*1 PEOPLES SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY A.
Patricia WATSON. Term, Sept.
No. 1989. Special Appeals Maryland. Court of
Jan. (Lori Douglas Gomulka, Richard W. Kelley brief), on the Hagerstown, appellant. Mahone, Frederick,
Willie J. appellee. Argued BISHOP, KARWACKI, JJ., before GETTY, JAMES S. Associate Judge the Court of (retired) Appeals Specially Assigned.
KARWACKI, Judge. (Peoples) ap- Company Life Insurance
Peoples Security on a verdict judgment jury from a entered peals *2 in favor of Patricia A. Washington County Circuit rendering a (Watson), spe- appellee. jury, Watson 2-522, had Peoples found that pursuant cial verdict to Rule in con- Watson, its discharged employee, at-will wrongfully and public policy, of a clear mandate of awarded travention $20,000 in $15,000 damages puni- in compensatory her damages. raises three issues for our review: Appellant tive in motion denying appellant’s Did the trial court err I. failure to show judgment upon appellee’s based “clear mandate of public policy” the violation wrongful of action for support sufficient a cause discharge? answering Did the trial court err in the note from the
II. counsel? consulting without jury III. Did the motion denying appellant’s trial court err judgment ground appellee on the that failed to remedies?
exhaust her available contractual shall the first issue in the affirmative and We answer court. judgment Consequently, reverse of the trial we II III. need not address issues Background Procedural 13, 1986, appellee complaint On March filed a three count in the against appellant employee, Circuit Court and its I, (Strausser). alleged John In she Strausser Count 1984; she had since employed by appellant August been by appellant that Strausser had been since the employed 1985; 29, 1986, Strausser, Fall of and that on January while acting the course of his as- employment by appellant, saulted and her shoul- by grabbing battered around the II, der and her on attempting to bite her breast. Count appellee alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress Strausser, by acting employment while the course of his as by appellant, battery a result of the assault and de- III, scribed Count I. In Count asserted that the assault and battery committed by upon Strausser her on January 1986 had been “preceded by a series of annoy- ing and sexually suggestive comments” her Strausser on appellant’s premises while and in the course of her employment; appellant’s supervisory personnel had informed of been Strausser’s offensive conduct ap- toward pellee, but that appellant had failed to intervene and abate appellee’s harassment Strausser. Appellee sought com- pensatory punitive damages against Strausser and ap- pellant.
After appellee’s employment was terminated by appellant under the circumstances described filed infra, appellee amended on complaint April six containing counts. The first three counts substantially repeated the allegations of the three counts of appellee’s initial complaint. Count IV *3 alleged that appellee’s employment by appellant had been wrongfully 28, 1986, terminated on March in retaliation for her initiation of the instant litigation on March alleged appellee’s V discharge “con- by appellant stituted a breach of ... [appellant’s] duty good faith and VI, fair dealings.” Count appellee alleged that upon her discharge appellant had converted certain funds she had posted to secure a given bond appellant the course of her employment. Appellee sought compensatory puni- and damages tive from Strausser appellant and for the wrongs alleged in I Counts and II and from appellant wrongs III, IV, asserted Counts V and VI. trial,
At granted court Strausser’s motion judg- II, ment on Count appellee’s but submitted claim against him under I Count to the jury. Appellant’s motion for judgment granted I, II, was as to III; Counts its motion for judgment on Counts IV and V was denied. Count VI was abandoned by appellee during trial.
