*1 Apr. 1970.] A. No. 29677. Bank. [L. ONTARIO, Petitioner, v.
CITY OF COUNTY, OF SAN THE SUPERIOR COURT BERNARDINO al., DUCK et Parties in Interest THOMAS S. Real Respondent; . *3 Counsel & for Peti-
O’Melveny Myers, K. Potter and E. Nelson Rodney Rodney tioner.
No appearance Respondent.
Best, &Best in Krieger and Arthur L. Parties Interest. Littleworth for Real Opinion
MOSK, C. J. this for writ of By prohibition City petition Acting (hereinafter Ontario called respondent seeks to restrain City) superior court from suit filed taking further in a real taxpayers’ by proceedings matter is (hereinafter interest called before us on parties plaintiffs). an alternative writ issued the Court of by Appeal. discretion in contends the abused its trial court cause
City finding good certain to excuse statutory plaintiffs’ requirements noncompliance we conclude fails to summons. As will publication appear, City discretion, such an abuse of sustain its burden of demonstrating writ must therefore be denied. suit allegations complaint underlying taxpayers’
be summarized as follows: contractor, Stolte, Inc.,
In 1966 a to finance private developed plan the construction of an automobile stadium in the of Ontario racing device of bonds to be issued a tax-exempt nonprofit corporation land, created acres of Stolte obtained on 800 municipality. options (California) the Ontario Motor as City organized Speedway Corporation had no nonprofit entity question. Speedway Corporation independent staff; its were could take no activities carried on and it by City personnel; shell, the action without It therefore a mere significant City approval. alter and its acts were in fact those of ego City, City.
Stolte’s but a new scheme was options then expired January devised. On July caused Speedway to enter into Corporation *4 it, an with known as the Ontario agreement Motor Stadium Agreement. document, That together accompanying agreements, provided sell, would issue and without voter Speedway Corporation approval, $25,500,000 of bonds to finance the of the site and mortgage purchase the stadium; construction of the would enter into Speedway Corporation a Stolte, contract with without for the competitive bidding, construction of the stadium $12,500,000; at a cost of and would Speedway Corporation then lease the stadium for a called period years profit corporation Ontario Inc., Motor which would the as a Speedway, operate facility pri- vate turn, business venture. In it would vacate and transfer City agreed title to streets in the stadium area further without to Speedway Corporation consideration. the land Finally, Speedway Corporation agreed convey and the stadium to bonds; the retirement of the their term was City upon however, and all and interest were to be years, payments principal made out of stadium; the if the in case such profits, any, operating insufficient, became profits sold a fore- would publicly in property closure proceeding. In other causes of action it was that Stolte had been reimbursed alleged $257,386 out of the bond for proceeds its original which had options,
become worthless; that even before into the Motor Stadium entering Agree- ment, made two $5,000 unauthorized loans of City on behalf of Speedway and that had and Corporation; continued to City paid pay proportion of the salaries and of numerous involved expenses municipal employees (venture. The of the lawsuit was that scheme theory foregoing City therein were undertaken for the sole participation purpose establishing of certain a commercial for financial benefit private parties, enterprise benefit, in such a manner rather than for and were designed any public in this as to evade restrictions on law cities general regard. legal placed various of was to violate the conduct alleged particular, complained law, as the constitutional against well as statutory prohibitions provisions for funds or credit making gift lending private purposes public Const., XIII, 25). (Cal. art. § First, was kinds of an three relief. injunction complaint prayed the various to restrain the from agreements
sought parties performing or other above, other funds described and from doing any expending any re- Second, order was acts in furtherance of the speedway project. all make restitution to money quested parties compel Third, connection. out unlawful in this prayed paid purposes scheme, that the entire including for a the effect declaratory judgment was invalid. the bonds agreements, accompanying after i.e., filed on was days only complaint August defendants It named as Motor Stadium Agreement signed. directors, construc- councilmen, its its Speedway Corporation form usual Summons tion company. company, operating civil in ordinary defendant the manner was served each provided de- this actions. Defendants did not raise procedure, any objection on its otherwise; rather,
murrer, answered complaint motion or they merits, and taking depositions. began plaintiffs immediately *5 however, the 64th
On after the of the moved day filing complaint, to dismiss the did con- entire action on that summons not the ground form to sections 861 of Code of Civil Procedure special requirements 10, to 863. Those are of the sections 9 of title found part (§§ we 860-870). code In actions are to which they subject applicable—a in addition to summons directed be explore below—they require 861.1), in a (§ “all interested be in the matter” and persons published 861); if is (§ circulation general completed newspaper within 60 publication cause for such “unless action must dismissed be days, good (§ 863). failure shown” motion to dismiss was at in two and argued length days hearings,
written briefs and declarations were filed. The court determined impliedly that the action 860-870, was sections found that but governed by expressly had shown cause” to excuse their failure to plaintiffs “good comply sections 861 and 861.1. the court that the motion ordered Accordingly, sections; be unless granted with those plaintiffs promptly complied so, did and filed thereof court. with the now seeks proof prohibition that to review and to further in the action. ruling proceedings prevent
I (hereinafter Code of Civil Procedure sections 860 to 870 referred as 9) were first enacted 1961. The legislation proposed Council, Judicial which had for some that it been “concerned explained with the numerous statutes within which years providing periods appeals notice contained in be taken at variance with the time for may appeal Cal., (1961), (Judicial the Rules on Council of 18th Biennial Rep. Appeal.” to numerous scat- omitted.) fn. the Council p. pointed particular, counties, cities, tered statutes actions agencies authorizing public assessments or the their bonds or establish legality validity cases; existence, such their appeals providing special procedures noted, of doubtful consti- some were latter Council provisions, (see, Irr. Dist. In re tutionality e.g., Shafter-Wasco within 30 taken be P.2d 755] [statute declaring appeal months”]). It was three within and “must be heard and determined days into therefore that “To these conformity bring proceedings explained with the Rules on to avoid constitutional those Appeal, including questions, to the notice uni- relating adequacy given, provide simple, form the Judicial Council recommends procedure, general legislation be enacted for matters, or which these determining validity legality will include the most statutes.” found in of the general provisions existing warned, Council however, that “It is that this specifically proposed when, extent, and to the it is made legislation apply only applicable by the statutes to a the Judicial Council relating particular public agency, statutes the Session. amendments to such plans present during necessary This studied would matters not from prevent covering procedure (Judicial the Council which less might procedure.” adaptable Cal., omitted.) Council cit. fn. supra, op. p. As enacted, 9 and its originally companion legislation respected
the limited purpose Council. Section 860 that a provided an action within 60 agency may determine the bring days matter “which under other law authorized to any be determined pur- *6 suant to this 860, a section statutes chapter.” Implementing variety were amended in the session to incor- relating particular agencies the (See cross-reference. State Bar J. porate provisions chapter by (1961), 717-718.) Each limited, however, pp. agencies specific specific proceedings, most could be invoked to validate bond only is- assessments, sues or contracts with other or the agencies, existence of the itself. It was agency expected similar amendments be would proposed in the future to extend the terms of to9 individual chapter agencies and not covered proceedings the by original legislation, and that each such would be considered on its merits. proposal however, statute validating appears the these humble beginnings, From Council. by conceived beyond originally have far scope grown of Government enactment with the took change place validating First, pro- than rather limiting and 53511. sections 53510 to any availability its extended section 53510 cedure to agencies, specific or municipal or district any public “county, city county, city, public to imagine It is difficult or authority.” agency public corporation, public categories. another of those that would not fall within one or entity local an acts Second, by class of rather than this to a limiting specific procedure determine “an action to section 53511 extended to9 