SHANEL PROCTOR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 1:18-cv-00701 (TNM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
May 2, 2018
TREVOR N. MCFADDEN, United States District Judge
Plaintiffs Shanel Proctor and Charlaine Braxton, two homeless residents of the District of Columbia, are suing the District under
I. BACKGROUND
The basic facts of this case are undisputed. The District of Columbia has adopted a Protocol for the Disposition of Property Found on Public Space and Outreach to Displaced Persons. Compl. Ex. 2. By following this Protocol, the District provides homeless individuals
A. The District of Columbia‘s Protocol
The Protocol applies to property left in public spaces maintained by the District “when the property left in the public space presents a security, health, or safety risk, interferes with community use of public space, or becomes a significant community nuisance.” Compl. Ex. 2, 3. The Protocol establishes a detailed procedure for standard disposition of this property, providing District employees a guide to follow before, during, and after cleanup of a public space where homeless individuals have an encampment. Id. at 4-7. In doing so, the Protocol has three main purposes. Horen Decl. ¶ 5. First, it seeks to address immediate and persistent public health and safety concerns, including concern about homeless people‘s exposure to the elements, the risk of fires caused by cooking and heating inside tents, the spread of disease caused by improper disposal of human waste and by vermin attracted to garbage and food waste, and the use of closed tents as sites for drug use and prostitution. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Second, it seeks to “enroll residents in safer, healthier living arrangements through an array of housing, mental health, and other services.” Id. ¶ 5. Third, it seeks to ensure that public spaces are clean and accessible to the public. Id.
On the day of a scheduled cleanup, the Protocol directs Department of Human Services (DHS) employees to arrive an hour early “to confirm everyone who is interested in packing belongings has the opportunity to do so” and to provide encampment residents with containers or bags for storing their belongings, including two 40-gallon storage boxes or bins. Id. at 6. Residents may designate for storage whatever fits in the two boxes, with limited exceptions for items that pose public health or safety hazards. Id. And the Protocol directs DHS not to discard certain categories of items, including important documents, fully assembled and operational bicycles, and functional tents. Id. The Protocol also directs DHS to inventory all belongings that it takes into storage.
After an encampment cleanup, the Protocol gives homeless individuals 60 days to reclaim their property by calling DHS at a number provided on the notice signs. Id. at 6-7. The Protocol instructs DHS to store the property during this time, to make it available for pickup, and
B. The District of Columbia‘s Practice
The District of Columbia‘s actual conduct of encampment cleanups appears to be informed by the Protocol‘s orientation toward assisting homeless people while maintaining clean public spaces. The parties do not dispute that the District posts notice before conducting a cleanup, as the Protocol directs. There does appear to be some tension between the Protocol‘s instruction that the notice should include a warning that “any items not removed by the cleanup deadline are subject to removal and disposal” and the sign‘s actual warning that items not removed by the cleanup time “are subject to removal and disposal” unless the items are personal belongings packed in containers provided for storage or are personal belongings in plain sight of obvious value. Compare id. at 4 with Horen Decl. ¶ 12. But in addition to posting notice, outreach workers visit the site several times in the weeks before a cleanup to determine who lives there, to explain what will happen, and to explain that tents and other belongings may be preserved by moving them or by packing them for temporary storage by the District. Horen Decl. ¶ 14. Outreach workers have ready access to interpretive services if needed. Id. ¶ 18.
During a cleanup, District employees sort hazardous waste, items that can be put into a trash truck, and items in plain sight that should be stored, such as important documents, medication, glasses, bicycles, and electronics. Id. at 39-40. In some cases, District employees may open a purse, backpack, suitcase, or other container that appears likely to contain a wallet or identification. Id. at 40. Even so, the District will sometimes discard documents, functional tents, and other items that the Protocol says should not be discarded, if DHS staff determine that the property is clearly abandoned or at least can be considered abandoned. See id. ¶¶ 52-53
Tents and other property are generally found to be abandoned on one of three grounds: (1) the property appears to be uncared for and has been deteriorating throughout the notice period, and outreach staff and other residents do not know who owns the property; (2) “despite two weeks of notice, opportunity, and outreach, including information from outreach or other residents that the owner knew about the upcoming cleanup, the owner chose not to be there or otherwise communicate to others his or her desire to have his or her belongings stored“; or (3) the owner leaves the cleanup site without the property after the cleanup team arrives. Horen Decl. ¶ 52; Ban Decl. Ex. 4 (a couple‘s items were discarded when they walked away from their property at the start of a cleanup); cf. id. Ex. 7 (a woman‘s tent and other property were discarded after she walked away from an encampment before a cleanup started).
