142 Nev. Adv. Op. 40
Nev.2026Background
- Nevada S.B. 510 requires parental notification or judicial bypass before an unemancipated minor may obtain an abortion, and violations are criminalized. 1
- After a federal injunction was vacated in 2025, the statute took effect and Planned Parenthood Mar Monte and Dr. Doe sued in state court. 2
- Appellants sought to enjoin enforcement, arguing the law was void from inception, unconstitutionally vague, and violated procedural due process. 3
- The district court denied a preliminary injunction, finding appellants had not shown success on the merits or injury on all issues. 4
- The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed standing, ripeness, and the preliminary-injunction ruling de novo or for abuse of discretion as applicable. 5
- The court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the preliminary injunction. 6
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to challenge judicial bypass provisions 7 | Threat of criminal enforcement creates injury from the bypass scheme as a whole. | No injury from the judicial-authorization subsection; fears stem from nonparty prosecutors. | Appellants had standing; injury, causation, and redressability were satisfied. 8 |
| Ripeness of judicial bypass challenge 9 | The bypass scheme forces immediate compliance choices and presents pure legal issues. | Challenge is premature without further factual development. | The challenge was ripe. 10 |
| Proper vagueness standard 11 | Criminal penalties require the stricter criminal-vagueness standard. | Civil vagueness standard applies. | The district court used the wrong standard; criminal vagueness applies. 12 |
| Parental notification vagueness 13 | Terms like personally notified and reasonable effort are unclear. | Scienter and certified-mail notice provide sufficient clarity. | The parental-notification provision is unconstitutionally vague. 14 |
| Judicial bypass vagueness and preliminary injunction 15 | The bypass provisions give no workable standards for verifying authorization and create prosecution risk. | The statute is sufficiently definite and no injunction should issue. | Appellants showed likely success, irreparable harm, and favorable equities; injunction required. 16 |
Key Cases Cited
- Logan v. Abe, 350 P.3d 1139 (Nev. 2015) (standing is reviewed de novo 17)
- Nat'l Ass'n of Mut. Ins. Co. v. State, Dep't of Bus. & Indus., 524 P.3d 470 (Nev. 2023) (Nevada standing generally mirrors federal injury, causation, and redressability 18)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (U.S. 2016) (defines injury in fact as concrete, particularized, actual or imminent 19)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (explains the Article III injury-in-fact requirement 20)
- Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289 (U.S. 1979) (credible threat of prosecution can establish injury in fact 21)
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (U.S. 2014) (hardship and suitability govern ripeness 22)
- Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (U.S. 1985) (issues are ripe when they are purely legal and need no further factual development 23)
- State v. Castaneda, 245 P.3d 550 (Nev. 2010) (vagueness may arise from lack of fair notice or standardless enforcement 24)
- Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v. Chanos, 217 P.3d 546 (Nev. 2009) (criminal statutes demand stricter vagueness review and prohibit arbitrary enforcement 25)
- Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (U.S. 1982) (scienter may mitigate vagueness but does not cure it 26)
- Elk Point Country Club Homeowners' Ass'n v. K.J. Brown, LLC, 515 P.3d 837 (Nev. 2022) (preliminary injunction requires likely success and irreparable harm 27)
- Excellence Cmty. Mgmt., LLC v. Gilmore, 351 P.3d 720 (Nev. 2015) (preliminary-injunction and review standards 28)
- City of Sparks v. Sparks Mun. Ct., 302 P.3d 1118 (Nev. 2013) (constitutional violations can themselves constitute irreparable harm 29)