PROJECT VOTE/VOTING FOR AMERICA, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Elisa LONG, in her official capacity as General Registrar of Norfolk, Virginia; Donald Palmer, in his official capacity as Secretary, State Board of Elections, Defendants-Appellants. United States of America; the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press; American Society of News Editors; The Associated Press; Association of Capitol Reporters and Editors; Atlantic Media Inc.; Citizen Media Law Project; Lin Media; The National Press Club; National Press Photographers Association; Newspaper Association of America; North Jersey Media Group, Incorporated; Radio Television Digital News Association; The Seattle Times Company; Society of Professional Journalists; Student Press Law Center; USA Today; Virginia Coalition for Open Government, Amici Supporting Appellee.
No. 11-1809.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued: May 17, 2012. Decided: June 15, 2012.
682 F.3d 331
Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed and remanded by published opinion. Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge DIAZ and Judge FLOYD joined.
OPINION
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
The question here is whether Section 8(i)(1) of the National Voter Registration
I.
Plaintiff Project Vote/Voting for America, Inc. (“Project Vote“) is a nonprofit organization seeking to increase voter registration among young, low-income, and minority voters. This suit arose after Project Vote learned that students at Norfolk State University, a historically African-American college, experienced problems in registering to vote in the November 2008 primary and general elections in Virginia. In particular, Project Vote worried that the students’ registration applications had been erroneously rejected by the Norfolk General Registrar, defendant Elisa Long, who is responsible for processing voter registration applications.
On May 11, 2009, a Project Vote affiliate—Advancement Project—requested that Registrar Long “make available for inspection and copying the completed voter registration applications of any individual who timely submitted an application at any time from January 1, 2008, through October 31, 2008, who was not registered to vote in time for the November 4, 2008 general election,” as well as “documents identifying the reasons the applications were rejected.” The request was made pursuant to NVRA Section 8(i)(1), which provides:
Each State shall maintain for at least 2 years and shall make available for public inspection and, where available, photocopying at a reasonable cost, all records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters, except to the extent that such records relate to a declination to register to vote or to the identity of a voter registration agency through which any particular voter is registered.
On May 15, 2009, representatives from Project Vote and Advancement Project visited Registrar Long‘s office in person and repeated their request, which was again refused. Accordingly, the organizations wrote to the Secretary of the VSBE, giving notice that Registrar Long was allegedly violating NVRA Section 8(i)(1) and requesting remedial measures. On September 25, 2009, VSBE forwarded to Project Vote and Advancement Project an informal opinion of the Attorney General of Virginia. The opinion concluded that “the completed voter registration application of any individual is not a part of the record of the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purposes of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters covered by [the Public Disclosure Provision].” To date, defendants have not disclosed the requested records.
Project Vote then moved for summary judgment. Defendants opposed the motion, reasserting their original arguments and also claiming that the district court‘s interpretation of the NVRA was incompatible with two other federal statutes, the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA“),
II.
The NVRA reflects the view of Congress that the right to vote “is a fundamental right,” that government has a duty to “promote the exercise of that right,” and that discriminatory and unfair registration laws can have a “damaging effect on voter participation” and “disproportionately harm voter participation by various groups, including racial minorities.”
The NVRA directs states to establish at least three methods of voter registration for federal elections: “(1) by application made simultaneously with an application for a motor vehicle driver‘s license,” “(2) by mail application” using a federally prescribed form, and “(3) by application in person” at designated voter registration agencies.
Finally, as explained above, Section 8(i)(1) of the NVRA mandates public disclosure of voter registration activities.
III.
A.
We begin by considering the Commonwealth‘s argument that the text of Section 8(i)(1) does not require public disclosure of completed voter registration applications. This issue of statutory interpretation is one that we review de novo. United States v. Ide, 624 F.3d 666, 668 (4th Cir.2010). The starting point for any issue of statutory interpretation is of course the language of the statute itself. United States v. Bly, 510 F.3d 453, 460 (4th Cir.2007). “[W]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous, ... this first canon is also the last [and] judicial inquiry is complete.” Willenbring v. United States, 559 F.3d 225, 235 (4th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Appellants assert that “[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of [Section 8(i)(1)] does not encompass voter applications, much less the rejected applications initially sought.” Appellants’ Br. at 10. Instead, they claim, the “‘programs and activities’ referred to in Section 8(i)(1) of the NVRA are programs and activities related to the purging of voters from the list of registered voters.” Id. at 11.
Contrary to appellants’ insistence, the plain language of Section 8(i)(1) does not allow us to treat its disclosure requirement as limited to voter removal records. As the district court concluded, completed voter registration applications are clearly “records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters.”
First, the process of reviewing voter registration applications is a “program” and “activity.” Under Virginia law, election officials must examine completed voter registration applications and register applicants that possess the necessary qualifications. See
Moreover, the “program” and “activity” of evaluating voter registration applications is plainly “conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters.”
Furthermore, the registration applications requested by Project Vote are clearly “records concerning the implementation
Finally, “the fact that [Section 8(i)(1)] very clearly requires that ‘all records’ be disclosed brings voter registration applications within its reach.” Id. at 707-08 (emphasis added). As this court has recognized, “the use of the word ‘all’ [as a modifier] suggests an expansive meaning because ‘all’ is a term of great breadth.” Nat‘l Coal. for Students with Disabilities Educ. & Legal Def. Fund v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283, 290 (4th Cir.1998). Given that the phrase “all records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters” unmistakably encompasses completed voter registration applications, such applications fall within Section 8(i)(1)‘s general disclosure mandate.
