Pierson, Leonard Jr., 426 S.W.3d 763

Background

Leonard Pierson Jr. was tried on indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault charges; during the State’s direct case the victim testified and defense counsel’s first cross-question was: “Did you also make an allegation that [Appellant] did these same things to his own daughter?”
The prosecutor objected before an answer; the court excused the jury, held a hearing, and the trial judge found the question sought inadmissible collateral impeachment or impermissible evidence of an extraneous allegation and granted the State’s motion for mistrial.
Appellant objected and sought pretrial habeas relief to bar retrial on double‑jeopardy grounds, alleging the prosecutor’s objection caused the mistrial (intentionally or recklessly); the habeas court denied relief, finding the mistrial was caused by defense counsel and was manifestly necessary.
At a second trial (same judge), Pierson was convicted on multiple counts and sentenced to life; the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of mistrial and retrial as within the trial court’s discretion.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review and affirmed the court of appeals: (1) the defense failed to meet the Rule 104(a) burden to show admissibility of the proffered question/evidence; (2) the trial court did not abuse discretion in finding mistrial manifestly necessary and that an instruction to disregard would not cure the prejudice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Pierson)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether retrial after the mistrial violated double jeopardy	The single unanswered cross‑question did not create extraordinary circumstances warranting mistrial; retrial is barred	The question was incurable, prejudicial, and caused mistrial by defense; manifest necessity supports retrial	Court held retrial was not barred: mistrial was manifestly necessary and defendant did not consent
Whether the cross‑question was admissible under Rule 104(a)/as impeachment or extraneous‑offense evidence	The question was a proper predicate to impeach the victim (including under Confrontation Clause and Rule 404(b)) and could be developed with extrinsic proof	Proponent (defense) failed to establish admissibility at the hearing; the content/basis of alleged prior allegation was unclear	Court held defense failed its burden to prove admissibility; exclusion was within trial court’s discretion
Whether the trial court should have given an instruction to disregard instead of granting mistrial	A curative instruction would have sufficed; mistrial was unnecessary and extreme	Trial judge observed potential juror bias and concluded an instruction could not cure the prejudice; mistrial necessary to protect State’s interest	Court deferred to trial judge’s assessment of juror bias and found he reasonably ruled out less drastic alternatives
Standard of appellate review for mistrial based on prejudicial statement/question	Trial court’s ruling should not receive unfettered deference because question was unanswered and ambiguous	Trial court is best positioned to judge jury impact; its manifest‑necessity decision gets great deference	Court held Washington deference applies; trial court’s manifest‑necessity ruling reviewed for abuse of discretion and was not abused

Key Cases Cited

Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (U.S. 1978) (explains "manifest necessity" standard and deference to trial judge on juror bias and mistrial decisions)
Vinson v. State, 252 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (proponent bears burden under Rule 104(a) to establish admissibility)
Ex parte Garza, 337 S.W.3d 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (retrial allowed when mistrial based on manifest necessity; trial court must consider less drastic alternatives)
Flannery v. State, 676 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (impeachment on collateral matters generally impermissible)
Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (discusses limits on impeachment by specific instances and interplay with Confrontation Clause)
Lopez v. State, 86 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (addresses admissibility of evidence of prior false accusations in sexual‑offense contexts)