In practice, the determination that property is abandoned appears to involve a fact-specific, individualized analysis. See, e.g., Supplemental Decl. Ex. 16 (unattended property was discarded after “[i]t was observed that the resident had moved the belongings that he wanted and left a collection of items and trash“); id. Ex. 18 (unattended wheelchair that was discarded had dry-rotted wheels and unattended tent that was destroyed contained no valuables and smelled of
The District also considers extenuating circumstances in determining whether property is abandoned. Horen Decl. ¶ 53. For example, if the District learns that the property owner has been detained or hospitalized, the property is reviewed for storage rather than considered abandoned and discarded. Id. ¶ 50; cf. Supplemental Decl. Ex. 15 (the District tried to return an unattended identification card, walker, and glucometer to a woman they learned had been “admitted to a program“). If the District learns that the property owner lacks the mental capacity to understand, DHS considers alternatives to disposal of the property. Horen Decl. ¶ 51. The determination that property is or may be deemed to be abandoned is made in consultation with District outreach workers, third-party outreach providers, and encampment residents, who often know the individuals who own the property in question. Id. ¶¶ 46-49; see also id. ¶ 59 (unattended items discarded when District outreach workers were unable to make contact with owner and other encampment residents said they had not seen the owner in a while); Ban Decl. Ex 9 (unattended items discarded as abandoned after camper explained that “she told her neighbors about the clean up and they left their items there any way [sic]“).
After a cleanup, the District logs and stores property for up to 60 days at the Adams Day Drop-In Center in Northeast Washington, D.C. Horen Decl. ¶ 29. The District provides free transportation for people to retrieve their property and makes reasonable arrangements to deliver property upon request. Id. That said, it is common for people to abandon their property,
After the District government destroyed property belonging to Ms. Proctor and Ms. Braxton, they brought this case. They allege that the District has a pattern and practice of summarily destroying the unattended property of homeless individuals that violates the
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy; it is never awarded as of right.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008) (citation omitted). This remedy should only be granted if the party that moves for a preliminary injunction makes “a clear showing that four factors, taken together, warrant relief: likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, a balance of the equities in its favor, and accord with the public interest.” League of Women Voters of the United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016). That said, “[a] preliminary injunction may be granted based on less formal procedures and on less extensive evidence than in a trial on the merits.” Cobell v. Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 261 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Still, an evidentiary hearing is required if the parties raise a genuine issue of material fact that must be resolved in deciding the motion. Id.2
Similarly, class certification is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011). Plaintiffs may only be certified to sue on behalf of a class if they can show:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Plaintiffs Have Not Satisfied Their Burden to Show Entitlement to a Preliminary Injunction
The first point on which Plaintiffs must make a clear showing to obtain a preliminary injunction is that they have a likelihood of success on the merits. League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 6. At the heart of the Plaintiffs’ merits argument is the assertion that summary destruction of unattended property violates the
That said, “[a] warrantless . . . seizure of property that has been abandoned” is reasonable and consistent with the
Despite significant disputes in their briefing over the applicable caselaw, the parties appeared to agree at oral argument that individuals retain
The Plaintiffs have not made a clear showing on this point. When asked to point to their most flagrant evidence of a
Even if the destruction of Plaintiffs’ property were unconstitutional, Plaintiffs have not shown that it took place under a custom of the District of Columbia that is actionable under Section 1983. Although the District has discarded unattended property on occasion, the record does not show that it has done so under circumstances that made an abandonment determination unreasonable. The record shows that homeless individuals often abandon property in public places when they acquire new property, move, or obtain housing. Horen Decl. ¶¶ 17, 30, 88. The District does have a policy and practice of cleaning up abandoned property. But as explained above, the District takes extensive precautions to reduce the risk of destroying property that is wanted. See Compl. Ex. 2 (District policy of providing notice, conducting outreach, providing containers to move or store property, and more); see also Horen Decl. ¶¶ 46-49 (District practice of making abandonment determinations in consultation with outreach providers and encampment residents).