B.
Although Section 8(i)(1) generally requires disclosure of applicable records, it creates exceptions “to the extent that such records relate to [(1)] a declination to register to vote or [(2)] the identity of a voter registration agency through which any particular voter is registered.”
C.
Appellants next argue that NVRA Section 8(i)(2)—which immediately follows Section 8(i)(1)—limits the records subject to public disclosure. Section 8(i)(2) provides:
The records maintained pursuant to [Section 8(i)(1)] shall include lists of the names and addresses of all persons to whom notices described in subsection (d)(2) of this section are sent, and information concerning whether or not each such person has responded to the notice as of the date that inspection of the records is made.
D.
In sum, the NVRA‘s disclosure requirement is not limited to voter removal records. The NVRA, including Section 8(i)(1), concerns voter registration, not simply voter removal. Notably, the statute is entitled the “National Voter Registration Act,”
IV.
Appellants further contend that the district court‘s interpretation of the NVRA causes the statute to conflict with HAVA and the MOVE Act. Given that the requested registration applications unquestionably fall within the plain language of Section 8(i)(1), we need not look outside that plain language in construing the statute. Where “the language is plain and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,’ there is no need to inquire further.” In re JKJ Chevrolet, Inc., 26 F.3d 481, 483 (4th Cir.1994). Accordingly, we need not consider the impact of HAVA and the MOVE Act on the language of Section 8(i)(1), which clearly requires public disclosure of completed voter registration applications.
Appellants insist, however, that all three statutes address related electoral proceedings and that to interpret them at cross-purposes would lead to real confusion. We are not persuaded by this view. Even considering these statutes, both are entirely consistent with the district court‘s interpretation of Section 8(i)(1). The Help America Vote Act requires, among other things, that states establish a free access system through which provisional voters
Appellants’ argument fails to recognize that HAVA‘s security provisions only concern the “personal information collected, stored, or otherwise used by the free access system,”
Appellants next point to the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act as evidence that Congress did not want Section 8(i)(1) to apply to voter registration applications. The MOVE Act requires states to establish procedures “for absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters to request by mail and electronically voter registration applications and absentee ballot applications” and for states to send such applications by mail and electronically.
[t]o the extent practicable, [these procedures] shall ensure that the privacy of the identity and other personal data of an absent uniformed services voter or overseas voter who requests or is sent a voter registration application or absentee ballot application ... is protected throughout the process of making such request or being sent such application.
Appellants’ argument ignores the plain language of the MOVE Act, which expressly limits the application of its security and privacy provisions to personal data conveyed during the voter form request process. The provision cited by appellants—
V.
Finally, appellants’ proffered privacy concerns do not necessitate reversal of the district court‘s decision. In support of their argument to the contrary, appellants point to Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir.1993), in which we held that a statute that conditions voting on public release of a voter‘s Social Security number “creates an intolerable burden on that right as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 1355. Greidinger is inapposite here, however, because the district court did not require public disclosure of Social Security numbers, which the court recognized “are uniquely sensitive and vulnerable to abuse.” Project Vote, 752 F.Supp.2d at 711-12. The district court expressly concluded that Section 8(i)(1) “grants the plaintiff access to completed voter registration applications with the voters’ SSNs redacted for inspection and photocopying.” Project Vote, 813 F.Supp.2d at 743 (emphasis added). Plaintiff has never requested completed applications with unredacted Social Security numbers and does not object to the district court‘s redaction requirement. Accordingly, there is no danger that this uniquely sensitive information will be compromised by Section 8(i)(1)‘s public disclosure requirement.
Appellants next argue that “information other than applicants’ SSNs, such as responses to requests regarding criminal history, mental incompetency, and even home addresses, phone numbers, and birth dates implicate real privacy interests.” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 20. Because the Virginia voter registration application form requires this personal information, appellants contend, “it must be reasonably supposed that conditioning voting on the public release of such information will suppress registration contrary to congressional intent.” Appellants’ Br. at 22.
We do not think appellants’ privacy concerns unfounded. By requiring public disclosure of personal information,* Section 8(i)(1) may conceivably inhibit voter registration in some instances. However, this potential shortcoming must be balanced against the many benefits of public disclosure. It is self-evident that disclosure will assist the identification of both error and fraud in the preparation and maintenance of voter rolls. State officials labor under a duty of accountability to the public in ensuring that voter lists include eligible voters and exclude ineligible ones in the most accurate manner possible. Without such transparency, public confidence in the essential workings of democracy will suffer.
It is not the province of this court, however, to strike the proper balance between transparency and voter privacy. That is a policy question properly decided by the legislature, not the courts, and Congress has already answered the question by enacting NVRA Section 8(i)(1), which plainly requires disclosure of completed voter registration applications. Public disclosure promotes transparency in the voting process, and courts should be loath to reject a
VI.
In the end, appellants ask us to revisit issues already resolved by the Congress. It may or may not be that Section 8(i)(1) is the most effective means of promoting the NVRA‘s stated purposes. The public disclosure provision may or may not “increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote” in federal elections and “enhance[] the participation of eligible citizens as voters.”
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED