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Pierson, Leonard Jr.
426 S.W.3d 763
Tex. Crim. App.
2014
Check Treatment

*1 claim— liability the claim is a health care Further, expert health care

applies here. testimony prove is needed to or refute Nguyen

Sok’s claim that Bioderm and Dr. care, breached the standard appropriate and has not therefore Sok rebutted presumption. Because Sok filed a health liability

care claim but failed to serve expert required by the Medical report as Act,

Liability we conclude the court of affirming erred in the trial court’s denial of the to dismiss. motion Addition-

ally, requested Dr. Nguyen Bioderm and attorney’s fees and costs the trial court 74.351(b)(1) of the pursuant to section Act. we Liability Accordingly, Medical re- claim mand to that court dismiss Sok’s con- against Nguyen Bioderm and Dr. sider their attorney’s fees

costs. PIERSON, Jr., Appellant

Leonard of Texas. STATE No. PD-0613-13. Appeals Court of Criminal of Texas. 9, 2014. April *2 Attorney, Austin, TX,

State’s for The State.

OPINION J.,

HERVEY, opinion delivered the *3 KELLER, P.J., the Court in which MEYERS, PRICE, KEASLER, COCHRAN, ALCALA, JJ„ joined. Pierson, Appellant, Jr., Leonard was charged indecency with with a child aggravated assault sexual of a child. After completed the victim her direct-examina- tion testimony, the defense’s first was, on cross-examination you “Did also make an [Appellant] did things these same to his own daughter?” hearing, After a the trial court granted the for a State’s Appellant mistrial. then pretrial filed a habeas-corpus applica- seeking prevent a second trial on jeopardy. the basis of double The court application denied that because it again trial) (as found at it did that the mistrial of the was the fault defense and that there appropriate was no remedy other under circumstances; thus there was a mani- necessity retry fest Appellant, and his precluded second trial was not by double- jeopardy principles. convicted at his second of indecency of one count "witha child of aggravated

and seven counts sexual as sault of a child. He was sentenced to life On imprisonment. appeal, Appellant ar gued second trial that his violated double- but jeopardy principles, the Texarkana held Appeals Court of that the trial court properly granted the State’s request for mistrial. Pierson v. 2013). (Tex.App.-Texarkana We

granted Appellant’s ground sole for re Horton, Law, Attorney Lee Jason view:

Texarkana, TX, for Appellant. single posed by Petition- Sutton, N.

Lauren Assistant District At- type er’s trial counsel create the torney, Texarkana, McMinn, very extraordinary Lisa C. and striking cir- mean, nothing. there was That a find- did—I necessary to sustain

cumstances was the extent of it. necessity to declare ing of manifest either The court of mistrial. precedent or misapplied misinterpreted prepon- It’s proof [COURT]: contrary conclusion. to reach beyond proof derance evidence the court of judgment affirm the

willWe doubt; actually it’s that it’s a reasonable appeals. false. That’s the standard. background Factual # don’t 2]: ATTORNEY [DEFENSE fifth as its called the victim prove The State you how—how ever know The first in its case in chief. witness though? on cross-exami- question the defense asked That’s An admission. [COURT]: *4 was, you allega- make an “Did also nation it, any found was only way court’s ever things [Appellant] did these same tion that that it an admission the victim was objected daughter?” The State his own actually false. answered, question before it was to the no way And —there’s [PROSECUTOR]: Dur- jury. excused I can recover from that. hearing presence ing the outside you can I don’t see how ei- [COURT]: following place: took exchange

jury, ther. way not al- That’s [PROSECUTOR]: Well, #2]: ATTORNEY [DEFENSE mean, I I think that’s in cross. lowed into the actual —. yeah, get that doesn’t for a grounds mistrial. way an instruction any There’s on, Hold hold on a second. [COURT]: cure that? would The oth # 2]: COUNSEL [DEFENSE mean, No. I I’m ask- by the daughter questioned [PROSECUTOR]: er was CAC[1] out ing for mistrial. It’s there. allegation. on the based way get no I it—. There’s can admissible That’s not [PROSECUTOR]: here. I there’s any don’t see how [COURT]: Okay, the nature of way what’s could possible that a [COURT]: the—? And in the event testimony. this kind got right— no (Inaudi- appeal, of an [S]tate’s #2]: COUNSEL [DEFENSE the. acquittal, I mean in the event of an ble, whispering) appeal, no got right of so [S]tate’s 412, way. no Under [PROSECUTOR]: if the they’re absolutely prejudiced got Hold to have on. We’ve [COURT]: hears it. nature of the hearing on the—is the she a false out- recess, that has made twenty-four-minute After a tri- somebody else or that she’s cry against hearing and asked al court resumed the outcry other against a true some made argument out [their] the defense “flesh person? for more the basis a little bit about admissibility cross examination.” prove can’t [the] He [PROSECUTOR]: victim false, explained that the stat- the end The defense it’s but [the victim]—in the end of her interview that [Appel- ed at CAC her interview she said CAC things, That’s did “the same sorts daughter his too. molested] lant did, allegations, he the same he say he how same—made it. She didn’t what Advocacy acronym Child Center. "CAC" is an abbreviation 1. The allegations against subsequently investigated committed those was had and went nowhere. years own now sixteen daughter, who’s So she made an old. point, At this the court stated that alleged perpetrator in her case had done I find that to be so far removed [issue] types same to his own things biolog- begin with, from this case to it’s a collat- child.” went on ical Defense counsel eral issue that interject could confu- biological argue Appellant’s daughter sion jury[.][T]here’s to the not even molested, being Ap- enough denied ever and that to substantiate that it’s even her statement, own that she’s pellant’s biological daughter’s alleging denial it happened, but it’s her understand- credibility. be relevant to the victim’s ing happened.... following exchange place then took be- court, the prosecutor, tween and the The judge then cited discussed a num defense: ber of cases that he felt led to the conclu sion that the defense’s im But it’s a collateral issue. [COURT]: proper because the answer would not lead mean, you’re attacking her credibility to admissible Lopez evidence. See v. a statement her own

with not—not alle- State, 86 S.W.3d 228 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); this to gation he’s done others but Garcia v. 228 S.W.3d 703 (TexApp.- her statement that he said he’s done it 2005); Houston Hughes [14th Dist.] people. to other *5 State, 850 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.App.-Forth No, sir, #2]: COUNSEL [DEFENSE 1993); Worth Thomas v. Judge, my that wasn’t understand- the — 1984). 420 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] ing of it was she claimed that this hap- hand, Returning to the at case the DeKalb[, in in pened pres- Texas] her concluded, daughter, ence when he his I abused I find that the evidence is not admissi- my understanding. is believe ble. It unduly prejudicial-it’s not rel- evant, all, unduly prejudicial. first of it’s No, that was her [PROSECUTOR]: interject It only serves to that are issues cousin. potentially collateral which would con- Oh, # COUNSEL [DEFENSE 2]: I jury, fuse the don’t know how it that’s the cousin? can be cured with instruction to the # Yes. [DEFENSE 1]: COUNSEL said, jury. So I’m going with that Okay. # grant 2]: COUNSEL the motion for a mistrial. [DEFENSE [S]tate’s I

Since find that this was done because of actions of the defendant and not be- even really So we don’t know [COURT]: [S]tate, cause of the of the actions then was.[2] the what basis for her statement there’s no that jeopardy attaches. # We don’t [DEFENSE 1]: COUNSEL After the judge granted the State’s mo- statement, just know the basis of the Appellant tion for a filed a pre- allegation application3 she made the and that trial habeas-corpus prevent that it victim, allegation allegedly by 2. The victim made the in of what was said or to the but that during question an interview with the report Sexual was not into evidence. offered See However, Pierson, Assault Nurse Examiner. that vid- 398 S.W.3d at n. 5. eo was not offered into evidence at trial. addition, trial, Appellant’s Pamela second judge presided Applicant's 3. The over same Freeman, nurse, registered referred to a trial, Applicant’s habeas-corpus first ruled on report apparently that contained the content that disputed characterization Appellant’s taking place from because his second trial the argued intentionally recklessly his second trial violated caused he that it or of the prohibition United double-jeopardy that by objecting, and asserted mistrial application, In his States Constitution. was precipitating mistrial question “the mistrial was Appellant alleged that and, therefore, mani- there was a incurable objection to prosecutor’s by caused necessity grant fest a mistrial. to elicit whether attempt defense counsel’s par- hearing arguments After alleged allega- had made other victim ties, that “it stretches concluded and that “the against [Appellant,]” tions say question that the credulity just bit to by case caused mistrial in this was it was or intentionally imply or reckless- that true prosecutor either Bauder, 974 ly.”4 parte that, Ex S.W.2d true[,]” possible of the two out The (Tex.Crim.App.1998).5 defense question on cross- asking intentions respect with changed argument also examination, only possibility made one admissibility ques- the basis for the interpretation “the reasonable sense: argued the defense asked: purpose for the was proper as evidence of an question was yes, and then answer would extraneous offense. See Tex.R. Evid. litigate the truth of defense 404(b). Furthermore, Appellant argued allegation, interjecting essence just simply that “there was false allegation child victim had made a asked, this you allegation. did make against sexual abuse the defendant There no inference whether it was o[f] was daughter, own and since true not true.” concluded liar, false, ... and since she’s was she’s a asserting there no ne- manifest liar, allegation’s ... false.”6 cessity grant the State’s state, judge went on was not harmed mistrial because State in- reasonably can you don’t see how question and there by the were less *6 not harm- being this as terpret remedy problem drastic means to than inter- proposes ful It to granting vigorously [S]tate. a mistrial. The State to 335, presided Applicant’s (Tex.Crim.App.2007) application, and over 219 S.W.3d State, (”[W]e 921 S.W.2d [v. overrule Bauder second trial. progeny and (Tex.Crim.App.1996) ] 696 (.Bauder III, II [15 Lee [State v.] prosecutor’s response, part, 4. The in relevant ], (Tex.Crim.App.2000) parte II Peterson [Ex ] that, Applicant’s allegation to was ])."). (Tex.Crim.App.2003) S.W.3d 804 [117 absolutely ap- am [PROSECUTOR]: [I] remembers, palled, everybody If offended. 404(a) (stating general- 6.See Tex.R. Evid. right sitting happened, I was when it there ly person’s or char- character ”[e]vidence saying not a word. purpose for acter trait is not admissible they’[ve] alleged The that that's what fact conformity on a proving action in therewith occasion_”). partially absolutely ... this motion is particular The inten- other saying anything. ... absurd agreed possible, since wasn’t was but tion that the court that, say unlikely, And for to "I counsel highly [defense counsel] so was that defense correct,” uh, allegation thought swear is true and wow. the victim had made true this sexually his Appellant also abused had Appellant argues Although that this Court's daughter in- biological and that the defense opinion double-jeopar in Bauder controls the jury was to inform the that their client tended case, dy assaulting daughter. issue in this we note that Bauder was guilty sexually obvious, eight years ago. by overruled this Court over reasons that are For intention, Bauder, (Tex. legitimate parte See Ex S.W.2d 729 did not consider this Lewis, contrary. argument to by parte despite Appellant’s Crim.App.1998), overruled Ex rejected an ject jury allegation upon giving before the alternative of an in- struction disregard, to and the speculate pro- record they which are to vides some support for the trial [Ap- accusation that court’s child made a false conclusion that the intent of the daughter, his own pellant] did this to was to prejudice the rather therefore, jury, than a and that if that is realistic attempt to solicit admissible evi- false, must be false then this one as well. Pierson, dence.” 