agency, evi- bonds, warrants, contracts, or obligations validity agency’s] [the If, “contracts” as the here the word dences of indebtedness.” argues, agency into which the in section 53511 is taken to mean contract enter, the of the statute becomes apparent. lawfully far-reaching expansion undertaken necessarily The vast of such an are majority agency’s dealings matters, contracts; but others means of some involve routine ministerial by at embody large. decisions important affecting policy public moreover, is com- decisions, those to challenge The public’s opportunity 9 provides 863 of chapter this Section restricted by legislation. mensurately “any does not initiate validating proceedings, that if the public agency the court and in the time an action within interested bring person.may such the validity Section 860 of this to determine by specified “No 869: section reads This seems innocuous until one matter.” enough, or of any thing or agent contest or its officer by except public agency time and within the than matter under this shall be made other words, while section added.) other (Italics the manner herein specified.” action, an that an such section 869 interested says “may” person bring he must do so contesting or be forever barred from says validity action in a such restriction is agency’s court of law. Yet no placed itself, which is in section agency effect authorized by disregard statute of section 60-day limitations 860.1 imposed be of this scheme should practical consequence clearly statutory an recognized: action but “validate” its agency may indirectly effectively it; by doing nothing to validate unless an “interested action brings person” his own under section 863 action agency’s within the 60-day period, of section added in spelled out second sentence authorization 1 This agency, agency, including any local or to its availability any public “The 1963: shall not construed to remedy chapter, this agents, provided or officers agents, agency its officers or of mandamus or such or the use preclude (See, any thing e.g., or matter.” Metro remedy determine the any other *7 724, Marquardt (1963) 170-171 politan 59 Cal.2d Water Dist. 28].) 379 P.2d Indeed, valid or not. it is from attack whether will become immune legally a statute which this to be so. Thus in the case at bar concedes agencies, a to be begins by expressly by remedy pursued providing (§ 860), a in rem” con- be “in the nature of it to declaring proceeding all, such do at cludes it to making anything unnecessary agencies out and the incidental or derivative of an “interested turns remedy person” be to This is a of the tail case controlling. truly dog. wagging version of concede, was in the original we implicit phenomenon, from drawn preexisting which section first appeared, exacerbated was statutes. its effect on the greatly But taxpayers in 1963. Prior and enactment of Code sections 53510 Government few, be to likely to that time number of “interested propor- persons” 9; because of the tionate to the limited and special applicability involved, “interested were to have likely nature of the statutes persons” notice of the action.2 It was not to agency’s perhaps inappropriate impose a such But brief statute of limitations on individuals. since relatively correct, if the construction of the “contract” every word City’s virtually has become an “interested to taxpayer every person” virtually regard action of a local It is unreasonable public agency. to assume mem- bers of such a have large are notice likely amorphous group prompt of each action them. Yet has agency whether such such affecting person not, notice or ishe given (1) which to discover only days the exis- tence, action, and effect (2) scope to reach a agency’s conclusion as to (3) its validity, determine whether the has agency instituted validating so, or not, intends to do proceeding imminently if prepare file of his own. proceeding age increasingly complex government, this seems a burden heavy impose vigilant taxpayer. And it a far certainly from Judicial Council’s cry concern original with the conformity Rules on Appeal.
II The case at bar is dramatic indicium of the wisdom the Council’s plan implement general statute selected validating by carefully follow-up above, legislation.3 As noted section 860 makes applicable matter which is authorized to be determined thereto pursuant “under any other law.” The only law” possible “other case is present Government Highways 2 For section example, Streets 5265 expressly declared that an action,to test of a the Improvement contract under Act of 1911 brought by agency “or obviously contractor.” latter would have notice question. of the contract support 3 The Council did the 1963 enactment of Government Code sections 53510 and 53511.
343 sections those whether sections 53510 53511. question as will the answer is far from clear. apply; appear, and Government section fact that both at the
We meet outset validation those proceedings only govern Code section purport or bonds public manifestly, a agency; which are or brought by against means. such cannot be challenged contracts of a private corporation those are not case, in issue however, the bonds or contracts In the present organized but of company City Speedway nonprofit Corporation, is alleged in 1966. City argues Corporation Speedway acts that its of Ontario ego alter be merely complaint one of ego was only alter as well. Yet deemed those of City must be the scheme direct alleged also participation theories pleaded; plaintiffs Moreover, defendants and employees. its officers City acting through indeed, they ego alter relationship; denied such any themselves vigorously order entity aas private separate, have treated Corporation Speedway contract its construction vote and avoid its bonds to submitting bidding. competitive lists, as It to be would seem face, applicable. section On its contracts, warrants, obliga- “bonds, under chapter for validation matters limitation no added). (italics There of indebtedness” or evidences tions “contracts,” therefore appear and it would the word or qualification Motor Ontario as the such contract municipal include a multipurpose statute suggests Yet the legislative history Agreement. Stadium bill First, proposing Counsel’s the Legislative digest result. contrary “a local agency the measure as one allowing 53511 characterized section indebtedness.” action to determine the of evidences bring validity 1, divi- Second, 3 of 53511 was enacted as part section part “Bonds,” 3 is entitled title of the Government Code. sion Chapter bonds, their and deals with the of local to sell exclusively agencies power bonds, defaced secure or lost their revenues to or replace pay pledge bonds. If such section 53511 was intended to be a general provision (“Miscel- it should have been in article logically application, placed laneous”) of (“General”) in which a of the same group part, Third, unrelated such matters are collected. of section key language 53511—“bonds, warrants, contracts, indebted- or evidences of obligations 9; taken ness”—was from section 864 under well-known directly of chapter canons of statutory it should the same given interpretation, ordinarily it as had in meaning the earlier statute. But as a of the companion perusal reveals, 1961 legislation when 9 was it made applicable adopted to such existence, matters only as the local legality entity’s validity its bonds and assessments, joint agreements financing with other If agencies. section 53511 was intended to reach and all *9 enter,
contracts into which an the restricted agency may lawfully language of section 864 was that for that language inappropriate purpose. Finally, event, for such a it peculiarly as inapt expressing general meaning lists the word “contracts” in the midst of four deal other terms which all with the limited of a local financial topic agency’s obligations. from the
Turning of the statutes to the relief language for in prayed still further complaint, difficulties are presented. validating typical action seeks a bonds, assessments, etc., declaratory judgment valid; are or are agency indeed, it is for this reason that section 860 characterizes the action it authorizes as “in nature of a proceeding in rem.” To the extent that case for a plaintiffs present prayed declaration scheme, the entire invalidating speedway including bonds and accompanying agreements, the provisions were arguably But applicable. plaintiffs also two sought other kinds (1) of relief: an injunction restraining from parties funds or spending any doing any other acts in furtherance of the (2) speedway project, order com- pelling parties make restitution to of all money unlawfully paid out in connection with the project. 9; indeed,
Neither of these latter remedies owes its existence to chapter each the enactment of that statute Plaintiffs’ claim predates many by years. for 526a, relief is injunctive predicated on of Civil Procedure section which has since that provided “An action to obtain a judgment, funds, restraining of . . . or other preventing any illegal expenditure of a . . . . . property . be maintained officer city, may against any thereof” aby of such That is the relief taxpayer city. precisely requested here. City argues that the matters sought to are for enjoined provided itself; in the Motor Agreement Stadium this be true but other part, matters alleged go beyond of that 5To the agreement.4 requirements extent ask for relief unrelated to the injunctive performance the terms of the Motor Stadium no reason Agreement, deny appears them their normal and long-standing Legislature taxpayers’ remedy. does obviously not believe that somehow section 526a repealed for it implication, took action on recently section.5 The courts very continued, course, have suits; to entertain and in at least taxpayers’ case one enactment of postdating relief was au injunctive alleged example, City’s 4 For necessary intention to all improvements make off-site at its own cost and paying to continue expenses salaries and municipal employees involved in the venture. Legislature 5 In 1967 the following added language to section 526a: “An action brought pursuant to this enjoin public improvement section to project shall take precedence special over all civil matters on the except calendar of the court those equal matters to which precedence granted (Stats. 1967, on the calendar is law.” 2080.) p. § ch. into entered a contract under illegal expenditures thorized prevent assessments, bonds, unrelated which was agency the defendant public Court Superior Beach Hermosa (City financial matters. or other 796].) 295, 300 funds out paid additional claim for restitution Plaintiffs’ the Motor Stadium the terms also goes beyond unlawful purposes unauthorized two made alleged, it Agreement: example, *10 Stolte and reimbursed $5,000 that agreement, before into entering loans of validating $250,000 in the general its worthless Nothing some options. action for repayment cause of such an in personam statute contemplates no reason appears money again of public unlawfully expended, in this regard. their normal deny remedy chal- wish to that a may large-scale taxpayer In most projects been courts, will have spent in the some lenge money already less related to future action more or threatening authorities will be be thus seem to relief this case would sought project. tripartite in. a rule rather than the But what is such plaintiff expected exception. Even if his to do when faced with the strict of 9? requirements chapter scheme, the entire he remain is invalidity principal complaint Yet the stat- entitled to his traditional relief and restitution. by injunction (Code ute of limitations in suit is one Civ. year an ordinary taxpayers’ Proc., 526a), wording and there or 9 nothing history chapter § Government Code were intended to they or section 53511 to suggest pro that rule tanto and to substitute the brief abrogate 60-day period section and resti- 860. Nor can the in personam jurisdiction injunction tution with the elaborate rem plausibly depend pro- upon compliance cedure for of summons in sections 861 to 863. publication prescribed To the extent the are9 procedural requirements inappropriate of the relief can it be said the vali- portions sought, categorically statute is dating to the case? “applicable”
Ill considerations to at least one clear conclu foregoing point sion: the case at bar whether 9 question applies presents a and debatable” issue. It is settled that an honest and “complex reasonable mistake of law on such an issue is excusable and constitutes cause for relief good from default Procedure section under Code of Civil (Viles 24, v. State 473. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 29 Cal.Rptr. [56 of California 666, 818], 423 P.2d cited.) and cases test The same claim governs cause under section 863 good “The cause which must good 9: be shown in such a case as this ‘may reason for a good equated party’s
346 from which failure to perform statute] specific requirement [of Court, 885, (Waters he be excused.’ 58 893 Superior seeks to Cal.2d 153, 265].) P.2d The rule is that ‘a. mistake Cal.Rptr. [27 law. as to the law does not relief from default as a matter of require 441, Monterey (1953) Line v. (Security Truck 117 Cal.App.2d 366, 755].) P.2d 257 P.2d The issue of which mistakes [256 law constitute excusable a fact deter neglect presents question; factors are the mining justi reasonableness of misconception (Fidelity lack & of determination of the correct law. Fed. Sav. fiability 568].) Loan Long (1959) Assn. v. P.2d 175 Cal.App.2d [345 Although an honest mistake of is a valid for relief where ground law debatable, problem law complex ignorance coupled negligence it will ascertaining certainly sustain relief.’ finding denying Co., (A & Conditioning S Air v. John J. Moore 184 Cal.App.2d 592].)” (Community Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Cal.Rptr. [7 201].) Court Thus *11 case, that a but arguendo 9 does to this mistaken assuming apply chapter by reasonable decision counsel that it did not plaintiffs’ constitutes apply for the cause trial court to good belated with its terms. permit compliance omniscient, are not Counsel be the to as expected Legislature plainly recognized by the “good cause” into writing section 863. exception relies
City Community Redevelopment, but the heavily case must be its distinguished on facts. There the filed an action in March plaintiffs seeking 1966 to have a of a local declared redevelopment plan agency invalid, failed but to with the summons of comply procedure 9. chapter mandate, dismissal compelling writ of the court appellate empha (1) sized statute out the governing of spelled applicability chapter (Health Code, 9 those in & proceedings great detail Saf. § 1963)6 (2) enacted in and the that issue had in event been any adjudicated (Sibbet prior decision v. Board reported Directors Pasadena 335]). Here, seen, as we have is not it unreasonable to construe the brief and largely inappropriate brought pursuant Chapter 6 “An (commencing action be with Section 860) of Title 10 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to validity determine the redevelopment bonds the plan refinanced, of part, and to be financed or in whole or in bonds, the validity redevelopment or to determine the plan not financed bonds, including limiting without generality the foregoing, legality the the and validity proceedings of all any theretofore way taken for or in connected with the agency, authority establishment of the its powers, transact business and its exercise designation area, survey area, the of the the project selection of the the formulation preliminary the plan, adoption redevelopment plan, or renewal and including legality also (as the and proceedings of all theretofore taken and resolution) provided in bond authorization, issuance, the proposed to be taken for delivery sale of the bonds and for the payment principal thereof interest thereon.” to exclude section 53511 operation of Government Code language to the case, holding decision and there is no reported in this prior contrary. lawof attack, if the issue contends that even
As its last line of City debatable, failed to prove have plaintiffs here complex presented with their to comply fact and failure causal connection between that any dismiss, docu- introduced At on the motion hearing 9. invoked for had evidence to show that counsel plaintiffs mentary case, and were familiar earlier hence procedures concedes also its But do such deny familiarity. terms. plaintiffs to have known of provi- that counsel must plaintiffs presumed asserts, how- 53510 and 53511. City sions of Government sections that “evidence” ever, court contains no record before the trial at decided such statutes were inapplicable counsel for time plaintiffs and acted on basis of that decision. their case role in these contention evinces a misunderstanding City’s pro- he., whether The issues before trial court were twofold: ceedings. whether coun- and debatable law was complex question presented, their sel reliance on acted in reasonable but mistaken appraisal of evi- of that Neither issue the formal introduction question. required dence, the latter turned on whether oral or documentary; particular, counsel, and for counsel’s and intent of understanding purpose to support court would constitute sufficient “proof” representations *12 not extent such repre- its Here we do know whether or what ruling. made, the oral was transcribe sentations were as no present reporter fault, was City the motion. But that is not arguments City’s plaintiffs’; motion, the the and in this moving charged party important record review. responsibility making adequate review, On this moreover, two well settled favor the presumptions below: as in the case of a motion for relief default under Code from ruling 473, “First, Civil Procedure section it is clear vested in power trial courts . . . should be that and exercised to the end freely liberally cases shall disposed to their substantial merits rather according than mere technical that matters and upon secondly, procedure, matters of this sort the the case rests almost decision of entirely proper below, the discretion of the court tribunals will inter and rarely appellate fere, never and unless it abuse that there has been plain clearly appears 627]; (Miller 10, v. Lee (1942) discretion.” 15 P.2d 52 [125 Cal.App.2d 25]; accord, (1931) 739, v. Fox Brill P. 211 Cal. 743-744 Higley [297 365], (1968) 640, Bank 644-645 Downey [67 Cal.Rptr. us, cited.) and cases On the record has failed to overcome presented and the those to demonstrate a clear abuse of trial court’s presumptions discretion.
The alternative writ is writ is denied. discharged peremptory Sullivan, Peters, J., Tobriner, J., J., concurred.
BURKE, J. For the reasons set forth I dissent. Mr. Justice Tamura District, him for the Court of Fourth opinion prepared by Appeal, Two, Division and concurred in Justice McCabe and Justice by Presiding 746), it is Kerrigan my (reported (Cal.App.) Cal.Rptr. opinion dissent, opinion appropriate Tamura’s with deletions 1Justice to this is as follows ], (brackets together, manner used opinion in this are to indicate deletions from the [ Emp. Appeal; (1962) see of the Court of Simmons v. Civil Service Ins. Co. 262]): Cal.2d fn. 1 P.2d (1) pending governed by The two issues are whether the action is sections ][ 860-870, (2) support finding whether there was sufficient evidence “good cause” noncompliance with those sections.
