RODRIGO RODRIGUEZ PRECIADO et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FREIGHTLINER CUSTOM CHASSIS CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent.
D079536
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
January 24, 2023
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
Earl H. Maas, III, Judge.
Law Offices of Otto L. Haselhoff and Otto L. Haselhoff for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, Philip R. Cosgrove and Ryan E. Cosgrove for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiffs Rodrigo Rodriguez Preciado, Norma Janeth Banda Arreola, Alejandro Rodriguez Banda, and Haydee Antonieta Zumaeta (Plaintiffs) appeal from an order granting the motion to quash service of summons filed by defendant Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation (FCCC). Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in concluding that they failed to establish that California has general or specific jurisdiction over FCCC in this action.
We conclude that Plaintiffs’ arguments lack merit, and accordingly we affirm the order granting FCCC‘s motion to quash and dismissing it from this action.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation arises from a February 22, 2020 bus accident that occurred on Interstate 15 in San Diego County, resulting in the death of Cynthia Karely Rodriguez Banda (Cynthia)1 and injury to Zumaeta.
On February 22, 2021, Zumaeta, along with Cynthia‘s parents and brother (as survivors), filed a lawsuit against several defendants. The defendants included (1) the bus owners/operators; (2) the bus driver; (3) the California Department of Transportation; (4) the manufacturer of the bus (alleged to be General Coach America, Inc.); (5) the alleged manufacturer of the bus‘s tires; and (6) the alleged manufacturer of the bus‘s seats and seat belts. As specifically relevant here, the defendants also included FCCC, which manufactured the bus‘s chassis.2 All of the causes of action asserted against FCCC were based on various theories of products liability.3
On April 1, 2021, FCCC specially appeared in the action and filed a motion to quash service of summons based on lack of personal jurisdiction in California. (
FCCC supported its motion with the declaration of Dennis Rostenbach, who holds a position in “FCCC Dealer Operations/Product Litigation” at
Based on the vehicle identification number of the bus involved in the accident, Rostenbach determined that FCCC was the manufacturer of the bus‘s chassis. As shown by the invoice attached to Rostenbach‘s declaration, the chassis was sold by FCCC in 2013 to Champion Bus, Inc., which was located in Imlay City, Michigan. FCCC assembled the chassis in South Carolina according to the buyer‘s specifications. According to Rostenbach, “The subject ... chassis was not designed, assembled, advertised or sold by FCCC in California.” Rostenbach stated that “FCCC has no control over where the purchasers of its chassis market and sell their completed vehicles.” As Rostenbach explained, “FCCC did not market, advertise, distribute or sell the subject bus, which Plaintiffs claim is defective, in California.”
Plaintiffs filed an opposition on June 25, 2021. The sole evidence relied upon by Plaintiffs in support of their opposition were two groups of printouts from internet websites.
The first group of printouts was from FCCC‘s website. In their opposition briefing, Plaintiffs focused on language in those printouts describing FCCC‘s market share for chassis: “As the world‘s largest manufacturer of diesel walk-in van chassis, nearly two-thirds of all diesel walk-in van chassis sold today are made by FCCC. We also hold more than half the market in Class A diesel motorhome chassis and more than a quarter of the market in conventional school bus chassis.” Plaintiffs also focused on the portion of FCCC‘s website that identified independent service centers where FCCC‘s products could be serviced. The FCCC website states, “Freightliner Custom Chassis owners have access to the industry‘s largest service network, comprised of more than 450 Freightliner branded service locations throughout North America.” Those service centers include at least 15 locations in California.
The second group of printouts was from the website of Velocity Truck Centers, which has several locations in California, and in other states. The printouts appear to indicate that Velocity Truck Centers is a dealer that sells
Plaintiffs filed objections to Rostenbach‘s declaration. They also requested, in the alternative, that the hearing on the motion to quash be continued by 180 days to permit them to conduct discovery. However, Plaintiffs did not set forth any specific jurisdictional discovery that they intended to pursue or point to any jurisdictional discovery that they had already propounded in the 85 days since FCCC filed its motion to quash.
In its reply, FCCC confirmed that Plaintiffs had not propounded any discovery specifically designed to develop facts relating to the issue of personal jurisdiction. Instead, on June 10, 2021, Plaintiffs propounded lengthy discovery requests to FCCC that were not targeted to issues of personal jurisdiction.6
At a July 9, 2021 hearing, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ request for a continuance to conduct discovery, overruled Plaintiffs’ objections to Rostenbach‘s declaration, and granted FCCC‘s motion to quash.