Plaintiffs argue that it is unreasonable for the District to consider property abandoned solely because it is left unattended at a cleanup site given that the notice that the District posts inaccurately assures readers that some categories of property left at the site will be stored for 60 days and will be available to be reclaimed during that time. Reply ISO Mot. Prelim. Inj.; see also Horen Decl. ¶¶ 12, 53. Plaintiffs may be right. But it is unnecessary for me to decide this
Plaintiffs’ heavy reliance on Lavan does not help their case. In Lavan, the City of Los Angeles posted only a general notice that cleanups could happen anywhere in the Skid Row
By contrast, the District of Columbia provides residents with notice of the specific date, time, and place of a scheduled cleanup, allowing them two weeks to move their possessions or pack them for storage. Horen Decl. ¶ 10. It takes extensive measures to identify the owners of the property in question and tries to help the owners not only by providing them containers to store or move their belongings but also by seeking to arrange housing and provide other services. Id. ¶¶ 13-15, 23. When District employees encounter unattended property, they consider many factors and consult several sources, including other encampment residents, to make what appears to be a good-faith determination about whether the property is abandoned. Id. ¶¶ 46-53, 59; Ban Decl. Ex 9. The District‘s practice is unquestionably much more narrowly tailored and respectful of the rights and property of its homeless residents than the practice at issue in Lavan. Unlike the plaintiffs in Lavan, Plaintiffs here have failed to establish a violation of their
But the Plaintiffs have not established that such losses are imminent and certain without preliminary relief. As explained above, Plaintiffs have not made a clear showing that the District has a pattern of destroying property in violation of the
The third and fourth points that the Plaintiffs must show are that the balance of the equities and the public interest favor injunctive relief. League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 6. The Plaintiffs argue only that one equitable and public interest factor points in their favor, and
B. The Plaintiffs Have Not Satisfied Their Burden to Show That the Proposed Class Should Be Certified
Plaintiffs have not adequately established numerosity, the first prerequisite for class certification under
The District of Columbia responds that not all of the unsheltered residents of the District “have been or will be subject to encampment clears pursuant to” the Protocol, noting that Plaintiffs have pointed to far fewer than 40 situations in which individuals’ unattended property has been discarded and observing that the same individuals may have been involved in several situations. Def.‘s Opp. to Mot. Class Certification 5-6.8 The idea that not all unsheltered residents of the District have been or will be subject to encampment cleanups is supported by the fact that the Protocol applies only “when the property left in the public space presents a security, health, or safety risk, interferes with community use of public space, or becomes a significant community nuisance” and “does not apply to any property that is left in the public space located on federal property, including National Park Service land, WMATA property, or private property.” Compl. Ex. 2, 3. Much of the land in the District of Columbia is federal property, including significant amounts of parkland, which presumably are common encampment
Rather than providing additional information to allow a reasonable approximation of the class size, the Plaintiffs reply to the District‘s argument by repeating that Census data shows there are 897 unsheltered people in the District of Columbia and asserting that “[t]hose 897 people are members of the proposed class; they reside in and maintain property on public spaces that are subject to District, rather than federal, authority.” Pls.’ Reply ISO Class Certification. But the Census data on which Plaintiffs rely provides no reasonable basis for this estimate of the class size. The Plaintiffs therefore have failed to provide adequate grounds for class certification.
For the reasons explained above, the Plaintiffs’ Motions for Preliminary Injunction and for Class Certification will be denied. A separate order will issue.
TREVOR N. MCFADDEN
United States District Judge
Dated: May 2, 2018