310 F.Supp.3d 107
D.D.C.2018Background
- Plaintiffs Shanel Proctor and Charlaine Braxton, homeless individuals in D.C., sued the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment after District employees destroyed their unattended belongings during encampment cleanups.
- The District has a written Protocol for disposition of property found in public spaces: it requires advance posted notice (initial at 14 days, final at 48 hours), outreach, provision of containers on cleanup day, inventorying, and 60-day storage for claimed property (except items posing health/safety risks).
- In practice the District sometimes discards unattended items it deems abandoned after a fact-specific inquiry (e.g., lack of owner contact during notice period, visible deterioration, owner leaving site at cleanup start); outreach workers and others are consulted; some items categorized for storage.
- Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction requiring the District to store unattended personal property for 60 days before destruction (except hazardous items), and class certification of all homeless persons subject to District encampment clearings.
- The court held an evidentiary record showing notice/outreach and individualized abandonment determinations; plaintiffs declined an evidentiary hearing and relied on declarations and cleanup reports.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary destruction of unattended property violates the Fourth Amendment | Destruction of unattended but not abandoned property is an unreasonable seizure; District routinely destroys such property | Destruction is reasonable when property is abandoned; District follows Protocol and makes individualized abandonment determinations | Plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success; record supports reasonable abandonment determinations in plaintiffs’ cases |
| Whether there is a municipal custom or policy actionable under § 1983 | District practices effectively cause unconstitutional widespread seizures of homeless property | District has a policy (the Protocol) and takes precautions; occasional discards are not an unconstitutional custom | Plaintiffs did not show an unconstitutional policy or custom attributable to the District |
| Whether plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction | Loss of personal property and constitutional rights is irreparable and likely to recur | Plaintiffs cannot show imminent, certain injury; they can protect property under existing notice or by designating items for storage | Although loss of property can be irreparable, plaintiffs failed to show the harm is imminent and certain here; factor favors District |
| Whether class certification is appropriate (numerosity) | Census data shows ~897 unsheltered persons in D.C., supporting numerosity | Not all unsheltered persons are subject to the Protocol; plaintiffs point to far fewer actual cleanup incidents | Plaintiffs failed to provide a reasonable estimate of class size; numerosity not established; class certification denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008) (preliminary injunction is extraordinary relief and not awarded as of right)
- League of Women Voters of the United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (four-factor preliminary injunction test)
- Cobell v. Norton, 391 F.3d 251 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (preliminary injunction may proceed on less formal evidence; hearing required if genuine factual disputes exist)
- Soldal v. Cook Cty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56 (1992) (seizure occurs when there is meaningful interference with possessory interests)
- United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (warrantless seizure of abandoned property is reasonable; abandonment judged by objective facts)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires an official policy or custom)
- Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012) (city’s summary destruction of unabandoned possessions violated the Fourth Amendment)
- Mills v. Dist. of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (loss of constitutional freedoms, even briefly, can constitute irreparable injury)
