PLANNED PARENTHOOD MAR MONTE, INC., A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION; AND DR. DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL, Appellants, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA EX REL. THE OFFICE OF THE NEVADA ATTORNEY GENERAL; AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEVADA, Respondents.
No. 91394
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
MAY 28 2026
142 Nev., Advance Opinion 40
Erika Mendoza, Judge
Reversed and remanded.
Planned Parenthood Federation of America and Valentina De Fex, New York, New York, and Hannah Swanson, Washington, D.C.; Bravo Schrager LLP and Bradley S. Schrager and Daniel Bravo, Las Vegas; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP and Grace E. Hart and Brian Yeh, New York, New York, and Hui Fang, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.
Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Heidi J. Parry Stern, Solicitor General, and Jeffrey M. Conner, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Carson City, for Respondents.
American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada and Christopher M. Peterson, North Las Vegas, for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada.
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, HERNDON, C.J.:
In 1985, the Nevada Legislature passed Senate Bill 510, requiring persons under the age of 18 to notify their parent or guardian, or obtain judicial approval, before receiving an abortion. Enforcement of the law was enjoined before it took effect pursuant to federal injunction. Recently, the federal injunction was vacated, and S.B. 510 took effect in July 2025. At that time, Planned Parenthood Mar Monte (PPMM) and Dr. Doe sued in state court, challenging the law as unconstitutional. In this appeal, we consider the state district court‘s denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction against S.B. 510‘s enforcement.
Broadly, the questions presented to this court are whether appellants satisfy standing and ripeness requirements and whether they satisfied the components for a preliminary injunction to issue. We conclude that appellants demonstrated injury and thus have standing to challenge aspects of S.B. 510 and that the matter is ripe for review. As to the preliminary injunction, we conclude that appellants demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success and irreparable harm and that the balance
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Nevada regulates abortion healthcare through a combination of laws and regulations found in
In 1985, Nevada lawmakers passed S.B. 510, establishing certain processes for patients under the age of 18 who wish to receive an abortion. These processes were codified under
In December 2023, two Nevada district attorneys filed a motion for relief from the federal district court‘s judgment under
In July 2025, Planned Parenthood Mar Monte and Dr. Doe challenged S.B. 510 in state court, naming the State of Nevada and the Nevada Attorney General (collectively, the State) as defendants. PPMM is a nonprofit corporation licensed to operate in Nevada that provides health care and education through its health centers. PPMM, through Nevada licensed physicians, provides reproductive healthcare at its centers in Reno and North Las Vegas. PPMM provides medication abortions up to 11 weeks after the patient‘s last menstrual period and in-clinic abortions (also known as procedural abortions) up to 12 weeks from a patient‘s last menstrual period. Dr. Doe is an anonymous physician who is licensed to practice medicine and who performs abortions in Nevada.
Appellants moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, arguing S.B. 510 was void from inception and beyond the legislature‘s authority to enact, is unconstitutionally vague, and violates their patients’ procedural due process rights. The district court denied the preliminary injunction, finding standing and ripeness requirements were met only as to certain issues and that appellants had not sufficiently demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and injury, and this appeal followed.
S.B. 510
As enacted, S.B. 510 contains two relevant parts. The first: under
The second: under
Additionally, under
Standing
Standing is a question of law we review de novo. Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 263, 350 P.3d 1139, 1141 (2015). “The Nevada Constitution does not include the ‘case or controversy’ requirement stated in Article III of the United States Constitution, so we are not strictly bound to federal constitutional standing requirements.” Nat‘l Ass‘n of Mut. Ins. Co. v. State, Dep‘t of Bus. & Indus., 139 Nev. 18, 22, 524 P.3d 470, 476 (2023). However, “as a prudential matter and because of the justiciability requirements the separation-of-powers doctrine imposes on the Nevada judiciary, our caselaw
Appellants demonstrated injury as to the judicial bypass provisions
The district court found appellants had standing to challenge the parental notification and pocket approval provisions but did not have standing as to the request for judicial authorization provision, as they did not need to understand how the request for judicial authorization provision works in order to comply with their duties under the other provisions. Appellants argue the district court erred in concluding they did not establish injury in fact stemming from potential enforcement of the provisions allowing for the judicial bypass method of securing an abortion as a whole.
