277 Pa. 209 | Pa. | 1923
Opinion by
As administrator of the estate of Joseph Strain, deceased, plaintiff sued defendant to recover damages for. the latter’s alleged negligence, which resulted in injuries' to and the death of plaintiff’s decedent. The affidavit of defense averred, as a matter of law, that plaintiff could not legally commence such an action; the court below sustained this contention and éntered judgment accordingly ; hence plaintiff appeals.
Considering this section alone, without reference to the title of the act, it would be exceedingly difficult to reach any other conclusion than that contended for by appellant, for the present is a “personal action,” not for slander or libel, and, by the language quoted, “executors or administrators shall have power to commence and prosecute......[it, if] the decedent whom they represent, might have commenced and prosecuted” it, as unquestionably plaintiff’s decedent might have done. It is not necessary to decide this point, however, for, if so construed, the section offends against article III, section 3, of the Constitution of the State, which specifies that “No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.”
In Dorsey’s App., 72 Pa. 192, and Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Hammond, 230 Pa. 407, it is pointed out that the word “clearly” in this section must be given full effect in determining whether the title covers the particular subject in the body of the statute; and, in Union Passenger Ry. Co.’s App., 81* Pa. 91, and Central District and Printing Telegraph Co. v. Homer City Borough, 242 Pa. 597, if this is not found to be the case, the title will be held to be misleading, and the act invalid as to everything beyond that which is “clearly expressed in its title.”
Quoting so much of the title of the Fiduciaries Act as bears upon the question under consideration, we find it
This conclusion is in accord with the rule that statutes altering the common law are not to be extended beyond their obvious import (Diver v. Diver, 56 Pa. 106; Smith v. Altoona, etc., R. R. Co., 182 Pa. 139); and also with the evident fact (from which a misleading title might possibly be inferred) that no one would expect to find, in a Fiduciaries Act, so radical a departure from unrepealed prior statutes dealing with procedure in common law actions.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed..