
2. LAFCO
LAFCOs are a means used to achieve the purposes and policies of the Reorganization Act. (See
The powers and duties given to LAFCOs are intended to be exercised in a manner that encourages the orderly formation and extension of local government services, while balancing the competing needs for affordable housing, economic opportunities and preservation of natural resources.4 (
3. Lawsuits Challenging LAFCO Determinations
A LAFCO annexation determination is quasi-legislative and, before the annexation is completed (i.e., final), may be challenged by a petition for a writ of ordinary mandamus brought under
Once a LAFCO annexation determination is completed, however, its validity may be challenged only by an in rem proceeding under the validating statutes or by a quo warranto proceeding filed by the Attorney General. (Hills for Everyone v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 461, 466 [164 Cal.Rptr. 420] (Hills for Everyone).) Currently, the requirement for the use of a validating action is set forth in
In Katz v. Campbell Union High School Dist. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1028 [50 Cal.Rptr.3d 839], the court set forth the following overview of validation and reverse validation actions: “A validation action is ‘in the nature of a proceeding in rem.’ ([
B. Contentions and Issues
In this appeal, PAL acknowledges that (1) its cause of action under the Reorganization Act is subject to the procedural requirements that apply to reverse validation actions and (2) it did not comply with the requirements regarding the summons and its publication. As a result, PAL‘s claim that the trial court abused its discretion is limited to the cоurt‘s refusal to (1) treat PAL‘s Reorganization Act claim as a reverse validation action and (2) allow PAL to complete the summons and publication procedure required by statute. In particular, PAL argues it should be excused for its erroneous handling of the summons because it made the showing of “good cause” required by
The trial court addressed the issue of good cause in its September 2012 written ruling, which stated: “Court finds no good cause under
C. Good Cause Requirement
In City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 335 [85 Cal.Rptr. 149, 466 P.2d 693], the California Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the good cause requirement in
The court observed that some, but not all, mistakes of law are excusable and thus provide good cause for relief. (City of Ontario, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 345-346.) On the one hand, the court noted that it was settled that an honest and reasonable mistake of law on a complex аnd debatable issue is excusable and constitutes good cause for relief. (Id. at p. 345.) Thus, attorneys are not expected to be omniscient. (Id. at p. 346.) On the other hand, the court referenced the rule that a mistake of law does not require relief as a matter of law. (Ibid.) Consistent with these parameters, the court
Because our Supreme Court has identified the question of good cause relating to a mistake of law as presenting a question of fact, we will review the trial court‘s finding under the substantial evidence standard.
We recognize that appellate courts generally review a trial court‘s determination regarding good cause under
D. Analysis of Trial Court‘s Finding of No Good Cause
The trial court found that, for purposes of
The trial court‘s finding regarding counsel‘s legal research was made to address a point raised in the declaration of PAL‘s attorney. The declaration stated that, prior to filing the action, the attorney consulted the chapter dedicated to LAFCOs in Curtin‘s California Land Use and Planning Law (26th ed. 2006) and nothing in that chapter mentioned the need to challenge actions by LAFCOs via the validation procedures. The declaration does not mention other legal research, thus implying that the attorney relied on a single treatise.
Defense counsel submitted a declaration stating that the California LAFCO produces a guide to the Reorganization Act (i.e., the operating statute for LAFCOs throughout the state) and makes the most recent version of that
In addition, defense counsel cites Hills for Everyone, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d 461, to demonstrate that existing case law had discussed the need to comply with the validation action statutes when challenging the validity of an annexation. In that case, the court concluded that an unincorporated association could test the validity of a completed municipal annexation “only by an in rem proceeding under the validating statute or by a quo warranto proceeding.” (Id. at p. 466.) Because the unincorporated association filed its petition for writ of mandate without preparing, publishing and serving the summons required by
Besides the casе law and treatises addressed in the appellate briefing, we note that other secondary authorities indicate that challenges to certain LAFCO decisions must be pursued as reverse validation actions. (See 2 Lindgren et al., Cal. Land Use Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2013) Land Use Litigation, §§ 21.53-21.74, pp. 21-44 to 21-63 (rev. 9/13) [validation actions]; 5 Manaster & Selmi, Cal. Environmental Law and Land Use Practice (2013) § 73.16, pp. 73-59 to 73-61 (rel. 34-6/01) [judicial review of annexation/boundary issues]; see also 2 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the Cal. Environmental Quality Act (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 2013) §§ 23.39, 23.146-23.151, pp. 1179-1180, 1297-1300 (rev. 3/13) [CEQA claims brought as validation actions].) Indeed, a “practice tip” for litigants who challenge an annexation states: “Follow Procedural Requirements of Validation Actions. Plaintiffs must take care to follow the procedural requirements of validation actions, or their challenges may be dismissed.” (5 Manaster & Selmi, Cal. Environmental Law and Land Use Practice, supra, § 73.16[2], p. 73-61.)