Thus, the jury was instructed to determine whether Strausser had committed an assault or battery upon appel- lee, and if it concluded so, that he had done then to assess compensatory damages against Strausser. The jury was not, could, punitive need assess that it but also instructed him. damages against against appellant claims appellee’s
The court submitted for its jury special and V to the verdict. under Counts IV appellant to determine whether jury The court asked had, if it discharged appellee, and whether wrongfully had (a) the result of retribution discharge was “... (b) or violation of the public policy? of a clear contravention if was instructed that employment?” jury contract of discharged, compen- wrongfully it found that was The court further damages should be her. satory awarded appellant that if it concluded that had jury instructed in contravention of a clear discharged appellee wrongfully could, need punitive damages but public policy, mandate not, be awarded. in its instruc- the tort of abusive
Explaining to the the court stated: jury, tions retaliatory discharge The essential elements of abusive one, employment relationship; the existence of an are two, employment relationship by the termination of the three, that the motivation of employer proof contravenes some employer discharging public policy. clear mandate of plaintiff And it is the that her termi- position filing nation motivated of a law suit solely by John Life Insurance Com- against Peoples Strausser intentional infliction of pany alleging battery, assault and *4 note negligent supervision. emotional harm and You will But you. that neither of those last two counts are before discharged it is her that she position solely was because contravening suit therefore filing the law being public policy by punished clear mandate of to the courts. exercising right her of redress The found that had assaulted or battered jury Strausser dam- appellee appellee compensatory and awarded $300 against punitive him. The declined to award ages jury any against Strausser. has satisfied the damages Strausser him, against party entered and he is not a to this judgment appeal. concluded that had jury appellant wrongfully
The also discharged wrongful discharge and that such was appellee of a clear public the result of retribution contravention appellee’s rather than a violation of contract of policy The employment. jury appellee compensatory awarded After its motions for punitive damages against appellant. trial or were judgment notwithstanding new verdict denied, from the entered on appellant appealed judgment has filed no cross appellee appeal. that verdict.
FACTS
offered and all inferences
When we view
evidence
light
appellee, Impala
therefrom in a
most favorable to
(U.S.A.), Inc.,
296,
Md.
Impala
Platinum Ltd. v.
Sales
(1978);
Md.App.
Miller v.
Schaefer,
65,
Patricia A. Watson was as office until she terminated for appellant’s Hagerstown alleged “unreported absence insubordination” effective Appellee’s employment by March contract of appellant provided for termination at the will of either party. one of several employed by appellant
Strausser was as managers sales in its office. after Hagerstown Soon began Hagerstown at the office employment Strausser or he suggested October November that he like to her on his staff. more Becoming would have insistent, things he said such as “You’re going work like it or I’m you going you me whether not. to show how only to make real Not did Strausser continue this money.” hours, importuning during working began also he tele- but home, phoning appellee night saying things at such “I in here. I you sleep as want come have to on the floor *5 if of money make a lot you doll face can office. And in the do this.” you Leid- manager, Michael her sales informed appellee
When advances, Leidheck- (Leidhecker), about Strausser’s hecker matter to the attention bring this that he would er indicated manager (Shoemaker), agency Shoemaker of Harold inci- Relating the supervisor. direct was Strausser’s who laughing herself, got only appellee to Shoemaker dents worry not to appellee told who from Shoemaker response 1986, appel- January Then, evening on the it. about and one Strausser office with Leidhecker. came into the lee (Bowman), already were Bill Bowman agents, his sales behind, from Strausser appellee Approaching office. motion shoulders, biting made a on her his hands placed an inch of chest, his mouth within bringing her toward Straus- though appellee protested, Even appellee’s breast. maneuver. repeated ser 29 incident brought January immediately
Leidhecker met with Shoemaker to the attention Shoemaker. from her absolutely away him “to stay and told Strausser to.” spoken are you unless speak and do not [appellee] session at training attended a appellee In February grab attempted Strausser College. Junior Hagerstown bathroom, “Doll face asking she came out of the appellee as attempting grab Besides you.” what’s the matter occasion, abused appellant verbally also on that appellee on that training day. at the session represent- or to any notice to Strausser any prior Without case in the instant complaint initial appellant, ative of Appel- March Court on was filed the Circuit of the fact that this were made aware representatives lant’s 17 or 18. filed on March action had been from Leid- permission appellee requested March On 14 so that she on March hecker to be absent from work evening On the appointment. a doctor’s keep could Leidhecker, 15, appellee telephoned March March or on writing him had certified physician and advised *6 that she from would benefit a two week medical leave of absence. approved Leidhecker that leave. (Williams),
Robert D. Williams a vice-president appel- supervisor lant and field encompassing Hagers- area town, learned on March 17 or 18 of the by appellee suit filed on March 13. He advised Shoemaker by telephone that he would come to from Hagerstown Annapolis office on March “to Thursday, investigate and to to try get clearer picture just problem what the was” connection gravamen with the of the complaint Also, filed by appellee. Williams asked Shoemaker to the parties have involved and any witnesses the incident of January present, 1986 so he could them on interview March 20.