We agree, as appellants’ challenge to the judicial bypass provisions cannot be parsed by subsection in this manner. “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.‘” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Appellants argue that the threat of enforcement as to the judicial bypass provisions gives them a special or peculiar injury that is
Moreover, the threat of enforcement is sufficiently concrete to establish standing. See Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (recognizing a plaintiff satisfies the injury in fact requirements when he alleges “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder“). Dr. Doe‘s declaration explains that appellants provide minors with medication abortions up to 11 weeks, or procedural abortions up to 12 weeks, and that, due to uncertainty from the judicial bypass provisions, they are unable to confidently perform the procedure if minors cannot demonstrate the procedure has been judicially authorized. This evidence, in conjunction with the fact that two of Nevada‘s elected district attorneys took the affirmative step of reinvigorating a dormant federal lawsuit to lift a decades-old injunction and activate the statutes, leads us to conclude that appellants face a credible threat of prosecution.
Appellants satisfy causation and redressability
The State argues that appellants’ general standing theory suffers from deficiencies on causation and redressability because potential
In the district court, the State did not dispute causation and conceded that Dr. Doe had standing to challenge the parental notification and pocket approval provisions. As a result, appellants argue that causation generally, and redressability as to Dr. Doe and the parental notification and pocket approval provisions, should not be considered on appeal given the State did not cross-appeal the district court‘s conclusions. But, in this case, the State contests a factor within the broader standing argument that was addressed below. Accordingly, we address the State‘s argument.
Regarding the merits, we conclude that the causation requirement is satisfied against the Attorney General, even though the district attorneys are not named, because “[c]hallengers’ standing is not short-circuited by the fact that there are multiple authorized enforcers for the statute.” Matsumoto v. Labrador, 122 F.4th 787, 798 (9th Cir. 2024); see also Bronson v. Swenson, 500 F.3d 1099, 1110 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he causation element of standing requires the named defendants to possess authority to enforce the complained-of provision.“). Further, the State and the Attorney General have not disavowed enforcing S.B. 510, and the
Furthermore, appellants satisfied the redressability requirement. “Where a state statute specifically grants enforcement powers to multiple government authorities, an injunction against the exercise of those powers by any one of those authorities suffices to establish redressability.” Matsumoto, 122 F.4th at 801. Although
Ripeness
Appellants argue the district court erred in concluding that their challenge to the judicial bypass provisions was not ripe for review. Ripeness is a question we review de novo. See Or. Nat‘l Desert Ass‘n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 957 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2020). “[R]ipeness focuses on the timing of the action rather than the party bringing the action.” In re T.R., 119 Nev. 646, 651, 80 P.2d 1276, 1279 (2003). “The factors to be weighed in deciding whether a case is ripe for judicial review include: (1) the hardship to the parties of withholding judicial review, and (2) the suitability of the issues for review.” Id.
In Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 167-68 (2014), the United States Supreme Court found the hardship factor was satisfied when “denying prompt judicial review would impose a substantial hardship on petitioners,” as it would force a choice “between refraining from core political speech on the one hand or engaging in that speech and risking costly Commission proceedings and criminal prosecution on the other.” Dr. Doe asserts that when patients cannot demonstrate judicial authorization, it delays or even impedes a physician‘s ability to provide care. Specifically, care must be delayed until the patient can demonstrate that the abortion is authorized under
Furthermore, a case is suitable for review when the challenge to the statute “presents an issue that is ‘purely legal, and will not be clarified by further factual development.‘” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 167 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581 (1985)). Appellants have raised questions of law regarding whether the judicial bypass provisions are facially vague. Because appellants bring solely a facial challenge and present issues that are purely legal and will not benefit from waiting for further factual development, we conclude the issues are ripe for review.
Preliminary injunction
For a preliminary injunction to issue, the moving party must “demonstrate that (1) it has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits‘; and (2) ‘absent a preliminary injunction, it will suffer irreparable harm for which compensatory damages would not suffice.‘” Elk Point Country Club Homeowners’ Ass‘n v. K.J. Brown, LLC, 138 Nev. 640, 642, 515 P.3d 837, 839 (2022) (quoting Excellence Cmty. Mgmt., LLC v. Gilmore, 131 Nev. 347, 351, 351 P.3d 720, 722 (2015)). Further, “courts [will] also weigh the potential hardships to the relative parties and others, and the public interest.” Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev. v. Nevadans for Sound Gov‘t, 120 Nev. 712, 721, 100 P.3d 179, 187 (2004).
A decision on a motion for preliminary injunction is only reversible “when the district court abused its discretion or based its decision on an erroneous legal standard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact.”
Likelihood of success on the merits
Appellants argue the district court erred in concluding they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success as to their arguments that S.B. 510 is unconstitutionally vague, was void from inception and beyond the legislature‘s authority to enact, and violates their patients’ procedural due process rights.
As to the vagueness challenge, appellants argue that S.B. 510 does not provide adequate notice of proscribed conduct, allowing for discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement. “Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons: (1) if it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited; or (2) if it is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. 478, 481-82, 245 P.3d 550, 553 (2010) (emphasis added) (citation modified). We have explained that “constitutional vagueness analysis does not treat statutory text as a closed universe” and clarity may be supplied by “judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, by giving a statute‘s words their well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning, and by looking to the common law definitions of the related term or offense.” Castaneda, 126 Nev. at 483, 245 P.3d at 553-54 (emphasis omitted) (citation modified). Further, if the legislature‘s intention is clear, “it is the duty of the court to give effect to such intention and to construe the language of the statute to effectuate rather than nullify its manifest purpose.” Sheriff, Washoe Cnty. v. Martin, 99 Nev. 336, 340, 662 P.2d 634, 637 (1983).
Appellants argue that the district court erred by applying the vagueness standard for civil statutes. We agree with appellants because, when a statute “involves criminal penalties or constitutionally protected rights,” a higher standard applies and “the question becomes whether vagueness so permeates the text that the statute cannot meet these requirements in most applications.” Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v. Chanos, 125 Nev. 502, 512-13, 217 P.3d 546, 553-54 (2009) (emphasis added). The judicial bypass provisions are subject to criminal penalties because
The parental notification provision is unconstitutionally vague
Under the proper standard, appellants argue that the parental notification provision is unconstitutionally vague. The State argues that the provision includes a scienter requirement, see
The phrase “personally notified” is also problematic. “Personally notified” plainly refers to direct communication to the parent or guardian about the procedure. See Personally, Oxford Dictionary of English (3d ed. 2010) (defining “personally” as “with the personal presence or action of the individual specified; in person“); Notify, Oxford Dictionary of English (3d ed. 2010) (defining “notify” as “inform (someone) or something, typically in a formal or official manner“); Actual Notice, Black‘s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “actual notice” as “[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party“). The legislative history also supports this meaning, as the legislature understood that “a telephone call or personal visit” or “the parent com[ing] to the abortion clinic” would count as “personally notified.” Hearing on S.B. 510 Before the Assemb. Judiciary Comm., 63d Leg. (Nev., May 30, 1985). While the expectation that phone calls could suffice is reasonably clear, the statute is not reasonably clear that medical professionals may be expected to make “personal visit[s]” to attempt to locate and notify minor patients’ parents or guardians. It is also unclear
Finally, the phrase “notified the parent or guardian by certified mail at the last known address of the parent or guardian,”
We conclude that vagueness so permeates the text of the parental notification provision that the statute cannot meet the requirements in most applications. Thus, appellants demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits as to their void-for-vagueness claim on the parental notification provision.
