Price v. Carter Lumber Co.Price v. Carter Lumber Co.
DICKINSON, Presiding Judge.
INTRODUCTION
{¶1} Gerald Price claims that his former supervisor told him that Carter Lumber Company would not rehire Mr. Price after a lay-off because Carter was not willing to work around his dialysis schedule. Mr. Price sued Carter and the former supervisor, Jim Collins, in federal district court for disability discrimination. The federal court dismissed without prejudice state-law claims that Mr. Price had brought against Mr. Collins. Mr. Price then sued Carter and Mr. Collins in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. After Carter won a jury verdict in federal court, both Carter and Mr. Collins moved the common pleas court for summary judgment on all of his claims against them. The common pleas court initially denied the motion for summary judgment and a motion to reconsider, but later sua sponte granted summary judgment to both defendants. Mr. Price has appealed that ruling. This Court affirms the part of the
BACKGROUND
{¶2} The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a complaint against Carter in federal district court, making claims on behalf of Mr. Price under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Commission averred that Carter discriminated against Mr. Price by denying him employment because of his disability.
{¶3} Mr. Price filed his own federal complaint against both Carter and Mr. Collins. He averred a disability discrimination claim against Carter under the Americans with Disabilities Act, a similar state-law claim against both Carter and Mr. Collins under
{¶4} Mr. Price later sued Carter and Mr. Collins in the Summit County Common Pleas Court for disability discrimination under
{¶6} Carter and Mr. Collins moved the common pleas court to reconsider its denial of the requested continuance. They included with their motion certified copies of jury interrogatories from the federal case, the federal court‘s journal entry announcing the verdict against Mr. Price, and Mr. Price‘s federal complaint. The common pleas court granted the motion to reconsider, cancelled the trial, and placed the case on the court‘s inactive docket.
{¶7} When the common pleas court reactivated the case, Carter and Mr. Collins moved for summary judgment, arguing that, due to the preclusive effect of the federal jury interrogatory responses, Mr. Price was barred from pursuing his state-law claims against them. Following Mr. Price‘s response to that motion, the common pleas court denied summary judgment on the disability discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, but granted Carter and Mr. Collins summary judgment on the violation of public policy claim. After the case was transferred to a new trial judge, Carter and Mr. Collins moved for reconsideration of the denial of summary judgment on the disability discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. The new judge refused to reconsider, determining that Carter and Mr. Collins had not presented any evidence that the first common pleas judge had not considered.
CIVIL RULE 54(B)
{¶8} Mr. Price‘s first assignment of error is that the common pleas court incorrectly “dismiss[ed]” all of his claims “pursuant to
{¶9}
RECONSIDERATION
{¶10} Mr. Price‘s second assignment of error is that the common pleas court should not have granted the defendants’ motion for reconsideration of their motion for summary judgment because, according to him, the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize motions for reconsideration. Citing Pitts v. Ohio Department of Transportation, 67 Ohio St. 2d 378 (1981), he has argued that the common pleas court had no authority to reverse its earlier denial of the motion for reconsideration because the motion for reconsideration was a nullity.
{¶11} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “[t]he Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure do not prescribe motions for reconsideration after a final judgment in the trial court.” Pitts v. Ohio Dep‘t of Transp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 378, at paragraph one of the syllabus (1981). Therefore, it has determined “that motions for reconsideration of a final judgment in the trial court are a nullity.” Id. at 379. The issue turns, however, on the operative word: “final.” In Pitts, the Supreme Court explained that, on the authority of
{¶12} The common pleas court‘s May 2008 order denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Mr. Price‘s claims of disability discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. That order did not affect the parties’ substantial rights nor prevent a judgment on those two claims. See
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
{¶13} Mr. Price‘s remaining assignments of error are that the common pleas court improperly granted summary judgment to Carter and Mr. Collins. In reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard the common pleas court is required to apply in the first instance: whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Parenti v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 66 Ohio App. 3d 826, 829 (1990).
Res Judicata
{¶14} Res judicata, under Ohio law, includes two concepts: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. State ex rel. Schachter v. Ohio Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 121 Ohio St. 3d 526, 2009-Ohio-1704, at ¶27 (quoting O‘Nesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113 Ohio St. 3d 59, 2007-Ohio-1102, at ¶6). Claim preclusion bars subsequent actions between the same parties or their privies on all claims arising out of the transaction that was the subject of a previous action. O‘Nesti, 2007-Ohio-1102, at ¶6. Issue preclusion bars the same parties or their privies from re-litigating an issue in a subsequent action if the “fact or point . . . was actually and directly at issue in a previous action” and a court of competent jurisdiction has determined it. Fort Frye Teachers Ass‘n, OEA/NEA v. State Employment Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St. 3d 392, 395 (1998).