On March in Hagerstown, Williams interviewed Shoe- maker, Strausser, Leidhecker, Bowman, but was ad- vised that had appellee telephoned and stated that she was not coming to meet with him. Williams directed Shoe- maker appellee to reach by telephone explain to her that Williams had made a long trip specific for the purpose of investigating the for complaint basis she had institut- ed against so, appellant. Shoemaker did unsuc- but was in persuading cessful appellee change her mind. While appellee line, was still on the telephone Shoemaker reported this to Williams then spoke who directly appellee. with Despite request William’s that she come to the office for a problems discussion of the prompted lawsuit, which her appellee told that Williams she was unwilling speak with him without having lawyer present. replied Williams that he was not prepared Rather, to talk with her lawyer. he told appellee that he “simply wanted to talk with her and if to see we get thing couldn’t resolved.” When him, continued to refuse to speak Williams ordered her to appear work on the following day, advised her if she failed to appear, she would fired. be Appellee go did not to work on March and her employ- ment was terminated.
DISCUSSION 31,Md. Corp., In Adler v. American Standard an adopted exception Appeals the Court of A.2d person employed rule common law the well settled basis, is on at-will can period, that an an indeterminate good time for a employer any his or her discharged by be The Court held reason, or for no reason at all. a bad reason that: recognize does cause action Maryland
... employer an at will discharge1 by abusive for the contravenes some the motivation when *7 public policy____ clear mandate of 47, A.2d 464. Id. 432 cause action announcing existence
While
circumstances,2 the
under these limited
wrongful discharge
determining
clear
recognized
difficulty
Court
in the
expression
policy
of that
constitu-
absent some
policy
development
reviewing
exception
of this
to the common law
1. In
states,
that various "... courts have
rule in other
the Court observed
‘abusive,’
‘wrongful,’
or
as one for
characterized this cause
action
2,
(291
‘retaliatory’ discharge.”
A.2d
The
Id.
at 36 n.
432
464.
Md.]
interchangeably
opinion.
used
terms
its
603,
Co., 316 Md.
(1988), the Court held that an employee who was fired for filing a worker’s compensation claim had a cause of action for wrongful discharge. The Court reasoned:
Discharging an employee solely because that employee filed a worker’s compensation claim contravenes the clear mandate of Maryland public policy. Legislature has strong made a statement to that effect in making such offense, conduct a criminal and our perception of the magnitude of the public interest in preserving the full benefits worker’s compensation system to employ- ees, deterring employers from encroaching upon those rights, is equally strong.
Id. at
In the case sub judice, appellee successfully pressed her suit for wrongful discharge the trial court on the theory that appellant discharged her filing against suit it in alleged contravention of the clear mandate of public policy expressed in Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights: person him in his man, done to any injury every That of the remedy the course ought by to have property, "or right, land, and ought justice have Law denial, sale, fully speedily any without without freely of the land. according to Law delay, without by evidenced public policy Appellee argues dis- appellant was violated when provision constitutional against her it. We in retaliation for suit charged her disagree. not, from not, prevent appellee did and could
Appellant courts of this State. against it pursuing claims in the first in fact those claims embodied Appellee pursued complaint initial her amended of her three counts adju- under those counts were complaint fully. Her claims as matter rejected which them a the trial court by dicated judg- not from those adverse appealed has Appellee law. ments. appel- light most favorable
Viewing
evidence
might
lee,
discharging appellee
motivation for
appellant’s
with an
relationship
a desire to sever its
have been based on
it.
litigation against
actively pursuing
who
employee
was
Nevertheless,
not cited
and we
any authority,
had
none,
clear mandate of
any
are
which establishes
aware
such a decision
public policy
prohibit
which would
under
the circumstances
this case.
private employer
have reached similar
jurisdictions
The courts in other
Jewelers, Inc.,
Kay Finlay
Alexander
conclusions.
denied,
cert.
506 A.2d
N.J.Super.
allega
(1986), the
held that an
N.J.
court
discharged
employee
an at-will
be
tion that an employer
right
employer
to sue the
cause that
exercised
did not state a cause of action for
salary dispute
over a
wrongful discharge
discharge.
tort
had
wrongful
recognized
Supreme New
previously
been
“contrary to a clear mandate of
discharge
if the
Jersey
The intermediate
court concluded
appellate
policy.”
alleged
for the
in the
motivation
case
*9
meet
test. The
it did not
court
reasoned:
before
plaintiff
right
While
had a
to
legal
sue
employer
monies considered to
him salary,
be due
as
there can be
no
the
question
company
compelling
also had a
operate
interest to
its business without the harassment of
by employees
wages
suits
dissatisfied
their
or dis-
gruntled
of a reduction in their salary.
because
As the
judge pointed
granting
trial
out in
summary
defendant’s
motion,
judgment
plaintiff’s continued employment at the
salary
reduced
could
to
subject
company
future suits
by plaintiff
asserting claims to
he
what
considered
be his
It is
us
rightful salary.
evident to
that such an
adversarial attitude
employee
between
employer
could
inimical to the
of
operation
company
be
and that
any
imposing
upon
limitation
of a
firing
discontented
impact
would
severely
upon
employer’s
right
discharge
those whose conduct could be harmful
to the employer’s business. Under
a
these circumstances
balancing
competing interests
the employer.
favors
Moreover, in our view defendant’s termination of plain
tiff’s
did
employment
any
not violate
clear mandate of
There
no
policy.
statutory
or regulatory pro
scription against
in retaliation for the
firing
institution
against
a civil action
as
employer
a means
resolving
salary dispute.
Defendant’s
plaintiff
not in
contravention of his
exercise of
v.
created
as
Lally
Copygraphics,
statutorily
right
162, 413
supra
N.J.Super.
(App.Div.1980),
A.2d 960
[173
aff'd,
Nor,
(1981)].
N.J.
itwas
of his
perform
because
refusal
any duties violative
public policy. See
Pierce
Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp.,
supra
(1980) Rather,
N.J.
417 A.2d
[84
].
the dispute giving rise
plaintiff’s
termination of
employment
involved a matter having
significance
no
beyond
private
of plaintiff
interests
and defendant.
Id.
Kavanagh Airlines, Dutch Royal 566 F.Supp. 242 (N.D.Ill., E.D.1983) apposite. is also It was there held that despite Illinois’s recognition a cause of action *10 termi- was employee an at-will discharge where wrongful policy, clearly of a mandated in contravention nated who employee an alleged by was cause of action no such attorney, and threat- he an discharged retained because The court dispute. a salary his over employer sue ened to opined: at-will an and an employer a between dispute
Whenever dis- employee’s in the to culminate threatens employee retaining attorney an simply charge, employee, is un- sue, that procure could which threatening to security. through contract—employment to him available employ- argues that inherent persuasively KLM was an plaintiff had relationship it ment-at-will managers and its understanding organization of trust and atmosphere more in an effectively function destroyed, regardless harmony when cooperation; all concerned to fault, it is in the interest of is at of who in the advocated relationship. their rule terminate for dis- penalize company ironically would complaint rela- employment when the charging employee at-will stake Plaintiff cannot completely has soured. tionship him discharging allegation on that KLM his claim the right general public policies favor violated to the courts. right and the to free access counsel Id. at 244. (7th F.2d 242 Cir. Corp.,
Similarly, Beam IPCO alleged 1988), court that an at-will who held an attor- discharged he consulted that he had been because employers he had with ney dispute in connection with wrongful stated cause of action for had not the dis- law. The court reasoned under Wisconsin reflected in charge any public policy did not stated violate and statutes of Wisconsin. the constitution
CONCLUSION in this State public policy is no clear mandate There appellee, from its appellant discharging prevented which litigation had instituted employee, at-will because she alleged redress what she wrongs upon were committed by appellant and one of her fellow employees. Consequent- ly, necessary predicate to her asserted cause of action for wrongful discharge was and the lacking, court erred in submitting her claim jury. to the REVERSED;
JUDGMENT BE PAID COSTS TO BY THE APPELLEE. *11 BISHOP, J., dissents.
BISHOP, Judge, dissenting. I disagree
Because
the majority’s disposition of the
with
issue,
first
I
Adler v. American
dissent.
In
respectfully
Corp.,
Standard
291 Md.
As the Court has not confined itself to legis- enactments, lative prior judicial decisions or administra- regulations tive when determining public the policy of aware, however, State. We have always been that recognition of an public otherwise undeclared as a policy judicial basis decision application involves the of a very nebulous concept case, to the facts of given that declaration public policy normally the function branch____ of the legislative As Mr. Justice Sutherland stated for the Supreme Court in States, Patton v. United 276, 306, 281 U.S. 50 S.Ct. (1930): L.Ed. 854 “The truth is that the theory of public policy embod- ies a vague doctrine of and, variable quality, unless given deducible circumstances from constitution- al or provisions, statutory should accepted be as the all, determination, if only at judicial basis gen- of one public policy The circumspection. utmost conditions, pub- not, be changed under may eration added.) (Emphasis of another.” policy lic 45-46, 432 omitted.) Adler, A.2d (Citations supra court held that: Additionally, this focus is which upon primary interest society’s It is “clear mandate of The source of the required. enactments, prior in legislative found may be policy” or regulations, it decisions and administrative judicial case, care undeclared, in which extreme be must may is, fact, policy insure it be taken to must be case, public policy found any State. or the basis a tort provide clear to “sufficiently wrongful discharge.” action for contract (Citations omitted.) supplied.) Townsend v. (Emphasis 55, 61, Inc., 64 Md.App. L. W.M.Management, (1985). public policy limits the holding opinion in the majority in Article 19 expressed to that by appellant
asserted every per Rights. provides Article 19 Declaration *12 him or for done to remedy injury son should have a law right held that the to seek widely her. it is Although not a clear mandate grievances of in court is such redress discharge an public predicate on which to abusive policy Inc., Jewelers, N.J.Su claim, v. 208 Kay Finlay Alexander 466, 517 denied, 506 379 104 N.J. per. A.2d cert. Airlines, (1986); Royal v. KLM Dutch Kavanagh A.2d 449 E.D.1983), (N.D., Ill., under circumstances F.Supp. as to the inquire like Court must what those sub this judice, for such While the institution grounds were lawsuit. enough may alone not be against employer suit an ignore this should not the public policy, contravene employer’s may of the suit and the conduct which nature in grounds may it. The the suit itself be provoke an Only after examination public policy. contravention of is to determine the nature of possible of the suit’s it basis violated. policy may the which be At discharged trial stated that she was for filing suit in against employer. Implicitly included this asser- tion complaint is the nature of the and the gave facts which I rise to it. am aware the trial court dismissed Counts I, and, II and III a result as one could conclude that the issue of the appellant sexual harassment as not before IV, discharge count, us. Count the abusive includes by all of allegations reference the included in the previous three clearly counts. These counts the contain sexual them, harassment claims the and facts contained in to the IV, extent that are basis Count they the are included in I, The II II count. dismissal Counts eliminates from the case the causes action raised those counts did not but eliminate facts which upon they were based. basis abusive count not simply was discharge taken in isolation upon from facts which it was but based also includes those facts.
The cases cited are majority distinguishable be- cause do they personal not concern such intensely an af- front judice, case sub employee as where the was employee sexually point harassed to the an assault A battery. review of the cited cases majority makes clear: Alexander v. Jewel- point Kay Finlay ers, Inc., supra, the employee discharged filing was suit against his employer in connection with a salary dispute; Kavanagh Royal Airlines, KLM Dutch supra, an em- ployee discharged was because he retained an attorney threatened to sue employer dispute; over and in salary Beam Corp., v. IPCO (7th Cir.1988), F.2d 242 an at will discharged for revealing confidential infor- mation retained in attorney connection a dispute job performance. case, about In this appellee was dis- *13 charged in retaliation filing against appellant a law suit alleging sexual harassment that rose to level the of an assault and It battery. cannot seriously be doubted that has State an undeclared yet clearly mandated public policy proscribing such conduct.
