186 A. 320 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1936
Argued May 1, 1936. This is an action in trespass brought by the plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Clayton Murray, against the defendants to recover expenses of the last illness and burial of its decedent, whose death was caused by the alleged negligence of the defendants. The expenses sought to be recovered consist of physician's fees for attending decedent during his last illness, hospital and nursing charges for care of decedent during his last illness, and funeral expenses.
Clayton Murray, the deceased, was struck by a truck which was owned by Nicholas Petcoff, one of the defendants, and operated and driven by his servant, Mike Kulich, the other defendant. As a result of the injuries which he sustained, Clayton Murray died about eight days after the accident. Letters of administration were granted on his estate to the Potter Title and Trust Company, the plaintiff. During his lifetime the deceased did not institute any action against the defendants for his injuries. He was not survived by any widow, children, or parents.
The defendants filed an affidavit of defense, questioning plaintiff's right to recover on the facts. The court below entered judgment in favor of the defendants; the plaintiff appealed. *543
Appellant contends that it has the right to bring an action to recover the funeral expenses of the deceased and the expenses incurred for his medical and surgical care, under section 1 of the Act of May 13, 1927, P.L. 992, No. 480 (12 Pa.C.S.A. § 1604), although the deceased instituted no action against the defendants during his lifetime and left surviving him no widow, children, or parents. Section 1 of the Act of May 13, 1927, P.L. 992, No. 480 (12 Pa.C.S.A. § 1604), reads as follows: "Whenever any person or persons, who are authorized by law so to do, shall bring an action to recover damages for a death caused by unlawful violence or negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff may recover, in addition to the damages now recoverable in such actions, the expenses incurred for medical and surgical care and for nursing of the deceased, and such other expenses caused by the injury which resulted in death as could have been recovered in an action begun by the injured person in his lifetime; and plaintiff may also recover the reasonable funeral expenses of the deceased, if plaintiff has paid or incurred such expenses."
The real question presented to us on this appeal is: What is meant by the words "who are authorized by law so to do" in section 1 of the act of 1927, quoted supra?
At common law a right of action for an injury resulting in death did not survive; there was no right in any one to recover damages for the death of another.1 This common-law rule was abrogated in England by the Act of 9 10 Vict., c 93, § 1, known as "Lord Campbell's Act," passed in 1846. Howard v. Bell Telephone Co.,
The Act of April 15, 1851, P.L. 669, § 19 (12 Pa.C.S.A. § 1601), authorizes an action for damages when death is caused by unlawful violence or negligence. The Act of April 26, 1855, P.L. 309, § 1, as amended by section 1 of the Act of June 7, 1911, P.L. 678 (12 Pa.C.S.A. § 1602), designates the person or persons who may exercise the right conferred by the act of 1851.2 The Acts of April 15, 1851, and April 26, 1855, are based on Lord Campbell's Act.3
These acts altered the common law and created a new right of action, and they are "not to be extended beyond their obvious import."4 Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the family relation is the foundation of the right of action authorized.5 Section 19 of the Act of April 15, 1851, was not repealed by section 1 of the Act of April 26, 1855. The latter goes no further than to designate the person or persons who, in connection with the widow, and in lieu of the "personal representatives," shall thereafter be entitled to exercise the statutory right of action conferred by the Act of April 15, 1851.6 The right of action given to the personal *545
representative by section 19 of the Act of April 15, 1851, was obviously withdrawn by section 1 of the Act of April 26, 1855, in order that damages might be recovered in such actions only by and for the benefit of those persons most directly and severely injured, to wit, husband, widow, children, or parents of the deceased. Books, Adm'r, v. Borough of Danville,
Our courts have repeatedly held, in construing these acts, that the right of action is confined to the four separate parties designated, to one of whom, according to the circumstances of each case, the right of action is given (Huntingdon and Broad Top Railroad and Coal Co. v. Decker,
Article III, § 21, of the Constitution of 1874 (amended November 2, 1915) (Const. Art. III, § 21), permits the Legislature to prescribe for whose benefit such actions should be prosecuted. In the case of Books, Adm'r, v. Borough of Danville,
It is evident that prior to the Act of May 13, 1927, the person or persons who were authorized by law to bring *547 an action to recover damages for death caused by unlawful violence or negligence were the husband, widow, children, or parents of the deceased, as enumerated in the Act of April 26, 1855, P.L. 309, § 1, as amended by the Act of June 7, 1911, P.L. 678, § 1.
Under the Acts of 1851 and 1855, there could be recovery only for loss of pecuniary benefits which the persons who were authorized to sue would have received from the deceased had death not intervened.7 The Act of May 13, 1927, supplemented the Acts of 1851 and 1855 by giving the right to recover for medical, surgical, nursing, funeral, and other expenses, where the family relation exists. Staggers v. Dunn-Mar Oil Gas Co.,
Under the existing law, the appellant cannot recover.
Judgment of the court below is affirmed.