I determined, by implication, The trial court subject the action was to the Plaintiffs, provisions simply nevertheless, of sections 860-870. contend was that the action taxpayers’ brought a traditional suit pursuant to section 526a of the Code of (1) Civil merely Procedure attacking validity because action one (2) agreement; the motor sought stadium the bonds to be invalidated are those aof nonprofit organization municipality; not of the section 53511 applicable only Government Code is to contracts on indebtedness and not to con- generally. tracts assertion, Contrary plaintiffs’ essence of action is its attack on the validity plaint attacking thereto agreement. of the motor rely upon allegations stadium Plaintiffs City com- of the the commitment of the to vacate convey streets and to title nonprofit corporation, without consideration to validity of the con- struction contracts and the nonprofit corporation awarded bidding, without competitive mortgage revenue approval. bonds issued without voter Those matters, however, inextricably part agreement. are all of the motor stadium agreement requires longer required vacate streets no by reason con- *13 struction of obligates convey alternate streets and corporation; to title thereto nonprofit to the nonprofit corporation the to cause the stadium to be constructed in ac- cordance with a Stolte, Inc.; contract entered into between it and expressly and provides that entering agreement, into the City approves the financing the site of acquisition and mortgage construction issuance of operation revenue bonds and the of the by leasing stadium profit corporation. it to the The contention that the action does not come within scope the of section 53511 of the Government bonds, indentures, Code because the trust construction contract and operating lease nonprofit were acts the corporation of and City not those the of is not persuasive. complaint The is framed theory on the nonprofit corporation shell, corporate but a only that it can approval act City, with of the that it is in fact ego but the City, alter of the and that its acts are the acts of the and
349
Civil
of the Code of
Pro
sections 860
870
action is
this
governed by
cedure,
cause for not
failed to show
and that
good
complying
the
writ of
I
issue
would
Accordingly,
peremptory
with those sections.
municipal corpo-
pertaining to
statutory
and
limitations
subject to
constitutional
the
against
the
on those alle-
may
their cause of action
not base
rations. Plaintiffs
gations
conclusion
resisting a
to dismiss. The
yet
disavow
when
motion
them
validity
attack
of the “Motor
upon
is its
the
inescapable that the essence of the action
sought
is embodied
Agreement”;
plan
invalidated
the entire scheme or
to be
Stadium
agreement.
in that
section 53511 was intended
Plaintiffs
that
word “contract” as used in
contend
as the “Motor
be limited to contracts
indebtedness and not to contracts such
to
Stadium
legislative
Agreement.”
they
In
refer to the
support of their contention
1737,
Digest
53511
the Government
Assembly
counsel’
Code,
validity
Procedure.”
Bill
which added section
allowing
agency
bring
determine the
as
bill
a local
an action to
"...
pursuant
provisions
of indebtedness
to the
of the Code
Civil
evidence
legislative
While
where it is consistent with
such
material
be of assistance
Court,
708,
(Maben
Superior
Cal.App.2d
interpretation
reasonable
statute
v.
255
of a
439]),
statutory
controlling
language
where
is clear.
Cal.Rptr.
713
it is not
[63
Lundblade,
638,
(See Taylor
344].)
interpreta-
Cal.App.2d
The
v.
P.2d
[111
urged by plaintiffs
tion
render
word
in
53511 of the
would
“contract”
section
Furthermore,
enacting
superfluous.
it is
section
apparent
Government Code
53511,
validating
Legislature
thereby
intended
to authorize cities to utilize
procedure
was
purposes
procedure
sections
all
which that
860-870 for
of the
for
designed.
are identical
The matters listed in section 53511 of the Government Code
prescribing
the matters described in section 864
Code Civil Procedure
purpose
of sections
time when such matters
be deemed to be in existence for
shall
of the Code
860-870. Both section
Government Code and section 864
53511 of the
“bonds, warrants, contracts, obligations
of Civil Procedure list
and evidences
860-870,
recommending
sections
the Judicial Council
indebtedness.”
enactment of
agencies
dealing
specific public
took note
of the various statutes then in existence
matters,
authorizing
in-
to determine the
of various
districts
actions
Council, supra.)
cluding
(18th
Report
The council
contracts.
Biennial
Judicial
adoption
report clearly
procedure recommended
was
indicates that the uniform
designed
generally,
used
contracts
as well as contracts
for the validation of
Code,
(see,
Legislature
e.g.,
so
those sections
Wat.
indebtedness.
has
construed
50979)
they
(Clark’s
§
v.
have
so
Fork Reclamation Dist.
Johns
been
utilized
370]).
Cal.Rptr.
II finding justified “good cause” Plaintiffs contend that the trial has court meaning publish been summons shown within the of section 863 for failure form within time required statute. ground concept “good exposition calls of a cause” for a “factual reasonable Court, Superior sought {Waters Cal.Rptr. v. order.” 58 Cal.2d 893 [27 Co., 265]; 377 P.2d Goodman v. & Ins. Cas. Citizens Life 682]; Court, Community Redevelopment Agency Superior *14 164, Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. 201].) empowers 174 law the court to [56 Where the 350 restraining court respondent taking from further
prohibition any proceed action, dismissal, in the main other than to order its without ings but prej udice to have to an any action right may bring independent plaintiffs matters included in the which not be to may respecting complaint subject specific statutory requirement showing good comply excuse cause, with a of law on failure a good upon honest depending mistake constitute cause the “rea- misconception justifiability sonableness of of lack of determination of the (Community Agency Superior Court, supra; Redevelopment Fidelity correct law.” Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. v. Long, 568].) Cal.App.2d 154 P.2d An ground honest problem “complex mistake of law is for where a and debat- relief able,” “igorance coupled negligence ascertaining but of the law with not in it” will (Community Court, justify Redevelopment Agency Superior supra.) relief. v. comply Plaintiffs contend their failure to that with sections 860-870 was excused question procedure because the prescribed whether the there to the applicable was pending presented action “complex a problem.” and debatable Community Redevelopment Court, Agency Superior supra, Cal.App.2d v. showing by court that plaintiffs determined a the one similar to made “good meaning instant case was insufficient to establish cause” within the section 863 of the Code of Civil Procedure observed that mere failure of [ ] [and] complaint recognize time procedure counsel at the he filed the that deter- for challenged mining by of the matter was 860-870 controlled sections justify finding “good the Code of Civil Procedure did*not a cause.” present presented Plaintiffs in the case no evidence from which could have been it found there upon misconception that was an honest mistake of law based reasonable justifiable fact, of the law and lack of correct determination of the law. In presented no “good evidence whatsoever issue cause” comply on the failure with sections The that depositions 860-870. declaration which had been taken plaintiffs supported allegations complaint merely tended of the to show that there good action, was filing “good faith in not for noncompliance cause” with the statutory procedure. contend, however, Plaintiffs the deficiency proof that was supplied by their They urge memorandum of authorities. only possible method demonstrating question scope that whether action fell within the of sections 53510, 53511 of the Government Code and presented “complex sections 860-870 question,” legal and debatable difficulty plaintiffs’ memorandum. The with position they showing filing failed introduce prior evidence to the summons, they of the action and the issuance of considered applicability of the validating procedure prescribed sections 860-870 and not determined to follow it in inapplicable. the honest belief that it was The problem mere fact that a is “com- debatable,” plex itself, “good is insufficient constitute cause” comply statutory failure to requirements. with provisions applicable sections 860-870 had been made to contracts Code, obligations (Gov. 53.510, 53511), of cities in years prior §§ over five (Community Redevelopment Agency Superior the institution of the pending action. Court, supra, (1967) Cal.App.2d delineating what must shown to con- “good Procedure, stitute cause” under section 863 of Civil the Code of Sibbet 335], v. Board Directors Pasadena 731 [47 deciding the noncompliance effect of [ ] with section had been the books long circumstances, prior to the plain- commencement In these pending action. showing “good tiffs’ was insufficient to constitute cause.” having “good comply Plaintiffs failed to show cause” for failure to sections 860-870, jurisdiction (Code Proc., the court had no other than to order dismissal. Civ. 863.) original having § having summons been form and been defective in *15 sections 860 to 53511 and section of Government the provisions Procedure. the Code of Civil 870 of
McComb, J., concurred. an amended summons published prescribed period, publication within the (Commu- jurisdiction. expiration statutory period after the nity Redevelopment could confer Court, 164, 180.) supra, Agency, Superior ] [