435 in deter- various interests Adler, Court balanced the excepted: at must the will rule be mining that notice, is sud- employee an without When terminated future and difficult job with an uncertain denly faced continuing obligations. economic meeting prospect itself, circumstance, adoption in warrants hardly But this employ- termination at will rule that would forbid of a “wrongful” to a appeared the termination ees whenever hand, employee’s an at the other will or a On jury. court continued em- security, when job particularly interest in dissatisfaction by genuine not is threatened ployment re- has employee but because job performance or attempted in manner to act an unlawful fused duty, deserving is statutorily prescribed perform a employ- is to be considered recognition. Equally an being able to important has an interest er it would be beneficial at will whenever as a has interest Finally, society whole business. are public policies ensuring important that its laws and at rule modification will Any not contravened. into of these interests. must take account all indicated, flatly rejected have As we have few courts discharge of an at will wrongful the notion damages. give rise a cause of action employee may the line is to determining is where courts differ Where per- from legally separates wrongful drawn that be large This discharge. depends determination missible is violated allegedly on policy whether part tort or con- provide clear to basis sufficiently for wrongful discharge. action tract 464. This test Adler, supra [291 Md.] 432 A.2d same Alexander v. well. See as in other applied jurisdictions Jewelers, Inc., A.2d 506 N.J.Super. 208 Kay Finlay denied, 104 N.J. 466, 517 A.2d cert. 379, Co., 114 N.H. A.2d v. Beebe Rubber (1986); Monge (1974). to the balancing applied test must be This interests public. judice case sub policy meet the demands *14 436
The exception decision to make this the at employ will ment only taking rule can be made after into account the interest in employee’s job security, “particularly con when employment genuine tinued is threatened not dissatisfac Adler, tion job performance,” 42, with supra at [291 Md.] 432 A.2d the in employer’s “being interest able an discharge employee business,” when it beneficial to his is id., and in society’s “ensuring interest that its laws and important public policies are not contravened.” Appel id. lant discharged appellee not for of genuine reasons dissatis faction of job performance but because she an performed public act which would policy encourage—she filed suit to in prevent continued sexual harassment the work place. weighed against This must be appellant’s interest in run ning addition, the business as it sees fit. In it is clear that a will, of discharge employee at that is motivated retaliation, is not in the of best interest the economic system Therefore, or the it public good. is this jurist’s opinion clear, that there is although indeed a not explicitly declared, mandate of public policy predicate on which appellee’s cause action. Such is not novel idea. Co., Monge supra, Supreme Beebe Rubber the New Hampshire held the an employee, who alleged sexual harassment on job, was “motivated by faith or bad malice or based on retaliation” and violated public policy. Despite the fact that Monge was based on an abusive discharge claim under the breach contract theo ry, Adler, the Court on in Appeals relied it supra 36-37, 432 holding A.2d that of action cause exists in Maryland. The test applied Hampshire New applied the same as that in Adler and the sub judice. case To fail to that implement policy the case sub judice give message would to employers that if harass- present ment such as occurs, that this case the employer it may persist let until can tolerate harass- ment no longer and files suit in an attempt to it. terminate At point the employer may discharge the employee impunity. message employee would be harassment, such or himself from herself protect in order to with no job her or his to lose required be may she or he In Palmateer v. employer. against redress legal Cf. 52 Ill.Dec. Co., Ill.2d Harvester ternational Bank, 162 W.Va. (1981); v. First Nat’l Harless N.E.2d *15 210, Hocks, 272 Or. (1978); and v. 116, Nees 246 270 S.E.2d (1975). 512 536 P.2d Sherwin-Williams that Makovi v.
I not unaware am (1989), affirming Makovi v. 603, 179 Co., 561 A.2d 316 Md. (1988) 494 58, 540 A.2d Co., Md.App. 75 Sherman-Williams discharge was limited wrongful of action cause judice that the case sub I believe Appeals. the Court explained by the exception ground” “narrow falls under the 620, A.2d 179: p. 561 Makovi Md.] [316 discharge a constitute underlying the facts Sometimes and of statute of an anti-discrimination both violation reflecting clear focused, another, statute narrowly more remedy. no civil Lucas providing but public policy Cir.1984) (8th Inc., 1202 illus- Root, 736 F.2d Brown & ground. the narrower which utilizes analysis trates an fired be- that she had been alleged There the plaintiff The court her foreman. sleep to cause she refused herself for a woman invited to trade reasoned that “[a] prostitute.” Id. being is in asked become job effect Arkan- crime was a denounced at 1205. Prostitution predicted Supreme Eighth The Circuit sas statute. discharge be- find an abusive Court of Arkansas would refusing penalized not plaintiff “should be cause do the law forbids.” what not general holding in Makovi does my opinion regardless whether judice, the case sub apply Adkins was Judge or whether exception applicable above he dissent: correct when observed ground on the explain The Lucas majority attempts ability wrongful to sue plaintiffs that the being she was forced into based on the fact that statute, Md. at in violation of a criminal 316 prostitution plaintiff 620, unpersuasive. at 187. This is 561 A.2d 438
alleged she was a victim of quid
pro quo
sexual
harass-
ment, a
Title VII. See Meritor Savings
violation
Bank,
v. Vinson,
FSB
U.S.
106 S.Ct.
(1986).
L.Ed.2d
Thus,
she was allowed to bring wrongful discharge
despite
action
the existence of a civil
remedy under Title VII.
atMd.
fn.
For I the above reasons would affirm on the first issue.
Stephen D. LANGHOFF v. MARR,
MICHAEL E. P.C. *16 113, Sept. Term,
No. 1989. Special
Court of Appeals Maryland.
Jan.