Claims against Carter
{¶15} Mr. Price‘s third assignment of error is that the common pleas court incorrectly granted Carter summary judgment based on the determination that both of his claims against it were barred by res judicata. The common pleas court granted Carter summary judgment because it determined that all of Mr. Price‘s claims had been “fully litigated in the [d]istrict [c]ourt.” The common pleas court pointed out that, contrary to Mr. Price‘s representations, the federal district court had not dismissed all of his state-law claims against both Carter and Mr. Collins before Mr. Price filed this case in common pleas court. Rather, it had only dismissed his claims against Mr. Collins. Therefore, the common pleas court determined that the federal jury‘s verdict in favor of Carter disposed of all the claims against Carter, including his state claims, and barred Mr. Price from pursuing those state claims in common pleas court.
{¶17} The doctrine of claim preclusion required Mr. Price to bring all potential claims against Carter and its privies arising from the same occurrence in his initial lawsuit or be barred from later bringing the omitted claims because a plaintiff must “present every ground for relief in the first action, or be forever barred from asserting it.” Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St. 3d 379, 382 (1995) (quoting Nat‘l Amusements Inc. v. Springdale, 53 Ohio St. 3d 60, 62 (1990)); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982). In support of its motion for summary judgment, Carter argued that, based on the same set of facts, it had obtained a valid final judgment in its favor in federal court. It pointed to the jury verdict and jury interrogatory responses indicating that judgment had been rendered on the merits of the federal employment discrimination claim. Thus, Carter met its initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under
{¶18} The question is whether Mr. Price met his reciprocal summary judgment burden. See Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St. 3d 421, 428-29 (1997);
{¶19} The common pleas court in this case granted summary judgment to Carter based on res judicata because the federal district court‘s order of May 19, 2005, “dismiss[ed] only ‘state law claims asserted against Defendant Jim Collins in his individual capacity . . . .‘” The federal court dismissal explains why Mr. Price was not able to pursue his claims against Mr. Collins in the federal action, but it does not address his state claims against Carter. On appeal, Mr. Price has neither explained how the language of the May 2005 order could be construed as a dismissal of his state-law claims against Carter nor pointed to any other evidence tending to show that the federal court dismissed those claims without prejudice. Mr. Price‘s only argument is that the state-law claims against Carter “were never litigated” in federal court. He has correctly pointed out that Carter has admitted that no state-law issues were tried in federal court.
{¶20} The problem with Mr. Price‘s argument is that it fails to recognize the breadth of claim preclusion‘s reach. Claim preclusion not only bars all claims that were litigated, but also
{¶21} The dissent has suggested that the common pleas court erred by granting summary judgment to Carter based upon claim preclusion because Carter did not raise that aspect of res judicata in its motion for summary judgment and because the common pleas court wrote that it had examined the federal court docket. Mr. Price, however, has assigned neither of those things as error. Generally, this Court does not construct arguments for parties and reverse trial court decisions based upon errors not argued on appeal. See, e.g., Moss v. Lorain County Bd. of Mental Retardation, 185 Ohio App. 3d 395, 2009-Ohio-6931, at ¶9.
Claims against Mr. Collins Individually
{¶22} Mr. Price‘s fourth assignment of error is that the common pleas court incorrectly granted summary judgment to Mr. Collins. The common pleas court granted Mr. Collins summary judgment because it determined that Mr. Price had not brought any separate claims against him in his individual capacity. Despite the fact that he was named in his individual
{¶23} The common pleas court disposed of both the intentional infliction of emotional distress and disability discrimination claims against Mr. Collins on the same basis. That is, it determined that Mr. Price never argued or identified a separate claim against Mr. Collins involving allegations distinct from those he made against Carter. The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, however, is primarily aimed at Mr. Collins, not Carter. The complaint provides details regarding Mr. Collins‘s behavior toward Mr. Price. In fact, every allegation supporting the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is based on the acts of Mr. Collins. Thus, the trial court incorrectly granted summary judgment to Mr. Collins on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based on its determination that Mr. Price had not presented any claims against Mr. Collins.
{¶24} In an effort to support the common pleas court‘s decision on the disability discrimination claim, Mr. Collins has argued that Mr. Price failed to allege any facts to form a separate claim against him in his individual capacity “separate and apart from his official capacity” as an employee of Carter. In response, Mr. Price has argued that, under Genaro v. Central Transport Inc., 84 Ohio St. 3d 293 (1999), he presented a claim against Mr. Collins in his individual capacity without alleging that Mr. Collins acted outside the scope of his employment. Mr. Price has conceded that he alleged identical claims against Mr. Collins and Carter.
{¶25}
The Jury Interrogatories
{¶26} Mr. Price‘s fifth assignment of error is that the common pleas court incorrectly granted summary judgment even though genuine issues of material fact remain for trial. In support of this assignment of error, Mr. Price has presented an argument regarding issue preclusion.
{¶27} We have already determined that the common pleas court properly granted summary judgment to Carter on both claims based on claim preclusion. There is no reason to reach this assignment of error, therefore, as it relates to Carter.
{¶29} The common pleas court never reached the question of whether the jury‘s interrogatory responses in the federal case barred the issues Mr. Price wanted to litigate against Mr. Collins in this case. Rather, it granted summary judgment to Mr. Collins because it determined that Mr. Price had failed to state a claim against him in his individual capacity. “Therefore,” it wrote, “no cause of action remains to be resolved by this [c]ourt.” This matter must be remanded to the common pleas court for it to consider, in the first instance, the summary judgment arguments made by Mr. Collins and Mr. Price, review the evidence, and make a determination regarding both claims against Mr. Collins in his individual capacity. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Commercial Union Ins., 9th Dist. No. 20936, 2002-Ohio-5033, at ¶38-44 (citing Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St. 3d 356, 360 (1992)). Accordingly, this Court also does not reach Mr. Price‘s fifth assignment of error as it relates to Mr. Collins.
CONCLUSION
{¶30} Mr. Price‘s first, second, and third assignments of error are overruled. The common pleas court correctly reconsidered its non-final denial of summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Carter based on claim preclusion. Mr. Price‘s fourth assignment of error is sustained. The common pleas court should not have granted summary judgment to Mr. Collins in his individual capacity based on its incorrect determination that Mr. Price had not stated claims against him. We do not reach Mr. Price‘s fifth assignment of error. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed equally to both parties.
CLAIR E. DICKINSON FOR THE COURT
BAIRD, J. CONCURS
{¶31} I concur with respect to most of the majority‘s opinion. However, I respectfully dissent with respect to the majority‘s resolution of the third assignment of error.
{¶32} The majority concludes that Mr. Price failed to meet his reciprocal summary judgment burden as he failed “to show that the federal court dismissed his state claims against Carter without prejudice[]” and thus failed to demonstrate that his claims were not barred by claim preclusion.
{¶33} However, Carter did not assert in its motion for summary judgment that Mr. Price‘s claims were barred by claim preclusion. Carter only asserted that Mr. Price‘s claims were barred by issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel. While it is true that both claim and issue preclusion comprise the doctrine of res judicata, the evidence needed to support claim preclusion is not necessarily the same evidence needed to support issue preclusion.
{¶34} This Court has previously stated that:
“With regard to the moving party‘s burden to inform the trial court of the basis for the motion, a party seeking summary judgment must specifically delineate the basis for the motion in order to allow the opposing party a meaningful opportunity to respond. We have explained that if the moving party does not raise an issue in its motion for summary judgment, then it is improper for the trial court to grant the motion on that basis. If a party files a motion based on some, but not all, issues in a case, the trial court should restrict its ruling to those matters raised. It is reversible error to award summary judgment on grounds not specified in the motion for summary judgment. The trial court may not rely on law or fact that is not presented in the moving party‘s motion.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Lindsey v. Summit Cty. Children Services Bd., 9th Dist. No. 24352, 2009-Ohio-2457, at ¶10.
{¶35} Here the trial court did not restrict its ruling to the arguments raised by Carter. There was no reason why Mr. Price would have presented the evidence the majority is requiring him to present when that evidence would support an argument that was not made by Carter on
{¶36} In addition, the trial court committed legal error when it relied upon materials not before it in ruling on the motion. See, e.g., In re J.C., 186 Ohio App. 3d 243, 2010-Ohio-637, at ¶¶13-15 (stating that “[m]atters outside the record cannot be used to demonstrate error, nor can they be considered in defense of the judgment[]“). In its judgment entry, the trial court states that it examined the docket of the federal court case in concluding Mr. Price‘s claims were barred by claim preclusion; however, that docket was not within the ambit of materials that the trial court could properly consider pursuant to Civ.R. 56; in fact, it was not within the trial court‘s record at all.
{¶37} Therefore, I would reverse the trial court‘s entry of summary judgment as to Carter on the basis of claim preclusion and remand the matter for further proceedings.
(Baird, J., retired, of the Ninth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment pursuant to §6(c), Article IV, Constitution.)
APPEARANCES:
EDWARD L. GILBERT, attorney at law, for appellant.
THOMAS F. HASKINS, JR., attorney at law, for appellee.
MICHELE MORRIS, attorney at law, for appellee.