The judicial bypass provisions are unconstitutionally vague
Appellants argue that the judicial bypass provisions are unconstitutionally vague, as
We conclude that the judicial bypass provisions are vague as to what the physician must do and the standards that would be enforced. Under
These questions demonstrate not only that the judicial bypass provisions provide insufficient notice to appellants, but also how the statute could allow seriously discriminatory enforcement, as enforcement authorities may challenge the method by which a physician determines judicial authorization occurred. See Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC, 125 Nev. at 514, 217 P.3d at 554 (“The statute fails to provide guidelines as to what action is required and how the statute is enforced, and therefore, it creates the possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.“). Because physicians face possible criminal prosecution and occupational harm pursuant to
Irreparable harm
A preliminary injunction “is proper where the moving party can demonstrate that it has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and that, absent a preliminary injunction, it will suffer irreparable harm for which compensatory damages would not suffice.” Excellence Cmty. Mgmt., LLC v. Gilmore, 131 Nev. 347, 350-51, 351 P.3d 720, 722 (2015) (emphasis added). Appellants have shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claim that S.B. 510 is void for vagueness, and thus, they also demonstrate irreparable harm. See City of Sparks v. Sparks Mun. Ct., 129 Nev. 348, 357, 302 P.3d 1118, 1124 (2013) (“As a constitutional violation may be difficult or impossible to remedy through money damages, such a violation may, by itself, be sufficient to constitute irreparable harm.“).
Balance of hardships and public interests
Finally, courts “may . . . weigh the public interest and the relative hardships of the parties in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction.” Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Buchanan, 112 Nev. 1146, 1150, 924 P.2d 716, 719 (1996).
Appellants first argue the district court abandoned the principle of party presentation “by introducing independent arguments and evidence to support its holding that the balance of hardships did not favor a preliminary injunction.” Specifically, appellants assert the district court improperly considered parents’ interests and community views when balancing hardships.
The principle of party presentation “sets forth that courts rely on the parties to frame the issues of a given matter.” Nev. Pol‘y Rsch. Inst., Inc. v. Miller, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 69, 558 P.3d 319, 331 (2024) (emphasis added). This court has recognized, however, that courts “may consider an issue antecedent to . . . and ultimately dispositive of the dispute before it, even an issue the parties fail to identify and brief.” U.S. Nat‘l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Nev. Pol‘y Rsch. Inst., Inc., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 69, 558 P.3d at 331. Thus, the district court was permitted to consider independent arguments and evidence that were relevant to its decision on balancing hardships and public interest.
The relevant factors weigh in appellants’ favor
Appellants argue the district court erred in determining they failed to demonstrate that the balance of hardships and public interest weighed in favor of granting a preliminary injunction. Appellants assert the district court failed to consider that granting an injunction would preserve the status quo, the new requirements would restrict access to health care, and appellants and their patients have a strong interest in not being subject to unconstitutional laws.
Although the State rightly asserts that rights of parents have been repeatedly recognized as a fundamental interest even pre-Dobbs, see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981) (explaining that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected), and is a public interest that weighs towards denying preliminary injunction, preserving the status quo and access to healthcare are considerable interests in favor of granting a preliminary injunction. On balance, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion and that the hardship to appellants and the public interests involved favor appellants and warrant a preliminary injunction.
We conclude that appellants have shown injury for standing and ripeness to challenge the judicial bypass provisions. As to the preliminary injunction, we conclude that appellants demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on their claim that S.B. 510 is unconstitutionally vague, that appellants demonstrated irreparable harm, and that the balance of hardships and public interests favor appellants. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying the request for a preliminary injunction and remand the matter to the district court with instructions to grant the preliminary injunction.
Herndon, C.J.
We concur:
Pickering, J.
Parraguirre, J.
Bell, J.
Stiglich, J.
Cadish, J.
Lee, J.
Notes
[A] physician shall not knowingly perform or induce an abortion upon an unmarried and unemancipated woman who is under the age of 18 years unless a custodial parent or guardian of the woman is personally notified before the abortion. If the custodial parent or guardian cannot be so notified after a reasonable effort, the physician shall delay performing the abortion until the physician has notified the parent or guardian by certified mail at the last known address of the parent or guardian.