398 S.W.3d at 419-20. And ... not the kind of it’s evidence granted We review determine whether interjected jury before the the court of appeals misapplied or misin- Court believes could be cured with an terpreted existing precedent when it held disregard. top instruction to of ... [0]n that the trial court was within its discre- right that since the has no [S]tate tion to find that there was a manifest appeal acquittal, in the event of it is necessity grant a mistrial.7 prejudicial for the to the defense [SJtate something interject was not ad- Discussion with, begin highly missible to is Generally a criminal defendant prejudicial, simply jury and then ask the may not put jeopardy by the State wait jury and for the twice for the same offense. U.S. Const. they acquit really because can’t disre- V; amend. see Hill v. gard it. 308, 313 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). prohi All of that the Court to the leads bition on double jeopardy was extended to reach, conclusion that I could which was states Supreme United States time, at conclusion I reached Court through the Fourteenth Amend was, which a mistrial caused ment. See Maryland, Benton v. 395 U.S. the fault of the and that defense there (1969), 89 S.Ct. 23 L.Ed.2d 707 was no of a remedy short Connecticut, overruling, Palko v. 302 U.S. therefore it the test of meets manifest (1937). 82 L.Ed. 288 necessity preclude which does retrial cases tried before a jury, defendant is under the Fifth Amendment. So the placed in jeopardy when the is em motion, or the application writ of paneled sworn, jeopardy and “because corpus, habeas denied and we’ll go judgment attaches before the fi becomes forward with the selection. nal, the protection constitutional also em was convicted his second braces the right defendant’s ‘valued trial of indecency one count of with a child have *7 completed by particular his trial a ” aggravated and seven of counts sexual as- tribunal.’ Washington, Arizona v. 434 case, sault of a to child. Relevant 497, 504, 824, U.S. 98 54 L.Ed.2d 717 S.Ct. Appellant (1978) his convictions appealed Hunter, on dou- (quoting Wade v. 336 U.S. ble-jeopardy grounds. 684, 689, The 834, Texarkana (1949)); 69 L.Ed. 974 S.Ct. 93 Hill, Court of Appeals held the trial court Despite see 314. S.W.3d at the did not abuse in granting general against its discretion prohibition jeopardy- trials, a request State’s for mistrial because barred exceptions there are two may trial court considered when a criminal explicitly “[t]he and defendant be tried a precise ground necessity 7. The for review The is: to declare a mistrial. court of appeals misapplied misinterpreted either or single posed by Appellant’s question type very existing precedent contrary trial create the counsel did not of to reach its con- striking extraordinary and circumstances clusion. necessary finding to a of sustain manifest As an appellate U.S. at 98 S.Ct. 824. violating double-jeop- without second time court, our to review the rec- pre- ends it is function prosecution if ardy principles (1) trial exer- if ord determine if the result of a mistrial: maturely as the a granting to cised discretion” when consents retrial “sound the criminal defendant (2) at 824. to mistrial. Id. necessity was a manifest or there Garza, 337 parte mistrial. Ex grant a Analysis (Tex.Crim.App.2011); see

S.W.3d 505-06, 98 S.Ct. 434 U.S. at Appellant did A. not consent to recognized exceptions are be- 824. These request a mistrial. State’s for a reasons exist for to cause valid in appeals opinion of stated its The court of trial the conclusion a discharged before that [Appellant] State concedes “[t]he “invariably those reasons and not all of for a opposed the State’s Thus, to accused[.]” create unfairness supports position.” and the record his con- right to have defendant’s Pierson, 398 at 412 n. 4. The State S.W.3d tribunal “is some- particular ducted challenged has not the conclusion of in public to the interest times subordinate in appeals petition court of for discre- one full and fair affording prosecutor merits, on tionary review or in its brief his evidence to an opportunity present record, agree we reviewing after Washington, 434 at impartial jury.” U.S. of appeals Appellant with the court 505, 98 S.Ct. of granting did not consent a mistri- prevail double-jeopardy To in a al at trial. his first claim, must a criminal defendant first show being that he she is tried the same appeals correctly B. con- The court which the mistrial was declared offense for court cluded that did objection. over The bur the defendant’s when exclud- abuse its discretion to the to demonstrate den then shifts State ed the at issue on cross- (also necessity” referred to as “manifest examination. “high degree” necessity) for the mis judge’s to the trial decision respect With trial. A trial court’s decision to declare a propounded question as im- exclude inquiry mistrial limited to the if there proper, court of on this relied necessity” grant was a “manifest a mis opinion Court’s Vinson Garza, trial. 909. We (Tex.Crim.App.2008), have that a trial court abuses its stated carry failed to conclude that if it a mistrial “without discretion declares 104(a) under of the Texas burden Rule availability less considering first prove Rules of Evidence to admissibili- reasonably ruling drastic alternatives and ty sought of the evidence he introduce out[,]” although them the basis for the therefore, and, that the cross-examination not be expressly mistrial need articulated agree proper. We with the Supreme in the Id. record. And Court appeals. conclusion overriding “the has stated that interest *8 Vinson, that our justice administration of In we stated “[i]n evenhanded system, the requires highest degree justice proponent that we accord the criminal ordinarily the burden of es respect judge’s to the trial evaluation of evidence has tablishing admissibility prof that impartiality the likelihood of one Vinson, may jurors by have been affected fered evidence.” more 104(a) 340; (“Preliminary see improper comment.” Tex.R. Evid. ... questions concerning the admissibility the victim’s allegation, it appears that de- of evidence shall be determined fense counsel Hoped, intended, more than court....”). Our statement from Vinson that the answer elicited would lead to ad- Texas, remains valid law in and we hold missible evidence.

that it the evidentiary controls issue in this Despite not knowing exactly case. As the court noted in its what the victim alleged, had the record opinion, indicates Appellant’s theory of admis

The record in this case is not suffi sibility at trial was that the question asked ciently developed for us to determine was to impeach intended the victim’s ve whether allegation evidence of the false racity Appellant because would call his at issue was admissible. Although biological daughter to the deny stand to defense announced an intent to call [Ap addition, the victim’s allegation. In at a pellant’s biological daughter to testify hearing Appellant’s on pretrial application falsity to the of the allegation, the rec for a writ of habeas corpus, Appellant ar ord concerning is unclear what gued for the first time that “trial counsel prior allegation false was. The attor ... made the trial court aware of the neys disagreed concerning whether [the possibility that the bad relationship be claimed to have personally victim] ob tween [Appellant] and [the moth victim]’s served some abuse or to have heard a er was a motive for the mother to coach report of abuse. As summarized [the to make victim] false accusations.” court, “So we don’t really even Because theory this new admissibility know what the basis for her statement presented was pretrial at the confer was.”[8] trial, ence at the second and the trial court Pierson, 398 (emphasis S.W.3d at 416-17 had no opportunity to consider it at the added). short, In parties trial, and the first we will not consider it. See Tex.R.App. court were not sure what the content of note, however, P. 33.1. We was, the victim’s allegation actually only Appellant’s continuation of argument allegation of some kind was made.9 attempting to prove that the victim was a However, However, without knowing the content of liar.10 the habeas ad- comment, response judge’s to the Appellant's one testified at second trial: "And stated, Appellant counsel for you’ve "We don’t know there’s been trials testified in that the statement, just jury the basis of the telling has found the child she made was not truth, hasn’t subsequently and that it there?”: investigated and went nowhere.” interjected [COURT]: You’ve now before that there have been other cases 9. Different theories of what the victim had where she's testified that the has found alleged points were discussed at different dur- lying. that the child was process, including the victim Judge, [DEFENSE COUNSEL But #1]: alleged Appellant sexually had also it’s cross examination. We're entitled to biological daughter abused his (prosecutor), get opinions into her findings. Appellant told the victim that he had also Objection [PROSECUTOR]: based on rele- (trial sexually biological daughter abused his vance, speculation. horribly prejudi- It’s judge), or the thought victim stated that she cial. sexually had also abused his about, [DEFENSE COUNSEL # 1]: What biological daughter (prosecutor). testifying nothing what she’s to has to do with this case. following exchange 10. The counsel], occurred in re- really [COURT]: [Defense does. sponse question Kathy to defense counsel’s your theory It’s rebuttal to that the child Lach, Examiner, a Sexual Assault lying Nurse inju- must be because she didn't have *9 wit- deny- quate showing complaining that argument before Appellant’s dressed allegation Ap- a writ of application for herself made the pretrial his ness concluded, skeptically biological habeas and corpus sexually abused his pellant Well, was false. daughter it is—I and that the Okay. I think [COURT]: circumstances, a bit to credulity just think it court stretches these Under imply say question that the Appellant failed free to was conclude it was true or not true. If Court burden, carry proponent his as of the the answer to were find evidence, was question show ‘yes! allegations and those question was impeach- anything prelude more than a true,’ essentially defendant are then imper- ment on a collateral matter and an interjected an extraneous would have complaining attempt missible to attack That’s offense his own client. against credibility evidence general witness’s with you reach. So only could conclusion of See specific of conduct. instances of the interpretation reasonable 608(b). Based on our review Tex.R. Evid. that the purpose for the was opinion court of appeals of the the de yes, answer and then would be case, we the record this hold of that litigate fense would the truth correctly concluded that appeals allegation, interjecting that in essence not abuse the trial court did its discretion allega child had a false victim made Appellant’s when it cross-exami- excluded tion of abuse the defendant sexual Appel- impermissible. nation as daughter, since that against his own burden, carry lant failed to his as the false, allegation was therefore she’s evidence, that the victim’s proponent therefore, liar, liar, this and since she’s Vinson, answer admissible. allegation’s false. 104(a). 340; S.W.3d at see Tex.R. Evid. State, Flannery v. curiam), (per (Tex.Crim.App.1984) appeals appropriately The court of C. im- explained general rule that Court “great ruling gave deference” imper- peachment on a collateral matter is trial court. Although to the exceptions missible. Id. The court held that it was exist, rules general rule and sometimes the grant “to the trial court’s evalua- required way give of evidence must to a defendant’s potential juror bias defer- ‘great or right to Sixth Amendment confront ” Pierson, at 419 398 S.W.3d ence.’ accuser,11 Appellant her has not shown Petro, 653, 661 (citing Ross 515 F.3d any exception in this v. applies such Cir.2008)). (6th Rather, case. an inade- Appellant made No, theory you testifying ries. what her that's the—the [COURT]: And she’s as to is, training, background always experience, proposed her her have to this there’s demonstrated, always the has that that's not trauma. Since there is no trauma —. any specific case. That doesn't discuss case, See, e.g., Hammer talk this case. It’s doesn’t about (discussing (Tex.Crim.App.2009) the rela- just rebutting theory you've simply tionship Texas Evidence proposed lying between the Rules of that the child must be be- right to and a Sixth Amendment cause she doesn't have trauma. defendant's her, against him or you opened have that door. confront witnesses So [COURT]: including qualified right theory. to attack the accus- they're doing rebutting your All is, “general credibility possi- ... theory always show Your there’s trauma. ers self-interest, No, bias, testify- my theory or motives in # ble [DEFENSE COUNSEL 1]: ing”). they any in this find case did trauma.