Plaintiffs appeal from the order granting FCCC‘s motion to quash and dismissing FCCC from the action.7
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the Request to Continue the Motion to Permit Discovery or by Overruling Plaintiffs’ Objections to Rostenbach‘s Declaration
Before turning to the merits of FCCC‘s personal jurisdiction challenge, we consider two preliminary issues. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in (1) denying their request for a continuance of the motion to quash so they could conduct discovery; and (2) overruling their objections to Rostenbach‘s declaration.
1. Plaintiffs’ Request for a Continuance to Conduct Discovery
Plaintiffs requested in their opposition memorandum that the trial court continue the motion to quash for 180 days to allow them to conduct discovery relevant to personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in denying their request.
“A trial court has the discretion to continue the hearing on a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow the plaintiff to conduct discovery on jurisdictional issues.” (HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173.) “In order to prevail on a motion for a continuance for jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff should demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction.” (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127 (Automobile Antitrust Cases).) Because the decision to grant a continuance is a discretionary decision, “[o]n appeal, we will not reverse the trial court‘s ruling unless we find a manifest abuse of that discretion.” (Ibid.)
Here, although Plaintiffs requested a continuance for the purpose of conducting discovery on jurisdictional issues, they failed to identify any specific area of inquiry that they would pursue if they were allowed to conduct discovery. In his declaration, Plaintiffs’ counsel described the discovery he sought to conduct in extremely vague terms: “Plaintiffs seek to take depositions, engage in limited written discovery, and probe the connections of the moving defendant to the forum state, and inquire as to the claims regarding non-connection by moving defendant, among other things.” In addition, there were 85 days between the April 1, 2021 filing of FCCC‘s motion to quash and the June 25, 2021 filing of Plaintiffs’ opposition to that motion, and 99 days between the filing of the motion and the hearing date.
In denying the continuance, the trial court specifically focused on Plaintiffs’ failure to propound jurisdictional discovery when they had the opportunity to do so, and on their failure to identify the specific discovery they would pursue if given a continuance. As explained in the order granting the motion to quash: “The Court finds, as stated in the reply papers, that plaintiffs have had since the motion was filed on April 1, 2021 to propound discovery regarding the jurisdictional issues, but have failed to do so. Instead, plaintiffs propounded discovery regarding issues that were unrelated to the motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs also failed to submit the specific discovery or description of the discovery they seek to propound for the Court‘s consideration.”9
Because Plaintiffs failed to articulate what specific facts they would seek to develop if granted a continuance, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Plaintiffs did not “demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction.” (Automobile Antitrust Cases, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 127.) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs’ request for a
2. Plaintiffs’ Objections to Rostenbach‘s Declaration
Plaintiffs filed objections to almost every paragraph in the Rostenbach declaration. They objected on grounds that included lack of foundation, conclusory, irrelevant, calls for speculation, and lack of personal knowledge. The trial court overruled the objections.
On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that their objections should have been sustained because Rostenbach had no personal knowledge of the matters discussed in his declaration, and thus his statements lacked foundation. According to Plaintiffs, “the declaration did not state the basis of [Rostenbach‘s] personal knowledge nor provide admissible evidence establishing his personal knowledge.”
The Evidence Code provides that “the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter.” (
Here, Rostenbach‘s declaration explained the nature of his employment at FCCC and his familiarity with its records and corporate operations. Rostenbach declared, “I make this declaration based on personal experience and knowledge of the facts set forth herein, which includes my review of the books and records of FCCC that are kept in the ordinary course of business, as well as personal knowledge obtained during my employment by FCCC in the ordinary course of my duties. [¶] . . . I have been employed by FCCC since August of 1996. I have held the position of FCCC Dealer Operations/Product Litigation since 1998. In my role with the company, I have become familiar with the record-keeping of FCCC and its organizational structure, as well as that of other corporate entities that are affiliated with FCCC, such as Daimler Trucks North America LLC. [¶] . . . Based on my
These statements provide substantial evidence to support a finding that Rostenbach had personal knowledge of the matters set forth in his declaration. (See Tutti Mangia Italian Grill, Inc. v. American Textile Maintenance Co. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 733, 742 [a foundation was properly laid for a declaration where the witness explained the basis for his personal knowledge].) The trial court accordingly did not abuse its discretion in overruling Plaintiffs’ objections to Rostenbach‘s declaration based on lack of personal knowledge.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Motion to Quash
We now turn to the central issue presented in this appeal: whether the trial court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs failed to establish that California had personal jurisdiction over FCCC in this action.
The standard of review in an appeal from an order granting a motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction is well-settled. “In reviewing a trial court‘s determination of jurisdiction, we will not disturb the court‘s factual determinations ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘When no conflict in the evidence exists, however, the question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing court engages in an independent review of the record.‘” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 273 (Pavlovich).) Here, the parties do not identify any factual disputes that the trial court was required to resolve. We accordingly conduct an independent review.
A California court “may exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitutions of California and the United States.” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 268; see also
“When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.” ( Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449 (Vons).) “The plaintiff must come forward with affidavits and other competent evidence to carry this burden and cannot simply rely on allegations in an unverified complaint.” (Buchanan v. Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1362.) “Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant‘s burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” (Vons, at p. 449.)
There are “two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general (sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called case-linked) jurisdiction.” (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (2021) ___ U.S. ___ [141 S.Ct. 1017, 1024] (Ford Motor).) Plaintiffs contend that they “established both general and specific jurisdiction.” We accordingly consider each in turn.
1. General Jurisdiction
“A state court may exercise general jurisdiction only when a defendant is ‘essentially at home’ in the State. [Citation.] General jurisdiction, as its name implies, extends to ‘any and all claims’ brought against a defendant. [Citation.] Those claims need not relate to the forum State or the defendant‘s activity there; they may concern events and conduct anywhere in the world. But that breadth imposes a correlative limit: Only a select ‘set of affiliations with a forum’ will expose a defendant to such sweeping jurisdiction. [Citation.] In what [the Supreme Court] ha[s] called the ‘paradigm’ case, an individual is subject to general jurisdiction in her place of domicile. [Citation.] And the ‘equivalent’ forums for a corporation are its place of incorporation and principal place of business.” (Ford Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct. at p. 1024.)
Although a defendant‘s state of incorporation and principal place of business are the paradigmatic indications that a corporation is “at home” in a state, “in an exceptional case . . . a corporation‘s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 139, fn. 19 (Daimler AG), citing Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437.) For example, in Perkins, the Supreme Court held that a corporation was subject to general personal jurisdiction in Ohio, even though it was organized in the Philippines and normally conducted its operations there, because its business operations were temporarily relocated to Ohio during wartime. (Perkins, at pp. 448-449.) The inquiry is “whether th[e] corporation‘s ‘affiliations with
Here, the undisputed facts are that FCCC is a Delaware corporation, and its principal place of business is in South Carolina. It does not have any offices or facilities in California. Plaintiffs have submitted website printouts suggesting that some of FCCC‘s products are sold and serviced in California (through independent dealers), but those types of contacts do not establish that FCCC is “at home” in California. As the Supreme Court has made clear, general jurisdiction requires more than a showing that “a corporation ‘engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business‘” in a state. (Daimler AG, supra, 571 U.S. at pp. 137-138.) Instead, the state must hold the particular position of being the location where the corporation is “at home.” (Id. at p. 139, fn. 20 [“A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.“].) Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that FCCC is subject to general jurisdiction in California.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
In contrast to general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction “covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims. The contacts needed for this kind of jurisdiction often go by the name ‘purposeful availment.‘” (Ford Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct. at p. 1024.) For a state to have specific jurisdiction, the defendant “must take ‘some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.’ [Citation.] The contacts must be the defendant‘s own choice and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’ [Citation.] They must show that the defendant deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home—by, for example, ‘exploi[ting] a market’ in the forum State or entering a contractual relationship centered there. [Citation.] Yet even then—because the defendant is not ‘at home‘—the forum State may exercise jurisdiction in only certain cases. The plaintiff‘s claims . . . ‘must arise out of or relate to the defendant‘s contacts’ with the forum.” (Id. at pp. 1024-1025.)
Thus, a two-part showing by the plaintiff is required to establish specific jurisdiction: “[(1)] the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum, . . . and [(2)] the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472-473, citation omitted.)
We first consider whether Plaintiffs have established that FCCC purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within California.
“‘[P]urposeful availment occurs where a nonresident defendant “purposefully direct[s]” [its] activities at residents of the forum’ [citation], ‘“purposefully derive[s] benefit” from’ its activities in the forum [citation], ‘create[s] a “substantial connection” with the forum’ [citation], ‘“deliberately” has engaged in significant activities within’ the forum [citation], or ‘has created “continuing obligations” between [itself] and residents of the forum.‘” (Snowney v. Harrah‘s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1063.) “‘The purposeful availment inquiry . . . focuses on the defendant‘s intentionality. [Citation.] This prong is only satisfied when the defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs his activities toward the forum so that he should expect, by virtue of the benefit he receives, to be subject to the court‘s jurisdiction based on’ his contacts with the forum.” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.) In a products liability case, like this one, the California Supreme Court has held that a nonresident manufacturer purposefully avails itself of the benefits of California when it takes actions “designed to consummate a business arrangement in which [it] would profit financially by selling its product for use in California,’ and both knows and intends that its product will ‘enter California and . . . be used’ in this state. (Secrest Mach. Corp. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 664, 671 (Secrest).)” (LG Chem, Ltd. v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 348, 362-363 (LG Chem).)
“Following Secrest, California courts have consistently concluded that a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of the California forum when it knowingly sells and ships its products to California businesses for use in California.” (LG Chem, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 363 [citing cases].) Thus, for example, this court recently held that a company who “sold and shipped millions of its [particular] batteries over the course of two years to three California companies for their use,” constituting sales that were “substantially remunerative,” had “purposefully availed itself of the benefits of doing business in California.” (Id. at p. 363.) Put another way, “if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor . . . is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product” in the forum state, the purposeful availment requirement is met. ( World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297 (World-Wide Volkswagen).)10
As we have explained, the only evidence Plaintiffs submitted in opposition to the motion to quash were printouts from the websites of FCCC and Velocity Truck Centers. As FCCC did not assert any evidentiary objections to those documents, we consider their contents.
As relevant to the issue of purposeful availment, the website printouts suggest that FCCC may, to some extent, “serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product” in California. (World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at p. 297.) Specifically, the printouts from the Velocity Truck Centers website show that Velocity Truck Centers offers for sale two chassis models made by FCCC. Those same website printouts also show that Velocity Truck Centers has several locations in California. From those predicates, along with FCCC‘s description of itself as “the world‘s largest manufacturer of diesel walk-in van chassis,” Plaintiffs contend they have established that FCCC sells chassis in California. Moreover, the printouts from FCCC‘s website show that FCCC has relationships with numerous authorized service centers in California to provide service for its chassis in the state.11
The sparse evidence provided by Plaintiffs on the issue of purposeful availment makes it difficult for us to analyze whether FCCC has, indeed, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in California. It would have been preferable for Plaintiffs to have attempted to develop facts about the nature and extent of FCCC‘s sales of chassis in California, FCCC‘s advertising in California, and the extent to which FCCC has entered into contracts with service centers in California. The cursory website printouts provided by Plaintiffs are a poor substitute for discovery targeted at issues related to purposeful availment.12 As will become evident from our subsequent discussion, however, the purposeful availment prong of the specific
b. Arising Out of or Related to FCCC‘s Contacts With California
The inquiry in the second prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis is whether Plaintiffs have established that their claims against FCCC in this lawsuit ” ‘arise out of or relate to [FCCC‘s] contacts with the forum.’ ” (Ford Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct. at p. 1026, italics omitted.) As the Supreme Court explained in Ford Motor, “[t]he first half of that standard asks about causation; but the back half, after the ‘or,’ contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing. That does not mean anything goes. In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the phrase ‘relate to’ incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Ford Motor is the Supreme Court‘s most recent discussion of the second prong of the specific jurisdiction inquiry.13 (Ford Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct. 1017.) The facts in Ford Motor have some meaningful similarities to this action that make Ford Motor an especially useful precedent in determining whether Plaintiffs have established that their claims against FCCC arise out of or relate to FCCC‘s contacts with California.
where the injury-causing accident occurred in the forum state, but the allegedly defective vehicle was sold and manufactured somewhere else.
In Ford Motor, two product liability suits were brought against the automobile manufacturer Ford as a result of two car accidents. (Ford Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct. at pp. 1022-1023.) In both of the cases at issue in the Ford Motor opinion, “[t]he accident happened in the State where suit was brought. The victim was one of the State‘s residents. And Ford did substantial business in the State—among other things, advertising, selling, and servicing the model of vehicle the suit claims is defective.” (Ford Motor, at p. 1022.) However, “the particular car involved in the crash was not first sold in the forum State, nor was it designed or manufactured there.” (Ibid.) “Only later resales and relocations by consumers had brought the vehicles to” the forum states, where the accidents occurred. (Id. at p. 1023.) Ford argued that the claims against it did not arise out of or relate to its contacts with the forum states because it did not sell, manufacture or design the plaintiffs’ cars in the forum states. (Id. at p. 1026.) The Supreme Court rejected that argument because the record established other connections between the plaintiffs’ claims and Ford‘s activities in the forum states.