Another practice guide includes a table that lists the types of approvals that must be challenged by use of a validation action. (2 Lindgren et al., Cal. Land Use Practice, supra, Land Use Litigation, § 21.54, p. 21-45 (rev. 9/13).) The list of approvals includes: “Any change of organization, reorganization, or sphere of influence determination completed under the Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Lоcal Government Reorganization Act of 2000 (Govt C §§56000-57550).” (Ibid.)
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court‘s finding of inadequate legal research is supported by the evidence in the record and our own independent research. Therefore, the court‘s ultimate finding of no good cause does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Consequently, we will affirm the trial court‘s decision to dismiss PAL‘s cause of action under the Reorganization Act.
III. CEQA Violations
A. Contentions of the Parties
Defendants contend that PAL‘s CEQA cause of action is also barred by PAL‘s failure to comply with the publication and summons requirements of the validation statutes. (
B. Applicability of Reverse Validation Procedures
1. Nature of PAL‘s CEQA Claim
Paragraph 1 of PAL‘s petition alleges that Stanislaus LAFCO “adopted a Municipal Service Review for the City of Ceres, approved modification to the City‘s Sphere of Influence, and approved an annexation of land to the City and simultaneous detachment from the Westport Fire Protection District.” Immediately after this allegation, the petition stated: “PAL challenges the adoption of the Sphere of Influence and the approval of the annexation (thе project) in violation of [CEQA] and the [Reorganization Act] ....” The prayer for relief in the petition requests the issuance of a writ of mandate
These allegations clearly demonstrate that PAL‘s CEQA claim is an attack that seeks to set aside (i.e., declare void) Stanislaus LAFCO‘s approval of an annexation and a change in a sphere of influence. PAL‘s appellate briefing further confirms that it is pursuing the CEQA claim to invalidate these approvals. In reference to its CEQA claim, PAL argues: “The project approval must be set aside.” Therefore, the CEQA claim is a challenge to the validity of Stanislaus LAFCO‘s determination regarding the annexation and the change in the sphere of influence and, consequently, qualifies as an “action to determine the validity of any change of organization, reorganization, or sphere of influence determination completed pursuant to [the Reorganization Act]” for purposes of
Based on the foregoing interpretation, we reject PAL‘s contention that there is no law that its CEQA claim must be brought pursuant to the validation statutes.
2. Case Law
PAL also asserts that the cases cited by defendants are inapposite. PAL, however, does not discuss Hills for Everyone, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d 461. In that case, an unincorporated association filed a petition for writ of mandate to compel Orange County‘s LAFCO to set aside its approval of an annexation of territory by the City of Yorba Linda. (Id. at p. 463.) The association alleged the LAFCO (1) violated CEQA and (2) violated the former Knox-Nisbet Act8 by failing to consider the factors set forth in that act before approving the project. (Hills for Everyone, supra, at p. 463.) The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending the validating statute provided the
Therefore, Hills for Everyone, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d 461, provides an еxample of a case where a plaintiff alleged a LAFCO violated both CEQA and an act similar to the Reorganization Act and lost both claims because it failed to comply with the requirements of the validating statute. As a result, the case is precedent for the proposition that CEQA claims seeking to set aside a LAFCO‘s approval of an annexation must comply with the requirements for reverse validation actions. (See 2 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the Cal. Environmental Quality Act, supra, § 23.39, p. 1180 [certain CEQA claims must be brought under the validating action statutes];
C. Other Issues
Because we have determined that the procedures applicable to reverse validation actions apply to PAL‘s CEQA cause of action against Stanislaus LAFCO and operate as a bar to that cause of action, we need not decide the issues presented at the next two levels of analysis. First, we have not decided whether PAL has stated a cause of action under CEQA by setting forth allegations that track language in California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 15096, subdivisions (f) through (h) and asserting Stanislaus LAFCO did not comply with that language. For example, we have not decided whether PAL has stated a cognizable CEQA claim by alleging that Stanislaus LAFCO‘s “findings, including the Statement of Overriding Considerations, are inadequate and not supported by substantial еvidence in the record.” Second, assuming a CEQA cause of action was stated, we have not decided the merits of any such claim. (Cf. Woodward Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. City of Fresno (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 683, 719 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 102] [city‘s finding regarding one of the overriding considerations was not supported by substantial evidence].)
The judgment is affirmed. Stanislaus LAFCO and City of Ceres shall recover their costs on appeal.
Cornell, Acting P. J., and Poochigian, J., concurred.