773 argues that the court of Appellant based on additional research that it argued gave “great mistakenly deference” appeals showed that “there theory was no on which ruling granting the trial the court’s the basis the new trial ruling could be appears mistrial. He assert brought of the jury, attention apply assessing when standard does not prejudice jury could not be granting correctness of a mistrial by repaired any cautionary instructions, asked, on a but not an based a and that mistrial was a ‘manifest necessi- ” swered, How during cross-examination. 500, ty.’ Id. at 824. 98 S.Ct. This time ever, why not explain does granted the trial court the State’s motion. court’s should not be ruling trial accorded 501, Id. at 98 S.Ct. 824. it is evalu great deference when based on precedent Our and a review of bias, ating potential juror sug nor does he do not Washington support Appellant’s al what level deference have gest of leged opening distinction between argu In appropriate according been to him. ments and questioning on cross-examina stead, Appellant opines, the court “[h]ad tion. See Harrison v. given ‘great deference’ to the appeals 18, 22 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (“[Washing grant trial court’s decision to emphasizes ton] that in the context of a likely the court of would have declaration of involving mistrial an assess found that the trial court did in fact abuse the prejudicial impact ment of upon the discretion.” jury of impropriety, some the trial judge’s The seminal on this issue is Ari- case is great decision entitled to defer 497, v. Washington, zona 434 U.S. S.Ct. 98 ”). Instead, ence .... Washington, in (1978). Washing- 717 L.Ed.2d Supreme Court’s of when great discussion ton, the respondent guilty was found deference should be accorded to the ruling murdering a hotel clerk. Id. at of a granting a mistrial turned on the Later, 824. granted S.Ct. he was a new judge’s ability unique to evaluate trial when it was State discovered complained whether action biased exculpatory had withheld evidence. Id. and, so, if if to determine that bias During the voir at the respondent’s dire can be remedied an instruction to disre trial, testimony second the State alluded to gard. U.S. at 512- Then, previous of witness from a trial. example, 98 S.Ct. 824. For the Su dire, during defense voir stat- counsel’s he preme Court an improper stated that “that ed there was evidence hidden from statement a risk opening creates that “the [respondent] last trial.” at the Id. at tainted!,]” [jury] panel may entire in open- Later the defense’s that an instruction to “will not arguments, explained great- counsel necessarily remove the risk of bias that er detail that about would hear may argument.” be created improper how the State exculpatory had withheld bias, Again referring Id. to potential evidence, and that the Arizona Supreme Supreme Court stated that the respondent

Court ordered that should compelling are There institutional in light receive new trial of the State’s militating considerations favor Brady argu- violation. After opening Id. ments, appellate judge’s requested deference to State a mistrial comments, significance pos evaluation of the based on defense counsel’s juror 499-500, which the court Id. at sible bias. He has seen denied. following jurors during 824. The their morning, S.Ct. heard voir dire State renewed its for a mistrial examination. He most fa- *11 appeals err in The court of the back- D. the evidence and miliar with holding acted the trial court that He has of case on trial. the ground it deter- with sound discretion when the as it argument to tone of listened the instruction to disre- mined that an ap- the and has observed was delivered gard be insufficient. would short, jurors. reaction parent the fac- ap- far “conversant with of he is more that the court Appellant argues incorrectly the determination” than and concluded peals relevant to trial court tors disregard to defense that an instruction possibly can be. any reviewing court cured question would not have counsel’s added). omitted) (footnote (emphasis Id. error, if on to any. Appellant goes the contrast- Finally, Supreme the Court also that, “[j]ust appeals as the court of assert with in presented it was the situation ed the court’s erro- dodged the issue of trial arguments during Washington opening — ruling, ap- of evidentiary the court neous jury an entire could be biased—with which by tenu- dodged creating this issue a peals a juror one on in which a situation reaching factual instead of ous distinction be with replaced and could jury is biased Appellant sup- proper the conclusion.” a granting instead of juror an alternate argument by citing his Justice Mose- ports n. 824 at 512 mistrial. See id. opinion from the court ley’s dissenting (“[I]f suggestion there a of individual instruc- argues jury “a bias, possible replace may be to juror sufficiently the tri- tion should have saved alternate.”). Thus, it juror with an al, unnecessary.” rendering a mistrial the Supreme Court appear does J., Pierson, (Moseley, at 426 the comments improper considered when State, Simpson 119 dissenting) (citing v. trial important to be when a came as as (Tex.Crim.App.2003); 272 S.W.3d ability to unique uses or her judge State, 103, 115 29 Wesbrook S.W.3d by an any bias created potential evaluate 13 Ovalle v. (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Harrison, 788 comment. See improper (per (Tex.Crim.App.2000) S.W.3d result, curiam)). reasoning As a 22. explicated Supreme Court WasA- argument to respect With with to created ington respect bias applies judge’s of what deference to carries force improper argument the same ruling, necessity” the court “manifest potential on cross-examination because ruling held such should appeals properly remains, the trial biasing trial accorded deference when the great be position gauge is still in the best judge Pier- court exercised “sound discretion.” has been biased because whether son, Renico v. (citing 398 S.W.3d at ques- judge listened to the tone of the Lett, 766, 130 559 U.S. S.Ct. as it observed tion was delivered and (2010)). This also L.Ed.2d 678 deference Washing- jurors. apparent reaction judge’s trial applies determination 512-13, ton, We 434 U.S. at S.Ct. disregard an instruction to would trial judge’s hold that when a decision bias any juror remediate insufficient to is based on the risk grant mistrial because, just a trial court is in the best as bias, “great ruling is entitled to juror to hear the tenor of the position deference,” com- of whether the regardless apparent and to reactions asked see open- place during of conduct took plained they if have been jurors determine biased, ques- of a in the best ing arguments judge or took form is also an instruc- position to determine whether on cross-examination. be sufficient unscrupulous [u]nless tion to defense counsel remedy any the same reasons. are to be unfair advantage, bias for allowed an have power must following hearing Appellant’s At declare a appropriate mistrial in cases. cross-examination, question on the follow- orderly, impartial interest in proce- place took exchange relevant with re- dure would be if impaired he were de- spect disregard, to an instruction exercising terred from power by Well, ATTORNEY [DEFENSE #2]: *12 concern that a any reviewing time court yeah, get that doesn’t into the actual —. disagreed with his assessment of the way an any There’s not instruction trial situation a retrial would automati- would cure that? cally be barred. mean, INo. I’m ask- [PROSECUTOR]: Washington, 434 U.S. 98 S.Ct. 824 It’s for a mistrial. out there. Dinitz, (quoting United States 424 U.S. get way There’s no I can it—. 600, 612, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 267 I how there’s any [COURT]: don’t see (1976)).12 Although reviewing a court may possible way disregard that a could required great to accord deference to this kind of And in the testimony. event the ruling of a trial granting court a mis- appeal, got right— of an no [S]tate’s trial, ruling that trial court’s not insulat- I acquittal, mean in the of an event ed appellate However, from review. on of an got right appeal, [S]tate’s no so record, say this we cannot that the trial they’re if absolutely prejudiced judge irrationally acted or irresponsibly hears it. when he an determined that instruction to Later, when the trial made his rul- disregard any would not remediate bias.13 ing granting the State’s for a mis- appeals We hold that the did not trial, again, he stated “I don’t know how err when it concluded that the trial court with an can be cured instruction [the bias] exercised sound in determining discretion jury.” to the disregard that an instruction to was not a comments, Based on these we viable granting alternative to the of a mis- agree with the court of that “[t]he trial.14

trial court’s actions demonstrate deliberate Conclusion

consideration, than a precipitous rather ruling[,]” trial appeals correctly and that the court consid The court of concluded ered and ruled out “less drastic that the within alterna trial court was its discre- mistrial, than if including tives” an in tion to declare a based on mistrial manifest would disregard necessity struction have been due to the actions of defense Therefore, under Appellant’s sufficient the circumstances. Pier counsel. second son, Furthermore, 398 S.W.3d at trial was double jeopardy. 418-19. not barred are Supreme we mindful of the Court’s We affirm the of the court judgment in Washington appeals. statement Pierson, (“We say

12. This is not to counsel in this case 14.See also 398 S.W.3d at 418 sought conclude that the trial court exercised sound unscrupulous he or that an unfair (a) granting parties op- discretion in an advantage. positions portunity argue their on declara- mistrial, (b) considering tion of a alternatives 13. See U.S. at (c) using to a its discretion to legitimate conclude the defense lacked basis question.”). for the we disregard, which PRICE, J., instructions concurring opinion. filed a such argues whenever JOHNSON, JJ., entertain WOMACK defendant remedy mistrial only the of a radical concurred. he as regards save him from what can PRICE, J., concurring opinion. filed a prosecutorial prejudice. Consid- indelible sepa- join opinion. I write the Court’s mistrial precipitous the risk that a ering First, while I rately for two reasons. right to to the “valued poses defendant’s satisfy the agree appellant completed particular have his trial by proof of impeachment predicate tribunal,]”3 lightly judges should not accusation, that not neces- prior false does possibility that a stout instruc- dismiss the posed he sarily mean that will serve to ameliorate invariably inappropriate be deemed jury contamination —es- any potential for Not- here, laid. proper predicate what, had the been from amounts to as pecially opin- language withstanding ambiguous import Court’s unanswered *13 v. Flannery in v. State Hammer ions part. defense counsel’s on State,1 yet we to disclaim the admissi- have I. bility prior of evidence of false accusations question upon testimony complaining appellant’s first impeach the of attacking cross-examining complaining the witness by witnesses in sex offense cases context, you make an general credibility. In this in this case was: “Did also their appellant] these right confronta- did [the the Sixth Amendment If, in yet things daughter?” own may trump general be held to the same to his fact, witness claimed impeachment complaining on collat- the prohibition against ever personal knowledge have had prohibition eral and the in Rule matters 608(b) daugh- against appellant sexually of abused own of the Rules Evidence ter, in ask- false, Sec- fact that claim was impeachment by specific conduct.2 ond, im- predicate that a as a agree while I with the such Court permissible have been a reviewing great peachment might court owes deference to rights judgment an in- exercise of his Sixth Amendment the trial court’s whether Clause, notwith- inappropriate under Confrontation struction to any contrary I rule evidence standing the need of question obviates for a might interposed have acknowledge think it worthwhile to State so, admissibility.4 as the efficacy against of the of Even appellate presumption 369, State, attacking supporting the credibili- Flannery 676 370 witness’ 1. See v. S.W.2d provided (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (prohibiting ty, the im of crime as other than conviction 609, inquired may into on peachment a witness on a mat in Rule of collateral 555, ter); State, proved 296 564- nor Hammer v. S.W.3d cross-examination of witness evidence.”). (suggesting by evi (Tex.Crim.App.2009) 65 extrinsic prior of a sexual dence false accusations Garza, (Tex. parte 909 3. Ex 337 assault should be deemed inadmissible victim Hunter, Crim.App.2011) (quoting Wade impeachment, in the Con v. as even the face of 684, 689, Clause, L.Ed. 974 simply U.S. if it is frontation offered (1949)). impugn general credibility, such her because nothing "prohib evidence for more than calls (Tex. State, Lopez v. 225-26 inferences, 18 S.W.3d violate propensity” ited which (Keller, J., Crim.App.2000); concur 608(b)). id. at Tex.R. Evid ring). Billodeau also 608(b) Lopez (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (citing for ("Specific 2. See Evid. instances Tex.R. witness, proposition prior evidence false purpose of of the of a for the conduct out,5 appeals essentially pointed II. problem real in this case is that I agree said, also that it cannot be based was unable to establish the appellant upon case, the record in this that the trial he predicate facts which could assert “irrationally[,]” acted “irresponsi- admissibility a theory, under such as re- bly,” or in “precipitately response to the 104(a) by Rule of the quired Rules of prosecutor’s request for a mistrial.”9 It is today Evidence.6 The seems to Court certainly true “that the extent possi- of the the court aspect ap- confirm this ble bias” that may engendered have been opinion when it concludes that peals’s by the inappropriate question in this case appellant carry has “failed to his burden measured,” “cannot be and “that some tri- proponent as the of the evidence that judges al might proceeded have with the victim’s answer I agree was admissible.”7 trial after giving appropriate cau- emphasize with this. But I wish to tionary instructions.”10 am inclined to yet we have not ruled out altogether think that an to disregard instruction in possibility Clause Confrontation this case would have sufficed to remove requires permitted defendant be Indeed, the potential juror for bias. I do develop prior evidence of false accusations grave not think there potential witness, by the complaining least sex here, juror actual bias since the prosecutions, motive general offense as evidence behind would not lack have been complaining witness’s of credi- 608(b) bility, and, notwithstanding immediately apparent Rule to the jury *14 event, Rules of any Evidence.8 no reply.11 there was “Never- 564-66, may conclusion, impeach accusations to at might suggest be admissible the such a complaining witness in sex offense and case we did cite several federal cases in Ham- 26, acknowledged because "this proposition, Court has mer for that id. at 565 n. we the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth formally Amend so hold in Hammer. Nor may require ment admission of evidence that expressly today. does the Court so hold 608(b) bar”); otherwise would [Tex.R. Evid.] State, 92, Palmer v. 222 (Tex.App. S.W.3d 95 104(a). 6. Tex.R. Evid. 2006, ref’d) (evi pet. Houston [14th Dist.] prior dence of false accusations of sexual Majority Opinion (citing 7. 772 at Vinson v. may impeach abuse to admissible com State, 336, (Tex.Crim.App. 252 S.W.3d 340 long plaining falsity as actual witness so is 2008)). State, established); adequately Thomas v. 420, S.W.2d (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 5, ante; 608(b). 8. See notes 4 & Tex.R. Evid. 1984, ref’d) (Sixth pet. Amendment Confron tation Clause error to exclude evidence of the 497, 9. v. 434 U.S. 514- Arizona complaining prior witness’s false accusations (1978). 54 L.Ed.2d 717 rape prosecution aggravated of in a for sexual child). assault of a 10. Id. at 98 S.Ct. 824. State, 5. Pierson v. 413-17 2013). (Tex.App.-Texarkana ap- altogether apparent court of It is not me to that the peals in jury this case believed evidence appellant’s that the would have realized that the complaining appellant about predicate witness lied the as a meant to im- having daughter peaching molested his own complaining could be the witness. While if complain- may admissible it showed on the interpreta- bias be "the reasonable ing part, discerning judge lawyer witness's but never be tion” that might could admissi- or merely general ble upon place question, Majority as a Opinion attack her credi- on the see bility, court), Lopez (quoting and the Confrontation Clause the more notwithstanding. Although likely simply puzzled Id. our unani- found ap- itself opinion pellant’s lawyer mous in seemingly Hammer ask such a would in theless, prejudice, any, in the if deliber- overriding interest even- count its justice requires of handed administration ations.13 reviewing highest accord [a court] must its own Every case be considered on judge’s of to the trial evalu- degree respect course, facts, have of but we observed impartiality ation of the likelihood that the of reversal of a conviction for the failure jurors may have been of one or more to follow- trial court declare mistrial improper” question.12 affected disregard improp- an instruction to an In the of the evenhand- further interest er Sauce for the “rare.”14 however, I justice, of ed administration goose to be ought defendant’s sauce the bench and compelled feel remind gander. prosecutor’s appellate presumption bar of our of Moreover, typically upon we have relied efficacy instructions. defen- When efficacy disregard of instructions pros- dants mistrials on account of resolving procedur- issues of context indiscretions, we have been quick ecutorial requests al A defendant who default. recognize impact ameliorative seeking mistrial without first an instruc- judicial disregard: instructions jury disregard objec- some In cases in majority the vast which potentially incendiary matter tionable testimony argument is made or comes way that has made into evidence has in, deliberately inadvertently, which only preserved appeal ap- error for if the any has no relevance to material issue in can pellate say instruction with it case carries some defi- not, event, any have disregard potential for prejudice nite the ac- had the desired effect on the facts of the cused, upon this Court has relied what too, context, particular case.15 we In that appellate an presumption amounts to essentially have applied appellate pre- that an instruction to the evi- efficacy.16 obeyed sumption In jury. dence will be its faith in the puts [C]ourt essence Garza, recently we observed: instruction, jury’s ability, upon con- *15 shows, sciously disregard being potential to for Once defendant he is consciously prejudice, and then to dis- tried for the same offense after declara- event, self-immolating question. jury disregard objec- In that instruction that the an potential burning only for the State would have ... tionable occurrence is essential when theoretical; purely been an instruction to dis- such an instruction could have had the de- effect, regard have been more than sufficient should which enable continua- sired is to extinguish to the flame. impartial jury. The a[n] tion of party request fails an who instruction 511, 12. 434 U.S. at 98 S.Ct. 824. appellate will have forfeited review of that class of events that could have been State, 750, (Tex. v. 746 S.W.2d Waldo 753 by such if an ‘cured’ an instruction. But 1988) State, Crim.App. (quoting v. Gardner 730 effect, could had instruction not have such an 675, (Tex.Crim.App.1987)) (ci 696 S.W.2d ta tio mistrial, only remedy a and a suitable is omitted). quotation ns and internal marks only motion for mistrial is essential prerequisite presenting complaint on State, 14. Swallow v. 829 S.W.2d 227 appeal.”). (Tex.Crim.App.1992), overruled on other State, Randolph grounds by v. (reversing the court of 16.See id. (Tex.Crim.App.2011). holding appeals's to disre- instruction gard "objectionable Young could not have cured the 15. See ("[T]he case). (Tex.Crim.App.2004) request in an occurrence” for it) objected, of a mistrial to he a drawn from of its tion which out collective mind heavy justi- burden shifts to the State to while deliberating? the trial court’s declaration of the fy I personally am inclined to think mistrial. The State must demonstrate a impossible fair trial was not had the trial necessity” “manifest for a given such an instruction to disre- say “high degree”