The Supreme Court first recited the extensive contacts between Ford and the forum states, including sales in the forum states of the identical car models involved in the accidents and alleged to be defective: an Explorer and a Crown Victoria. (Ford Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct. at p. 1028.) “By every means imaginable—among them, billboards, TV and radio spots, print ads, and direct mail—Ford urges [forum-state residents] to buy its vehicles, including (at all relevant times) Explorers and Crown Victorias. Ford cars—again including those two models—are available for sale, whether new or used, throughout the [forum] States, at . . . dealerships . . . . And apart from sales, Ford works hard to foster ongoing connections to its cars’ owners. The company‘s dealers in [the forum states] (as elsewhere) regularly maintain and repair Ford cars, including those whose warranties have long since expired. And the company distributes replacement parts both to its own dealers and to independent auto shops in the two [forum] States. Those activities, too, make Ford money. And by making it
The Supreme Court then explained how Ford‘s forum-state connections related to the plaintiffs’ claims. “Each plaintiff‘s suit, of course, arises from a car accident in one of those [forum] States. In each complaint, the resident-plaintiff alleges that a defective Ford vehicle—an Explorer in one, a Crown Victoria in the other—caused the crash and resulting harm. And as just described, Ford had advertised, sold, and serviced those two car models in both [forum] States for many years. (Contrast a case, which we do not address, in which Ford marketed the models in only a different State or region.) In other words, Ford had systematically served a market in [the forum states] for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those States. So there is a strong ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation‘—the ‘essential foundation’ of specific jurisdiction.” (Ford Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct. at p. 1028, italics added.) The Supreme Court explained that “this exact fact pattern (a resident-plaintiff sues a global car company, extensively serving the state market in a vehicle, for an in-state accident)” is “a paradigm example—of how specific jurisdiction works.” (Ibid.) As the Supreme Court summarized its holding, “When a company like Ford serves a market for a product in a State and that product causes injury in the State to one of its residents, the State‘s courts may entertain the resulting suit.” (Id. at p. 1022, italics added.)
Here, Plaintiffs’ sparse evidentiary submission in opposition to FCCC‘S motion to quash did not establish the type of facts that Ford Motor relied upon to conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of or were related to the defendant‘s contacts with the forum states. In Ford Motor, an important factor was that ”Ford had systematically served a market in [the forum states] for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those States.” (Ford Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct. at p. 1028, italics added.) Specifically, the cars that caused the injuries alleged by plaintiffs were an Explorer and a Crown Victoria. The evidence showed that Ford ”advertised, sold, and serviced those two car models in both [forum] States for many years.” (Ibid., italics added.) In contrast, the website printouts provided by Plaintiffs do not establish that FCCC has ever advertised, sold, or serviced the model of chassis at issue in this lawsuit in California. At most, the printouts from the website of Velocity Truck Centers suggests that two models of FCCC‘s chassis are sold in California (the “Freightliner Custom Chassis MT” and the “Freightliner Custom Chassis MT50e“), but not the “2014 Freightliner S2 chassis” at issue in this case. Moreover, there is no evidence that authorized service centers in California have serviced the model of chassis involved in this lawsuit.
“These courts have indicated that forum activity relating to other models of the same product type could provide support for specific jurisdiction, if there is no basis to conclude that there is a material difference between the models.” (Adams, supra, 284 A.3d at p. 618.) “Although not stated expressly, these courts appear to have presumed that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, other models of the same product type that were produced by the defendant manufacturer could or would share the same design defect, manufacturing defect, or defective warnings as the particular model at issue in the litigation.” (Ibid.)
We agree that if it were reasonable for us to presume that other similar models of chassis sold by FCCC in California had the same alleged defect as the 2014 Freightliner S2 chassis involved in this litigation, that would likely be sufficient to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of or relate to FCCC‘s forum-related activities. But we see no basis for such a presumption on this record. According to Plaintiffs, the alleged defect in the 2014 Freightliner S2 chassis is that it did not have electronic stability and traction control features. Without any evidence on the issue, we cannot simply presume that FCCC‘s other models of chassis sold in California had or have the same alleged defect. We express no view on whether such a presumption or inference would be appropriate in another factual context.
Plaintiffs’ insufficient evidentiary showing becomes clear when contrasted with the detailed evidentiary showing by the plaintiff in a recent products liability case against FCCC‘s corporate relative, Daimler Trucks North America LLC (Daimler), which sells the Freightliner brand of trucks.
Apart from failing to present evidence that FCCC sold the same or similar chassis in California, Plaintiffs also have not identified any other connection between FCCC‘s California contacts and this lawsuit that would support an exercise of specific jurisdiction. As FCCC established through the Rostenbach declaration, the chassis at issue was assembled in South Carolina and then sold to Champion Bus, Inc. in Michigan. FCCC had no involvement in bringing that chassis, or the bus into which it was ultimately incorporated, into California. There is also no evidence that FCCC was involved in servicing that chassis in California.
DISPOSITION
The order granting FCCC‘s motion to quash and dismissing FCCC from this action is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.