which is to of neces- gard. willing But I am to concede that sity, and the trial court’s discretion to reasonable disagree minds could on the a mistrial on manifest declare based ne- efficacy of such an instruction in this case. to, cessity justi- is limited and must be circumstances, Under these the court extraordinary by, fied circumstances. appeals did not err to defer to the trial abused, said, That discretion is we have judgment question, court’s on that consis- whenever the trial court declares a mis- tent with the dictates Arizona v. Wash- considering without the avail- trial first ington. that, I only urge would in order to ability of less drastic alternatives and justify “highest degree of respect” reasonably out. ruling them But the that the Supreme has Court accorded appropriately trial court exercises its the trial court’s discretion in this regard, to declare a mistrial —that discretion is trial judges great take care not to “act say, necessity manifest for the mistri- precipitately in response prosecu- particular al exists—when the circum- tor’s for a mistrial.”18 What that giving stances rise to declaration that, means to me is when making deter- it impossible render to arrive at a fair necessity minations of manifest vel non— tribunal, verdict before the initial when that is to say, balancing when the State’s simply impossible it is to continue with right to a fair trial, designed trial to end just in any or when verdict that the origi- judgments against the defendant’s valued might nal tribunal return would auto- right to have matically subject completed by to reversal on ap- particular peal judges because of trial error.17 tribunal19—trial must give the same consideration to the remedi- case, appellant’s question how- potential al of an instruction to disregard inflammatory, ever erroneous or they routinely give would almost such trial, impossible it make to continue the any instruction time is the inject something nor did it into the record defendant who seeks a mistrial. result automatic reversal on So the appeal. basis manifest remarks, join With these additional necessity presented ques- here opinion. Court’s so as to contaminated the render *16 impossible for tribunal the initial to ar- rive at a fair Could the appel- verdict. at a

lant’s have arrived fair verdict instructed, it been in no had uncertain terms, recognize consciously poten- prejudice consciously

tial for put (and appellant’s any prejudi- implications they may may cial not have Wade, Garza, 19.Garza, (citing 17. 337 S.W.3d at 909. 834). 336 U.S. at 69 S.Ct. 511, 515, 18. 434 U.S. at

Case Details

Case Name: Pierson, Leonard Jr.
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Apr 9, 2014
Citation: 426 S.W.3d 763
Docket Number: PD-0613-13
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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